

# A HISTORY OF THE FAR EAST IN MODERN TIMES

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## PREFACE

THE term "Far East" has come to have a definite meaning attached to it. It has come to mean primarily China, Japan, and Korea rather than all of the countries of eastern Asia; and precisely with this restricted geographical use of the phrase in mind this book has been called *A History of the Far East*. The restriction would seem to be justified, however, for more important reasons than because the established usage sanctions it, and these reasons of course help to explain the usage itself. With the exception of Siam, the countries of eastern Asia have fallen under European control. Consequently their history has been largely that of colonies of the several European Powers rather than that of independent or semi-independent peoples. Thus the history of India is of major importance, but from the standpoint of relationship it is more logical to bring its consideration within that of the history of the British Empire than to unite it with that of China and Japan. In modern times these countries have been affected by India indirectly through England's possession of the country more than directly. Similarly the Philippine Islands are important in the Far East, but as appanages of the United States which condition its policy rather than in terms of their own development. In both cases this condition is tending to change, but the change has not yet been realized. Furthermore, with the possible exception of India, none of the Oriental countries, save China and Japan, have separate cultures of great development; and none, up to the present time, have seriously affected the course of international development and of world history. Consequently, since restriction is necessary in a single-volume treatment, it seems entirely justified to restrict by acceptance of the customary terminology.

The modern period is dated from the time of the movements to bring China, and subsequently Japan and Korea, into an enlarged contact with the world. Thus "modern" is defined in terms of the Far East rather than of Europe. Institutional changes commenced after that time, even though there were significant internal movements antedating the application of foreign pressure. The Chinese and Japanese political, economic, and social systems had continued virtually unchanged for more than two hundred years before the establishment of treaty relations with Western nations. A new order has begun to evolve since the negotiation of the first treaties. It is this which distinguishes the modern from the pre-modern period.

In this volume it would have been out of place, even if it had been possible, to enter into a comprehensive and detailed description of

the institutions and cultures of pre-modern China, Japan, and Korea. All that could be attempted was to lay down a foundation sufficiently extensive, (1) to be built upon by making use of the reading lists appended to the first and fourth chapters, and (2) to make possible the tracing of the changes which have taken place in the modern period. Since until the present time these changes have been largely political and economic, there has been relatively more consideration of political and economic development than of social and cultural. As the present tendencies toward social, intellectual, and artistic change become more than tendencies, the historical emphasis will naturally shift from the politico-economic to the cultural realm.

It must be recognized that the most important single conditioning factor in the development of the Far East in modern times has been the impact of the West. In order to withstand the pressure of the Powers, these countries of the Orient had at once to attack the problems of their political and economic reconstruction. The larger cultural background of political and economic life is being more gradually adapted to the New World; and just as the foreign impact has led to an over-emphasis on political development, so the rivalries of the Powers have assumed a larger relative importance in the Orient than has been the case in the Occident. For that reason more space has been given to international relations than would otherwise have appeared justifiable. The history of China and Japan, from the standpoint of movement, has been more largely political and diplomatic than it would have been if these countries had taken their places in the modern world in a more normal and natural manner.

Thus the logic of events has determined the general treatment of the various phases of the subject. The plan of the book has been similarly fixed. The streams of modern Japanese and Chinese history ran in separate channels until the struggle over Korea caused them to converge. After 1895 they continued to diverge somewhat, but never as widely as in the previous years. The attempt has been made to follow these natural lines of development. Sometimes the two streams are brought together, and at other times they are allowed to separate; but most of the time the two main channels have been fed by waters from Europe and America, from Korea, Indo-China, and Siberia.

Responsibility for the planning and execution of the work is the writer's, but he is deeply indebted to the editor of the Borzoi Historical Series for much valuable advice, particularly as to ways and means of bettering the plan. The writer is further indebted to his colleague, Professor George A. Hedger, who read and criticised parts of the manuscript. The entire manuscript was read by Professor K. S. Latourette, through whose criticisms and suggestions not a few errors were avoided and the entire work was strengthened at many points.

HAROLD M. VINACKE



## PREFACE TO THE SECOND REVISED EDITION

THE first revised edition incorporated a number of changes designed to bring the writing down to the date of publication (1933), and to correct certain errors of statement of fact or interpretation which had inadvertently found their way into the original writing. In addition to those changes of detail certain portions of the book were substantially re-written. A new chapter on the nationalist movement in China, XIII, was inserted in place of one in the first edition, entitled "The Modernization of China." Such of the materials in the latter as it seemed advisable to retain were worked into other portions of the book. The original Chapter XX, "The Far Eastern Republic of Siberia," was replaced with a chapter on "Russia in the Far East," which, while retaining much of the original material, was expanded and altered to cover Russian policy from 1922 to 1933. The last two chapters were almost completely re-written. Finally, extensive additions were made to the reading list appended to each chapter.

In this second revision the same general plan has been followed. Certain corrections of detail have been made in the text, and there has been some re-phrasing of materials. The major changes, however, have been in the form of additions. Chapter XXII has been completely re-written, with the exception of the first few pages, and a new chapter has been added, covering the developments of the years from 1933 to 1936. For purposes of interpretation it was felt advisable to include in this new chapter a review of certain changes in the economic and political life of Japan which do not fall within the limits of those years rather than to insert additional materials in earlier chapters.

In preparing this revision, I am indebted to those who, either in reviews or in personal correspondence, called attention to errors in the first edition and in the first revision. In the preparation of the new material I have had the benefit of the criticism of Colonel Herman Beukema, of the United States Military Academy, who read the manuscript of Chapters XXII and XXIII and made valuable suggestions for its improvement; and of Professor George Washburn of the Ohio State University, who read the manuscript of Chapter XXII. It is a pleasure further to acknowledge my indebtedness to Colonel Homer H. Slaughter, General Staff, United States Army, for aid in the verification of railway data incorporated in the new map included in this revision, and to others who gave assistance in its preparation. Responsibility for any errors, either of commission or of omission, in this revision, as in the previous editions, however, is mine.

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University of Cincinnati  
November, 1936

## CONTENTS

## CHAPTER V

## JAPAN IN TRANSITION (1868-1894)

|                                      | PAGE |
|--------------------------------------|------|
| 1. THE RESTORATION OF MEIJI          | 92   |
| 2. THE FEUDAL SYSTEM ENDED           | 94   |
| 3. DIVISION IN THE BUREAUCRACY       | 96   |
| 4. THE CONSTITUTIONAL MOVEMENT       | 101  |
| 5. THE CONSTITUTION OF 1889          | 103  |
| 6. GOVERNMENT UNDER THE CONSTITUTION | 105  |
| 7. FOREIGN RELATIONS                 | 106  |
| 8. SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT   | 108  |

## X CHAPTER VI

## THE CONTEST FOR KOREA

|   |     |
|---|-----|
| 1. PRE-MODERN RELATIONS OF CHINA AND JAPAN WITH KOREA | 114 |
| 2. THE OPENING OF KOREA                               | 115 |
| 3. INTERNAL CONDITIONS IN KOREA                       | 118 |
| 4. THE STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OF KOREA                  | 120 |
| 5. THE CAUSES OF THE CHINO-JAPANESE WAR (1894-1895)   | 125 |
| 6. THE COURSE OF THE WAR                              | 130 |
| 7. THE TREATY OF SHIMONOSEKI                          | 131 |

## CHAPTER VII

## CUTTING THE CHINESE MELON

|   |     |
|---|-----|
| 1. CONSEQUENCES OF WAR OF 1894-5              | 135 |
| 2. RUSSIA MOVES SOUTH                         | 135 |
| 3. THE GERMAN ADVANCE                         | 138 |
| 4. THE "BATTLE OF THE CONCESSIONS"            | 139 |
| 5. SPHERES OF INTEREST                        | 140 |
| 6. ATTITUDE AND INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES | 142 |
| 7. THE POLICY OF THE "OPEN DOOR"              | 144 |
| 8. THE "HUNDRED DAYS" OF REFORM               | 146 |
| 9. THE BOXER MOVEMENT                         | 149 |
| 10. THE CONSEQUENCES OF BOXERISM              | 151 |

## CHAPTER VIII

## X THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR

|  |     |
|--|-----|
| 1. RUSSIA AND JAPAN NATURAL ANTAGONISTS      | 154 |
| 2. THE STATUS OF MANCHURIA IN 1900           | 154 |
| 3. RUSSIA IN MANCHURIA                       | 155 |
| 4. THE JAPANESE INTEREST                     | 156 |
| 5. RUSSIAN POLICY IN AND AFTER 1900          | 158 |
| 6. THE ANGLO-JAPANESE AGREEMENT OF 1902      | 161 |
| 7. THE KOREAN QUESTION                       | 165 |
| 8. FUSION OF KOREAN WITH MANCHURIAN QUESTION | 167 |
| 9. THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR                    | 168 |
| 10. THE TREATY OF PORTSMOUTH                 | 170 |

# CONTENTS

xi

## CHAPTER IX

### FINANCIAL IMPERIALISM IN CHINA

|   | PAGE |
|---|------|
| 1. METHODS OF CONQUEST OF CHINA                                 | 173  |
| 2. EARLY WESTERN INTEREST IN CHINA                              | 174  |
| 3. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FINANCE AND DIPLOMACY                   | 175  |
| 4. SPECIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF CHINA'S FINANCIAL PROBLEM         | 177  |
| 5. FINANCIAL ACTIVITIES OF POWERS (1895-1908)                   | 179  |
| 6. THE KNOX NEUTRALIZATION PROPOSALS                            | 183  |
| 7. INTERNATIONAL COÖPERATION IN FINANCE                         | 185  |
| 8. EFFECTS OF REVOLUTION AND EUROPEAN WAR                       | 187  |
| 9. CHINA'S ATTITUDE TOWARD AND INTEREST IN RAILWAY CONSTRUCTION | 189  |

## CHAPTER X

### REFORM AND REVOLUTION IN CHINA

|   |     |
|---|-----|
| 1. CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH REFORM WAS UNDERTAKEN | 191 |
| 2. THE FIRST PERIOD OF REFORM                   | 193 |
| 3. THE CONSTITUTIONAL MOVEMENT                  | 194 |
| 4. UNDERLYING CAUSES OF REVOLUTION              | 199 |
| 5. INFLUENCE OF THE REVOLUTIONARY GROUPS        | 201 |
| 6. IMMEDIATE CAUSES OF REBELLION                | 203 |
| 7. THE REVOLUTION OF 1911                       | 205 |
| 8. NEGOTIATIONS FOR PEACE                       | 208 |
| 9. THE SETTLEMENT                               | 210 |

## CHAPTER XI

### THE RULE OF YÜAN SHIH-K'AI

|   |     |
|---|-----|
| 1. REVIEW OF CONDITIONS AT INAUGURATION OF REPUBLIC | 212 |
| 2. ORGANIZATION OF THE NEW GOVERNMENT               | 213 |
| 3. THE FINANCIAL PROBLEM                            | 215 |
| 4. CONFLICT BETWEEN PRESIDENT AND ASSEMBLY          | 217 |
| 5. GOVERNMENT UNDER THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMPACT      | 222 |
| 6. THE MONARCHICAL MOVEMENT                         | 225 |
| 7. "CANCELLATION" OF MONARCHY                       | 227 |

## CHAPTER XII

### GROWTH OF MILITARY POWER IN CHINA

|   |     |
|---|-----|
| 1. RECONSTRUCTION OF THE GOVERNMENT AFTER DEATH OF YÜAN SHIH-K'AI | 229 |
| 2. THE NEW ERA  | 230 |
| 3. THE WAR QUESTION   | 232 |
| 4. THE MILITARY GOVERNOR  | 233 |
| 5. THE TUCHUNATE  | 236 |
| 6. ESTABLISHMENT OF MILITARY IN POWER AT PEKING                   | 237 |
| 7. FACTIONAL STRUGGLES IN NORTH                                   | 240 |
| 8. OVERTHROW OF ANFU RÉGIME                                       | 242 |
| 9. RECURRENT CIVIL WAR  | 243 |

## CHAPTER XIII

## THE NATIONALIST REVOLUTION

|   | PAGE |
|---|------|
| 1. THE KUO MIN TANG, 1912-1924                  | 253  |
| 2. THE PARTY PRINCIPLES                         | 256  |
| 3. THE CONTEST FOR POWER AT CANTON, 1924-1926   | 258  |
| 4. THE NORTHERN EXPEDITION                      | 260  |
| 5. HANKOW AND NANKING                           | 262  |
| 6. CHINA UNIFIED BY THE NATIONALISTS            | 264  |
| 7. THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT ESTABLISHED          | 264  |
| 8. DOMESTIC POLITICS, 1929-1933                 | 266  |
| 9. THE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT                       | 268  |
| 10. THE ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT | 269  |

## CHAPTER XIV

## THE PROGRESS OF CHINA: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL

|   |     |
|---|-----|
| 1. POLITICAL STABILITY NOT AN ABSOLUTE PREREQUISITE TO PROGRESS | 273 |
| 2. FOREIGN TRADE  | 273 |
| 3. CHANGES IN AGRICULTURAL LIFE                                 | 278 |
| 4. INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT                                       | 283 |
| 5. EFFECT OF INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT ON GUILD SYSTEM             | 285 |
| 6. LABOR ORGANIZATION AND PROBLEMS                              | 288 |
| 7. EFFECT OF FOREIGN PARTICIPATION IN CHINESE INDUSTRY          | 291 |

## CHAPTER XV

## THE PROGRESS OF CHINA: INTELLECTUAL AND CULTURAL

|  |     |
|--|-----|
| 1. POLITICAL REVOLUTION AND INTELLECTUAL RENAISSANCE | 294 |
| 2. EDUCATIONAL DEVELOPMENT                           | 294 |
| 3. THE PRESS AND THE INTELLECTUAL AWAKENING          | 299 |
| 4. THE LITERARY REVOLUTION                           | 300 |
| 5. INTELLECTUAL FERMENT                              | 302 |
| 6. THE STUDENT MOVEMENT                              | 302 |
| 7. CHANGES IN FAMILY SYSTEM                          | 305 |
| 8. RELIGIOUS SKEPTICISM                              | 308 |
| 9. CHINESE ARTS AND ARCHITECTURE                     | 313 |
| 10. THE THEATRE                                      | 314 |

## CHAPTER XVI

## THE PROGRESS OF JAPAN: INTELLECTUAL, SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL

|                                    |     |
|------------------------------------|-----|
| 1. RELIANCE ON LEADERSHIP          | 317 |
| 2. CHANGES IN LIFE OF PEOPLE       | 318 |
| 3. EDUCATION                       | 319 |
| 4. STATUS OF WOMEN                 | 322 |
| 5. THE FAMILY SYSTEM               | 325 |
| 6. ABOLITION OF CLASS DISTINCTIONS | 326 |
| 7. NEW CLASS ALIGNMENTS            | 326 |
| 8. LITERATURE AND THE PRESS        | 330 |
| 9. JAPANESE ARTS AND CRAFTS        | 334 |
| 10. RELIGIONS                      | 337 |

# CONTENTS

xiii

## CHAPTER XVII. THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC PROGRESS OF JAPAN— 1895-1926

|   | PAGE |
|---|------|
| 1. THE DEVELOPMENT OF PARTIES                 | 342  |
| 2. THE PARTIES AND THE GOVERNMENT 1901-1912   | 346  |
| 3. RESUMPTION OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT        | 347  |
| 4. EFFECT OF THE WAR ON POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT | 349  |
| 5. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT                       | 351  |
| 6. EFFECTS OF INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT          | 354  |
| 7. LABOR PROBLEMS                             | 357  |
| 8. THE POPULATION PROBLEM                     | 357  |
| 9. AGRICULTURAL LIFE                          | 359  |

## CHAPTER XVIII THE ASSERTION OF JAPANESE HEGEMONY IN THE FAR EAST

|   |     |
|---|-----|
| 1. JAPANESE DEPENDENCIES: FORMOSA AND KOREA | 366 |
| 2. JAPAN IN MANCHURIA                       | 369 |
| 3. THE IMMIGRATION QUESTION                 | 375 |
| 4. JAPAN ENTERS THE WORLD WAR               | 377 |
| 5. THE TWENTY-ONE DEMANDS                   | 380 |
| 6. THE 1915 TREATIES                        | 383 |
| 7. THE 1917 SECRET TREATIES                 | 386 |
| 8. THE LANSING-ISHII AGREEMENT              | 387 |
|   | 391 |

## CHAPTER XIX CHINA AND THE WORLD WAR

|  |     |
|--|-----|
| 1. THE CONSEQUENCES OF NEUTRALITY                      | 389 |
| 2. THE MOVEMENT TO END NEUTRALITY                      | 390 |
| 3. IMMEDIATE CONSEQUENCES OF PARTICIPATION IN THE WAR. | 393 |
| 4. POLITICAL EFFECTS OF CHINA'S ENTRANCE INTO THE WAR. | 395 |
| 5. THE LEGAL SITUATION AT TIME OF PARIS CONFERENCE     | 397 |
| 6. THE PARIS CONFERENCE AND THE FAR EAST               | 399 |
| 7. FAR EASTERN PROVISIONS OF TREATY OF VERSAILLES      | 401 |
| 8. REVIVAL OF THE CONSORTIUM                           | 402 |
| 9. CONSEQUENCES OF CHINA'S REFUSAL TO ACCEPT TREATY    | 402 |

## CHAPTER XX RUSSIA IN THE FAR EAST

|   |     |
|---|-----|
| 1. AREA AND RESOURCES OF SIBERIA            | 405 |
| 2. ACQUISITION OF SIBERIA                   | 405 |
| 3. SETTLEMENT OF TERRITORY                  | 408 |
| 4. EFFECTS OF RUSSIAN REVOLUTION ON SIBERIA | 410 |
| 5. FOREIGN INTERVENTION PROPOSED            | 411 |
| 6. INTERNAL STRUGGLES                       | 414 |
| 7. SOVIET RUSSIA AND JAPAN                  | 417 |
| 8. SOVIET RUSSIA AND CHINA                  | 419 |

## CHAPTER XXI

## THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE AND AFTER

|   | PAGE |
|---|------|
| 1. THE BACKGROUND OF THE CONFERENCE                 | 426  |
| 2. ARMS AGREEMENTS AND THEIR EFFECT ON THE FAR EAST | 433  |
| 3. THE NINE POWERS TREATY CONCERNING CHINA          | 434  |
| 4. SETTLEMENT OF SHANTUNG QUESTION                  | 440  |
| 5. TREATY REVISION                                  | 441  |
| 6. THE MANCHURIAN QUESTION REOPENED                 | 450  |

## CHAPTER XXII

## THE EAST AND THE WEST

|   |     |
|---|-----|
| 1. INTEREST OF WEST IN THE FAR EAST                         | 466 |
| 2. COMPARISON OF JAPANESE WITH CHINESE DEVELOPMENT          | 467 |
| 3. NATIONALISM IN CHINA AND JAPAN                           | 473 |
| 4. FAILURE OF THE WESTERN INTERVENTION IN 1931              | 476 |
| 5. REVERSAL OF POWER-RELATIONSHIPS OF THE WEST AND THE EAST | 479 |
| 6. CHANGE IN ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIPS                         | 483 |

## CHAPTER XXIII

## THE NEW FAR EAST

|  |     |
|--|-----|
| 1. JAPAN: INTERNAL CONDITIONS IN 1933                | 488 |
| 2. THE ARMY RESUMES THE LEADERSHIP                   | 493 |
| 3. INTERNAL EFFECTS OF ARMY RULE, 1933-1936          | 498 |
| 4. JAPAN IN MANCHUKUO, 1933-1936                     | 502 |
| 5. NON-JAPANESE FOREIGN RIGHTS IN MANCHUKUO          | 503 |
| 6. JAPAN AND RUSSIA                                  | 507 |
| 7. THE MONGOLIAN QUESTION                            | 511 |
| 8. JAPAN AND CHINA                                   | 515 |
| 9. THE STRUGGLE AGAINST COMMUNISM IN CHINA           | 521 |
| 10. INTERNAL DEVELOPMENT IN CHINA, 1933-1936         | 525 |
| 11. NANKING AND CANTON, 1933-1936                    | 528 |
| 12. FUTURE JAPANESE EXPANSION AND THE WESTERN STATES | 530 |
| 13. THE FUTURE OF THE PHILIPPINES                    | 534 |
| INDEX  | 541 |
| CONVERSION TABLES                                    | 557 |
| CHINESE PLACE NAMES                                  | 557 |

## CHAPTER I

### CHINA UNDER THE MANCHUS

#### I. THE COUNTRY AND ITS RESOURCES

THE modern history of the Far Eastern countries begins with the drawing of those states from their long-continued seclusion into contact with the Occidental world. This history has been shaped in large part by outside forces, the operation of which in each case has resulted in a modification of ancient cultures and long-established and firmly-rooted institutions. If these changes and the historical developments attending them are to be understood, the general condition of society at the beginning of the modern period must be appreciated. Consequently the attempt must be made to describe pre-modern China in its many-sided life as a necessary preliminary to the tracing of the pattern of its history since 1842.

*Modern period  
begins with  
foreign  
intercourse*

At the time of the opening of the East to intercourse with the West the Chinese Empire consisted of: (1) China proper, comprising the eighteen provinces; (2) Manchuria, now divided into three provinces; (3) such dependencies as Tibet, Mongolia, and Sinkiang, with which close supervisory relations were maintained; and (4) nominally vassal states such as Korea and Annam. Excluding the vassal states, but including the dependencies, China had a total area of 4,277,170 square miles of compact territory—an area exceeding that of the United States, including Alaska, Hawaii and Porto Rico, by 705,947 square miles. We may place the region geographically, and to some extent climatically, by observing that it extends, from north to south, from the extremes presented by Vancouver, B. C., on the north and Mexico City on the south. Thus it falls largely in the north temperate zone, with variations ranging from the tropical to the extremely cold regions.

*Territorial  
extent of  
Empire*

This made possible a well diversified agricultural life, with the staple crops including rice, cotton, sugar, tea, wheat, barley, millet, and other cereals. Because of this varied productivity the Chinese were able not only to provide themselves with food, but also to develop an industrial activity sufficient to supply their limited needs for clothing, implements, and ornaments. It made possible the development of as extensive a trade as the limited means of communication permitted.

*Diversified  
agriculture*

Add to this the richness in the sub-soil or mineral wealth, and at once the explanation of the self-sufficiency of China begins to appear. Coal and iron, copper, tin, lead, antimony, and silver—all are found in the country and in pre-modern times they were sufficiently

*Mineral  
wealth*

worked to supply the primitive needs of the people. Economically, then, the Empire was sufficient unto itself, and hence was regarded with some envy by early European travelers and traders. At no time have the Chinese looked abroad to supply their needs, whereas other peoples have always, if intermittently, been interested in establishing trade contacts with China. This interest has unquestionably led to an over-estimate of the natural resources of the country, but with all due allowance for exaggeration it represents an appreciation of a reality—that of a basically richly-endowed country.

The diversity in agricultural production not only represents a wide variation in climate, but indicates as great a range of physical features as that presented by the United States. Over against the desert and pasture lands of northwestern China and Mongolia may be set the fertile loess plains of the north, watered and often inundated by the Yellow River—"China's Sorrow." South of the Yellow River lies the broad central area drained by the Yangtse River, the greatest waterway of China and one of the greatest in the world. Still farther south lies the basin of the West River and its confluent. These three river basins represent as many natural geographical regions, each one distinct, with its own contributions to make to the life of the Chinese people, and yet each presenting many features of similarity to the others. The most important of these similarities is the great fertility of the soil from north to south.

The monotony of the plains is relieved by mountain ranges, which rise ever higher to the west and the southwest until they reach the Himalayan system. There are four main chains of mountains—the Tien Shan, the Kwanlun, the Hingan, and the Himalayan—which serve, as do the river systems, to distinguish different geographical areas. They further serve the life of the country by furnishing much of its mineral wealth. But where the rivers facilitate communication and intercourse, the mountain ranges obstruct them, making Szechuan province virtually an empire within China, cutting it off from constant and effective contact with the rest of the country, and retarding relations with, and control of, the other southwestern provinces. On the other hand, the western chain of mountains has served as a barrier between China and the regions to the west. ✓

*condition of China*

## 2. THE PEOPLE

In 1842 not only was China one of the largest political-geographic areas in the world, but it was also one of the greatest population units. Only estimates of population are available, due to faulty methods of census-taking, but that for 1812—362,467,182—may be accepted as fairly accurate.<sup>1</sup> Because of the pressure of population the people on the whole were poor, and the standard of living, judged by modern Western standards, was low—although for the masses it was not materially lower than the standard in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Europe.

<sup>1</sup> WILLIAMS, S. W., *Middle Kingdom*, vol. I, p. 263.



The people now known collectively as the Chinese undoubtedly consist of a blending of the various stocks which came into the country from Central Asia originally and from the northwest subsequently. The first migrants seem to have settled in the Yellow River valley, pushing the aboriginal inhabitants farther south. They and, in turn, their successors were driven southwards by succeeding waves of migration. After these movements of peoples stopped, the blending process began, or proceeded further toward completion. At the present time remnants of the original inhabitants, such as the Miao people, may be found in southwestern China; others, driven south-east, found their way into Indo-China, Siam, and Malaysia. Physical differences between the southern and northern Chinese are still clearly perceptible, preserved partly because of climatic differences and partly because of imperfect assimilation of stocks, due to the pushing of one group out by another rather than to the overlaying of one by another. At the time of the Manchu conquest the cultural assimilation had proceeded further than the physical.

*Chinese an  
amalgam of  
racial stocks*

### 3. PRE-MODERN SOCIETY

Both theoretically and actually the people were divided into five divisions or occupational groups. Highest in the social scale were the scholars or *litterati*, from whom the officials were selected. Next came the farmers, numerically by far the largest group and the most important for the maintenance of life in a self-sufficient state. The artisans ranked third, with the merchants and traders fourth, while at the bottom of the social scale were the servants and the soldiers. There is a Chinese proverb to the effect that "good iron is not used for nails, nor are soldiers made of good men."

*Social divisions*

Partly because the road to official position and preferment lay through learning, but also because of the general esteem in which learning was held, the scholars constituted the highest class in Chinese society. All of the sages urged respect for the learned, whose success reflected glory upon the entire community. Furthermore, the road of the scholar was rough and toilsome. The difficulties encountered caused a high mortality among those seeking degrees, and this of course enhanced the prestige of the successful.

1. *Litterati*

The emphasis on learning did not, however, lead to the establishment of "schools" as we understand this term in the West, nor did it result in a progressive broadening of knowledge. In fact, education came to constitute one of the greatest barriers to enlightenment in the Empire. This was due in large part to the exclusive emphasis laid upon reproducing the ideas and sayings of the Ancients, but also to the educational objective, which was preparation for the examinations. These were set entirely on the basis of the Classics, and candidates knew that their time would be wasted if they devoted it to study outside of the literature on which the examinations were based.

*Educational  
system a bar  
to progress*

The educational system produced stability through its emphasis on the past, and consequently it amply served the ends of a stable society conscious of having perfected its culture. It had the merit, as far as the examination system was honestly applied, of attracting men of ability to the public service, in so far as a purely reproductive training developed, and the examinations revealed, a talent fitted for the performance of public duties. It produced persevering scholars of a high refinement according to the standards of the time. But in spite of its good features, and notwithstanding its utility in preserving and perpetuating the best elements of a developed social life, the fact must be emphasized that it did not adequately serve a society which had to adapt itself to new ideas and practices.

The prestige attached to membership in the class of scholars caused many to aspire to it—or caused their families to aspire for them. Often one member of a family would be devoted to learning, as in other countries one child might be consecrated to the church. Such a fortunate individual would be supported by the family, or sometimes by the village, if he were a promising student and his family could not afford to give him an education. At the age of seven or eight he would attend the village school, an institution maintained by those who had children to be educated; and while his brothers worked or played, he would pore over his books from early to late. His task was to learn by rote the various books set before him, beginning usually with the "Trimetrical Classic," followed by such an elementary book as the "Thousand Character Classic." From these he proceeded to the "Four Books"—the Confucian Analects, the Great Learning, the Doctrine of the Mean, and the works of Mencius. These were followed by the Poetical Classic, the Book of History, the Book of Changes, and the Spring and Autumn Annals. All of these the pupil was expected gradually to memorize, with imperfect understanding and with little or no explanation of their meaning. Further learning consisted of a mastery of the innumerable commentaries on the Classics. At the same time the embryo scholar began to learn to form characters as a necessary antecedent to his entrance upon the next stage of his education. This consisted of mastering the art of essay-writing, preliminary to undergoing examination for the lowest degree.

Once in three or twice in five years an examiner came to the province from Peking. Prior to his arrival qualifying examinations were held in the several districts of the province for the purpose of selecting the candidates to appear for the provincial examinations. Five hundred or more would be found competing in the district examination. On the first day three themes would be announced for treatment, two in the form of a classical essay and one in the poetical form. Starting at daylight, few candidates finished before three or four o'clock in the afternoon; some might not finish until midnight; and the slowest, if permitted, might write until the next morning.

After an interval of one or two days for considering the results, the examination would be continued, with perhaps half of the original number of contestants. All together there were four separate sittings in this district examination, with some of the candidates eliminated after each sitting.

The next competition, limited to candidates successful in the district examinations, took place in the prefectural city. The contestants came from all of the districts in the prefecture and numbered into the thousands. The examination procedure was similar to that followed in the district city, although the standards of achievement were higher and the essay subjects were more difficult. Success in the prefectural examination was rewarded by the granting of a degree—the *Hsiieh T'sai* or Bachelor's Degree. Prefectural examinations

The holders of this degree were entitled to compete in the provincial examinations for the next higher award—the degree of *Chü-jén*. Those who achieved it might receive an appointment to office or compete in the metropolitan examinations for the third degree, the *Chin Shih*. The highest degree of all (the *Hanlin*) was rather an office, as it admitted to the Imperial Academy and to a salary. Provincial and metropolitan examinations

This education might entitle the student to an official appointment, provided he was successful in the examinations, but it failed to prepare him to grapple satisfactorily with the complex problems of modern life. Failing in the examinations, or finding himself among the large number of those qualified for official position in excess of the offices to be filled, the scholar could support himself in only two ways—by teaching or by doing clerical work. In spite of the respect for learning, the emoluments of the teacher were small. Furthermore, for each school there were always several applicants, whom the patrons could play against one another with a view to lowering the teaching cost. Means of support of successful scholar

Thus the life of even the successful scholar was not free from anxiety unless he gained admission to officialdom. And in order to secure office, in spite of the theory, it was usually necessary to have either influence or wealth, for those controlling the appointments expected a reward for favors extended. Consequently there were large numbers among the *literati* who had a very precarious economic existence in spite of the prestige which they enjoyed. In a material way, the scholar might derive only a meager livelihood from teaching. Among his privileges, however, was a standing at the magistrate's *yamen* not enjoyed by the common man, and in case he was an offender against the law he might not be beaten with the bamboo. Precariousness of existence of literatus

Among people who emphasized learning as did the Chinese, it seems strange, on first thought, that scientific knowledge failed to develop, or that large professional classes should not have existed; but such indeed was the case. Medical practice was largely quackery, because knowledge was not gained from experiment; the legal profession, as such, had no existence; engineering and mechanical knowl- Scientific knowledge undeveloped

edge had been left in an undeveloped condition after a promising start. The *feng shui*, for example, had more to do with the location and construction of buildings than did an analysis of the problems confronted. This state of arrested development in all branches of learning, it must be reiterated, was due fundamentally to an educational system established on the basis of an acceptance of the teachings of the past as embodying the wisdom of all times, and one motivated by a desire to prepare for examinations set for the purpose of selecting officials whose primary qualifications were considered to be the ability to write essays well and to reproduce the maxims of the philosophers. It was also due to the lack of contact with other societies which had undergone as great an advancement as China. Out of such contact and the resultant comparisons of ideas and practices would have come a stimulus to development which was lacking. This was, perhaps, as fundamental a reason for the arrested development as the educational emphasis. Certainly both need to be considered in seeking an explanation of it.

About eighty per cent of the people of China were engaged in agriculture. They did not live on farms, as the agricultural population of the United States does, but in villages, which sometimes consisted of only a few houses, sometimes of several hundred. With so large a population engaged in tilling the soil it was inevitable that in some parts of the country one village would seem to begin almost where another left off. To an American the peculiarity of the Chinese landscape lay in the fact that no houses were to be seen outside the villages.

Since so large a part of the population lived in villages, it will be well to consider briefly the make-up and life of the village community. Because the villages were usually named after one or two families, the limited number of surnames meant a multiplication of *Chang*, *Wang*, *Li*, and other *chuang* or villages. But sometimes the name came from a temple, if the village contained one at a comparatively early time, or from the distance to the seat of the district magistrate. Often a nickname was given the village, which came to be known by it, both unofficially and officially, rather than by the original name.<sup>2</sup>

The life of the village was centered in the temple, whether ancestral or Buddhistic, although there was no influential priestly class to guide and admonish the people. The temple grounds, or the area adjacent to them, usually provided the place for the weekly or bi-weekly market to which the people brought their surplus produce to exchange for the goods of the itinerant traders who moved from one market to another. They also provided space for the theatrical entertainments which were the primary source of amusement for the people. And they furnished neutral territory on which the "peace-talkers" could meet to compose the innumerable disputes which arose

<sup>2</sup> See SMITH, A. H., *Village Life in China*, ch. 3, for a discussion of village nomenclature.

between the inhabitants, either as individuals or as members of families.

Socially China was organized on the basis of the family rather than the individual. To this rule the village was naturally no exception. The Chinese family, furthermore, consisted of much more than husband, wife, and children. The young man brought his wife to the home of his parents, whose parents might also be living. Thus within the same establishment might be found a great-grandfather, grandfathers, fathers and their sons, all under the control of the oldest male, or, in case the great-grandmother or grandmother outlived her husband, under her authority. A man thirty, forty, or even fifty years old was not the master of his household merely by reason of his age.

*The family the basis of social organization*

Where this patriarchal conception of the family existed it might be expected that particular emphasis would be laid on its perpetuation and on relationships within the family. Since this was so, the individual was not free to marry or remain single as he chose, but his marriage was arranged for him at an early age to insure a continuation of the group; and one of his primary duties was to have sons to carry on the family name. Since the family could be perpetuated only through male children, girls were at a discount and boys at a premium. The birth of a son was an occasion of great rejoicing, while the coming of a daughter passed virtually unnoticed where it was not actually lamented. This difference was further emphasized by the fact that girls on marriage severed their connection with their own families and merged their fortunes with that of the husband. Thus not only could they not perpetuate the family, but their labor and service were early lost to it. The only advantage to be gained by affording them educational or other opportunities lay in the possibility of increasing the chances of making a favorable alliance and thus strengthening the family.

*Emphasis on marriage and on male progeny*

One may see the prevalence of this view of the family in the grounds recognized for divorce. A man might be freed from his wife for any one of the following reasons: barrenness, lasciviousness, disregard of her husband's parents, talkativeness, thievish propensities, envious and suspicious temper, and inveterate infirmity. This, however, was possible only if the wife had parents to whom she might be returned, and in case she had not yet mourned for her husband's parents during the customary period. On the other hand, the only recourse of the wife, except in very extreme cases, lay in the pressure which the family from which she came might exert to protect her interests.

*Recognized causes of divorce*

The development of ancestor-worship gave added importance to bearing sons and providing for their marriage. A father who had no heir would have no offerings laid before his tablet after his death, and for the same reason he would fail in his duty to his father and his father's father. Thus religious practice grew out of the emphasis on the family and, in turn, added to the emphasis.

*Ancestor-worship*

Concubinage also grew out of, and was justified by, the obligation to continue the family line. In case of barrenness or failure of the wife to give birth to a son, the husband, if well-to-do, might take one or more "secondary wives" or concubines. They had a status inferior to that of the wife, both legally and in authority within the home. Their children were considered as the children of the wife, from the standpoint of obedience and also from that of mourning in case of death.

Within the family great importance naturally was attached to filial obedience, but the relations of husband and wife, of brother to brother, and of brother and sister, were all regulated under the direction of, and subject to the authority of, the head of the house. This should have led to harmony and household quiet, but perhaps because of the monotony of life, and in part because of the lack of privacy due to the number of persons living within the family compound, dissension was frequently rife. If the quarrel became noticeable it might easily attract the neighbors, on the theory that what was anybody's business became everybody's business; for the family life itself was not lived in the privacy which is accepted as natural in the West.

Inter-family relations within the village were adjusted, as the common affairs were carried on, through the medium of a Council of Elders under the direction of a village headman. This council was never formally selected at one time, but might consist of the heads of households, or of a few persons generally recognized as capable of carrying on village business. The practice differed from one section of the country to another. Often difficulties were adjusted through the efforts of those who may be described as "peace-talkers"—individuals who were drawn in or who took it upon themselves to find a basis of agreement between the parties to a particular controversy. Usually they were rewarded for their services by a feast.

The land outside the village was held in individual ownership by the villagers. As a result of continued subdivision among the sons after the death of the father or on his retirement, holdings were small and often scattered. Consequently many mouths had to be filled from the production of what, to an American farmer, would seem a totally inadequate allotment of land. Hence the Chinese farmer was led to extremely skilful intensive farming, and even with primitive implements he was able to get a large return from the soil. This, however, demanded unceasing toil on the part of all and the practice of numberless small economies in farming. Since the soil had been worked by so many preceding generations it had continually to be restored. All waste and refuse was carefully collected and prepared for use as fertilizing material. Modern science in the West is just beginning to give the farmer knowledge of soil treatment which the Chinese had gained from the experience of their ancestors.

But with all of his skill the Chinese farmer gained only a bare

subsistence from his small holding of land. Most of the farmers lived from year to year, able to make ends meet, to buy seed and replace implements, to provide for weddings and funerals, and to help support the village theatricals and take part in an occasional feast, but unable to lay by sufficient reserves to banish the specter of want. If crops failed because of drought or flood, or if the returns were under the normal, there was no way of meeting the emergency. Famine conditions would ensue, with all of their attendant horrors—subsistence on roots and herbs; the break-up of families, the daughters being sold into slavery; and for many, actual starvation.

*Marginal  
existence of  
farmer*

Even in normally good years there would be some who could not make ends meet and who might have to be cared for by the more fortunate members of the family, if such there were. Sometimes they were able to tide themselves over by gleaning from the fields after their neighbors had harvested, and if opportunity afforded they might pilfer before the harvest. This possibility led each farmer to watch his crops day and night during the growing season and until they had been stored after the harvest. Often the entire village united to hire watchers, or the inhabitants took turns in standing guard. The apprehended thief was liable to harsh treatment at the hands of the villagers.

*Petty thievery  
common*

Thus, in spite of the natural fertility of the soil and the skill of the farmer, and in spite of the natural resources of China, the Chinese farming population lived a precarious life. To a great extent the intense struggle for existence resulted from the size of the population, together with the constant tendency toward increase because of the premium on birth. It was a struggle for the necessities of life and not for its luxuries. Mud-walled and thatched-roofed houses, unheated and unadorned; cotton clothing, padded for winter; a subsistence allowance of food; and a round of unceasing labor—were what the majority of the people had to look forward to and what they looked back upon.

*Life of farmer  
a struggle for  
existence*

And yet the life of the people was not hopeless, nor was it altogether devoid of interest. Occasional theatrical entertainments relieved the monotony of toil. Every pretext for a feast was seized upon—eating being one of the chief sources of enjoyment. And gambling opportunities were eagerly sought, even though loss meant actual suffering.

*Rural  
entertainment*

The artisan class ranked next to the farmers. Since industry was in the handicrafts stage, there was no industrial class divided sharply into two groups—the employers, or capitalists, and the workers—as there is in most Western countries today. All work was done in a small establishment which served as the home as well as the shop. Often the shop opened on the street, so that the passer-by could see the men at work. The establishment consisted of the master, journeymen, and apprentices. A long term of apprenticeship, usually seven years, had to be served before the aspirant was admitted to the craft

*3. The artisans:  
Handicrafts  
stage of  
industrial  
development*

as a workman or as a master. As the number of apprentices to each journeyman in the shop was limited by the craft rules, there was little danger of an excessive supply of workmen or of an over-expansion of the industry. After serving his apprenticeship the individual might remain in the shop, receiving pay for his work instead of the maintenance given him as an apprentice; he might find employment in some other shop; or he might go into business for himself. Usually, however, he continued to work, at least for a time, in the same shop.

The larger undertakings were often operated on the basis of a partnership of two or more men, but the corporate or joint-stock form of organization was unknown. The partners were jointly and severally responsible for the obligations of the firm and for the fulfilment of its engagements. And this was reinforced by the prevailing system of family responsibility for its members. It has become almost proverbial that the word of a Chinese is as good as his bond, which indicates that individual business standards were comparatively high. It must be recognized, however, that the social organization, with its system of family responsibility, and the close economic organization, helped to establish and perpetuate these high standards.

The entire craft was organized into a guild, to which all but apprentices might belong and which all were expected to support. The guild organization consisted of a president, an executive committee elected at the annual meeting, and a secretary, who was invariably one of the *literati* and a degree-holder, and the real administrator of the guild affairs.

The guild controlled prices, fixed quality, and determined wages within the craft to the extent that the minimum price and minimum wages were decided upon in its annual meetings and minimum standards were established. The minimum might be, but seldom was, raised at the discretion of the master. This control had the effect of preventing unfair competition and thus helped to stabilize the industry, just as did the limitation of the number of apprentices who might be received.

Fully as important a work was that of adjusting disputes between guild members, between masters and workmen, and between the guild and other industries. Rarely was there appeal from the decisions of the guild arbitration committee to the magistrate, for he almost invariably found it expedient to accept the committee's award. The only other recourse was to withdraw from the organization rather than accept its penalties, but this extreme step was seldom or never taken because it put the individual at the mercy of his competitors. They were free to entice his workmen away from him; they could throw innumerable petty obstacles in his way; and the whole craft and others from whom he obtained his supplies might use their collective power to drive him out of business.

The settlement of trade disputes and inter-craft difficulties through



guild intervention was no more important an activity than that of serving as the connecting link between the magistrate and the crafts. While the industry ruled itself, as has been suggested, its members sometimes came into the magistrate's *yamen* over actions affecting the public peace which he could not overlook or leave for decision by the guild. In that case the organization stood behind the individual, aiding him in his defense. The guild secretary, as a degree-holder, had access to the magistrate on terms enabling him to prevent too arbitrary action. He could also inform the magistrate as to local feeling in the matter and thus prevent him from taking action likely to cause trouble. Thus the individual as a guild member had in his dealing with officials a support which it would have been difficult to replace from any other source. This economic group solidarity was just as marked a feature of the life of China as was the social solidarity represented by the family.

*The guild and the magistrate*

The magistrate, in turn, found it expedient to consult with the guild before imposing any new taxes or increasing customary levies, or before taking any other action affecting the craft. If he did not reach agreement with its officers in advance he was merely courting trouble in case his action aroused opposition. He might find trade stopped and production brought to an end. On occasion a mob could easily be raised which would storm the *yamen*, loot his premises even threaten his life. Consequently the successful magistrate, on good terms with the guild officers, aiding them, when necessary, in the enforcement of guild rules and penalties, and working with and through them in the performance of the duties of his office.

*The magistrate and the guild*

Many of the guilds had their own halls for meetings and for social purposes, and some of the wealthier and more important ones maintained large establishments. Here feasts and theatrical entertainments for the members were held. A poorer organization might rent the hall of another guild for its meetings and entertainments; for it must be emphasized that the guild served as a social as well as an economic organization. Its benevolent activities were also important, although perhaps not so much emphasized in the case of the craft guilds as in that of the provincial or trade guilds.

*Social activities of the guild*

The traders and merchants were organized in much the same way as the artisans. The dealer in local products, of course, was also an artisan, and sold over the counter in the front of his establishment the goods produced in the rear. But where traders took the specialized production of the locality to other parts of the Empire they felt the need for membership in some sort of organization. This took the form of the provincial club, or guild, composed of men from different economic groups but from the same geographical area. Thus the Fukien or Shantung men in Tientsin, Peking, or Shanghai, whether they were officials or traders, would be found organized in their club. The advantage of this organization can be appreciated when one calls to mind the wide variation in dialect, amounting in some cases to a

*Provincial guild*

difference in the spoken language, and the important differences in custom and manner of living from district to district and from province to province. For in the north the Cantone~~se~~ was really a foreigner, unable to make himself readily understood and without understanding the customs of the region. More important to him, he was likely to find himself receiving the treatment accorded to foreigners in a strange land. Under these circumstances it was not strange that he should come into association with others in similar circumstances and through union erect a buffer between himself and the community. This organization also stood him in good stead in his dealings with the officials, who might have treated him with scant courtesy as an individual, but who did not dare to deal in summary fashion with an organization.

Thus we find the entire economic life of the country organized and largely self-controlled—the farmers in the village, the artisans, merchants, and traders in the guild. The range of the guild organization is indicated by enumeration of a few of them: the spinners' and weavers' guilds in various parts of the Empire; the bankers' guild, also a provincial organization, since the bankers came from Shansi province; the silk guild; the piece-goods guild; the goldbeaters' guild; the wheelbarrow guild; the organizations maintained by the beggars and the thieves; and the provincial clubs found in every sizable city.

By implication, since there were traders, there must have been ~~trade~~ <sup>tr.</sup> This, in turn, implies means of communication. Internal trade ~~in~~ <sup>pre-modern</sup> China, however, existed in spite of poor means of communication rather than because of highly-developed and well-maintained arteries of commerce. Goods could be transported from one coastal place to another, but only with risk, since the Chinese junk was not well fitted to withstand violent storms or long voyages. Some of the rivers afforded admirable arteries for the shipping of goods from far inland to the sea. Thus the Yangtse River, navigable for over sixteen hundred miles from its mouth, together with its tributaries, made trade possible throughout the great central basin. The West River served the south in the same way, and the Pei-ho and Yellow Rivers facilitated east and west communication in the north so far as they were navigable. The system of waterways was further artificially expanded by means of canals, the greatest of these being the Grand Canal, running from Tientsin in the north to the Yangtse at Chinkiang, thus affording a north-and-south waterway. In central and southern China, particularly in the eastern provinces, there were many smaller canals which helped in the moving of goods from one region to another. Unfortunately many of these, including some sections of the Grand Canal, had been so neglected during the last part of the Manchu period that they were little used.

Beyond the places served by waterways, communication and transportation were more difficult. Of good roads there were none, for such as had been constructed for Imperial military and courier

purposes had been allowed to fall into disrepair. The camel was used as a medium of transportation in the north, together with the donkey-cart, but the load had to be carried or pulled along paths which had become mere ruts, often sunk many feet below the level of the surrounding country, and during part of the year absolutely impassable. In the central and southern provinces even the pretense of roads had disappeared. Their place was taken by narrow foot-paths between the rice paddies or fields. On the northern plain and in central China the wheelbarrow was in common use for the transportation of goods and sometimes for the conveyance of people. The wheel was placed in the center and goods were loaded high on either side. It was sometimes propelled by pullers as well as pushers, and in this way a considerable load could be carried. For short distances, in the south, goods were moved by human carriers, the load being suspended on either end of a pole balanced on the shoulder.

Given such primitive means of conveyance, it is remarkable that there should have been as much internal trade as was carried on. And it is not surprising that the movement of peoples was reduced to a minimum—the principal exception being officials who were forced to move from province to province. This difficulty of travel was fully as effective as the family tie in keeping people at home and consequently in preserving a spirit of provincialism and localism.

For while we have been speaking of China and the Chinese we must not forget that there was almost as much variety within the Empire as there was in nineteenth-century Europe. The differences in spoken language and the lack of uniformity of custom and tradition have already been mentioned. This diversity extended to food, beyond certain large staples, and particularly to the preparation of food, and to the minutiae of every-day life. The people, prior to the coming of the Europeans to China, thought of themselves in terms of the locality and, at the maximum, of the province. Thus an individual would first of all place himself, in terms of his village, as a man from the village of the Wang family (*Wang chuang-jén*). His problems were local in character, to be settled to the local advantage, even though the consequences of his decisions were felt elsewhere. While it was possible for him to coöperate readily with his fellow-villagers or townsmen, it was almost impossible to bring him into coöperation with outside groups. Flood-prevention measures along the Yellow River, for example, would be taken coöperatively in the region locally affected, often with disastrous consequences to other villages. But inter-village coöperation in the solution of such a common problem was rare. Each village took care of its own interests, and expected others to do likewise.

#### 4. CULTURAL LIFE

The common bonds of union which make it permissible to think of China as an entity lay in the larger cultural life and in the political

2. Roads

Effect of poor  
communications

Variation  
within the  
Empire

organization. To offset the variety of the spoken was the unity of the written language. A Cantonese might not be able to talk to a northerner, but he could communicate with him in writing. The written language, non-alphabetical, consisting of many distinct characters each representing a particular thing or concept, had been used to develop and preserve a common literature and a broad community of ideas, ideals, and culture. The Confucian code, with its emphasis on the family relationship, and the doctrines of other great philosophers were uniformly taught and accepted throughout the Empire. Buddhism was not a local cult but was diffused throughout the state, not as a foreign religion, but as one which was essentially Chinese as a result of long modification of an originally foreign system. The southerner could feel at home in the Taoist temple north of the Yangtse. And all of the common people were united in their superstitious belief in good and evil spirits. That certain days were propitious for beginning journeys, marrying and burying; that demons might be exorcised; that evil spirits always moved straight ahead; that the spirits of the air had an effect on the destinies of men—these were national and not local beliefs, although there were emphases and variations due to peculiar local conditions. Deities might be given local names, but their characteristics were the same and the methods employed to hoodwink them were similar throughout the Empire.

It is this superstition, rather than any real religious bent, which has corrupted Buddhism from the originally subtle doctrines received from India into a system of propitiatory acts undertaken occasionally under stress of adverse circumstances. It is this which has overlaid the teachings of the Old Philosopher (Lao Tzu) with all sorts of debased ceremonies and rites, so that the original doctrines relating to the *Tao* or Way, leading to the living of correct and virtuous lives, have been lost to sight and certainly to practice.

Even Confucianism has been altered. Although Confucius refrained from pronouncements as to God and an after-life, and attempted to focus attention on right living, he himself has not escaped from deification and his philosophical system has been changed into a religious one. Yet Confucianism has been corrupted less than Buddhism or Taoism, for the elements of worship in it have been accepted much more perfunctorily than have the teachings with respect to living in this world. His exhortations to obedience, to filial piety and right conduct toward one's neighbors, were thoroughly inculcated into the thinking and living of the people. The unfortunate consequences of Confucianism came from the over-emphasis on the past. The Great Teacher did not profess to create a system, but only to restate and systematize the moral experience of the past. He thus emphasized adherence to former practice rather than experiment and innovation. To get back to the ideal life rather than to go forward to it, was his exhortation. The long acceptance of the Confucian view inevitably led to the development of a static society, which it was

possible to maintain because of the absence of contact with the non-Chinese world after the Manchu conquest in 1644.

### 5. THE POLITICAL SYSTEM

In addition to this cultural unity there was a political unity in the China opened to limited foreign intercourse in 1842. The Empire was, it is true, divided into provinces, each of which constituted a political as well as an administrative subdivision of the state. And although the provincial officials were all appointed by the Emperor, they were allowed so much discretion in carrying out the Imperial commands that they were in reality semi-independent rulers. This was necessary because of the poor means of communication and the variety of local problems and customs. Nevertheless, the allegiance of the officials was to Peking; they were moved freely from post to post throughout the Empire; there was a common obligation to preserve peace and good order in the provinces, and to transmit funds for the support of the central government; and appeals from the decisions of provincial officers went to Peking.

*Political unity  
in spite of  
territorial  
subdivision*  
1. The province

The provinces were subdivided into prefectures (*fu*), which, in turn, were combined for administrative purposes into circuits (*Tao*). In the eighteen provinces there were about one hundred eighty-four prefectures and ninety-five circuits. Each prefecture consisted of several districts (*hsien*), of which there were all together fourteen hundred and seventy. The district was the political and administrative unit, although it usually consisted of several villages.

2. Prefectures  
and districts

Surrounded by tributary states, and enjoying little of that contact with the European world which might have developed national feeling, China tended toward internal variation rather than toward national unity. Loyalty was contracted to the locality or expanded at the most to the province. Until the impact of the West had afforded a new basis for comparison and differentiation, what went on in other localities or beyond the province was the concern only of the people immediately affected. The historical consequences of this localism were fully revealed in the years following the opening of China. But the importance of the territorial decentralization of the country must be emphasized at this point in order to focus attention on an explanation of latter happenings in the Empire.

*Localism*

Similarly it is necessary to turn attention to the actual political organization of pre-modern China, both at Peking and in the provinces, in order to lay the foundations for an understanding of the history of modern China and of the Far East as affected by that of China.

*Importance of  
understanding  
pre-modern  
political system*

An informed writer describes the political system of the Chinese Empire as an "autocracy superimposed on a democracy." From one point of view the justification for this characterization is exhibited in the theory of political relationships in the Empire. The Emperor exercised the autocratic powers of the typical Oriental despot. He

*Position of the  
Emperor*

was the supreme lawmaker of the state; the executive and administrative functions were exercised under his direction and control; and he was the fountain of justice. In other words, the people, including the officials, were accustomed to a complete concentration of power in the hands of one individual. In a very real sense he governed by "divine right," for his responsibility was not to any body representative of the people as a whole or of important groups in the state. Heaven bestowed upon him a "mandate" to rule, and until that mandate was withdrawn there was no authority to which he could be held accountable for his acts. The Emperor did, nevertheless, act under a limited sense of responsibility. In return for the autocratic power conferred on him by Heaven he assumed a definite responsibility for the maintenance of peace, order, and comparative prosperity within the Empire. Thus if famine became widespread, the condition was held to be a result of some failure on the part of the Emperor. Famine, of course, would produce brigandage, and the gathering together of large bodies of armed men might easily result in rebellion against the Imperial authority. A successful rebellion would bring the dynasty to an end, and consequently would indicate that the "mandate of Heaven" had been withdrawn. Obviously it was to the real interest of the Emperor to make certain, so far as he could, that the condition of the people was good. As a matter of fact, the end of many of the dynasties in Chinese history has come as a direct result of some such process as that just described, whether the new rulers came from within the country or subjugated it from without. It should be said, however, that, coupled with hard times, the hand of authority would have to be relaxed throughout the country in order that a rebellion might be carried to a successful conclusion. The forcible overthrow of the Manchus in 1911, then, was not a new method of getting rid of a dynasty. The right of revolution was given explicit recognition in Chinese political theory, and China has always been known as a country of revolutions.

A few quotations from the Confucian Classics may serve to illustrate the theory back of the old Chinese political institutions. "Heaven hears as the people hear. Heaven sees as the people see." Again: "In a political state the people are the most important, institutions come next, the monarch is the least important of all." This conception of the importance of the people, enforced by the theory and practice of revolution, gave China a very workable theory of "divine right" indeed, from the complete operation of which would result a well-ordered state.

But there were other restrictions and limitations on the absolute power of the Emperor. He was conditioned in the exercise of his supremacy by the Imperial House Laws and by the edicts of his predecessors. While he was not absolutely bound by them, they constituted a valuable guide for his conduct, both personally and in the government of the realm. Furthermore, he was decidedly limited by custom

and tradition. While he had the power to issue orders contrary to custom, yet it is never possible to change a custom by a law, and nowhere is this more true than in China where it is impossible to over-estimate the force of tradition.

In a country of personal rule the first autocrats may exercise their authority to a large extent; but by degrees, as the dynasty continues, the rulers tend to concern themselves less and less with affairs of state, leaving the real power in the hands of their advisers. When the ruler confines himself to his palace or his capital, it becomes more and more necessary for him to rely upon the advice of others in formulating the policy of the state, thus transferring the real power to those who can gain and retain his confidence, often mere servitors in the palace. In any case the autocrat must rely upon others to carry out his commands. This reliance still further modifies his actual power.

In formulating his will the Emperor of China was assisted by two bodies, the Grand Secretariat and the Grand Council. The former, by 1842, had become a Court of Archives and was of little importance in the actual government. The Grand Council, on the other hand, was a very important advisory body. It usually consisted of six members, all of whom held other high offices in the central government, usually the presidency of one of the administrative boards.

It was through the administrative boards that the actual administration of the Empire, so far as Peking had any relation to it, was carried on. They were six in number until 1861, when the *Tsungli Yamen* (Board of Foreign Affairs) was established as the seventh. The original six were: Civil Appointments, concerned primarily with the disposal of the patronage; Revenue, under the direction of which the contributions from the provinces were received and assigned to the various services; Rites, concerned with the regulation of ceremonial, a very important function at an Oriental court; War, superintending such of the military and naval establishment as was not under provincial control, or otherwise provided for; Punishments, corresponding somewhat to the Department of Justice in this country; and Works, entrusted with the superintendence of the public buildings, highways, and other public property.

One of the organs of the central government deserving of more than incidental mention was the Censorate, which has been well described as the "eyes and ears" of the Emperor. There were twenty-four Censors in Peking and fifty-six in the provinces, the Viceroys and Governors of the provinces being honorary members. The function of the Censor was to criticize, and this function he exercised freely, though not always without bias. No one in the entire official system, from the highest, the Emperor, to the lowest, the district magistrate, was immune from this criticism. As late as the last quarter of the past century one of these critics sent in a memorial to

*Palace  
government*

*Organs of  
Central  
Government  
1. Grand  
Secretariat and  
Grand Council*

*2. Adminis-  
trative Boards*

*3. The Censorate*

the Empress-Dowager, then the ruler of China, severely censuring her conduct in not making suitable provision for an heir to carry on the worship of the late Emperor, at the same time committing suicide in order to lend weight to his criticism as well as to avoid the displeasure of the Empress-Dowager. The provincial censors were, in a sense, spies sent out to report on the conduct of the officials in the provinces in order that the Emperor might be kept informed of their acts, rewarding those who were faithful and punishing those who were lax in the performance of their duties or who might be suspected of disloyalty. This was one of the means by which the Imperial Government was able to maintain its control over the provincial officials.

It has already been pointed out that the provinces were semi-autonomous units in the Empire. While the general policy was established in Peking, it had to be carried into effect in the provinces, where it was modified as local customs and conditions, or the sympathy of the higher provincial officials with the policy, determined. A good example of this is to be found in the development of the Boxer movement. When the Empress-Dowager finally determined to support the Boxers, secret orders were sent out to the provinces to drive all foreigners into the sea. While in some few provinces attempts were made to carry out this command, in others it was totally disregarded, and, in violation of the Imperial orders, the foreigners were protected to the extent of the ability of the officials. When the Boxer movement collapsed, these men, among them Yüan Shih-k'ai and Chang Chih-tung, were honored for their superior understanding of the strength of the Powers instead of being punished for their disobedience to the Imperial orders. But while in this instance the exercise of discretion justified itself, it must be recognized that here was an element of serious weakness whenever it was desirable to secure complete uniformity in the administration of a policy.

At the head of the province stood the Viceroy or Governor. Most of the provinces were grouped into vicerealties. The exceptions were Shantung, Shansi, and Honan, which were headed by only a Governor. In two cases, Chihli and Szechuan provinces, the single province constituted a vicerealty, and over it no Governor was placed. One vicerealty was made up of three provinces (Kiangsu, Anhui, and Kiangsi), and each of the other five was formed by a combination of two provinces.

The Viceroy, unless he assumed the functions of the Governor of one of the provinces in addition to his viceregal duties, as in Kansu, Chihli, and Szechuan provinces, was a kind of superior colleague to the Governor, having a general power of supervision of the provinces within his jurisdiction. Both officials bore the same general relationship to the vicerealty or the province as the Emperor bore to China. They were held responsible to him for the condition of the province and for the transmission of the provincial contributions to



Peking. In the accomplishment of these limited ends they were allowed a wide choice of means, so that theoretically they exercised absolute authority in the area over which they had control. However, it should be borne in mind that in the exercise of this power they were subject to the same general limitations as the Emperor, i.e., custom and tradition in the province, and the necessity of maintaining peace and order, and comparative prosperity. They were naturally forced to act under a greater feeling of real responsibility also, since they were accountable directly to the central government. At the same time they were limited in their authority by the presence of other officers in the provincial system who were appointed directly under its supervision. These officers served as a check on the Governor and on one another. Finally, the high provincial officials were supreme only to the extent to which the prefect and the district magistrate accepted their commands and faithfully carried them into effect.

Among the other important provincial officials was the Treasurer, "the nominal head of the civil service in each province, in whose name all patronage is dispensed, even when directly bestowed by the Governor; and is treasurer of the provincial exchequer, in this capacity providing the Imperial Government with a check on his nominal superior, the Governor."<sup>3</sup> Others were the Judge, with supervision of the criminal law, and appellate jurisdiction in criminal cases; the Salt Comptroller, "in control of the manufacture, movement and sale of salt," a government monopoly; and the Grain Intendant, controlling the collection of the grain tribute. These officials constituted the general provincial official system.

2. *Provincial officials under the Governor*

Each circuit was presided over by an official called the *Tao-tai*, with special administrative functions, and the prefecture was supervised by the Prefect, together with his deputies.

3. *The Prefect*

At the bottom of the official ladder we come to the *Hsien*, or district magistrate, the real administrative officer in the Empire, and in many respects the most important official in the entire system. His functions were many and diverse, and a complete enumeration of them is impossible here. The general position of the magistrate in the official system, and in his relation to the people, is indicated by the title sometimes given him—"the father and mother official." Some of his more important duties may be indicated. He was the police magistrate and decided ordinary police cases. He was court of first instance in all civil and criminal cases. He was also coroner, prosecuting attorney, sheriff, jail warden, the agent of the Imperial Government in the collection of the land tax and grain tribute, registrar of the land, famine commissioner for his district, and the local representative of the Board of Works, and the provincial treasurer in the custody of official buildings. Aside from his manifold duties, the magistrate was important because he was the only official within the cognizance of the great majority of the people—the con-

4. *The District Magistrate*

<sup>3</sup> MORSE, H. B., *Trade and Administration of China*, p. 51.

necting link between them and the political system of the country. This fact has considerable importance in view of the later attempts to establish a national system of representative government.

The provincial system during Imperial days has been described in some detail because it furnished the real foundation on which the Republic had to be built. And out of it grew the post-revolutionary condition of military rule in China—a rule based upon control of the province and then gradually extended to Peking.

All of the members of the official hierarchy were appointed by the Emperor, acting either directly or upon the recommendation of one of the higher officials. In making his choice the Emperor was supposed to appoint from among those who had qualified in the examinations held at regular intervals throughout the country. Thus one who wanted to enter into the civil service would start with the local examination, pass from there to the prefectural and provincial examinations, and, if again successful, perhaps go up to Peking to compete in the metropolitan examinations. Anyone, with certain exceptions, such as soldiers and members of certain occupational groups, was eligible to compete. However, success did not ensure appointment to office, or promotion after appointment, for in order to get ahead it was necessary to have a friend at court or among the higher officials, or, in the latter years of the Manchu rule, to gratify the cupidity of one or more of those with influence. In fact, there existed a regular system of traffic in office which radiated from the Palace. While the eunuchs were not supposed, under the Imperial House Laws, to concern themselves with public affairs, under the Empress-Dowager the real power had come to reside in the hands of the chief eunuch. This condition was partly responsible for the political decay which set in during the last half-century of Manchu rule.

In spite of this fact the examination system did mean that officialdom was largely recruited from among those with a satisfactory education according to the standards of the time. Unfortunately administrative capacity was not tested at all in the examinations, nor knowledge of the problems of government, since the educational system was built on the Confucian Classics, and the abilities stressed in the examinations were those relating to essay-writing on classical subjects. So long, however, as the duties of the administrator were nominal rather than real, and demanded the attribute of common sense rather than a technical training in administration, the system gave satisfactory results.

All officials were appointed, according to the general rule, for three years, with the possibility of one reappointment before transfer to another post. This was not an absolute rule, however, for some officials were retained in the more important posts for much longer periods. A notable example of this deviation from the general practice was the maintenance of Li Hung-chang in the Tientsin vice-royalty for twenty-four years. But a rule that was never departed

from was that no official, whether governor or district magistrate, should be appointed to his native place. There was good reason for both of these rules, especially the latter. If a man were appointed to the governorship of his native province, for example, and left in the one post over a long period of time, he would, because from the beginning he would have a local following, and because his family life would be deep-rooted in the province, be able, if he were a capable and wise administrator, to establish himself in a position of independence of the Imperial Government. By appointing him to a province where he was unfamiliar with the local customs, and by transferring him to a new environment frequently, the central authorities prevented the development of a sense of independence and the possibility of an attempt to detach the province from the Empire, a danger which was, of course, greater in the provinces most remote from Peking. These two practices help to account for the maintenance of the Imperial rule in spite of the large discretionary power vested in the officials.

Another practice which serves to explain the continuance of the Imperial rule was that of balancing the various cliques or factions in dispensing patronage. In the first place, in the central government care was taken, in the making of appointments, to strike a balance between the Manchus and the Chinese, and this practice continued until near the end of the last century, when the Manchus began to predominate. In the second place, during the same period the two major factions, known because of the province of their leaders as the Chihli and Anhui men, were played against each other in order that neither should gain the supremacy to the disadvantage of the Manchus. After 1895 a third group, the Cantonese, who had always been discriminated against in official life, came into prominence by supporting the Emperor in his attempt to reform the government. With the failure of the reform movement many of them were driven into exile, so that the Cantonese became identified with the revolutionary propaganda. This partly explains the leadership of the south in the uprising of 1911. This balancing of the various groups against one another was followed in distributing provincial posts as well as those of the central government.

*Appointments  
distributed  
among factions*

Before we turn from the official to the extra-official system of government, the relationship between the various officials in the hierarchy should be explained more fully. The Emperor, as has been pointed out, was responsible for the government of the entire country. But he exercised his responsibility by the appointment of the Governor or Viceroy, holding him to account for the government of the viceroyalty or province. The Governor held the Prefect responsible for the condition of the prefecture, and he passed the responsibility on to the magistrates of the several districts in his jurisdiction. The magistrate, in his turn, held the headmen of the villages responsible for those under their direction. However, in spite of this complete

*Delegation of  
responsibility*

devolution of responsibility, no one was able to plead the negligence of those inferior to him as an excuse for the non-fulfilment of his own duties.

This delegation of responsibility is well illustrated by the specimen proclamation given by Parker: "The magistrate has had the honor to receive instructions from the prefect, who cites the instructions of the Tao-tai, moved by the Treasurer and the Judge, recipients of the commands of their Excellencies the Viceroy and Governor, acting at the instance of the Foreign Board, who have been honored with his Majesty's commands."

Still another feature of Chinese political life remains to be noted. None of the officials received salaries large enough to enable them to support their establishments adequately, or to provide for their own future. The official salary of the magistrate is given by Morse as ranging from 100 to 300 *taels* per annum, and the pay of the higher officials, while proportionately greater, was equally inadequate. This salary was supplemented by an allowance "for the encouragement of integrity among officials" amounting to several times the salary. But even with this allowance the official was decidedly underpaid. The natural result was that all added to their salaries by whatever means came to hand. The system of financial administration in the Empire enabled the officials to "squeeze" (i.e., graft) more than enough to recompense themselves for the meagerness of their official doles.

The Imperial Government did not tax the individual directly, but apportioned its needed income among the provinces according to their ability to contribute. Thus the Governor would be notified that his province would be expected to send in a given amount to the Imperial Treasury. If this contribution was paid, the central government had no further interest in the methods of finance of the province. Since the Imperial expenses were not great, normally the province could pay more, from the established sources of revenue, than was actually requested by the Board of Revenue. Consequently the practice early developed for the Governor to add to the contribution demanded a sum large enough to enable him to maintain properly his official establishment, consisting of a large number of necessary officers who were entirely unprovided for in the official system, and whom he was expected to pay out of his own purse. This increased sum he would divide among the various prefectures. If the requested amounts were duly paid, his responsibility ended, and he, in turn, made no attempt to see that the amount paid in to the provincial treasury was that actually collected. The Prefect then took the liberty of adding to the sum assessed on him an amount which would enable him to take care of his own needs. This further increased sum was then distributed among the districts for actual collection under the direction of the magistrate. Since he had to account, not for the amount actually collected, but only for that sum

for which the district was assessed, he in turn fixed the taxes to be collected from the individual according to the amount which he thought could be collected without undue friction. The balance he retained for his own needs.

It is immediately apparent that there would be a wide discrepancy between the revenue collected from the villagers and the sum actually delivered to the Imperial Treasury. The fact of this divergence was well known and these successive accretions were considered to be entirely right and proper. It would seem, however, that under this system, as in that of 'farming' the taxes resorted to in the Turkish Empire, the burden on the individual would soon become intolerable. This would have been the case had it not been for the fact that there was a natural disinclination on the part of the individual to pay more than his ancestors had paid, and, in the annual struggle between the tax collector and the farmer or villager, the force of custom was on the latter's side. In a society where custom was the determinant in all disputes, the interests of the individual were fairly well protected. The sources of direct revenue were fixed and immutable, and the levy on those sources could not go far above the customary rate without provoking disturbance. Since undue disturbance would reflect on the governing ability of the magistrate, his normal tendency would be not to exceed the figure marked by the individual as the point of open resistance. As a matter of fact, taxes were not unduly burdensome at the time of the opening of China.

*Custom a check  
on tax increases*

The same system of finance marked the collection of the customs duties and the administration of the salt monopoly, Peking losing and the individual official decidedly gaining. Some of the most lucrative posts in the Empire were those connected even indirectly with the foreign trade at Canton. The payments to secure these posts were correspondingly heavy, but the officials usually managed to amass more than a competency before being transferred. There was no regular schedule of charges upon the importation of goods into, or their exportation from, the Empire, and the foreign traders were taxed all that the traffic would bear. Much of what was received went into the pockets of the officials.<sup>4</sup>

*Collection of  
customs*

Throughout, then, there was what may be described as corruption in the financial administration, justified in part by the small salaries paid, but having its effect in the lowering of the public integrity of the officials.

*Effect of  
"squeeze"*

So long as the Imperial Government needed only a nominal and fairly constant revenue, the system just described proved to be workable. But with the added demands on the treasury of the central government due to the imposition of foreign indemnities, the necessity for more extensive armaments, and the cessation of contributions

*Defects in  
system apparent  
as expenses  
increased*

<sup>4</sup> This was true only up to the time of the first treaties, when a regular system of charges was provided. Corruption disappeared from their collection and transmission to Peking when the foreign customs service was organized on its present basis with a staff largely made up of foreigners.

from provinces devastated by famine or rebellion, it became necessary either to increase the levy on the existing sources of revenue and develop new sources, or to bring to Peking a greater proportion of the amounts actually collected. Increase in the levy, however, as in the case of the tax on land, could not go beyond a certain point without provoking resistance to the tax collector. New resources could not be developed rapidly enough to meet the expanding needs, because of the force of customary modes of procedure, although substantial revenue was derived from the *likin*, a transit tax developed after the middle of the last century; and the greatest source of expansion of income for a state, the foreign customs, early became fixed by treaty at a low point. The third alternative proved impossible as a solution, owing to the unwillingness of the officials to abate their own needs and demands. Consequently the financial problem became one of increasing difficulty during the last period of Manchu rule.

Thus far we have described a highly centralized administrative system in a decentralized territorial system, the main feature of which was autocracy with some important democratic modifications. The soundness of the characterization of political China as an autocracy superimposed on a democracy has not yet, however, been fully demonstrated, since we have not called attention to the democratic features of the system. These are to be found in the village, family, and guild systems which have already been described. The official system stopped where the real control of the lives of the people began—below the district magistrate. They paid taxes and in return expected the government to maintain peace and order. From the standpoint of law this meant that the officials made and administered the criminal law. Commercial law was established and enforced through the guild organizations, and trade disputes were usually settled out of court. Even the taxes were often not collected by the magistrate, but were returned to him by the village headman, who was selected by the village rather than by the magistrate.<sup>5</sup> As has been indicated, the village largely controlled itself through its Council of Elders, and the family, the real unit in the country, served as an agency of control to a much greater extent than in Occidental states.

It thus becomes clear that the real life of China, both social and economic, was carried on without the direction of the officers of government, and yet with a high degree of organization. The people were self-controlled in virtually all of their activities. With the provincial and craft guilds and the village and family organizations, it was possible to get along with a government that exercised the minimum of actual power. The official system was grafted on to the family and guild systems, and was supported by the people for the reasons already mentioned. It is in this extra-political system of

<sup>5</sup> Subject, however, to his confirmation. In some parts of the country it would seem that the magistrate suggested the headman. But this was rather the exception than the rule.

government that the democratic element in the Chinese state was to be found, and from it, as the conservator of local custom, that the autocratic features of the official system were modified. But the fact is worthy of note that it was not democracy in the political sense.

The account of how these features of Chinese life were modified will be found to be part of the history of modern China, dating from the attempt on the part of the states of the West to establish political relations with the Chinese Empire.

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of extended relations. They should be alert to safeguard trade interests against discrimination in favor of others. Again, a country such as China may be in need of foreign capital for its development, and the foreign representative should consider it to be part of his duty to ensure the capital of his state a complete equality of consideration for investment, and should see to it, as far as possible, that the interests of investors from his country are properly safeguarded.

But when the diplomatic agent begins to exert pressure on the government of a politically backward country such as China to secure a monopoly of trade or investment privileges for the nationals of his state, or when he brings pressure to bear to force conditions of trade which are wholly disadvantageous to the backward state, or when he seeks to coerce that state into borrowing on terms less advantageous than could be secured elsewhere, it must be considered that he is over-stepping his true position. In the long run such activities do not advance the real interests of either state.

Furthermore, when the lead is taken by diplomacy in securing privileges which are not being requested by the traders, or, more particularly, by finance, then there is justification for thinking that there is a motive behind the act which is political in its character and not purely economic.<sup>3</sup> In other words, when there is a proper relationship established between business and diplomacy, the latter should be used to advance the legitimate interests of the former rather than to bring them into being in order to utilize them for its own ends.

If this point of view is correct, then the diplomatic activity of the several Powers represented at Peking should have been closely proportioned either to their trading or investment interests in China or to pressure exerted by national trade and finance on the government to secure its aid in the establishment and development of commercial and financial undertakings. Otherwise it is fair to assume a political motive back of diplomatic action.

When we look to trade we find that, prior to 1905, it was not considered necessary to keep separate record of the commerce of the states of continental Europe, except Russia, with the Chinese Empire. In the customs reports they were grouped together as a trading unit. The greatest trading Power in 1900 was Great Britain. Japan came second, both as to imports and exports, with the United States third. Russian trade amounted to about half that of the United States, while that of Germany and France, together with all of the other states of continental Europe, in total of imports and exports, was very little greater than that of the United States. In 1896 the trade of these several states with China was considerably less, the activities

<sup>3</sup> Of course diplomacy may and should turn the attention of national trading and financial institutions to a field hitherto neglected by them, and take the lead in that way. What is meant is the practice of extorting concessions for its nationals which they are not in a position to use.



of the years from 1896 to 1900 having brought a slight proportional increase.

When we turn to their diplomatic activity, however, there is a different story to tell. The most active Power at Peking was Russia, supported by France. The least active in pressing its claims on the Chinese government was the United States. And it was not the desire to promote trade relations which was the most marked feature of the pressure on China during those years and immediately after 1900. The reason for this is, perhaps, the fact that political ends could not be so readily advanced by the promotion of trade. Consequently it is to finance that we must turn to estimate the position and the policy of the Powers.

*Diplomatic activity not proportioned to trade interest*

Beyond this, however, in estimating the relationship between finance and diplomacy, it is necessary to try to ascertain whether the latter was merely making use of the former, or the reverse, if we are to gain an adequate understanding of the international situation. Too often, in the case of countries such as China, diplomatic pressure has been exerted to introduce national finance into the country. It is hoped then to utilize it in order to afford a pretext for later intervention on the ground of the necessity for protection of the initial investment. As a result of this intervention further privileges have been secured, whether or not they could be utilized, and thus a broader ground has been laid for intervention. Perhaps as a result of an intervention some measure of political supervision, especially of finance and of the protective services, might result. In other words, the ultimate aim of this apparently peaceful economic penetration of a backward country may have been political rather than economic. And where the initiative has come from government rather than from finance, there is more likely to be a political motive involved than when the initiative has come from finance.

*Political rather than economic penetration the aim*

#### 4. SPECIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF CHINA'S FINANCIAL PROBLEM

Before proceeding further we must observe certain special characteristics of the financial problem in China. In the first place, China was entirely, and still is largely, dependent on foreign capital for her development and for meeting the increases in her governmental expenditure which necessarily arose from the imposition of indemnity payments. For developmental purposes there has been no domestic money market, not because there has been no available capital in China, but because of lack of confidence in the government as an agency for the construction of railroads and the opening of mines—the two great fields for the use of capital. There has also been a lack of familiarity with and confidence in the stock company as a form of organization capable of drawing into one set of hands large amounts of capital. To meet increased public expenditure there has been an inflexible revenue system, and one not easily changed, since it was founded on immemorial custom. Taxes on land and the production

*Dependence on foreign capital for development*

*Inflexible revenue system*

of salt could produce greater revenue only by an increase in the rate, which, of course, would meet with serious popular resistance. Furthermore, whereas modern states find the foreign customs the chief flexible source of income, China, because the rates were fixed by treaty, could not, until recently, meet her new needs by an increase in the foreign customs levies. Finally, it was impossible to produce increased revenues by a reorganization of the collection of the existing taxes, because of official interest in the possibility of "squeeze." Consequently, in spite of the fact that per capita taxes in China were comparatively small, the Empire had to depend on the foreign money market to take care of its immediate governmental needs, and to provide for the great developmental undertakings such as the construction of railways.

In the second place, as will be readily appreciated, if the obligations of the Chinese government are carefully examined, it is almost impossible, because of the intimate relationship between foreign finance and diplomacy, to distinguish between China's public and private obligations.<sup>4</sup>

In the third place, it must be noted that special national agencies have almost exclusively enjoyed the support of their governments in seeking concessions and in other ways securing the right to aid in the financing of China.

Thus Japanese loans have been made, for the most part, through the Yokohama Specie Bank . . . and a syndicate consisting of the Bank of Taiwan, the Bank of Chosen, and the Industrial Bank of Japan. . . . British financial interests have operated through the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, and the British and Chinese Corporation, formed, in 1908, by the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation and the trading firm of Jardine, Matheson and Company. German financial interests have operated in China through the Deutsch-Asiatische Bank. Russian financial interests have employed as their agency the Banque Russo-Asiatique, earlier known as the Banque Russo-Chinoise. France has used the Banque de l'Indo-Chine, and, in association with it, the Credit Lyonnais, the Comptoir National d'Escompte de Paris, and other banks. Belgium has used the Société Belge d'Etudes de Chemins Fer en Chine. American interests, for the most part, have acted through a banking group (originally constituted by J. P. Morgan and Company, Kuhn, Loeb and Company, the First National Bank of New York, and the National City Bank of New York), the International Banking Corporation, and Lee, Higginson and Co.<sup>5</sup>

Thus, in some cases (as the Crisp Loan)<sup>6(a)</sup> it has been impossible for responsible financial concerns to participate in the financing of China because they could not secure the support of their governments, since such support had already been promised exclusively to other institutions or groups. This has had the effect of restricting China's access, on competitive terms, to the loan markets of the world.

<sup>4</sup> MACMURRAY, *Treaties, etc.*, vol. 1, pp. xiv-xv.

<sup>5</sup> WILLOUGHBY, *Foreign Rights and Interests in China*, pp. 485-86.

<sup>6(a)</sup> *Infra*, p. 216.

## 5. FINANCIAL ACTIVITIES OF POWERS (1895-1908)

With this introduction it is possible to turn to the financial activities of the Powers after 1895. A survey of these activities may be conveniently divided into two periods, the first extending from 1895 to 1908, a time of intense competition among the several Powers, and the second including the years following 1908, when the Powers showed an increasing realization of the dangers of an unrestricted competition, and, as a result of this appreciation, tended to coöperate in the development and economic and financial exploitation of China.

*Division of  
survey*

Prior to the war with Japan, China had no appreciable foreign debt. The war, however, resulted in her agreement to pay an indemnity of 230,000,000 *taels*. Immediately Russia came to her aid, as she had in the matter of the cession of the Liaotung promontory, and offered the Imperial Government a loan out of which to meet the first payments on the indemnity. This loan of four hundred million francs, while made by Russia and France jointly, was almost entirely subscribed in France. It was secured on the Maritime Customs receipts, and by a Russian government guarantee. Russia had no money to lend, but was willing to guarantee the loan because of the effect it would have on her position at Peking.

*Russian loan  
to pay war  
indemnity*

The British immediately pressed on the Chinese government a loan to meet the second instalment of the indemnity, to the amount of sixteen million pounds.<sup>6</sup> This was an Anglo-German loan and marks the beginning of coöperation of English and German finance in Chinese affairs. In 1898, when the final instalment was due, the Anglo-German financiers were forced to compete with the Russians and French, both groups strongly urging their claims to consideration on the Chinese government. The former were successful, although offering less advantageous terms, because of the strong pressure brought to bear on China from the British legation. No government guarantee, however, was involved in the Anglo-German loans, which must be considered as more nearly financial in their ends than the Russo-French loan. It was, nevertheless, the desire to combat the Russian influence which caused the British government to insist that her financiers should have the privilege of helping China out of the difficulties created by the war with Japan. It has already been seen that both groups reaped an abundant reward for their benevolence when it came to the scramble for economic privileges in the Empire during and after 1898.

*Anglo-German  
loans*

The next great public debt fastened on China resulted from the failure of the Boxer movement, the indemnity imposed amounting to 450,000,000 *taels*. The security taken for this charge was: the unpledged balance of the Maritime Customs, increased by the raising of the tariff charges to an effective five percent; the revenues from the native customs administered in the open ports by the Maritime Customs service; and the revenues from the Salt Gabelle. The Mari-

*Boxer  
indemnity*

<sup>6</sup> Also secured by the Maritime Customs and certain provincial *likin*.

time Customs were taken as security for these early debts primarily because it was a service efficiently organized and administered under foreign supervision.

It was not until 1911 that China was again forced to borrow for governmental purposes. But with the (uncompleted) currency loan of that year and the reorganization loan of 1913, following the revolution of 1911, she began increasingly to seek funds abroad for general administrative purposes. Consideration of these loans, however, will be postponed for the present, since they fall within the second period, that of international coöperation.

While governmental loans were important, the principal field for foreign finance lay in securing and utilizing railway concessions. It was through railway construction that the Powers hoped effectively to penetrate and develop the areas claimed as spheres of interest, and it is in the control provisions of the various loan agreements that the policy and intention of the several European states are most clearly revealed. So far as the primary interest of a state was purely financial and economic, the control provisions in its railway contracts were designed merely to afford ample security to the bondholders. Where, on the other hand, the interest was partly or wholly political, more extensive control was demanded. These control provisions, whether of the one sort or the other, were five in number. They involved: 1) supervision of construction of the road; 2) a national priority in the purchase of materials; 3) audit, or other supervision of expenditure; 4) actual operation of the road during the life of the loan; and 5) administration of the railway zone and police rights therein. In some cases the roads themselves were pledged as security for the loan, whether with or without the above-mentioned control provisions. In other cases the loan was secured by a general Imperial Government guarantee, and by the pledging of certain revenues for the repayment of the loan together with the interest on it.

As examples of roads which provided for control of operation for strategical or other political purposes, may be mentioned the Russian and Japanese lines in Manchuria, the German Tsingtao-Tsinanfu line in Shantung province, and the French system in Yunnan and Kwangsi provinces. The several loan agreements for these systems contain all five of the provisions described above. They were constructed, and have been operated, under the supervision of the foreign governments concerned rather than by the Imperial Government of China, and the nature of the transaction in each case warrants the conclusion that the foreign government was interested in the loan for its own purposes rather than on behalf of national finance. In other words, the loans were not made primarily as good investments, nor were the roads constructed for the sake of the advantage derived from the sale of materials to be used in building them or because of the profits that would be made out of their operation. In some cases it was apparent that the roads would not be immediately or even for a long

time profitable, and the railway tariffs were not fixed with a view to profit but were established for political reasons.<sup>7</sup> Furthermore, the above-mentioned governments, in addition to specific concessions, sought continually to secure a general monopoly of construction in their respective spheres, with a view to determining the course of development of those areas. In consequence of this China has been greatly handicapped in the development of her communications along national lines.

As examples of roads the control provisions concerning which, although extensive, were designed primarily to afford security to the investor, may be mentioned the Peking-Mukden, the Shanghai-Nanking, and the Peking-Hankow railways. In each of these cases the security for the loan was the railway properties, which, upon default, might be taken over and administered in the interest of the bondholders. They differed from the French, Russian, and Japanese lines chiefly in that the construction and supervision of the operation of the roads lay in the hands of corporations which were not under the direct control of foreign governments and were not in a position, under their agreements, to shape the policies of the railways along non-commercial lines. The roads themselves were the properties of the Chinese government rather than of foreign governments.

*Examples of roads controlled to secure interests of investor*

The groundwork for the construction of these railways was laid in the years from 1898 to 1900, and the concessions obtained were, on the whole, in the respective spheres of interest of the Powers. Consequently they served to emphasize the division of China into spheres. Each Power sought to strengthen itself in its sphere by keeping out the others, either by direct agreement, or by pressure exerted at Peking to prevent the granting of concessions to nationals of other states. We have already referred to the agreements reached between Great Britain, on the one hand, and France, Russia, and Germany, on the other, providing for a mutual respect for each other's priority of interest in a specified region. These agreements were, on the whole, lived up to by both England and Germany. Russia, however, as has been indicated, tried indirectly to force her way into the British sphere by utilizing Belgian capital, and France tried to project her influence northwards into the Yangtse provinces.

*Spheres of interest and railway concessions*

American interests secured only one concession for the construction of part of the rail system of China during this early period, and this one American capitalists failed to utilize. An Anglo-American syndicate, headed by Senator Brice, sought in competition with the Belgian interests for the right to construct the road from Peking to Hankow. When China granted the concession to the Belgian interests she compensated the Americans by a concession for the line south from Hankow to Canton. In this way it was hoped to introduce a disinterested influence into the construction of her main north-and-south artery. But, although the concession agreement provided

*The American concession*

<sup>7</sup> This was true of the French, Russian, and Japanese systems.

specifically that control in the enterprise should not be allowed to pass from American hands, Belgian interests did gain control through purchases in the open market, and in 1903 the concession was cancelled, although control had been regained through purchases made by J. P. Morgan and Company.

*Subsequent  
interest of  
United States  
in Manchuria*

After this failure American interest next manifested itself in Manchuria, which, even after the Russo-Japanese War, continued to be the international storm center.

*The Harriman  
project*

At the conclusion of the war with Russia the statesmen of Japan were undecided as to their future policy in Manchuria. When Mr. Harriman, the American railroad magnate, approached the Japanese government with a proposal to lease the South Manchurian and operate it as part of a projected round-the-world system, a preliminary understanding was reached which was embodied in the Ito-Harriman agreement. But when Count Komura, the chief Japanese plenipotentiary, returned from Portsmouth, he strongly opposed any Japanese withdrawal from Manchuria. As a result of the opposition which developed, the agreement was not carried into effect, the cancellation being put on the ground that the road did not become the property of Japan until after China's consent to the transfer from Russia had been obtained.

*Use made by  
Japan of rights  
acquired from  
Russia*

Then Japan embarked on a systematic development of her newly acquired holdings. First of all, she undertook negotiations with the Chinese government to secure its acquiescence in the transference of the Russian rights and interests to Japan. This agreement was embodied in the Komura treaties. But in the unpublished minutes of the Peking Conference it was recorded that China should grant no concessions to foreign capital for construction of railways paralleling or competitive with the South Manchurian. As it was later interpreted and used, this alleged secret agreement denied the right of foreign (non-Japanese) capital to enter South Manchuria for the purpose of financing railway construction, giving Japan a virtual monopoly there. In addition to this the Japanese used their control of rail communications to advance their business interests at the expense of other foreigners doing business in Manchuria. In the first place, the commercial port, Dairen, was for some time closed to all but Japanese goods and vessels. From Dairen the goods were carried on the Japanese-controlled railway to points in the interior, although the railway was supposedly being used at the time only for the evacuation of troops and for other military purposes. In this way Japan attempted to establish a market for her goods before admitting her foreign competitors. Furthermore, rebates on the railroad were given to Japanese goods; the Japanese demanded exemption from the operation of the Chinese consumption taxes; and, in general, they indulged in many of the practices which they had objected to and protested against in the Russian action in Manchuria prior to the war and in the German action in Shantung, on the ground that such practices

constituted a violation of the doctrine of the Open Door. From the administrative side Japan balanced an efficient administration by continued encroachments on and offences against the Chinese position outside of the railway zone, and in the zone she made herself supreme so far as China was concerned.

Japan's use of her position and rights in Manchuria made some of the Chinese officials desirous of introducing non-Japanese capital north of the Great Wall in order to emphasize the fact of Chinese sovereignty. Consequently in 1907 an agreement was reached between the Manchurian Viceroy and Mr. Willard Straight, the American Consul-General at Mukden, for the financing of a Manchurian Bank with American capital. This bank was to serve as the fiscal agent of the Manchurian government, and was to participate in financing railway construction. The panic of 1907 in the United States, however, prevented even consideration of this project. Later in the year British capitalists were interested in, and secured a concession for, the construction of a railway from Hsinmintun to Fakumen. Japanese opposition to this concession developed immediately, based on its violation of the terms of the annexes to the Komura treaty. The British legation was unwilling to support its nationals in ventures north of the Great Wall in the face of Japanese opposition, and the project was not carried through. In 1908, however, negotiations were begun again between the Chinese government and Anglo-American financiers for the financing of a line from Chinchow to Aigun. This concession was pushed by the American government and was secretly ratified by the Imperial Government of China in 1910.

*Chinese seek to introduce American capital into Manchuria*

## 6. THE KNOX NEUTRALIZATION PROPOSALS

After securing the ratification of this concession-agreement the State Department made a move looking toward the clarification of the whole situation in Manchuria, when Secretary Knox made his famous proposal for the neutralization of the railroads in Manchuria. These proposals, it was felt, were justified for two reasons. In the first place, the Chinchow-Aigun concession had given American interests a tangible basis in Manchuria, so that the United States was not coming forward entirely as a disinterested outsider. She had something to give up in return for concessions from the other interested Powers. This was the real justification for pushing the Chinchow-Aigun negotiations. In the second place, Mr. Harriman had revived his round-the-world transportation project in 1909, just before his death, because of an intimation from Russia that the Czar's government would be willing to consider the lease or sale of the Chinese Eastern Railway. It was well known, on the other hand, that the Japanese government was in considerable financial straits, and it was felt that Japan might be willing to dispose of her South Manchurian holdings if Japanese interests were not thereby sacrificed. Consequently the Knox proposals were not so ill-advised as has sometimes been represented.

*Justification of Knox proposals*

*Criticism of  
methods  
employed to  
secure assent  
to proposals*

The methods employed to secure assent to them were, on the other hand, extremely ill-advised. In the first place, the intimation from Russia should have been followed up and a promise to sell the Chinese Eastern secured. This would have made it possible to bring a more effective pressure to bear on Japan to induce her to internationalize the control of the South Manchurian. It might also have prevented Russia from opposing the American policy because of the offense to her pride due to the fact that it was apparently assumed that she would assent to a policy which had Anglo-American support. It would have been more expedient to have approached England only after negotiations had been instituted with Russia and then with Japan. In any case, when England did not respond warmly to the American proposals, other support should have been sought before proceeding further, except as it may be assumed that the American government was more interested in focusing attention on the real Manchurian aims and intentions of the Powers than in successfully carrying out its own plans.

*Nature of the  
proposals*

Briefly, the proposal was that an international syndicate should be formed to make a large loan to China so that she might buy out the Russian and Japanese interests, and that the Manchurian railways should be neutralized and internationally administered during the period of the loan. In sounding out the British attitude toward the proposal Secretary Knox suggested that if the British government was not willing to support the larger project, it might at least join the United States in supporting diplomatically the Chinchow-Aigun scheme, in the development of which other Powers might be given a share.

*The British  
reply*

The British reply was disappointing in that it intimated that the British government felt that the time was inopportune for the making of such far-reaching proposals, and in that it suggested that the Japanese be invited to participate in the Chinchow-Aigun concession because of their peculiar interest in Manchuria. Thus instead of supporting the American position that Manchuria was a proper field for the activities of non-Japanese finance, the British government accepted the Japanese contention that South Manchuria was an exclusive Japanese preserve so far as investment rights and railroad development were concerned.

*Japan and  
Russia refuse  
assent*

The Japanese and Russian governments finally gave a categorical refusal to consider the American proposals, the wording of their answers being so similar as to indicate a prior agreement. It is interesting to note that the refusal of both countries was put, in part, on political and strategical grounds, indicating that the two governments construed their interests in Manchuria to be political and not purely commercial and financial. In opposing the Chinchow-Aigun concession both Japan and Russia produced secret agreements with the Chinese government by which it agreed not to undertake railway developments in Manchuria without first consulting Russia if north



Manchuria was affected, or Japan if the projects involved the territory south of Changchun. In the face of the open Russian opposition and the Japanese expression of a willingness to participate on entirely unacceptable terms, the Chinchow-Aigun concession was allowed to lapse.

The total effect of the Knox activity is summarized by Mr. Millard in the following terms:<sup>8</sup> 1) The right of China to decide upon the course of railway development within her territory was denied by foreign nations. 2) Certain foreign nations declared that their strategical and political interests must be considered as paramount in planning a railway system within China's territory. 3) Certain foreign nations asserted the right to decide who would finance, construct, and operate railways within China's territory and to veto arrangements in regard to these matters which China wishes to carry out. To these may be added two other effects; 1) Great Britain reversed her policy, returning to the sphere of interest conception and partially repudiating the principle of the Open Door, of equal opportunity in its enlarged conception. 2) Japan and Russia drew together in defense of their exclusive and preferential interests in the Manchurian provinces. In 1907 they had entered into a political convention in which each agreed to respect the Manchurian rights of the other so far as they were not inconsistent with the principle of equal opportunity, and they recognized in general the independence and territorial integrity of China and the Open Door principle and agreed to sustain and defend them. But in 1910 Russia and Japan entered into both a public and a secret convention defining their respective spheres in Manchuria, agreeing not to interfere with each other in developing their positions within their spheres, and stipulating for concerted action in case their special interests in Manchuria were threatened. The 1910 conventions contain no acceptance of the principle either of equal opportunity or of the integrity of China.

#### 7. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN FINANCE

In a sense this Knox proposal for the neutralization of the Manchurian railways was but a part of a general movement toward financial coöperation in China. The British objection to a discussion of the internationalizing of the Manchurian lines rested partly on the fact that the Powers were then engaged in working out arrangements for coöperating in the building of railways in western and southern China. Finance was rapidly finding out the difficulties of competition for concessions, and governments apparently were beginning to realize that there was room for all in the financing of the great trunk lines of China. They were coming to perceive that competition had the effect of playing into the hands of China by securing her more favorable terms in the making of loans than could otherwise have been obtained.

<sup>8</sup> MILLARD, *Our Eastern Question*, p. 25.

*The Tientsin-Pukow railway project*

Thus when a road was projected from Tientsin to the Yangtse River, England and Germany competed for the right to finance it. Both nations had a claim to participation, because the road penetrated their respective spheres of interest. The Germans proved agreeable to the granting of more favorable terms to China than the British (who insisted on the usual financial control provisions), but British diplomacy was stronger at Peking than that of Germany. Furthermore, the hands of both parties were tied by their agreement to respect each other's spheres. Finally, since both recognized the desirability of constructing the road, an agreement was reached by which they shared in the undertaking, the Germans gaining the right to construct the section from Tientsin to the southern border of Shantung province, while the British were to complete the road to its juncture, at Pukow, with the (British) Shanghai-Nanking railway. The competition, however, had resulted in China's securing the elimination of many of the usual control provisions. The road itself was not made the security for the loan, certain provincial revenues being pledged as the security. Consequently the road would not have to be administered in the interest of the bondholders. In fact, the construction and operation of the road was to be in the hands of China herself, although she agreed to appoint British and German engineers for their respective sections. Furthermore, there was no provision made for supervision of expenditure of the loan funds.

*Weakness of control provisions*

Tientsin-Pukow terms came to be synonymous with terms favorable to China for railway loans. Many foreigners, however, were skeptical as to the advisability of this weakening of the control provisions of the loan, and were particularly dubious about eliminating the right to supervise expenditure. And it must be admitted that this skepticism was somewhat justified by the event. It proved to be necessary to float a supplementary loan to complete the road, owing to the high cost of construction under Chinese control, for there was much squandering of funds.

*The Hukuang railways project*

For some years prior to 1908 there had been intermittently discussed the project of constructing a road south from Hankow to Canton, and westwards from Hankow into the great province of Szechuan. These discussions were renewed in 1908-1909, primarily in order to reach an agreement as to the measure of control which should be insisted upon, in the light of the Tientsin-Pukow experience, in the making of future loans. France and England, and, still earlier, the United States and England, had been interested in these two roads. In 1908 Germany also turned her attention toward them, and it was as a result of her activity that British, French, and German financiers and government officials undertook conversations in the hope of finding a basis for coöperation in the undertaking by reconciling their respective claims. Just when they had reached an agreement the American government interfered in the interest of American finance. When diplomatic action at Peking failed to achieve any results,

President Taft took the unusual step of cabling the Regent, requesting that Americans be admitted to participation. The basis for this request was the old concession of 1898-1903. After the intervention of President Taft, an American group was allowed to participate and the Four Powers Banking Group came into being. In order to show its real desire to extend the operation of the coöperative principle the American government at this time invited the other three Powers to join it in making a loan for currency reform in China, a project in which the United States had been given an exclusive interest. However, work on the railway project and the issuance of the currency loan were both retarded by the revolutionary developments of the year 1911 and thereafter.

#### 8. EFFECTS OF REVOLUTION AND EUROPEAN WAR

The revolution brought with it new financial problems for the Chinese government, and as a result it began to look to foreign sources for funds for general administrative purposes. On account of its immediately pressing needs and because of the large sums ultimately required, the Chinese government turned to the International Syndicate for advances and began to negotiate with it for a comprehensive loan to be devoted to reorganization and reconstruction purposes, giving the syndicate, in return for its advances for immediate needs, an option on the comprehensive loan. When the new Republican government began to negotiate for this loan it found that the syndicate (extended to include Japan and Russia because of the political character of the loan contemplated) insisted on adequate provision for control of the revenues to be pledged as security. In consequence it tried to gain the necessary funds outside of the Six Power Group, but was unable to do so as the several national groups had the exclusive support of their respective governments. Finally, in 1913, agreement was reached on the Salt Gabelle as the security for the loan, and provision was made for its reorganization under foreign supervision.

*Reorganization  
loan*

The outbreak of war in Europe in 1914 interfered with an extension of the financial operations of the first consortium. The American group had withdrawn from participation in the reorganization loan because the State Department under the direction of President Wilson refused to pledge its support to the members of the group, taking the stand that "the conditions of the loan seem to us to touch very nearly the administrative independence of China itself, and this Administration does not feel that it ought, even by implication, to be a party to these conditions."<sup>9</sup> After the outbreak of war German interests became inactive. And finally consortium advances on the loan came almost entirely from Japan. Additional loans for governmental purposes, as they became necessary, were also made by Japa-

*Withdrawal of  
United States  
from  
Consortium*

*Effect of war  
on Consortium  
activities*

<sup>9</sup> From President Wilson's announcement, reproduced in WILLOUGHBY, *Foreign Rights and Interests*, p. 301.

nese agencies acting independently, and, on a small scale, by American interests. Thus group action gave way to separate action until the revival and reorganization of the consortium at Paris, this time as the result of American initiative.<sup>10</sup>

The same reversion appeared in the railroad field. Contracts made after 1912 provided for the construction of over six thousand miles of road with foreign funds. A little less than a third of this mileage was granted to British financial institutions, the terms providing, among other conditions, for the employment of a British engineer-in-chief, chief accountant, and traffic manager, and for the pledging of the road as security for the loan. The Russians and Japanese<sup>11</sup> extended their railway interests in Manchuria, north and south, on the usual terms. The German contracts in Shantung for the Kaomi-Yih sien and Tsinan-Shuntefu roads (1913) were transferred to Japan and later by her to the second consortium. The French were awarded concessions of almost two thousand miles carrying them northwards through Szechuan, Shansi, and Shensi provinces to an ultimate connection with the Peking-Kalgan road. Except for the northwestern extension of French interests, all of these concessions fell within the claimed spheres of interest of the respective Powers. When an American concern, the Siems-Carey Company, secured contracts for fifteen hundred miles of construction in 1916, it found the old sphere conception fully revived. This made it a problem for the Chinese government to mark out the lines for American construction so as to meet the objections raised by the several interested Powers.

Due to the war-time and post-war financial conditions, little has been done toward completing these lines. The contracts have served principally as barriers to the undertaking of work by others than the concessionaires, and to that extent have hindered rather than helped the development of an adequate system of rail communications in China. By 1925 there was upwards of seven thousand miles of line in operation. This must be considered a good total in view of the general obstacles to construction, and it must, on the whole, be recognized that China has been materially benefited by the enlargement and improvement of her means of communication in spite of the introduction of foreign influence with the many problems and dangers presented by it. The dangers have been pointed out, and some of the problems may be stated very briefly. The conditions under which loans were granted have been so different, and the provisions for the supervision of construction have been so varied, that a non-uniform gauge has resulted. Some of the roads have the standard gauge, the Russian roads use the five-foot gauge, and the French roads the meter gauge. This has prevented a satisfactory utilization of rolling stock

<sup>10</sup> It seems advisable to postpone further discussion of the financial problem in China after the Revolution to succeeding chapters, since it can be most easily followed in connection with the discussion of the evolution of the political system after 1911.

<sup>11</sup> Japanese interests are more fully discussed in Ch. 14.

*Effects of war  
on railway  
construction*

*Peculiar  
problems of  
railway  
administration  
due to foreign  
influence*

and stands in the way of the administration of the roads as a unit. Then there is the very serious problem presented by the variety of administrations, with the Chinese Ministry of Communications unable to control all of the roads effectively. These and other administrative problems rising out of the conditions of financing and constructing the Chinese system have been attacked and partially solved by the institution of "conferences," which have sought to work out coöperatively a uniform system of operation. Representatives of the non-government as well as the government lines have participated in these conferences. In spite of the handicaps presented by the political disorganization of the years 1916-1926, and the interference of the military with the normal operation of the railways, their financial condition steadily improved with their more extensive use.

*Interference of military authorities with railways*

So far as equipment and general maintenance are concerned, however, military interference and internal turmoil have resulted in deterioration, which naturally affects the foreign investment. They have also resulted in the suspension of payment of both interest and principal on a number of the loan accounts.

#### 9. CHINA'S ATTITUDE TOWARD AND INTEREST IN RAILWAY CONSTRUCTION

Before concluding this discussion of financial imperialism in China it is proper to consider the general effect of the activities of the Powers on Chinese opinion. First of all, we must remember that China was totally unable to finance the construction of railways, the opening of mines, and the general industrial and political reorganization of the country. This fact necessarily modified the Chinese attitude from time to time as it was brought home to the educated classes. With this modification in mind, however, it may be said that the attitude of the Chinese people was determined by their fear of foreign financial control of their country.

*Chinese reaction to attitude of Powers*

During the years after the war with Japan the Chinese little realized the significance of the process of economic penetration which was being provided for by the agreements entered into from 1896 to 1900. The use made of the Manchurian railway by the Russians, however, awakened many of the officials to the danger to the state inhering in the foreign-controlled railway. Consequently there came a period when the Chinese were unwilling to accept foreign loans. The concentration of attention on the developing conflict between Japan and Russia over Korea and Manchuria also led to the cessation of loans.

*Growing realization of significance of foreign-controlled railway*

After the Russo-Japanese War the Chinese awakened still more fully to the gravity of the situation. The war promoted the movement toward internal reform, one phase of which was the attempt to develop a national system of communications. Immediately before and after the conflict in Manchuria the attempt was made to construct provincial railways out of locally subscribed funds. This, in the long run, would have had the effect of retarding the unification of the

*Development of rail communications part of reform program*

country, and the more capable of the Imperial officials soon perceived this fact. The perception of the possibility and the necessity for unification of the country by means of the construction of railways under the control and direction of Peking led to the elaboration of a program of railway nationalization. The cooperative attitude of the Powers fitted in perfectly with this policy as it provided Peking with the necessary funds for the construction of the great trunk lines, from which feeders could be thrown out gradually as opportunity offered.

*Influence and  
interest of the  
provinces*

Provincial opinion, however, had to be considered, and the gentry in the provinces were afraid of the gradual development of an international control of China through control of a centralized system of communications. Furthermore, the provinces had to be considered so far as they had invested in local railway undertakings. Their natural tendency, too, was to fight centralization unless they stood to profit by it. It was from this direction that part of the opposition which has been connected with the revolutionary movement of 1911, such as the insurrection in Szechuan province, came.

*Factors making  
difficult the  
inauguration  
of policy of  
centralization*

Fear of foreign financial control, the natural centrifugal tendency in the country, and the interest of the gentry in securing favorable terms for themselves in giving up to the central government their provincial railway investments—all conspired to make more difficult of execution the policy of centralization determined upon in 1907-1909.

#### REFERENCES FOR FURTHER STUDY

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## CHAPTER X

### REFORM AND REVOLUTION IN CHINA

#### I. CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH REFORM WAS UNDERTAKEN

THE internal history of China during the decade following the signature of the Boxer Protocol presents two patterns which are distinct and yet closely interwoven. The first is that of reform and the second that of revolution. And through both runs the thread of international relations. Since the narrative will be clearer if the two patterns are kept distinct, we shall attempt first to trace the development of the Manchu reform program up to the outbreak of the revolution in October of 1911, and after that has been done we shall try to picture the larger background of the revolution. It will then be possible to consider the revolution and the history of the eventful years following the abdication of the Manchu Emperor.

*Separate  
consideration  
of reform and  
revolutionary  
movements  
advisable*

To preserve the sequence, a brief recapitulation may well be undertaken at this point. In the first chapter a summary description of the political organization of China was given. Two of its features, it will be remembered, were the decentralized territorial system resulting from the high development of provincial and local autonomy, and the inflexible revenue system which could not be readily adapted to meet the new burdens on the state resulting from unsuccessful war and from the attempted introduction of such Western inventions as the steam engine. Succeeding chapters indicated the reaction of China to the contact with the West, particularly her failure to strengthen her political system, her military organization, and her economic life so as to enable her to protect herself against those who, because of her weakness and economic backwardness, became her despoilers. Such limited reorganization as had been attempted had been only partially successful because of the innate conservatism and feeling of superiority of the officials and the gentry, and, so far as it related to military and naval reform, had been largely neutralized by the widespread system of "squeeze." As a direct consequence of her weakness and the unwillingness of her officials to recognize the changed conditions, China lost most of her dependencies, suffered repeated defeats, both military and diplomatic, the most humiliating being that administered by Japan, and was finally threatened with partition along the lines marked out in 1897-1898. This could not help but engender dissatisfaction with the reigning dynasty. Furthermore, it has been pointed out that the foreign impact synchronized with bad internal conditions, partly the result of famine, piracy and

*Summary of  
development  
to 1900*

brigandage, and widespread rebellion. For these internal conditions, as well as for external aggression, the dynasty was held responsible. Consequently by 1900 it was presented with the alternatives of reform or elimination, because of its inability to fulfil its obligations to the country. We have briefly described the attempt at reform, as it was made rather impulsively in 1898, and the overthrow of the reformers, as well as the successful attempt to divert the discontented elements into the channel of anti-foreignism. The failure of Boxerism made almost inevitable a renewal, in a more conservative way, of the attempt to preserve the dynasty by reform of the governmental system.

*Reform edict  
of 1901*

That this attempt was to be made was clearly indicated in an edict issued in 1901 by the Empress-Dowager from Hsianfu, whence the Court had fled as the foreign expeditionary force approached Peking. Parts of the edict deserve quotation as predicating the course of events of the next few years.<sup>1</sup> "Looking at the matter broadly, we may observe that any system which has lasted too long is in danger of becoming stereotyped, and things which are obsolete should be modified. The essential need which confronts us is at all costs to strengthen Our Empire, and to improve the condition of our subjects. . . . The Empress-Dowager has now decided that we should correct our short-comings by adopting the best methods and systems which obtain in foreign countries, basing our future conduct on a wise recognition of past errors." In order to placate those who had objected to the K'ang Yu-wei reforms, the edict then pointed out that the objects of the Empress-Dowager were fundamentally different from those of the 1898 reformers. "Their main object is not reform but a revolution against the Manchu Dynasty," while the Old Buddha's object was to preserve the dynasty. Furthermore she intimated that she was interested not in making radical changes, but in reality was merely aiming at removing evil growths from the age-old system. "The teachings handed down to us by our Sacred Ancestors are really the same as those upon which the wealth and power of European countries have been based, but China has hitherto failed to realize this, and has been content to acquire the rudiments of European languages or technicalities while changing nothing of her ancient habits of inefficiency and deep-rooted corruption." The whole edict was primarily devoted to the important work of convincing the conservative officials that it would be safe to inaugurate a program of change under the supervision of the Empress-Dowager, although a similar program proposed by the Emperor had been properly condemned as revolutionary.

*Reforms  
contemplated  
differentiated  
from those of  
1898*

*Yüan Shih-k'ai  
and Chang  
Chih-tung  
leaders in  
reform*

Upon the return of the Court to Peking the reform era was inaugurated and an opportunity was afforded for judgment as to the sincerity of the Empress-Dowager. It is obvious that changes could be made only with the coöperation of the officials of the metropolitan

<sup>1</sup> The following excerpts are taken from the translation given by BLAND AND BACKHOUSE, *China under the Empress-Dowager*, pp. 419-424.



area and the provinces, and two of these stood out as honest supporters of progress. Yüan Shih-k'ai, who had served as Chinese Resident at Seoul until 1895, and who had thereafter been Judicial Commissioner of the Metropolitan province, Junior Vice-President of the Board of Works, and Governor of Shantung during the Boxer uprising, was appointed Viceroy of Chihli province at the end of 1901, when he was also made Junior Guardian of the Heir Apparent. It was under his direction that many of the changes in the central administration were carried out. He also showed his interest in army reorganization. The other leading advocate of reform was Chang Chih-tung, who as the Hukuang Viceroy dominated reform in the provinces up to the time of his death. While Yüan was primarily interested in political and military reorganization, Chang would seem to have been principally concerned with the strengthening of the economic foundations of the state.

## 2. THE FIRST PERIOD OF REFORM.

The first concrete interest was manifested in military reform. Until after 1895 China had no real modern national army, her military forces consisting of the Banner troops, and of the Green Flag or provincial troops.<sup>2</sup> The latter were in reality provincial constabulary and were organized and controlled by the provincial officials. After 1895 an attempt at reorganization was made but without permanent effect. In 1901 an Imperial edict again ordered reorganization, which was begun in Chihli province by reason of the interest of Yüan Shih-k'ai. Between 1903 and 1906 he created a model force of six divisions. Four of these were transferred in 1906 to the then established Ministry of War, and a plan was projected for the formation of a National Army of thirty-six divisions. In 1907 it was ordered that this program should be completed by 1912. The real advance in program came as a direct result of the interest created by the war between Russia and Japan. By 1911 progress had been made in this part of the reform program, and it will be interesting subsequently to note how the partial formation of a modern army affected the fortunes of the Manchus.

A second and more fundamental reform was inaugurated in theory in 1905, when by edict the age-old examination system was abolished. This struck a blow at the heart of the old order, for it forecast the end of the dominance of the classical tradition and the putting of a premium on knowledge of Western subjects. It meant immediately a paper rather than a real change, but it was no less significant for that reason. Previously permission had been given to Imperial Clansmen and Nobles to send their children abroad for education. These successive acts, coupled with the action of the United States in returning a portion of the Boxer indemnity and the decision to use it for

<sup>2</sup> Li Hung-chang was supposed to have a modern force under his direction, but it could not be considered as constituting a modern or national army.

educational purposes, and with the successes of Japan in the war with Russia, gave a tremendous impetus to the interest in foreign study and led many to go abroad for that purpose. The consequences of this movement will be indicated when we attempt to picture the background of the revolution.

Among other changes predicated or actually undertaken were a removal of the ban on intermarriage of Manchus and Chinese; an attempt at the abolition of official sinecures; some reorganization in the central administrative system, mainly by changing the names of various offices, consolidating agencies and redistributing functions; and the active encouragement of railroad building, the undertaking of mining operations with Chinese capital, and the construction of arsenals.<sup>3</sup>

After the outbreak of war between Russia and Japan, which was fought almost entirely on Chinese territory, the reform movement was accelerated and, moreover, took on the character of real institutional change. The victory of a reconstructed Oriental state over a powerful Occidental antagonist created active and widespread interest in reform as the earlier defeats of China had not done. A reference to the reform edicts of 1898 will indicate how closely the changes proposed from 1901-1905 paralleled the earlier program, and will consequently serve to show how little growth there had been in appreciation of the necessity for fundamental reconstruction of the political system. After 1905 the movement began to look toward the ultimate introduction of constitutional government into China. And there began also a conscious effort to centralize authority—to break down the autonomy of the provinces by means of the establishment of a national system of rail communications, which would ultimately make possible a more effective supervision over them. It must be here pointed out, however, that the policy of railway centralization was adopted only after several years had been given over to an attempt to finance and construct railways by and in the provinces with local funds. This question of railway policy acquired major importance as the revolutionary movement developed, and will be discussed more fully later.

### 3. THE CONSTITUTIONAL MOVEMENT

The idea of constitutionalism as a panacea for the ills of the state was, in large part, an importation from Japan. Prior to 1890 that country had been considered weak, and the Japanese had been looked down upon as an inferior people. Then suddenly China had been forced to revise her impression of her neighbor. First Japan showed herself to be stronger than China, and then she successfully challenged the great European Power, Russia. The chief secret of the newly-acquired strength of Japan was felt to be her introduction of Western

<sup>3</sup> Social and general economic changes of this period will be discussed later in another connection.

methods of government. And, since it was after the establishment of the Japanese constitution that the strength of the Island Empire was first revealed, the belief was natural enough. Furthermore, all the great European states except Russia, as the edict accepting the report of a commission sent abroad in 1905 to study Western forms of government pointed out, had constitutions. And Russia had just been defeated by the first Asiatic state to establish a constitutional system. The conclusion seemed to be perfectly obvious.

The report of the commission also indicated to the Empress-Dowager that the Japanese had found it possible to continue, through constitutional forms, the old absolutist system of government. There was no reason apparent to her why the same result might not be achieved in China. Thus she said: "As for ourselves, it is necessary at present to make a careful investigation into the matter, and prepare ourselves to imitate this government by constitution, in which the supreme control must be in the hands of the Throne, while the interests of the masses shall be given to the elect, advanced to such position by the suffrage of the masses."<sup>4</sup>

*Absolutist  
system to be  
continued  
under  
constitutional  
forms*

It is certainly questionable whether the autocratic Tzu Hsi would have even contemplated seriously the establishment of a constitutional system if she had thought that it would introduce any real limitation on her own power, or that it would affect the Manchu supremacy. But to recognize that fact is not to impugn the motives of the Court and the reform party among the officials. The constitution itself, it was their honest belief, was what would serve to strengthen China, just as it had Japan, even though the old system really functioned under and through the new forms. Their knowledge of Western systems of government was slight, and their understanding of the tendencies in political development after the principle of popular participation has been admitted was just as limited. So there may well have been honesty of intention in the attempt to establish a constitutional form of government in China while maintaining the autocracy. It was only after 1910, when the ultimate end of the movement began to be made apparent, that the Manchus laid themselves open to the charge of insincerity and double-dealing.

*Limited  
understanding  
of nature of  
constitutional  
government*

Had it not been for the revolutionary year 1911, the great year for modern China might have been 1908, for it was then that the government took the first steps toward the establishment of a constitutional régime. The Throne promulgated the "principles" of the constitution, announced a definite program of gradual progress, leading up to the calling of the National Parliament within nine years, and sanctioned regulations governing the provincial assemblies which were to be called into being within a year.

*Importance of  
steps taken in  
1908*

It is only necessary here to note the point of view expressed through the "Principles of the Constitution." It was identical with that originally expressed by the Empress-Dowager. A quotation from

*"Principles  
of the  
Constitution"*

<sup>4</sup> *China Year Book*, 1912, p. 353.

the edict accepting the "Principles" will serve to illustrate it. The foreign nations which "have established their constitutions under influences from above have first determined the ultimate authority of the Court, and thereafter there has been granted to the people the advantage of inquiring about the affairs of government. . . . In most of the nations in which the constitution has been granted from above the origin of all powers is in the Court. The Parliament must grow out of the constitution, not the constitution out of Parliament. The government of China is to be constitutional by imperial decree."<sup>5</sup> Consequently the primary emphasis was laid on securing the powers of the Throne in order to ensure that "the Ta Ts'ing Dynasty shall rule over the Ta Ts'ing Empire for ever and ever, and be honored through all ages." This was not a very good start, it must be recognized, toward convincing the country of the sincerity of Manchu professions, but it was, nevertheless, a distinct step in advance.

The setting-up of a program of gradual reform extending over a nine-year period was an indication of wisdom rather than of bad faith. It revealed a perception of the fact that China was not prepared for a representative system of government and that the foundations should be carefully laid before the superstructure was erected. Of course it could also be interpreted in another way—as providing a breathing space for the Manchus, during which they could revivify their rule. During the period each year was to witness certain changes such as the introduction of local self-government, law reform, census-taking, police reorganization, the extension of the educational system so as gradually to reduce illiteracy, the introduction of a budget and auditing system, and the issue of constitutional laws, Imperial House Laws, and parliamentary laws. The whole program was to culminate in the establishment of a Parliament and the organization of a Privy Council and a Cabinet in the ninth year. Certainly all of these reforms were necessary and, if carried out in good faith, would have served as foundations for the new régime. However, because of the confusion of the years after 1908, coupled perhaps with a lack of real interest in reform, many steps in the program were taken only on paper.

A third important advance, promised in 1907 and incorporated in the program of 1908, related to the establishment of provincial assemblies as a preliminary step to the convocation of a National Assembly. This promise was actually carried out when the former were convened in October of 1909. The members were selected by electoral colleges composed of representatives chosen by a carefully restricted electorate, and the powers and functions of the assembly were limited with equal care. The regulations governing them stated that "it must not be forgotten that all deliberative bodies are restricted in their functions to debate. They have absolutely no executive powers."<sup>6</sup> And in the main they could only debate propositions sub-

<sup>5</sup> "Amer. For. Rel.," 1908, incl. 1 in no. 1005, p. 192.

<sup>6</sup> From translation of regulations given "Amer. For. Rel.," 1908, incl. in no. 989.

mitted to them by the Viceroy or Governor. The intention obviously was to create agencies for the ascertainment of public opinion rather than governing bodies. As such they would have served to indicate the sincerity of the rulers while not unduly interfering with them. Unfortunately for the Manchus, however, the assemblies immediately began to give voice to provincial grievances, serving as focal points for the expression of unrest and dissatisfaction. They united in pressing for a shortening of the period of preparation before the establishment of a parliament; they expressed dissatisfaction with the Imperial Government's railway policy; and they asserted themselves in the actual development of provincial policy, many times in opposition to the Governor or Viceroy. Their activities outside the range of their legal functions were so noteworthy that it may be said that in some of the provinces they were in a fair way to establish themselves in a controlling position. After the outbreak of the revolution they served in some cases as an agency of direction. On the whole they facilitated the revolutionary development instead of helping to retard it.

In yet another direction the year 1908 was of outstanding importance, for within a short interval of time both the Emperor and the Empress-Dowager died. The death of Kuang Hsu was not especially significant, but the death of the Empress-Dowager at almost the same time removed from the helm the strong hand of a truly remarkable woman who had ruled China since 1860. When the Emperor died the Old Buddha, not anticipating her own early end, provided for the accession of another minor to the Throne, with Prince Ch'un named as the Nominal Regent. Her death left him in a position of real rather than nominal authority.<sup>7</sup> The Regent was a well-meaning man, but had not sufficient knowledge or strength to cope with an increasingly difficult and complex situation. Nor was there at Peking any man of sufficient wisdom and ability to deal with it. The one strong man of progressive tendencies who might have saved the Manchus was sent into retirement in 1908 in fulfilment of a last request of the Emperor. Yüan Shih-k'ai had incurred the undying enmity of Kuang Hsu as a result of his participation in the coup d'état of 1898. In consequence of this the Emperor demanded, on his death bed, Yüan Shih-k'ai's life. Moreover, Yüan Shih-k'ai had the strong man's usual quota of active enemies at court, and the death of Tzu Hsi removed his principal supporter. Prince Ch'un did not feel free to accomplish his death, but he did give him leave to go into retirement. "He has now, however, been seized with a disease in the feet which makes it difficult for him to move about and thus renders him unfit for the performance of his duties. We therefore Decree that as a mark of compassion he shall forthwith vacate his posts and retire to his native place for the purpose of treating his

*Death of  
Emperor and  
Empress-  
Dowager*

*Forced  
retirement of  
Yüan Shih-k'ai*

<sup>7</sup> Which, however, he had to share with the widow of Kuang Hsu, the new Empress-Dowager.

complaint."<sup>8</sup> With him went out of public life many of the able officials with whom he had surrounded himself.

Thus simultaneously the two principal figures of strength at Peking were lost to the government, and with their passing a question was automatically raised as to the future of reform. This question was answered in an edict of November 25, 1909. "We will reverently obey the edict issued on the first day of the eighth moon last year." Reform was to be continued but without a strong central direction, and, in the result, in such a manner as to justify the belief that only constantly applied pressure would avail to secure the realization of the 1908 program.

The new régime continued the issuance of proclamations instituting, by edict and in most cases on paper only, changes in the system of local government and enlarging educational opportunities. There was, however, a tendency then, as also later under the Republic, to consider the reform accomplished with the publication of the edict. And so far as the central government assumed a merely hortatory rôle, it laid itself open to the charge of lack of sincerity. On the other hand, since many of the changes could be inaugurated only with the coöperation of provincial officials, the Peking government may deserve only part of the blame.

One major change which passed beyond the paper stage, the establishment of provincial assemblies, has already been noted. Another was the convocation of the National Assembly in October, 1910. This body was so constituted as entirely to warrant the belief that it would be essentially conservative, seeing "eye to eye" with the government. One-half of its membership was selected by Imperial appointment and the other half was elected by the provincial assemblies. Since the members of the latter were chosen indirectly on the basis of a carefully restricted electorate, the provincial representatives should have been little less conservative than the Imperial nominees. But actually the history of the National Assembly resembled that of the provincial bodies. It asserted itself from the beginning in opposition to the government. It took up and pressed the case for an earlier promulgation of the constitution than was contemplated in the nine-year program, securing a promise of the shortening of the period of preparation to five years, with the establishment of a parliament in 1913. It attacked the policy of the government in financial matters and on questions of administration, and was prevented from impeaching the Council of State only because of concessions on the point at issue. It demanded, in the spring of 1911, the creation of a responsible cabinet and forced an acceptance of the principle before its adjournment. All of its activities indicated its intention of keeping the government in the path of reform, and even of modifying and enlarging the reform program. These intentions, it may be noted, were indicated before the outbreak of rebellion

<sup>8</sup> KENT, *Passing of the Manchus*, p. 43.

of any one making trouble under whatever pretext, to disturb the peace, he is to be dealt with according to law.<sup>1</sup>

This, in no uncertain terms, announced to the country that the new régime accepted as its primary obligation the preservation of peace and order. The continuance in official position of those who held power gave them more of a legal title to rule and brought them under the theoretical supervision of Peking. From another standpoint it meant, roughly speaking, that the President had men in high position in the northern provinces who were loyal to him rather than to the Republic, while in the southern provinces the officials were supporters of the republican principle and of the radical party which disputed Yüan's supremacy at Peking.

Another step forward was taken with the construction of a Cabinet. T'ang Shao-yi, one of the President's protégés in Imperial days, and the Imperial Peace Commissioner in 1911, was appointed Premier. This was a selection eminently satisfactory to the Nanking Council, as T'ang had established close relations with the Cantonese in the Shanghai government, and was even then preparing to throw in his lot with the radical party—the *Tung Meng Hui*. But when it came to the completion of the Cabinet, there was difficulty in securing the Council's assent to the President's nominations. The most serious opposition, for obvious reasons, was to his selections for the Ministries of War and Finance. The Premier was finally forced to go to Nanking to negotiate about them directly with the Council. The result was a compromise with the balance of advantage resting with the President. His first choice, Tuan Chi-jui, was confirmed as Minister of War, and Hsiung Hsi-ling, a Hunan man who had been an active revolutionary, became Finance Minister.<sup>2</sup> As an offset to the appointment of Tuan the President agreed to name the revolutionary leader, Huang Hsing, as Resident-General of Nanking, with supreme command over the southern armies. The other members of this first Cabinet either were members of the *Tung Meng Hui* or had no party affiliation which would make it difficult for them to co-operate with the National Council. With the legalization of the position of the provincial officials, the adoption of a provisional constitution, and the organization of a Cabinet, and after the legislature had convened at Peking, the provisional republican government may be considered to have been fairly established and the new régime brought under way.

*Construction  
of Cabinet*

### 3. THE FINANCIAL PROBLEM

Turning, now, to the second major problem confronting the republican government, that of finance, we find one much more difficult of solution. As has already been pointed out, the national treasury was empty, and it would take time and the restoration of

*Attempt to  
fill empty  
treasury by  
borrowing*

<sup>1</sup> The entire mandate is translated, *China Year Book*, 1913, pp. 486-487.

<sup>2</sup> He was not, however, the first choice of the Council.

order in the provinces before tax collections could be expected to approach the normal. Consequently the President was confronted with the necessity of borrowing both to meet immediate administrative expenses and to finance the disbandment of the swollen military forces, as well as to effect a general administrative reorganization. The way was prepared for this when the Powers, after the Emperor had abdicated, intimated that the ban on loans had been lifted. Negotiations were immediately instituted with the members of the Four Powers Banking group for a large administrative loan. The group had been expanded to include Japan and Russia, although they were borrowing rather than lending nations, and England and France had to agree to help them float their respective shares of the loan. The reason for their inclusion was political, and was due to the fact that the loan proceeds were to be used for general governmental purposes, and the loan was to be secured by the pledging of parts of the revenue system of the Republic. They were also included as a means of reënföring the financial monopoly of the group.

To meet the most pressing needs, the group bankers agreed to make monthly advances in February and March, in return for which the President gave them on March 7 a "firm option" on the comprehensive loan of \$125,000,000 for reorganization purposes, provided their terms were as favorable as could be obtained elsewhere.

In spite of this undertaking, and only six days after it had been entered into, the government concluded an agreement for a loan of £10,000,000 with an Anglo-Belgian syndicate. The International Loan Group, charging bad faith, immediately suspended negotiations with the Premier, who, however, secured the ratification of the Belgian loan agreement by the Nanking Council at the same time that he was seeking to persuade it to accept the President's Cabinet nominations. Upon his return to Peking, however, he found that he would have to resume negotiations with the Six Powers Group, as he could not find the sums needed elsewhere. Consequently he was compelled to accede to the demand that the Belgian agreement be cancelled except in so far as the advances already made were concerned. A subsequent attempt to secure funds outside the group failed when the governments concerned brought pressure to bear on Mr. Crisp, who had ventured, as an independent financier, to make a loan agreement with the Chinese government, and forced him to cancel his agreement. Thus by reason of its own necessity and its inability to secure funds elsewhere because of the virtual monopoly of support given by England, France, Germany, the United States, Japan, and Russia to the financial institutions included in the group, the Chinese government was finally compelled to accept the terms offered by the international syndicate in spite of the opposition which developed.

This opposition, centering in the legislative body, was based upon the demand of the bankers for reorganization, under foreign direction, of the Salt Gabelle, which was to serve as the principal security for



the loan, and that for supervision of expenditure of the loan funds. These conditions, unobjectionable in themselves in view of past experience with Chinese officialdom in financial matters, were opposed as driving in still further the wedge of foreign financial control. It was pointed out that they were as objectionable as any suggested during Imperial days and that the new, enlightened, and republican, régime did not deserve the treatment justly meted out to the corrupt and backward Manchus. This position was also taken by President Wilson, who withdrew official and exclusive governmental support from the American bankers, partly on the ground of the monopoly character of the groups, and partly because the loan conditions unduly impaired the administrative integrity of China. The loan contract, consequently was entered into with a Five Powers Group.

The negotiations were completed by the end of 1912, and the agreement received the assent of the Council. Since this was made much of later, it may be well to point out that at the time many of the *Tung Meng Hui* members were away campaigning for election to the new Parliament, and that the measure was put through a rump legislature largely by bribery. Furthermore, after China had assented to the terms of the contract, the Powers fell into a dispute over the apportionment of adviserships among the participating states, and it was not until the spring of 1913, as the new Parliament was convening, that the agreement was put into its final form and duly signed.

*Agreement not  
completed until  
April 1913*

#### 4. CONFLICT BETWEEN PRESIDENT AND ASSEMBLY

The newly elected Assembly was a much more difficult body for the President to deal with than the Council which sat in Peking during 1912. The members of the latter had been divided into many groups, three of which were of importance, but none of which had an absolute control of the legislature. One group was, on the whole, conservative, and consequently it generally supported the President. A second was representative of the more radical elements of the south. And the third, holding the balance of power, had no definite point of view in parliamentary matters. This situation was of advantage to the President since, by playing off one group against another, and by occasionally using money to convert the third element to his point of view, he was generally able to find enough votes to support his policies. It was thus that he was able to secure assent to the loan agreement.

*Groups in the  
Council*

This must not be taken to imply, however, that Peking was placid during the life of the Council, for quite the contrary was the case. Trouble developed, for example, between the President and the Premier, since T'ang Shao-yi was as determined that the Cabinet should be the real executive as Yüan Shih-k'ai was determined that he would not permit himself to be relegated to the background.

*President vs.  
Cabinet*

On June 15 the Premier suddenly resigned and retired from Peking.

to Tientsin. The real reason for his resignation was that he thought he could force the President to construct a party rather than a non-party Cabinet. In this the *Tung Meng Hui* members of the Council supported him. The President refused to accept the principle of party government and, after a severe contest, reconstructed the Cabinet under the presidency of a non-party man, Lu Chêng-hsiang, with the *Tung Meng Hui* excluded from participation.

The antagonism between the radical party and the President was further increased when, in July and August, two prominent revolutionaries were seized and shot, the charges against them being preferred by Vice-President Li Yuan-hung.<sup>3</sup> The Council, refused proofs of their guilt, threatened to impeach the government, but was unable to carry out the threat, since the conservative members absented themselves, preventing action on account of the lack of a quorum. Subsequent attempts to impeach were similarly prevented, but the fact that they were made indicates the lack of harmony at Peking, and the outcome of each trial points to the strength of the President.

The Parliament which met in 1913 presented a much more difficult problem, since it was controlled in both branches by the radical party, which had reorganized in August 1912 in order to carry on the contest against the President more effectively, amalgamating with several other factions under the name *Kuo Min Tang* (nationalist or democratic party). Consequently Yüan Shih-k'ai had to face a united and much more formidable opposition than before. Of the method of election of members of the Assembly it is only necessary to say that it was fixed by election laws passed by the Council in August; that the members of the Senate were chosen indirectly, either by the provincial assembly or by electoral colleges, six being selected by an electoral college of overseas Chinese; and that the House of Representatives consisted of members chosen theoretically by direct vote of the people but actually indirectly, with every eight million people being entitled to one representative, but with every province, regardless of population, having at least ten.<sup>4</sup>

In spite of its reorganization and of its success in the elections the *Kuo Min* party lost in its first opposition to presidential policy. It protested vehemently against the signature of the Reorganization Loan Agreement before it had been submitted to, and had received the assent of, Parliament, but Yüan Shih-k'ai maintained that the constitutional requirements had been observed since it had been accepted by the Council; and the diplomatic body, when appealed to directly, took the position that it was empowered to deal with China only through the President, and consequently the agreement was signed by the representatives of the financial groups.

<sup>3</sup> Elevated to that position by the Nanking Council at the time when it elected Yüan President. He was also acting as the Hukuang Viceroy.

<sup>4</sup> For detailed analysis, see VINACKE, *Modern Constitutional Development in China*, pp. 141-147.

This action strengthened the position of the President in two ways. In the first place, it gave him the moral support of the Powers. It indicated clearly that they preferred to deal with the "strong man," capable of affording security for an investment, rather than to strengthen the cause of parliamentary government by insisting upon the observance of the constitutional provision by which all loan agreements had to receive the assent of the Assembly before becoming effective. In the second place, the President was strengthened by being furnished the financial means to enable him to consolidate his power. The major portion of the proceeds of the loan, it is true, was devoted to paying off existing foreign obligations, returning the funds already advanced, and making up arrears in payment of interest and principal on the Boxer indemnity, but the remainder was available for use by Yüan Shih-k'ai.

*Position of  
President  
strengthened*

Strengthened by the loan, the President proceeded to the task of consolidating his power. Parliament continually struggled against this, opposing all suggestions, whether good or bad, emanating from the President's office. By doing this, instead of attempting to develop a constructive program of its own, the Assembly gained the name of a purely obstructive body, active only in interfering with the President who was attempting to restore peace and order in the country. In spite of this opposition at Peking, Yüan Shih-k'ai gradually gained the upper hand in the provinces. He used every possible means to assert and consolidate his authority—gradually displacing troops and commanders in central and southern China with those faithful to himself, maintaining agents everywhere to keep him informed of conditions and sentiment throughout the country, and even resorting, according to his opponents, to assassination for political purposes, the murder at Shanghai in March, 1913, of Sung Chia-jen, one of the *Kuo Min* leaders, being the first in a series of acts of violence for which he was held responsible.

*Consolidation  
of power  
undertaken by  
President*

Finally, in the summer of 1913, he removed the *Kuo Min* military governor (*Tutuh*) of Kiangsi province, ostensibly in pursuance of his declared policy of substituting civil authority for that of the military. The policy undoubtedly was sound, but it looked bad to have him put it into effect only where his opponents were in power, and that is precisely what he had done. Failing to check him at Peking, the radical leaders had been laying plans for another "revolution" to complete the work begun in the first. This activity was probably well known to the President, so that when his appointment of a Civil Administrator for Kiangsi, followed by the removal of the *Tutuh*, precipitated a crisis, he was not caught unprepared. The consequence was the "Summer Revolution" of 1913, an uprising in the Yangtse valley, which merely served to exhibit the weakness of the opposition and the strength of the President. It was suppressed with remarkable ease, and was actually of material advantage to Yüan, because it enabled him to send more of his troops south to strategic locations,

*"Summer  
Revolution"  
of 1913*

and because it gave him an excuse to drive some of his opponents from the country and later to order the dissolution of the *Kuo Min Tang* itself as a treasonable organization on the ground that some of its leaders had been implicated in the revolt.

Before this was accomplished, and with it the virtual dissolution of the Parliament, the legislature completed part of the permanent constitution on which it had been at work since its convocation. The attempt to frame a permanent instrument of government to replace the Nanking (provisional) constitution was one endeavor of a constructive character which must be set down to the credit of the Parliament. If it had concentrated its efforts so as to complete it within a few months, it might have strengthened itself in the eyes of the country. As it was, it paid only intermittent attention to the work of constitution-framing until after the end of the rebellion. Then, seeing the hand-writing on the wall, the Assembly hurried to complete the document. It was being framed by a large committee of members selected by each House, and this committee met, interestingly, at the Temple of Heaven to engage in the work of laying the theoretical foundations for the Republic. The committee carefully refused to allow the President to participate or to influence its work, not even consenting to hear his views as to the needed governmental machinery. This of course did not tend to produce a better understanding between the executive and the legislature.

Yüan, however, was interested in consolidating his position through election as permanent President, and he urged, bribed, and cajoled the Assembly into passing the section dealing with the presidential office. Then, under the double pretext of celebrating the anniversary of the revolution, and of securing recognition from the Powers,<sup>5</sup> he carried through his election as permanent President. Three ballots were necessary before this was accomplished and, had it not been for bribery and coercion, it is possible that Li Yuan-hung would have been elected instead of Yüan Shih-k'ai. However that may be, he was elected, and on October 10, 1913, he was inaugurated as the first permanent President of the Chinese Republic, thus further strengthening his position in the eyes of the people.

The constitution drafting committee passed the entire draft of the permanent constitution on October 26, but before it could be formally accepted by Parliament that body had ceased to exist. Of the new constitution it need only be said that it continued the limitations on the executive provided for in the Nanking Constitution, and, in addition, provided for a permanent legislative committee which was to supervise the executive when Parliament was not in session.

The new constitution was immediately denounced in a flood of telegrams from officials in the provinces, possibly at the suggestion

<sup>5</sup> The United States alone among the Great Powers had recognized the Republic. England had withheld recognition pending settlement of the Tiberan question.

of the President, and in some cases the dissolution of Parliament was demanded. These protests, together with the implication of the *Kuo Min Tang* in the "Summer Revolution," were used by Yüan Shih-k'ai to justify his next moves. On November 4, 1913, with the concurrence of his Cabinet, he ordered the dissolution of the *Kuo Min* party as a seditious organization. This almost automatically brought about the dissolution of the Assembly for lack of a quorum, and while never formally dissolved, it was indefinitely suspended by a presidential mandate issued on January 10, 1914. This virtually ended the parliamentary régime in China, although its fiction was carefully preserved by the President for a year.

The people, it may be noted, showed their complete indifference to the change in governmental status by raising no objection to the dissolution. The idea that the Republic, and with it representative government, was founded upon an active popular desire and interest, was shown to be nothing more than a theory developed for revolutionary purposes. Of course some explanation in justification of the popular attitude may be made, but it is not entirely complimentary to the Assembly. Put in a strong position by a constitution of its own making, that body had shown itself to be entirely obstructive rather than constructive, and it was more than suspected of corruption. It had developed no plan of reorganization of its own to substitute for that of the President to which it raised objection. It had enacted no legislation for the benefit of the country. It had appeared to be a worse than useless cog in the machine and, for that reason, it had not endeared itself to thinking people. Yüan, on the other hand, had been active in the development of a constructive program. Further than this many argued that he had a legal right to effect changes in the governmental system as long as he maintained China as a Republic, for he had been commissioned by the Manchus to organize a republican form of government for the country.

In defense of the Parliament the fact may be noted that it was controlled by inexperienced young men, intolerant of the old régime and its officers by reason of their training. They needed time in which to temper their ideas and to evolve satisfactory methods of parliamentary action. Yüan Shih-k'ai made no greater allowance for their impulsiveness and inexperience than they made for his effort to keep the administrative machinery running. The intolerance of inexperienced reformers was met by the intolerance of the tried administrator for the projects of the untried. Furthermore, the attitude of the so-called democratic states, from the very beginning, constituted a hindrance to the establishment of a satisfactory parliamentary régime. It is strangely true that the democratic governments of the West have been suspicious of democratic experiments in regions where their nationals have built up property interests, and that they have invariably sought a strong man with whom to deal. The "slap in

Indifference of  
people to  
dissolution

Reasons for  
failure of  
Parliament

the face" administered to the parliamentarians early in 1913 had much to do with the Parliament's failure to maintain itself.

#### 5. GOVERNMENT UNDER THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMPACT

After the dissolution of the Assembly, Yüan Shih-k'ai proceeded to work out his own conception of a republican régime, one adapted to a country accustomed to personal rule and with a population of a low degree of literacy. On the whole his system embodied the ideas of Dr. Goodnow, an American who was one of his foreign advisers. The latter suggested that China was ready only for a dictatorship, tempered by the existence of an advisory assembly which should be constituted largely by appointment and which should represent group interests rather than individuals. These views coincided with the President's conceptions as well as his interest. Thus during the early part of 1914 it became clear that China had reverted to the status of about 1909 so far as her political life was concerned, and that the attempt would be made to develop from that point. The chief difference was that she had a dictatorial President rather than a weak Emperor, and consequently it was probable that her evolution would be even slower than might have been expected under the Manchus.

The first step toward establishing the new régime was taken in January, immediately after the suspension of Parliament, when a hand-picked Political Council was constituted. Under its advice the President then brought into being a Constitutional Council, which met for the first time March 18, 1914. Its chief function was to revise the Nanking Constitution so as to give a constitutional status to the new order. This it did by framing what came to be known as the Constitutional Compact, China's second provisional constitution. Under the Compact all power was concentrated in the hands of the President, who was to be elected for a ten-year period, with the right to extend his own term of office if he saw fit, or virtually to name his own successor.<sup>6</sup> The Cabinet was replaced by a Secretary of State, appointed by and responsible to the President, together with heads of departments or boards. The legislature was to have strictly advisory powers,<sup>7</sup> and a Council of State was to serve as the sole advisory body until the creation of the *Li Fa Yuan* (legislative assembly), and was thereafter to have the sole right to recommend constitutional changes. A reference to the "constitutional principles" of the Empress-Dowager will serve to show the similarity of the President's ideas to those of the earlier period of constitutional development.

Under the Constitutional Compact the President proceeded to govern as the dictatorial "strong man," whom China was assumed

<sup>6</sup> This was provided for in the Presidential Election Law.

<sup>7</sup> This was the only part of the proposed organization which was never carried into effect.

to need. He ruthlessly removed his political opponents where he was able to reach them, and those who, while outwardly friendly, were strong enough conceivably to oppose him in case matters were pushed to the extreme, were concentrated in Peking where he could closely supervise their actions. In spite of the paper developments toward a modified constitutionalism, China was governed during all of 1914 by terrorist methods. Spies were everywhere and no man dared to express his thoughts freely; the press, outside of the foreign concessions, was muzzled; and political assassinations became even more common. And yet it must be recognized that the people, on the whole, were not dissatisfied. Order was being restored gradually, and with it a more normal life; the sort of personal rule thus instituted was something they were accustomed to; the reëmphasis which Yüan laid on the Confucian morality, and the resumption of the Confucian worship furnished a link between past experience and the new order; and the Republic, with a fiction of representative government, was preserved. It was only the political "outs" who were dissatisfied. The masses had no concern with forms of government and methods of political action so long as they could sow and reap, and provide for the needs of their ancestors and for their own needs as potential ancestors. The revolution had disturbed them temporarily with its ideas of liberty, freedom from taxation, queue cutting, the end of foot-binding, and, in general, Westernization of the country. But, even so, the villagers had been very little disturbed. The new ideas had gained a real foothold only in the vicinity of the treaty ports, and China, as represented by the villages, acquiesced readily enough in the régime set up by Yüan Shih-k'ai, the holder of the Imperial mandate to institute a Republic, and the properly elected President. Thus, by the end of 1914, the President seemed to be securely entrenched in control, and, in all probability, he might have continued to rule as dictator if he had been content with the substance of power.

*Method of  
government  
under the  
Compact*

But there were foreign foes as well as domestic opponents to reckon with. Shortly after the founding of the Republic trouble had developed in Mongolia, and an independent Mongol government had been proclaimed. There had been a growing dissatisfaction with Chinese rule for some time as a result of the encroachments of Chinese settlers and the attempt to extend the governmental system of China proper to parts of Mongolia, an attempt which threatened the rule of the Mongol nobility. There seems also to have developed a nationalist movement which helped to strengthen the other separatist tendencies. Added to all of this was an active Russian intrigue against the Chinese rulers, Russia's interest being in establishing checks on the northward movement of the Chinese. It is not possible here to do more than note the consequences of this state of affairs. On December 1, 1911, the Chinese authorities were forced to withdraw from Mongolia and an independent government was instituted.

*The question of  
Mongolia*

During 1912 China attempted, with partial success in Inner Mongolia, to reestablish her authority. But in November Russia recognized the Urga government and concluded an agreement with it. Negotiations subsequently ensued between Russia and China and Mongolia and China to secure a definition of the position of the area. China and Russia, without the participation of the Government of Outer Mongolia, concluded a convention on November 5, 1913, by which the autonomy but not the independence of Outer Mongolia was recognized, China continuing as the suzerain. On June 7, 1915, a tripartite agreement was reached by which Outer Mongolia accepted the terms of the Sino-Russian Convention. Under the circumstances this agreement was a diplomatic victory for Yüan Shih-k'ai, but it was only a partial one, since it signaled, together with the 1913 agreement, the formal recognition of a Russian interest in Mongolian affairs.

At the same time Tibet revolted against the authority of China. The Chinese garrison at Lhasa revolted at the time of the revolution, the outbreak being marked by such excesses that the Tibetans rose and drove the Chinese out of the country. They later celebrated their triumph by concluding, as an independent people, an agreement with the Mongolian government on January 11, 1913. After the establishment of the republican régime at Peking, steps were taken to restore Chinese authority in Tibet, but the British protested against any effort, by military means, to reestablish China's control. This led to fruitless negotiations during 1913 and to a tripartite conference in 1914, out of which came an agreement providing for: 1) the complete autonomy of Tibet proper; 2) the right of China to maintain a Resident at Lhasa with a suitable guard; and 3) a semi-autonomous zone in Eastern Tibet in which China would occupy a stronger position.<sup>8</sup> This agreement, however, was never ratified, and the end of the Yüan Shih-k'ai régime came before any solution had been found. Thus British action with respect to Tibet had the same embarrassing consequences for the Republic as Russian intrigue had in Mongolia.

But the most serious situation developed out of Japanese participation in the World War. In the first place, the Japanese advance on Tsingtao put China as a neutral power in an anomalous position. A partially satisfactory way out was found in the proclamation of a war zone and the attempt to restrict Japanese military movements to this zone. At the beginning of 1915, since all reason for hostilities had ended, the zone was declared abolished. Following this action on the part of China, and using it as a pretext, Japan served her Twenty-one Demands on the President. These need not be discussed at this point, but the internal consequences of Japan's action must be referred to in order to make the story of the Yüan Shih-k'ai era complete. The demands, when they became known, aroused a widespread hostility to Japan, and developed a united support of the President in his resistance to the Japanese pressure. This support was manifested

<sup>8</sup> *China Year Book*, 1916, p. 606.



through the organization of national societies, the collection of funds, by widespread popular subscription, for the defense of the country, and the expression of loyalty on the part of leaders who had been in opposition to Yüan Shih-k'ai. All of this was assumed by the President to indicate his personal strength in the country, although it was, fundamentally, an expression of an incipient nationalism, awakened by the most dangerous single attack yet launched on the integrity of China.

#### 6. THE MONARCHICAL MOVEMENT

During the course of the negotiations it seems to have been intimated to Yüan that Japan would be sympathetic to the reestablishment of the monarchy, provided the aspirant to the Imperial position was favorably inclined toward her, and would give concrete evidence of his favor by the granting of the Japanese request, embodied in the demands, for a dominant position in the country. It is well known that the leading Japanese statesmen had never looked with favor on the Republic and had hopes of its early demise. It is true that the 1911 and also the 1913 revolutionists had received aid and support from unofficial Japanese sources, but this was indicative of interest, not in the radical cause, but rather in the production of disorder in China. However, while not hostile to the monarchical principle, Japan not only distrusted Yüan Shih-k'ai but also feared him, because he seemed capable of restoring China to her natural position of strength in the world, and because he had been in opposition to Japan's continental program since his Korean days. Consequently it was not considered to Japan's interest to see Yüan Shih-k'ai made the permanent ruler, unless and until he became more sympathetic to her. When the monarchical suggestion was made it was a bid for Yüan's support. This he refused to give, even in exchange for such a *quid pro quo*. But he seemed to consider that the expressions of opinion in China in his favor as the defender of the country were such as to make it an opportune time for him to establish himself as the founder of a new dynasty.

*Japan  
favorable to  
reestablishment  
of monarchy*

During the spring and summer of 1915 societies were formed, headed by men close to the President, to cultivate an opinion favorable to the restoration of the monarchy. The most influential of these was the *Chou An-hui* (Peace Preservation Society). The moving spirits in this organization were Yang Tu, a member of the Council of State, and Liang Shih-yi, head of the Bank of Communications and leader of the strong Communication's clique in Peking, both intimates of President Yüan Shih-k'ai. As the agitation reached the stage of open discussion, an expression of opinion, of an academic sort, as to the proper form of government for China was obtained from a former legal adviser to the President, Dr. Frank J. Goodnow, who was visiting in Peking. In his memorandum Dr. Goodnow expressed the opinion that "the monarchical system is better suited

*Activities of  
Chou An-hui*

*The Goodnow  
memorandum*

to China than the Republican system. For if China's independence is to be maintained, the government should be constitutional, and in consideration of China's conditions as well as her relations with other powers, it will be easier to form a constitutional government by adopting a monarchy than a Republic."<sup>9</sup> Three conditions must be observed, however, the writer went on to point out, before such a change should be instituted. Adequate provision for the succession should be made; it must be certain that the people would acquiesce in the change and that the Powers would not oppose it; and definite provision must be made for the progressive development of constitutionalism in China. This memorandum was used as the basis for the continued monarchist agitation.

When opposition began to develop it established its theoretical position on a counter-argument prepared by the noted Chinese scholar, Liang Ch'i-Ch'ao.<sup>10</sup> He had been one of the 1898 reformers, had stood for constitutional monarchy up to the organization of the Republic, and had supported the President in the overthrow of Parliament and the establishment of the dictatorship. Consequently he could not be accused of undue radicalism. His argument ran that the time for unsettling the country by a change in the form of the state had passed, that the Republic should be accepted as a fact, and that every effort should be bent toward a reorganization of the government so as to restore peace and order and give an efficient administration. Furthermore, he pointed out that Yuan Shih-k'ai had been given a term of office long enough to enable him to accomplish this work, and that if ten years were not sufficient, his term could be extended for another ten-year period.

However, the President himself was back of the agitation and the machinery was all under his control. Undoubtedly inspired by him, the Council of State memorialized in favor of the restoration of monarchy, saying that the people demanded it and that he, as President, was bound to follow the direction of public opinion. At first Yüan appeared reluctant and refused to consider making the change. But, instead of ordering agitation for it to cease, as he must have done if he had been sincere, he merely directed the Council of State to give the matter more careful consideration. Since it continued to insist on the desirability of restoring the monarchy, he finally gave in, with an appearance of extreme reluctance.

In order, however, to keep up the pretense that he was merely carrying out the will of the people, President Yüan directed that steps should be taken to enable the people to express themselves formally on the contemplated change. Machinery had already been perfected and set in motion to bring into being a representative assembly as provided for under the terms of the Constitutional Compact, and this machinery was speeded up so as to establish, at an

<sup>9</sup> *National Review* (China), Aug. 28, 1915.

<sup>10</sup> For translation of his pamphlet see WEALB, *Fight for the Republic*, Ch. X.

early date, a "Convention of Citizen's Representatives" to pass upon the question of a change in the form of the state. This Convention was duly convened, and it registered a unanimous verdict in favor of monarchy. This unanimity of opinion was due to the fact that careful instructions as to the voting were sent out from Peking; the ballots were prepared and marked in advance; the members of the Conventions had to sign their ballots; the meeting halls were surrounded by soldiers with fixed bayonets, and soldiers were in the meeting rooms; and each ballot was scrutinized before the voter left the hall. Consequently it is not a matter for wonder that the representatives were unanimous in their desire for monarchy and for Yüan Shih-k'ai as Emperor.

Before the movement had gone very far foreign disapproval of the proposed change was voiced. On October 28 Great Britain and Russia united with Japan, at the latter's suggestion, in tendering advice against making the change. The United States refused to add its voice, on the ground that only China was concerned with the form of her government. The opposition was put upon the ground that it was unwise to disturb an existing equilibrium and to stir up trouble when the international situation was so unsettled. A further protest was voiced in November, this time France and Italy joining with the other three in making it.

*Powers object  
to change*

Yüan replied that nothing would be done except with the full support of public opinion. When the second protest was made he was able to point to the affirmative vote of the Convention as indicative of popular approval of the change. Furthermore, he was sufficiently convinced of his ability to control any opposition which might develop to give assurances to the Powers that there would be no serious trouble. No further action was taken by the Powers, although Japan indicated that information at her disposal led to the belief that the southern provinces would not passively acquiesce in the reestablishment of monarchy. The next few months revealed the fact that Japan was better informed as to the possibility of opposition than was the Emperor-elect.

*Yüan convinced  
that no  
opposition  
would develop*

#### 7. "CANCELLATION" OF MONARCHY

While plans for the coronation were being perfected, revolt did break out in the extreme southwest. On December 23 a memorial against the change, and a demand for the cancellation of the monarchy, was sent to Peking from Yunnan province. When this demand was not complied with, the standard of revolt was openly raised. In spite of every effort put forth by the government—and it may be noted that it was almost uniformly successful from the military standpoint—the revolt spread until province after province had declared its independence of Peking. The revolutionists at first demanded the cancellation of the monarchy, the restoration of the Nanking constitution as the basic law of the Republic, and the reconstitution of the 1913 Assembly.

*Revolt in  
southwest*

In the face of this opposition, and of defection in the ranks of his own followers in the north, Yüan Shih-k'ai weakened to the extent of declaring that he would give up the idea of restoring the monarchy, saving his "face" by stating that he had been misled in his belief that it was the wish of the country that he should ascend the Dragon Throne. This indication of weakness, instead of satisfying the republicans, merely emboldened them to extend their demands to include the complete elimination of Yüan Shih-k'ai from Chinese politics. This, for a time, he refused to consider, although he further temporized by reviving the Cabinet and ostensibly transferring the executive power to it and handing over control of the military establishment to the Minister of War. Ultimately, however, he was forced to give in and consent to retire from office. Just when agreement was imminent the controversy was settled unexpectedly by the death, on June 6, 1916, of the President. Thus the period of the first reaction against true republicanism came to an end as a result of the elimination of the "strong man" who had been looked to by so many as the only person capable of bringing stability to China.

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## CHAPTER XII

### GROWTH OF MILITARY POWER IN CHINA

#### I. RECONSTRUCTION OF THE GOVERNMENT AFTER DEATH OF YÜAN SHIH-K'AI

THE events of 1915-1916 served to expunge from the memory of the people the failures of parliamentary government during 1912-1914, or where they were remembered they were ascribed solely to the machinations of Yüan Shih-k'ai. It was thought that he, rather than the lack of readiness of the people and the deficiencies of the legislative leadership, had been the chief obstacle to the attainment of constitutional government of the parliamentary type. He it was who had dissolved the Assembly after gathering the reins of power into his own hands; he had been responsible for the introduction of one man government under the Constitutional Compact. Consequently his death was expected to inaugurate an orderly resumption of power by the Assembly. This was the avowed aim of those who had risen in arms against the reestablishment of the monarchy—an aim which had been accepted by Yüan himself before his death. It was natural that the members of the Assembly who, in June 1916, had begun to gather at Shanghai preparatory to resuming their positions at Peking, should have forgotten their own sins of omission and of commission. But bitter experience should have taught them that Yüan was merely the central representative of a system of provincial military control, and that his death had not ended the system but had only temporarily weakened it.

*Failures of  
parliamentary  
régime forgotten*

There were, in addition, several important questions which had to be answered before the new parliamentary era could begin. In the first place, which of the two constitutions (both provisional) should be considered as in force? If the Compact, then the old Assembly had no legal right of existence. If the Nanking Constitution, then the term of office of the members of the lower house had expired, since they had been elected in 1913 for three years, and one-third of the Senate had to stand for reelection before the upper house could sit with full membership. Because of this situation, coupled with the demand of the "independent" provinces that the old Assembly should resume power, it was decided to regard the first provisional constitution as operative, but to consider the years 1914-1916 as an interregnum, allowing the members of the Assembly to sit out their entire terms with the subtraction of the period of dissolution from the time served. By this expedient it was made possible for the Assembly to

*Nanking  
provisional  
Constitution  
revived*

begin its work as part of the machinery of government without the delay attendant upon the holding of new elections.

*Li Yuan-hung  
accepted as  
President;  
Tuan Chi-jui  
the Premier*

The second question related to the constitution of the executive branch of the government. Yüan Shih-k'ai had transferred the executive powers to a Cabinet appointed by himself, without the confirmation of the parliamentary body, and had placed one of his henchmen, Tuan Chi-jui, as the Premier and Minister of War. Then, on his death-bed, he had requested Li Yuan-hung, as the Vice-President of the Republic, to assume the presidential office. Both President Li and Premier Tuan were military men, but with decidedly different attitudes toward the Republic and the exercise of power by Parliament. The former leaned toward the revolutionary point of view as it had been embodied in the Nanking constitution, as well he might since he had been an active figure in the revolution. The latter was of the school of Yüan Shih-k'ai, and he, rather than President Li, had the confidence of the conservative leaders and the military commanders in the north. Logically, whatever the choice for the presidency, a person more representative of the parliamentary point of view should have been made the Premier. But, because of his following, the Assembly confirmed Tuan Chi-jui in his position as Premier, making the same compromise which it had made in 1912 when it had elevated Yüan to the presidential office. It also accepted the accession of Li to the presidency to fill out the unexpired term of President Yüan. In the fall it proceeded to the election of a Vice-President, making selection of Fêng Kuo-chang, one of the strongly placed Viceroys on the Yangtse.

## 2. THE NEW ERA

*Comparative  
harmony at  
Peking*

The new era began harmoniously enough. The President was a convinced constitutionalist, and the Assembly for a time was on its best behavior. The Premier was confirmed in office without much opposition, and the Vice-President was elected in an orderly manner, the contest being carried on in the most approved parliamentary form. The only indication of trouble came with the constitution of the Cabinet, when some of the military governors, assembled in conclave under the leadership of an ex-imperialist, Chang Hsün, protested against the inclusion of T'ang Shao-yi, one of the leaders of the *Kuo Min* party, in the Cabinet as Minister of Foreign Affairs, and when they announced their intention to keep an eye on the Assembly in its work of constitution-framing. T'ang Shao-yi was not included in the Cabinet, and it was charged that the Premier was not sufficiently opposed to interference from the military. This incident caused bad feeling between the radical party in the Assembly and the executive, but it was largely forgotten as time elapsed without further interference from the military.

Chief interest at Peking, during the fall and early winter months of 1916, was attached to the work of framing a permanent constitution

for the Republic. The Assembly had been working on the draft of a permanent constitution at the time of its dissolution by Yüan Shih-k'ai, and had completed the section dealing with the President's office. Yüan, in turn, after he had established himself as dictator under the (provisional) Constitutional Compact, and before undertaking to restore the monarchy, had indicated an interest in the establishment of a permanent instrument of government by appointing a committee to frame it. After the monarchy had been revived, interest in the constitutional question was lost.

*Status of  
permanent  
constitution*

With the revival of the Assembly the work was taken up at the point reached before the dissolution, with the draft as a basis for further deliberation. Constitution-making was undertaken by the two chambers sitting at the Temple of Heaven as a Conference on the Constitution. The draft permanent constitution had been entirely the work of the Assembly, which had deliberately disregarded the point of view of the executive branch of the government, as presented to the committee by the President. Consequently it provided for the full supremacy of Parliament, and for continuing parliamentary supervision of the executive, when Parliament was not in session, through a permanent parliamentary committee. It was this feature of the constitution which was particularly objectionable to Yüan Shih-k'ai, and which he had seized upon as a legitimate excuse for the dissolution of the Assembly. In the main the draft followed the French model, provision being made for interpellation, for vote of want of confidence, and for dissolution of the Parliament only with the consent of the Senate. This last feature weakened the control of the executive by virtually denying it the right of appeal to the country against an adverse vote in the House of Representatives. The permanent constitution, as it came from the Conference on the Constitution in the early summer of 1917, continued all these features with the exception of the provision for a parliamentary committee to supervise the government when Parliament was not sitting. That provision was omitted, the chief ground of objection being that it gave too much power to a small number of members of Parliament.

*Debatable  
provisions of  
draft permanent  
constitution*

The chief difference of opinion which developed in the Conference on the Constitution was over the provincial system. The southern party wanted to establish a decentralized system, with the right to choose the Governor vested in the provincial Assembly. The conservatives, and the executive, on the other hand, advocated the continuance and the strengthening of the centralized administrative system inherited from the Manchus, with the ultimate aim of knitting the provinces together territorially, as well as from the administrative standpoint. Beyond this, the radicals wanted the provincial system provided for constitutionally, while the conservatives wanted it established by statute. On the whole question no agreement could be reached, and when the constitution was finally published, the chapter dealing with the provincial system was omitted.

*Difference of  
opinion over  
provincial  
system*

*Assembly again  
becomes  
obstructive*

As time went on after the establishment of the new régime, the early harmony tended to disappear, and for much the same reason as during the presidency of Yüan Shih-k'ai. The Assembly began to grow obstructionist so far as the suggestions emanating from the Cabinet were concerned, and, again, it failed to develop a constructive program to substitute for the one presented to it by the Premier. Heckling of Cabinet representatives became common, merely because it embarrassed the government. There were continual threats of impeachment, and, although none of them were carried out, certainly they did not make for mutual understanding. The Assembly continually rejected nominations to Cabinet office; the interest of the members in their work declined, so that adjournments for lack of a quorum became common; and many of the sessions of the Assembly were marked by extreme disorder, several of them ending in free-for-all fights.

*Failure of  
Premier to  
coöperate*

The Premier, on his side, failed to indicate a willingness to coöperate in good faith with the Assembly. He went about the business of government, just as had Yüan, as though what he did were no business of the legislators. Instead of advising with the Assembly as he worked out the details of the financial problem, which involved the making of loans and the reorganization of the revenue system, he made his arrangements and then asked the consent of the Assembly to something which had already been carried to completion. Sometimes he made nominations to office which he knew would be unacceptable in order to get later confirmation for a nomination only partly acceptable. And he insisted on relegating the President to a position of comparative obscurity, relying, of course, on provisions of a constitution which had been framed with the intention of restraining a "strong man" accepted as President from necessity rather than choice. It was a comparative lack of strength rather than desire which caused him to keep reasonably well within the limits of the Nanking constitution, and this became clear when he had behind him in opposition to Parliament the military power of the provinces.

### 3. THE WAR QUESTION

*War question  
provides  
material for  
internal conflict*

Serious trouble did not develop, however, until after the first months of 1917, when, again, a question from the outside provided the material for an internal crisis. The question was that of Chinese participation in the World War, a question which interests us here only because of its effect on internal politics, and which may therefore be stated only in its main outlines.

*Diplomatic  
relations with  
Germany  
severed*

When Germany announced her intention of engaging in unrestrained submarine warfare, the United States invited China, among other neutral states, to join her in protesting to the German government against its declared policy. On February 9, 1917, China sent a note of protest to Germany. When no satisfactory reply had been



received a month later, diplomatic relations were severed. In taking these first steps the Premier had the support of Parliament. While, at the beginning, the President was not so favorable because of a fear lest China should become involved in difficulties with an ultimately victorious Germany, he finally agreed to the severance of relations, subordinating his own opinion to that of Tuan Chi-jui.

When the breaking off of diplomatic relations had no effect in bringing about a modification of German policy, the government was forced to contemplate the third step—an actual declaration of war. There was considerable opposition to this in many quarters on the ground that China had nothing to gain by war with Germany, and had much to lose by becoming her active enemy. It was necessary, in order to counteract this feeling that the government should be able to show substantial advantage to China from joining the Powers at war with the German Empire. To this end negotiations were commenced with the representatives of the Entente Powers at Peking. . . .

*Opposition to  
declaration of  
war*

Before he had received a favorable reply from the Powers, the Premier gave Parliament to understand that he was assured of substantial concessions along the lines indicated if China joined the Entente. The negotiations dragged on, however, without any decision being reached, and interest in the war issue declined throughout the country. As interest lessened the majority of the government in Parliament decreased. It soon became apparent that the unanimity of the different departments extended only to the question of war with Germany, and that opposition was steadily growing even to the war policy of the Cabinet.

*Decline of  
interest in war  
question*

In order to divert attention from the unsatisfactory condition of the negotiations, Premier Tuan resorted to the expedient of asking the advice of the country. If it could be shown that a unanimous public sentiment favored war, he would have that to urge as a reason for the favorable action of Parliament irrespective of possible concessions from the Powers. To aid in the manufacturing of this sentiment Tuan summoned to a Conference some of the Military Governors.

*Conference of  
Military  
Governors  
summoned*

From the time this conference met the question of war became more a matter of internal politics than of foreign policy. The Military Governors assembled in Peking late in April, and the attention of the country was immediately centered upon their activities.<sup>1</sup>

From this time, when representatives of the military assembled to consult upon a matter of national policy, dates the ascendancy of the northern military party in Peking politics. For this reason space must be given to a description of the exact status of the military governor in the provinces and his influence on the central government prior to 1917.

*Ascendancy of  
military dates  
from conference*

#### 4. THE MILITARY GOVERNOR

Under Manchu rule, it will be remembered, the provincial establishment had consisted of a Viceroy or Governor, a treasurer, judge, the salt-comptroller, and the grain intendant, together with their deputies and assistants. The Viceroy (with jurisdiction over two or more provinces, with the exception of Chihli and Szechuan) and the Governor exercised substantially the same power within their juris-

*Manchu  
provincial  
system*

<sup>1</sup> VINACKE, *Modern Constitutional Development in China*, pp. 236-38.

dictions that the Emperor had in the Empire. In addition to their civil functions, they commanded the provincial constabulary and such parts of the national army as had not been transferred to the control of the Board of War. These troops were paid out of the provincial treasury, and, as a consequence, the allegiance of the soldier was to the Governor, who paid and kept him, rather than to the State.

*Provincial  
assemblies a  
permanent  
feature of  
system after  
1909*

As a result of the constitutional movement under the Manchus, provincial assemblies were provided for as part of the governmental machinery, and they were actually opened in most of the provinces in 1909. These assemblies were retained as part of the provincial system after the revolution, with the exception of the period of personal rule by Yüan Shih-k'ai, when they were temporarily done away with, to be later restored with the reestablishment of parliamentary government.

*Control by  
Assembly only  
in southern  
provinces*

When the revolution broke out in 1911, in some cases the regular provincial officials proclaimed their allegiance to the republican cause, and retained their control of the province. In other cases the provincial assembly took control of the situation, ousted the Imperial officials, and selected the head for the province from among the gentry, or from among the natives of the province who had been in the Imperial service. This reconstitution of the government took place, during the course of the revolution, only in the provinces south of the Yangtse.

*Revolution  
effected transfer  
of allegiance to  
Yüan Shih-k'ai*

In the provinces loyal to the Dynasty the revolution merely effected a transfer to Yüan Shih-k'ai of the allegiance of the Governors. But in these provinces, as well as in those to the south, the sole basis of authority, during the revolution and after, came to be military power.

*Troops and  
provincial  
revenues  
controlled by  
Military  
Governor*

As has been pointed out, the Governor had control of the troops even before 1911. In the course of the uprising the number of men under arms increased very materially in all parts of the country. The recruits for both the Imperial and the Revolutionary armies came mostly from those living on the economic margin of existence, and from those living as brigands, men who went into the military service because of the guarantee of pay and the certainty of food and clothing. The pay was not always forthcoming, but, so long as the commander retained control of territory, the subsistence was more certain. The more troops a man had, the larger the district he could control successfully, and the more important the figure he could cut politically. Many armed bands sprang up within the province, rendering nominal allegiance to the legal or self-constituted provincial authorities, but establishing themselves in control of prefectures or districts, supporting themselves by force, and maintaining themselves by collecting taxes over the smaller area or by requisitioning the people for supplies. Part of the taxes collected might be turned over to the provincial

leader, after the expenses of the local régime had been defrayed, but very little went beyond the province.

When Yüan Shih-k'ai became President he undertook to restore peace and order in the country. But he did not have the means to disband these practically independent troops in the face of the opposition of their leaders. Neither did he have the financial resources with which to buy them off and make up the arrears of pay due their soldiers, without which it would have been impossible to persuade them to return to civil life. Furthermore, it would have been a dangerous undertaking to disband them without making some temporary provision for their support, since to have done so would have meant that they would become brigands, and thus even more of a menace to the country than they were as soldiers. The consequence was that the President legalized the position in the province of their commanders by giving them official rank, trusting to carry out a gradual demobilization as conditions returned to the normal. Thus the only limitation on the power of the *Tutuh*, or Military Governor, lay in such public opinion as could make itself heard directly, or indirectly through the assembly where such a body was in existence; and in the requirement of the central government that a measure of peace and order should be maintained in the province. In addition to the Military Governorship, certain other offices were created to make provision for the support of such men as Chang Hsün, the Imperial commander at Nanking when that city was captured by the revolutionists. General Chang retired up the Tientsin-Pukow railroad from Nanking, and established his headquarters at Hsüchow in southern Shantung. Since he was too powerful to be antagonized, and, further, gave assistance to Yüan by serving as a perpetual threat to the parliamentarians, he was given an office to retain his allegiance. The President's desire to control strategic locations within provinces the military governors of which were not fully trusted, provided another motive for complicating the system. Thus Shanghai was separated from Kiangsu province under a Defense Commissioner who was controlled directly from Peking.

*Status of  
Military  
Governor  
under  
Yüan Shih-k'ai*

In the spring of 1913 Yüan Shih-k'ai undertook to replace the *Tutuh* with a Civil Administrator in a few of the provinces, with a view to the ultimate restoration of civil government. The paying off of troops was one of the declared purposes of the Reorganization Loan negotiated in 1913 with the Five Power Group. Some of the funds were used for this purpose, commanders being paid at the rate of fifty dollars per head. However, Yüan soon found other uses both for the money and for the men. After the President had made himself the dictator, he retained the Military Governor as head of the province, but changed the title from *Tutuh* to *Chiangchun*. On the whole he restored the old Manchu system of provincial administration, even abolishing the assemblies provided for just before the Republic was established. In order to strengthen his own position during this period

*Military régime  
useful to Yüan  
the dictator*

he attempted to entice to Peking men of whose allegiance he was doubtful. By getting them away from their provinces, and their troops, he was able effectively to deprive them of influence for the time. This was accomplished in the case of Li Yuan-hung, Tsai Ao, and others of prominence.

### 5. THE TUCHUNATE

The military governors and commanders north of the Yangtse who were faithful to Yüan constituted what was known as the *Peiyang* military party. There were two main factions in the party even during the period of ascendancy of Yüan Shih-k'ai. One, which came to be known as the Chihli group, accepted the leadership of Fêng Kuo-chang, who took the place of Li Yuan-hung as the Hukuang Viceroy after he had been brought to Peking. The other, called the Anhui faction, looked to Tuan Chi-jui as its leader. Until 1916, however, both factions recognized the leadership of Yüan Shih-k'ai and strongly supported him in his struggle against Parliament.

*Peiyang  
military party:*

a) *Chihli  
group*

b) *Anhui  
faction*

*Chihli faction  
attempts  
mediation  
between  
President and  
the south*

When his control began to weaken, after March of 1916, the Chihli faction, which was powerful in the central Yangtse region, attempted to strengthen its position by assuming a mediatory rôle as between the President and the south. General Fêng called a conference of provincial representatives which should attempt to find a basis of agreement. This move was largely unsuccessful because of southern distrust of his motives, and it was countered by the Anhui clique, which secured the transfer of the national executive power to Tuan Chi-jui as Premier and as Minister of War.

*Status of  
military after  
death of Yüan*

After the restoration of the Republic the situation was not materially changed. The military governors remained in control in their provinces, although their title was changed to *Tuchun*. While the provincial assemblies were revived, the actual power rested with the military. The leader of the Anhui clique continued as Premier, as has been noted, and the provinces were temporarily quiescent. Ultimately the groups united for the purpose of resisting the pretensions of the southern and parliamentary party.

*Hsüchow  
conference*

In the autumn of 1916, with Parliament established again at Peking, with a President who believed in constitutional rather than military government, and with their ranks somewhat divided, it must have appeared to the *Tuchuns* that the day of their provincial supremacy was drawing to an end. In order to show that they would not give up power without a struggle, however, several of them gathered a second time at Hsüchow, this time at the call of Chang Hsün and without the active participation of Fêng Kuo-chang. From the time of this conference dates the gradual extension of the power of the *Tuchuns* to Peking. It was a threat from the conference which prevented T'ang Shao-yi from taking a seat in the Cabinet; and it was at that time that announcement was made to the Assembly that

nothing must be done which would be prejudicial to the interests of the executive and the military. One reason for the renewed ill-feeling between the Assembly and the Premier was the fact that he took no steps to assert the freedom of the government from control by the *Tuchuns*, but was rather suspected, and, indeed, openly accused, of fostering military interference in order to strengthen his own hand at Peking. Certainly, when the issue was definitely joined later, Tuan Chi-jui threw in his lot with the *Tuchuns*, and not with the constitutionalists.

After this Hsüchow conference, nothing further was heard directly from the *Tuchuns*, as a body, for some months, in spite of the fact that they formed a "Union of the Provinces" at that time, and expressed the intention of holding periodic meetings to consider national affairs. This "Union," of course, was nothing but a league of the northern and some of the central *Tuchuns*. *Tuchuns quiescent*

The voice of the military party was next heard when, after the war issue had been raised, they were summoned into conference by the Premier. They decided in favor of war, and, since the Premier and Parliament were of substantially the same opinion, it would seem that nothing remained but the issuance of a formal declaration. However, the Premier decided to make assurance doubly sure and held off the introduction of the war bill while, by entertainment and otherwise, he attempted to enlarge his majority. After the bill had been introduced, and while Parliament was debating it, a mob demonstration in favor of it was staged before the Parliament building. The members of the Assembly took this as an attempt, as it probably was, on the part of the Premier to coerce them into doing something which they were prepared to do voluntarily. Consequently they refused to take action until a reconstruction of the government was undertaken. All of the Cabinet members resigned except the Premier, but he refused to go out by his own action. *Attempt at coercion of Parliament*

#### 6. ESTABLISHMENT OF MILITARY IN POWER AT PEKING

Out of the ensuing turmoil at Peking and in the northern provinces there came a definite alignment of the two elements that had been moving toward conflict since the first revolution—an alignment of the civil against the military power. Parliament, demanding the resignation or removal of the Premier, represented the civil and constitutional power, while the Premier, supported immediately by the northern *Tuchuns*, insisted on maintaining himself in control against the will of Parliament. The parties were struggling to control the action of the President, Li Yuan-hung, who hitherto had been rather a negative factor in the government, respected but not followed. Now he became the central figure, for he had it within his power to sustain the Premier by siding with him against Parliament, either by merely refusing to dismiss him, or by going so far as to dissolve Parliament, or he might take his stand firmly with the legislature *President dismisses Premier*

by removing the Premier. To the surprise of every one he did the latter. Had he stopped there, standing firm against the military opposition to his action which developed, he might well have gone down in history as the real "strong man" of the early Republic. But when the test came he did not have the courage of his convictions.

*Revolt of the  
Tuchuns*

Upon the dismissal of Tuan Chih-jui from the premiership, the military governors broke into open revolt, not against the Republic, but against parliamentary dominance. Perhaps instinctively, they seemed to realize that their position in the provinces could not be secured without the elimination of the representative element in the Peking government. They organized a provisional government at Tientsin, gathered their forces together for a march on Peking, and openly defied the President and Parliament.

*Grounds of  
revolt*

Strangely enough, the revolting *Tuchuns*, in demanding the dissolution of Parliament, rested their case on constitutional grounds. They took exception to the clause in the permanent constitution, then nearing completion, which restricted the exercise of the right of dissolution by the Premier by making it necessary for him to secure the consent of the Senate. They maintained also that the dismissal of the Premier was unconstitutional, since every mandate had to receive the counter-signature of the appropriate Cabinet Minister, in this case the dismissed Premier, to be valid. Therefore, they contended that Tuan alone could legalize his dismissal, since his temporary successor, Dr. Wu T'ing-fang, had no constitutional right to his position even by succession from the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs.

*Parliament  
divided*

The parliamentarians besought the President to stand firm, promising him support from the southern provinces. But their advice was weakened by the fact that it was not unanimous, the conservative element standing with the militarists and advocating a self-dissolution of the Assembly for lack of a quorum. Many of the parliamentarians, as a matter of fact, began to pack for a hurried departure from Peking, and it became difficult to find a quorum. However, the Assembly refused to help the President out of his difficulty by formally dissolving itself, even when he suggested this as the most satisfactory solution of the problem.

*"Mediation"  
of Chang Hsün*

When the punitive expedition of the militarists started its march northward, President Li began to weaken in his position. Finally he took the absurd step of summoning Chang Hsün, one of the worst of the militarists, to Peking to mediate between the two elements. The latter showed what could be expected of him when he stopped at Tientsin on his way to the capital to consult with the military government sitting there. From Tientsin he telegraphed the President his "advice," which was that Parliament should be dissolved. Then he moved to Peking surrounded by his own men, the most feared soldiers in China. They made a picturesque crew, with their brightly

colored uniforms and their "pigtails," from which they had been given the name of the "pig-tailed army."

Mediation, to General Chang, meant dictation. And President Li accepted his order that Parliament be dissolved, showing himself to be "an idol with feet of clay," as the *Far Eastern Review* called him. General Chang, however, did not rest there. He was an avowed imperialist, faithful to the last to the Manchu cause. From the time of the founding of the Republic he had been accused of a desire to restore the Dynasty, and it was predicted that his presence in Peking would result in a restoration. He had denied, from Tientsin, that he had any such intention, but the ease with which he gained complete control caused him to change his mind.

*Attitude of  
Chang Hsün*

As the result of a midnight resolution Chang Hsün proclaimed the restoration of the Manchu monarchy on July 1, 1917, with himself as the Premier. The old dragon flag appeared throughout the city as if by magic, the people indicating their acquiescence in the change in that way. The new régime, however, proved to be short-lived. General Chang had been told, when at Tientsin, that the *Tuchuns* would not stand behind a movement to restore the Manchus, but he thought that they would accept it if presented with the restored monarchy as an accomplished fact. In this belief he was wrong. However heartily they may have disliked parliamentarianism, it turned out that the *Tuchuns* had little less desire to see their privileges curtailed by the reestablishment of the Manchu Dynasty. Instead of acquiescing in the change, the military government at Tientsin announced its intention of continuing the march of its forces on Peking, not to bring Parliament to terms, but to restore the Republic.

*Restoration of  
Manchus  
proclaimed*

Out of this change of status might easily have come a reunification of the country. After the dissolution of Parliament its members retired to Shanghai and Canton, and at Canton they set up a government declaring itself to be the constitutional government of China. This government recognized Li Yuan-hung as the President and took up arms in his behalf and that of the parliamentary party. When the *Tuchuns* took the field in defense of the Republic, an opportunity was afforded for a reconciliation on the basis of coöperation against the Manchus. Unfortunately the northern armies were so easily successful in overthrowing the monarchy that the south had no chance to share in the undertaking, even if its aid had been sought. Equally unfortunately, no overtures were made to it at the time, and, when the armies led by Tuan Chi-jui were in occupation of Peking after a brief campaign of about three weeks, the government was reconstructed without the inclusion of any members of the *Kuo Min* party. The militarists could not surrender so remarkable an opportunity to complete their dominance, already established in the provinces, by the complete assumption of power at Peking.

*Tuchuns restore  
the Republic  
without aid of  
south*

President Li had been forced to take refuge in the legation quarter

*Fêng Kuo-chang  
becomes  
President*

of the city when the monarchy was proclaimed, and from his asylum he resigned his position in favor of the Vice-President, Fêng Kuo-chang. This put the leader of one faction of the *Peiyang* military party in that office, while the leader of the other faction assumed position as Premier. After some delay an assembly of a conservative nature, representative of the northern provinces, was constituted. The end of the summer of 1917 found the military leaders of the north in complete control at Peking, but confronted with the necessity of either subjugating or compromising with the southern provinces, if a united China was to exist.

#### 7. FACTIONAL STRUGGLES IN NORTH

*President vs.  
Premier*

During the year from August of 1917 to September of 1918, chief interest in the north lay in the struggle for power which developed between two cliques among the military, the one centering around the President and the other around the Premier. The chief issue in this struggle was their respective attitudes toward the provinces controlled from Canton by the constitutional party. President Fêng desired to pursue a policy of conciliation, while the party of the Premier favored an attempt at reunion by conquest and subjugation. Hostilities against the south were carried on intermittently, depending upon the degree of support given to one faction or the other by the *Tuchuns*, the real masters of the provinces north of the Yangtse. In carrying on this contest the President found, as had Li Yuan-hung before him, that his position at Peking, detached from the main body of his supporters, was considerably weaker than when he had been at Wuchang, looking both north and south, with his own men in power in neighboring provinces, and, most important of all, immediately under his supervision. At one stage he tried to leave the north for the Yangtse, but was firmly although politely turned back to Peking. After considerable jockeying for position the Premier's party carried the day, the seal being set to its victory when, the President's term having expired in October, 1918,<sup>2</sup> it was successful in elevating its candidate, Hsü Shih-chang, an old-time official, to the presidential office.

*Anfu Club  
organized*

In order to insure its success in the election, the Tuan faction organized itself into a society or club, the *Anfu* Club, which had as its ostensible purpose the carrying on of propaganda among the members of the newly-elected Parliament in favor of Hsü Shih-chang for the presidency. After it had attained its object, the Anfu Club continued in existence for the purpose of promoting the individual interests of its members. These interests related to the monopolizing of public office, largely for the purpose of lining the pockets of the *Anfuites*. To line their pockets they had to have access to some source of supply outside of the country, and this source they found in Japan,

<sup>2</sup> Both Li and Fêng were considered to be merely filling out Yuan Shih-k'ai's term of five years, dating from his election in 1913 as permanent President of the Republic.



whose financiers made loan after loan to the Peking government, either secured on various public services, or in return for valuable concessions of various sorts, or without security. Consequently the people of China came to consider the *Anfu* government as pro-Japanese and engaged in the process of selling out the country to Japan. ✓

The plans for conquering the south which were laid from time to time and half-heartedly put into effect did not succeed. The country was still divided between the two rival governments when Hsü Shih-chang was elevated to the Peking presidency. Shortly after his accession to that position the World War came to an end and the Peace Conference appeared on the horizon. China, as one of the belligerents, was entitled to a seat at that conference, and to a voice in the settlement of the questions to be brought before it relating to the Far East. But the Powers friendly to her saw that it would be difficult for her to present her views effectively so long as the country was in a state of disunion. Consequently it was suggested to the government at Peking that it would be advisable for it to seek a basis of agreement with that at Canton.

*China divided  
in 1918*

The Canton government, after its year of independent existence, had lost its appearance of constitutionality. The old leaders of the constitutional party, such as Dr. Sun Yat-sen, were still active and had organized a government known as the Military Government of the Southwest. The *Kuo Min Tang* itself continued its existence with large numbers of adherents in the south. Back of the civilian element in this government, however, was the same type of military power as that in control of the north. Civilian control extended actually only to Canton and its environs. Consequently it is difficult to make a very clear distinction between the two governments as far as their actual character was concerned.

*The Canton  
Government*

With this government, however, negotiations were opened by Peking in December of 1918, after an armistice had been declared by Hsü Shih-chang so far as the northern troops were concerned. T'ang Shao-yi, representing the Southwest in the internal peace conference, laid down a series of claims as the basis for negotiations, one of them being that the mandate issued by President Li dissolving Parliament should be cancelled. This was the rock on which the conference finally split, the north refusing to concede the illegality of its position. At one point before this, however, the conference was brought to a temporary end because of the discovery made by T'ang that the militarists in the south were seeking a basis of agreement with those in the north behind his back.

*Internal peace  
conference at  
Shanghai*

While the north and the south were unable to reach an agreement on the conditions of union, they did coöperate in sending representatives to Paris to represent China rather than one or the other of the two contending parts of the country. The Chinese delegation presented China's case to the Peace Conference very effectively, but it found that the Powers were bound by previous agreements with

*Paris decides  
against China*

Japan which prevented them from settling the question of the disposition of the German rights and interests in the Far East in a manner satisfactory to China. Consequently, in the Treaty of Versailles, those interests were transferred from Germany to Japan, with the understanding that the German properties in Shantung province would be restored to China after negotiations between that country and Japan.

*Chinese reaction  
to Versailles  
treaty*

When the news of the award reached China it produced an immediate reaction against the *Anfu* government, controlled, as it was popularly supposed to be, from Tokyo. The students first rose in revolt, refusing to attend their classes, and carrying on an educative campaign among the masses by means of street meetings with a view to informing the people as to the exact state of affairs. Later they were joined by the merchants, who instituted a boycott against all Japanese goods. As a result of this agitation the most noticeably pro-Japanese of the Peking ministers were forced to resign their positions, and Japanese interests were affected most unfavorably by the boycott. The expression of a growing national feeling which was so marked at this time did not, however, serve to reunite the country or to drive the militarists from power at Peking or in the provinces.

#### 8. OVERTHROW OF ANFU RÉGIME

*General Chang  
Tso-lin of  
Manchuria*

In spite of this agitation it was not until the summer of 1920 that the next internal crisis developed. After the assumption of control by the *Anfu* clique, the non-*Anfu Tsuchuns* manifested a growing dissatisfaction. Two among them had grown to considerable power. One of the two was General Chang Tso-lin, Inspector-General (*Super-Tsuchun*) of the three Manchurian provinces. He was an uneducated man, a leader of Hunghutze, or brigands, at the time of the Russo-Japanese War. During that struggle he fought on the side of Japan, and upon its conclusion he was taken into the Chinese service, where he received rapid promotion on account of bravery. The year 1911 found him the Military Governor of Fengtien province, which position he held, serving Yüan Shih-k'ai faithfully until his death, up to 1918, when he was given control of all of Manchuria. During the years of his control he devoted his considerable talents as a military man and an administrator to the development of Manchuria and to the consolidation of his position therein. General Chang played no active part in politics south of the Wall until he intervened in support of the Tuan Chi-jui policy of forcible action to bring the south to terms, thus taking a position in opposition to the Chihli faction. After that time he came to feel that Tuan did not give him his fair share of the spoils of office, and consequently he began to evince a more positive interest in general Chinese politics.

*Super-Tsuchun  
Ts'ao Kun*

Ts'ao Kun was the other powerful and dissatisfied *Tsuchun*. He also was popularly known as a *Super-Tsuchun*, since in 1920 he was *Tsuchun* of Chihli province and concurrently Inspector-General of Sze-

chuan, Kwangtung, Hunan, and Kiangsi provinces. General Ts'ao coöperated with Tuan Chi-jui and the other militarists in the movement against Peking to restore the Republic in 1917. Thereafter he remained acquiescent in the *Anfu* régime as long as he was well treated financially by the government.

Generals Chang and Ts'ao had as much real sympathy with Tuan Chi-jui as with each other, and consequently it was some time before they found common ground for coöperation against the Peking government. But as the *Anfu*ites tended more and more to monopolize office to the exclusion of the adherents of Chang Tso-lin and Ts'ao Kun, and to divert into their own pockets the major part of the fruits of office, the two warlords began to consider the possibility of setting themselves up as the makers of ministers in Peking in place of the *Anfu* clique. But neither dared to move without assurance of the support of the other.

*Attitude of  
Chang and  
Ts'ao to Anfu  
régime*

By the summer of 1920, however, they were prepared to coöperate, and were then forced to act, whether willingly or not. One of Ts'ao Kun's division commanders, General Wu P'ei-fu, was in Hunan province attempting to bring about its pacification. Because his actions violated orders issued from Peking, Premier Tuan Chi-jui asked the President to issue a mandate dismissing him, and also his chief, Ts'ao Kun, the latter because of his insistence that the Peking authorities furnish him with money to pay his troops. Under considerable pressure the President issued the mandate. General Wu, however, instead of accepting his dismissal quietly, led his troops on Peking, avowing his intention of driving the *Anfu* government out of the city. At the same time he proclaimed his ultimate objective to be the convocation of a national convention to determine all of the points at issue between the various factions. This declaration drew to his support the student class which had been so active at the time of the Shantung award, gave his activity a national character, and made him, for a time, the man of the hour.

*General  
Wu P'ei-fu  
moves on  
Peking*

Unfortunately he was not free to carry out his good intentions, for he was only one of Ts'ao Kun's division commanders and thus under his control, while a movement southward executed by the Manchurian forces enabled Chang Tso-lin also to claim some credit for the success of the anti-*Anfu* campaign and to participate as a principal in setting-up the new régime. Consequently Wu P'ei-fu was relegated to the background after the occupation of Peking, and with him the idea of a national convention. The net result of the victory of 1920 proved to be merely a shifting of control from one faction among the militarists to another, from Tuan Chi-jui to Ts'ao Kun and Chang Tso-lin.

*Wu relegated  
to background*

## 9. RECURRENT CIVIL WAR

The internal situation after 1920 was more muddled than it had been at any previous time. The Peking government existed only on

*Internal  
situation after  
1920*

sufferance of the two *Super-Tuchuns*, Ts'ao Kun and Chang Tso-lin, and they had power only by virtue of the large bodies of soldiers acting under their direction. The south was not united, a military group from Kwangsi province contending with the Canton forces under the control of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, who depended for his support on the military governor of Kwangtung province. Each province had its own group of militarists who contended with each other and intrigued with those in control of other provinces to secure their support. And in the central part of the country a movement toward provincial autonomy developed. This movement for autonomy seemed, for a time, to offer considerable hope for the future. The theory was that each province should first of all establish its own government, free from control of the militarists, and that ultimately a federation of the autonomous provinces of China should be established.

*Development  
retarded by  
political strife*

This was the situation at the time of the opening of the Washington Conference, at which the problem of China figured so prominently. To the outside world, it appeared rather a hopeless situation. And it would have been immediately hopeless had it not been for the fact, already noted, that the Chinese have not been much accustomed to concern themselves with the problems of politics. In spite of the turmoil of the country, growing rather than decreasing as years passed by, the people continued to buy and to sell, to import and to export, as though nothing were wrong. In this they were held back, of course, by the condition of political chaos, but not to the extent that would have been true of any other country. While political disintegration had been going on, economic integration and development had been proceeding, so that the situation was not so hopeless as it appeared to be. Nevertheless, China could not be treated as anything but a problem, and a problem it will remain until the political situation has resolved itself in such a way as to make possible a common government capable of assuming and giving effect to obligations in the ordinary relations of international life.

*Hope centered  
on General  
Wu P'ei-fu*

The Peking government was a figurehead controlled by those among the provincial leaders who had the most effective means of exerting pressure on it. In 1920 they were the men already mentioned. But the popular hope centered around the real victor of the struggle of that year, Wu P'ei-fu. He had retired into comparative obscurity, so far as the outside world was concerned, after his victory over Tuan Chi-jui. In his obscurity he went about the business of developing his forces, making alliances with others of the militarists in the Yangtse region, and preparing for a struggle for control with the Manchurian warlord. For, out of the successes of General Wu, Chang Tso-lin had profited more than had Ts'ao Kun. It was General Chang who was the stronger of the two, both as an individual and from the standpoint of his support, and he became the dominating force at Peking whenever he chose to assert himself.

The struggle for mastery developed in the spring months of 1922. General Wu, supported by his chief ally, the Christian General Fêng, *Wu gains*  
*Tuchun* of Shensi province, moved northward with his forces, while *control of*  
General Chang came south from Manchuria. When their armies met, *Peking*  
Wu P'ei-fu again showed his superiority by ousting the Manchurian troops from Peking and driving them back into Manchuria. This left him free to carry out the plans announced two years earlier. Li Yuan-hung was persuaded to resume the presidency, the Nanking constitution with its provision for parliamentary supremacy was revived, a new Parliament was convened, and the reunification of the country was proclaimed and partially effected.

But several groups stood out against the new government. Sun Yat-sen, for example, stood in the way of a complete reunion of all factions south of the Wall. He had sided with Chang-Tso-lin in the struggle, promising him support by an attack on General Wu from the south. His failure to deliver this support was one important cause of Chang's failure to maintain himself in north China. But Dr. Sun lost control of Canton, his chief military supporter went over to the side of unity under Wu P'ei-fu, and he himself had to flee to Shanghai. Later he returned to Canton, resuming control of the city, whence he continued to fulminate against the Peking government.

*Attitude of*  
*Sun Yat-sen*

Furthermore, though General Chang had been decisively defeated, he was able to retire to his Manchurian domain, which he continued to rule as an area independent of the authority of Peking. He immediately set about reorganizing and strengthening his army; he treated the Manchurian revenue system, including the Salt collections, as his own; and he separated the Shanhaikuan-Mukden section of the Peking-Mukden railroad from the southern section, thus seeking to emphasize the independence of Manchuria. Consequently Sun in the south and Chang in the north remained to be dealt with before the unification of the country could be considered complete. It was also incomplete by reason of the fact that Lu Yung-hsiang, an *Anfu*  
*Tuchun*, remained in control of his province, Chêkiang, with a henchman in control of Shanghai and the district of Sung-kiang, which is part of Kiangsu province. Outside of these regions the Chihli party of Ts'ao Kun and Wu P'ei-fu was dominant.

*Unification*  
*incomplete*

It must be recorded, however, that this change in the composition of the Peking government did little to better the actual political condition. The real power remained in the hands of the men who controlled the provinces, the authority of the so-called central government extending but a little distance beyond the city walls. Cabinets continued to be made and unmade by the strongest of the military leaders. Li Yuan-hung was supported for a time, it is true, by Wu P'ei-fu, who, however, gradually withdrew from the center of the Peking stage in favor of his superior, General Ts'ao Kun.

*Peking*  
*controlled*  
*from provinces*

Furthermore, the financial situation at Peking became more and

*Financial  
weakness of  
Peking*

more strained and uncertain. The central government was forced to ask for an extension on some of its loan payments and was hard-put to meet its current expenses.

*Activities of  
bandits: the  
Lincheng case*

To illustrate the actual condition of the country, it is but necessary to recall the series of bandit outrages which, during 1923, served to focus the attention of the outside world on China. Armed bands, not even under the nominal control of the officials, infested many parts of the country. Many Chinese, including women and children, were carried into captivity and held for ransom. In some cases foreigners were attacked and made prisoners. The most notorious of these outrages was committed at Lincheng, when a train was stopped and some of the passengers, including foreigners, were carried off. Three thousand men were in this band of brigands, and the troops of the province of Shantung proved insufficient or incompetent to bring them to book, making negotiations necessary in order to effect the release of the foreigners. From the terms demanded by the brigands it is reasonable to infer that politics was somewhat mixed up in the incident, as their leaders demanded that the brigands be enrolled in the army and that the force be recruited to the strength of from ten to fifteen thousand men. This body, they insisted, should not be placed under the direction of the governor of Shantung province, but should be under a separate command, and should be stationed in a position where it would be in a position to embarrass the Ts'ao Kun (Chihli) faction, should trouble develop either from the forces of Sun Yat-sen in the south or Chang Tso-lin in the north. The central government, supported by Ts'ao Kun, under the proposed arrangement, would have been especially impotent in the face of a simultaneous attack from both regions. These terms were not fully acceded to, but the bandits were finally persuaded to release the foreign prisoners.

*Ts'ao Kun  
elected  
President*

In the fall of 1923 another change occurred in the composition of the central government. Li Yuan-hung was again forced to vacate the presidential chair, partly because of the attitude of General Fêng Yü-hsiang, who exerted an influence on Peking from the northwest after 1922, and partly because of the desire of Ts'ao Kun to add the presidential title to his other dignities. He was elected to the office on September 5, after spending enormous sums in bribing the members of Parliament in order to secure a quorum and a favorable vote. This same Parliament celebrated the 1923 anniversary of the Revolution by promulgating the permanent Constitution of the Republic, thus completing the task begun in 1913. The permanent constitution remains unenforced, however, taking its place with the numerous other paper advances made since the founding of the Republic.

*1923  
comparatively  
peaceful*

In the spring the fancy of China's military rulers seems to turn inevitably to civil war, with never more than a two-year interval between struggles. The spring and fall of 1923 were comparatively uneventful, although an outbreak was threatened in the Chêkiang-

Kiangsu region because of the desire of the Kiangsu *Tuchun* to bring the Shanghai enclave under his control. Peace efforts of the gentry, together with Wu P'ei-fu's disapproval, resulted in the signature of a peace treaty by the *Tuchuns* of Kiangsu and Chêkiang. But while peace was preserved during 1923, Chang Tso-lin, Wu P'ei-fu, and the lesser lights of the military firmament, engaged in preparations for war. They enlisted and trained men, stored up military supplies of all sorts, and, most important of all, made alliances and counter-alliances with semi-independent militarists, in this way seeking to undermine the foundations of the opposition. The effects of these winter intrigues and bargainings were shown with the outbreak of hostilities.

The spring of 1924 found both sides waiting for the spark which would start the expected conflagration. Chang Tso-lin had cemented his alliance with the *Anfu Tuchun* of Chêkiang province, and with the out-of-power *Anfuistes*, including Tuan Chi-jui, and had reached an understanding with Dr. Sun Yat-sen. The Wu P'ei-fu ranks in central and north China were outwardly closed. The major antagonists were ready when war broke out between Chêkiang and Kiangsu provinces, after preliminaries of mutual recrimination which extended over the summer.

*Outbreak of  
war in 1924*

Fighting had no sooner commenced than the Manchurian forces began to move southward, so that the attention of the country was immediately turned from Shanghai to Tientsin. It is hardly worth while to pause on the details of the struggle. The outcome was a reversal of the verdict of 1922, due partly to the strength of Chang Tso-lin's armies, but largely to the defection of General Wu's chief ally, the Christian General Fêng Yü-hsiang. Fêng occupied Peking while Wu P'ei-fu was at the front, imprisoned President Ts'ao Kun, caused mandates to be issued dismissing General Wu from his command and his posts, and with him his chief lieutenants, and established a new central government. This defection and change in control at Peking brought Wu P'ei-fu between two fires, and forced him to give up the contest since reënforcements failed to reach him from central China. After an unsuccessful attempt to reassert himself he temporarily retired from the stage.

*Defection of  
Fêng causes  
defeat of  
Wu P'ei-fu*

Both Chang Tso-lin and Fêng Yü-hsiang then turned to Tuan Chi-jui, urging him to return to power as the head of a new régime, and each seeking to be the one to invest him with authority. Ultimately Fêng, Chang, and Tuan met in conference at Tientsin, and Tuan was persuaded to accept a joint appointment as Provisional Chief Executive. He took over the powers of the central administration from General Fêng's appointees on September 22, 1924.

*Tuan Chi-jui  
becomes  
Provisional  
Chief Executive*

With the Chihli party eliminated at Peking and its power apparently broken in the provinces, attention naturally centered on the relations of the triumvirate—Chang, Fêng, and Tuan. It was clear that Tuan Chi-jui's position was a precarious one, although he was soon surrounded at Peking by his *Anfu* friends, for his chief task was

*Position of  
Tuan precarious*

to please the two powerful militarists who had united to return him to power. In the endeavor to please both he was very likely to satisfy neither.

*Activities of  
General Fêng  
Yu-hsiang*

As for Fêng, even before the Tientsin meeting he had attempted to consolidate his position by organizing a new force called the *Kuominchun*, or National Army, raised by popular enlistment. Recruiting went on after the settlement until he had built up several of these "people's armies," with which he proceeded to dominate the western section of north China, continuing also to maintain himself in the northwest, and to overawe Peking. While taking these steps to consolidate his power, he tendered his resignation from his posts and announced his intention of going abroad. His retirement, however, was not taken very seriously, and Tuan Chi-jui naturally refused to accept his several resignations. It seemed evident that Fêng's retiring proclivities were due partly to a feeling that he had been outmanœuvred by Chang at Tientsin, but largely to a desire to take stock of the situation before committing himself further.

*Chang Tso-lin  
extends his  
position*

An advance of position was also undertaken by Chang Tso-lin, who occupied the eastern provinces as far south as Shanghai with his leaders and troops, the while he insisted on a voice in Peking affairs. Each man was suspicious of the other and it seemed only a question of time until a break would come, and with it a struggle for the ultimate mastery.

*Fêng Yü-hsiang  
vs. Chang  
Tso-lin*

The inevitable renewal of hostilities came in the autumn of 1925 and was continued into the spring months of 1926. The first phase of the contest was local, reproducing the initial outbreak in the war of 1924, only with different actors. The conflict commenced with an attempt to drive Chang Tso-lin's men from Shanghai. This forced him to move northward as a recognition of the fact that he had stretched his lines too thin. It was followed by a movement of Fêng Yü-hsiang's troops to Tientsin, the capture of which drove General Chang back into Manchuria, without, however, completely eliminating his influence from Chihli and Shantung provinces. General Fêng then brought about the defection of one of Chang Tso-lin's most trusted generals, who was guarding the gateway to Manchuria. When he turned against his chief it looked for a time as though the end had come for General Chang. He was able, however, to secure support from Japan, who sent additional troops to Manchuria, ostensibly to safeguard the interests of her nationals at Mukden and along the railways. While taking this step Japan continued to assert her neutrality in the struggle, but actually her action was directed toward enabling Chang to regain control. Regarding this as an incident in the larger struggle in north China, we may point out that Japan's action merely brought into the open an under-the-surface international struggle, for Soviet Russia had been supplying Fêng Yü-hsiang with munitions and support in order to advance her interests in the northwest and in north China, while also carrying on an



active propaganda at Canton. Thus an old rivalry was merely renewed. It may also be here pointed out that Wu P'ei-fu was the only major contestant for power who had received no foreign support, the merchant class of central China financing him. The financial backing which the *Anfu* Club had received from Japan had been notorious, and, by reason of his position at Mukden, Chang Tso-lin had been forced to maintain friendly relations with Japan. The Canton party had received aid from the same source until it began to lean toward Russia. And Fêng's Russian connections have already been referred to. Consequently the Japanese action was not new or surprising.

The next move in the game came toward the end of 1925, when Wu P'ei-fu appeared on the scene again as a major contestant and began to press Fêng Yü-hsiang's troops northwards. By that time Fêng had again retired to travel abroad, with the announced intention of studying and working at Moscow, and he refused to assume command even to save his hard-pressed legions. As the struggle developed it became clear that General Chang, once more firmly established in Manchuria, and Wu P'ei-fu had again joined forces to drive the supporters of the Christian General from Peking. This had been accomplished by the early spring of 1926, but the *Kuominchun* had merely been pushed beyond the Wall, not broken-up and dispersed. After that time operations against them were not pressed, although there was continual talk of carrying the struggle into Mongolia. The distribution of the spoils had to be arranged, however, by agreement between two allies, who were extremely mistrustful one of the other, and a government had to be set up at Peking which could receive the recognition of the Powers. While Chang Tso-lin's men guarded Nankow Pass to prevent the reëmergence in north China of Fêng and his hymn-singing troops, their commander was not willing to turn his back on Wu P'ei-fu long enough, nor to risk weakening his position by undertaking to break up the armies which had retired into Mongolia.

*Temporary  
elimination of  
Fêng Yü-hsiang*

Before conditions had stabilized themselves at Peking Wu P'ei-fu found his position in the central Yangtse region threatened from the south by a development which had the initial effect of radically deflecting the current of Chinese politics. To appreciate this development it now becomes necessary to consider briefly political conditions south of the Yangtse during the period of years (1918-1925) under review in this chapter.

*Wu P'ei-fu  
threatened*

After the enforced dissolution of Parliament by Li Yuan-hung the parliamentarians and other adherents of Dr. Sun Yat-sen retired to Shanghai and then to Canton where, as has been pointed out, a Military Government was instituted, with Dr. Sun as the Generalissimo. His power was more nominal than real, however, since the military props for his government were two militarists, T'ang Chi-yao, Governor of Yunnan and Kweichow provinces, and Lu Yung-ting, who controlled the troops in Kwangtung and Kwangsi

*Sun Yat-sen  
at Canton*

provinces. They were made the Vice-Generalissimos in the Military Government in recognition of this fact. Consequently, from this standpoint, the status of Dr. Sun's government was very little different from that of the successive Peking governments controlled as they both were in fact by military leaders with provincial bases for their power. This situation continued during this entire period, the changes which took place being the result of shifts in military power. To maintain himself at Canton in the event of a conflict with the provincial militarists Dr. Sun had to rely on his influence with the masses, on the activities in his behalf of such revolutionary leaders as Wang Ching-wei, Hu Han-min, and Liao Chung-k'ai, on the support generally accorded him by the southern press, on the southern navy such as it was, which consistently supported him, and on such independent military power as he could organize.

*Basis of union  
in the South*

The common objective which, for a time, united the various interests in the south was the desire to re-unify the country under the direction of the southern government or at least to prevent the conquest of the southern provinces by the Tuan Chi-jui government. So far as northern alignments were concerned, the southern leaders were strongly opposed to Tuan since he sponsored the policy of forcible subjugation of the south in opposition to President Feng Kuo-chang, who favored conciliation and the arrival at a peaceful solution by negotiation. This opposition to Tuan continued until after the overthrow of the *Anfu* Club, when hostility was transferred to Wu P'ei-fu, and the out-of-power Anfuites made their peace with Dr. Sun. "Tuan . . . sent a representative to Shanghai for the purpose of making peace with Sun Yat-sen. He admitted his past mistakes and crimes and requested to be allowed to collaborate with him. Sun accepted the offer and issued a manifesto in his support, stating that although Tuan was a militarist he was not so bad as his opponents."<sup>1</sup>

*Sun's position  
weakened*

By the time (1920) that this agreement between Sun and Tuan on collaboration had been reached the former as well as the latter was out of power. After some initial successes in 1917, the expedition which had been despatched north to bring about a unification of the country under southern direction had been forced back upon the south. The result was a concentration of the attention of the southern militarists on the consolidation and extension of their power in the southern region. To get rid of Dr. Sun's influence, which was consistently thrown in the direction of centralization, with a consequent attempt to lessen the independent rôle of the provincial militarists, Lu Yung-ting and others engineered a reorganization of the Military Government in May, 1918. The powers of the Generalissimo were vested in a State Council of seven Directors. While Dr. Sun was made one of the Directors, his position was weakened and his authority lessened. His only military support in the struggle for power was

<sup>1</sup> T'ANG LEANG-LI, *The Inner History of the Chinese Revolution*, p. 137.

that represented by the People's Volunteer Corps and the Kwangtung Army, both organized by his supporters after the establishment of the southern government and at this time placed under the command of Ch'en Ch'ung-ming, whose loyalty to Dr. Sun soon became doubtful. Under these circumstances Dr. Sun's position was extremely precarious, and he left Canton for Shanghai shortly after the reorganization of the government.

The combination of T'ang Chi-yao and Lu Yung-ting was in effect a combination of foreigners for the purpose of controlling Kwangtung as well as their own provinces. The Kwangtung army under Ch'en Ch'ung-ming, in contrast, was largely a native force, if considered from the standpoint of the Cantonese. When account is taken of the rapacity of the Kwangsi and Yunnan war lords, and especially of the former, who became dominant in Kwangtung after the retirement of Dr. Sun, it is not to be wondered at that hostilities broke out in 1920 between the Kwangtung Army under Ch'en and the Kwangsi troops of Lu Yung-ting. The defeat of the latter forced his retirement into Kwangsi province, where he maintained himself until August, 1922. It also brought about the return of Sun Yat-sen to Canton. Under his direction a long step was taken in the direction of bringing order out of the financial chaos resulting from the misrule of Lu, and a beginning was made in the reorganization of the governmental system of the province. Nominally Sun was head of the group of southern provinces to the west of Kwangtung in virtue of his election by the Special Parliament,<sup>1</sup> which he convoked upon his arrival at Canton, as President of the Chinese Republic. Actually those provinces (Kwangsi, Yunnan, Kweichow, Szechuan, and part of Hunan) which recognized the authority of Canton rather than of Peking, were ruled by their provincial militarists. Consequently it was only Kwangtung which was under the actual control of the so-called central Government headed by Sun Yat-sen. And even there his authority was dependent upon the military support of Ch'en Ch'ung-ming, the commander of the Kwangtung armies. This support was finally withdrawn in 1922.

*Sun returns to  
power at  
Canton*

Several reasons may be given for the break between Sun and Ch'en. The explanation of the former, and of those who supported him during all of this troubled period, is in terms of the ambitions of the latter, which made him restive under the direction of a civil government. Another explanation relates to the development of the situation in the north. After Wu P'ei-fu drove the Anfu Club from Peking he restored the old Parliament and brought back Li Yuan-hung as President. The consequence was that a number of the supporters of Dr. Sun urged him to terminate the southern government so that the country might be unified under the Peking régime. This

*Split between  
Sun Yat-sen  
and Ch'en  
Ch'ung-ming*

<sup>1</sup>This consisted of the rump of the old national Parliament. When a quorum was lacking upon its convocation in 1918 it was called a Special Parliament to justify its continued existence.

Dr. Sun refused to do, taking the position, justifiably as it turned out, that the fundamental character of, and basis of authority in, the Peking government had not changed. This position was a natural outgrowth of the entente formed between Sun and Tuan in 1920. Ch'en, however, decided to support Wu, either because of his own interests or because of his judgment as to the national interest. Thus the break between the two, and the *coup d'état* of June 16, 1922, which resulted in the retirement of Dr. Sun to Shanghai, was at least occasioned, even if not caused, by the different alignments of the two in relation to northern politics.

Sun dependent  
on militarist  
support

As it became revealed that Wu P'ei-fu was not going to carry out his announced program of calling a People's Convention, and bringing about the subordination of the military to the civil government, Sun's stock went up among the people in spite of his defeat by Ch'en. Successes also began to be won by his supporters among the southern militarists. These were either Anfuites who had been able to maintain themselves against those in control in Peking, or those who were independently seeking to gain power by overthrowing the dominant militarists. Consequently, with the aid of various mercenary forces, Dr. Sun was able to drive Ch'en Ch'ung-ming out of Kwangtung, which returned to its allegiance to Sun on January 26, 1923. But it was just as much the fact as it had been previously that Sun's authority was dependent upon the support of self-seeking militarists who paid him only lip-service. Consequently he reached the decision, by the end of 1923, to proceed to the reorganization of the Kuo Min Tang, and attempt thereby to find some other basis for his authority.

Out of this reorganization grew the nationalist movement which swept both Wu P'ei-fu and Chang Tso-lin from power, and which inaugurated the next important phase of the Chinese revolution, the consideration of which, however, must be deferred to the next chapter.

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## CHAPTER XIII

### THE NATIONALIST REVOLUTION

THE first phase of the Chinese revolution, purely political in its manifestations, accomplished the overturn of the Manchu Empire, but it did not attain its objective of the establishment of a parliamentary Republic. This phase was finished, in fact, although not in theory, with the failure of the "summer revolution" of 1913. To be sure, the parliamentary Republic was revived for a year, following the death of Yuan Shih-k'ai, but it could not maintain itself against the decentralizing militarist forces which definitively terminated it in 1917. All attempts to revive it in the face of the determination of the provincial war-lords to rule were completely unsuccessful. The revolution, consequently, lost for a time its political character and, from 1917 until 1924-1925, began to plow the deeper soil presented in the economic, social, literary, and intellectual fields, leaving politics to the military rulers, supported in the central government by those who may be described as professional politicians and career diplomatists, and to Dr. Sun Yat-sen and his small circle of followers.

*Failure of  
the early  
revolution*

#### 1. THE KUO MIN TANG —1912-1924

During the years between 1913 and 1924 the revolutionary party had become practically moribund. The secret revolutionary organization (the *Tung Meng-hui*) which had been the instrument of the political revolution of 1911 lost much of its revolutionary force when, after the revolution had been theoretically accomplished with the overthrow of the Manchus, it was reorganized as a non-secret political party including other groups than the *Tung Meng-hui*. Because of this it was reconstructed as a secret revolutionary party after the failure of the rebellion of 1913, with all members required to take an oath of personal allegiance to Dr. Sun Yat-sen. This had the effect of restricting its membership since many of those who had been members of the *Tung Meng-hui* refused to take the oath. Thereafter, the revolutionaries "were kept together solely by the personality of Dr. Sun Yat-sen; membership in the party became a matter of tradition; it merely meant that one had personal contact with Sun Yat-sen."<sup>1</sup> The weakening effects of this being perceived, the party was again reorganized after the capture of Kwangtung in 1920. The new National People's Party of China remained a secret society, but the personal oath was abolished, together with some other restrictions formerly imposed. This enlarged the membership, but it did not

*The Kuo Min  
Tang moribund*

<sup>1</sup> T'ang Leang-li, *Inner History of the Chinese Revolution*, p. 139.

effectively energize the party since no provision was made for party meetings for the coöperative development of a program. And no relationship was established between party authority and political and military power. The party remained the instrument of the leader.

*Party not  
vitalized  
by recon-  
struction*

This party reconstruction did not enable Dr. Sun to maintain himself for long in power in Kwangtung, nor did it serve to distinguish the southern government in any material respects from that at Peking since, as has been pointed out, the basis of such authority as Dr. Sun possessed was the support accorded him by provincial militarists. Conscious of this dependence, Dr. Sun sought to find a new basis of power by attempting another reorganization of the party along radically different lines.

*Collaboration  
with  
Russia*

The procedure followed in reorganizing the *Kuo Min Tang* was suggested by Russian advisers who came to Canton in the autumn of 1923 at the invitation of Dr. Sun. The basis for collaboration with Soviet Russia had been laid at the beginning of the year when Dr. Sun had carried on extensive conversations at Shanghai with Mr. Joffe, the Soviet emissary to the Far Eastern countries. As a result a joint pronouncement<sup>2</sup> was issued in which Dr. Sun, with the concurrence of Mr. Joffe, stated that he did not feel that either communism or the soviet system could be introduced into China, whose problem was that of the attainment of unity and complete independence. In the solution of that problem Dr. Sun was assured of the support of Russia. The declaration then went on to reassure Dr. Sun as to Russian intentions with respect to the Chinese Eastern Railway and Outer Mongolia. This included a general reaffirmation of the principles of the Soviet Declaration of 1919, which established the Soviet policy as anti-imperialistic, as contrasted with the imperialism of the capitalistic states.

*Borodin  
the chief  
Russian  
adviser*

Michael Borodin was designated as the principal adviser to the southern government. From the time of his arrival at Canton in September, 1923, dates the vitalizing of the *Kuo Min Tang*. The first objective was that of transforming it into a highly organized party of disciplined individuals, united by the acceptance of a common program of action instead of the personal tie of loyalty to Dr. Sun. The model for the reorganization was the Russian Communist Party. The steps taken to transform the party included a re-registration of the members of the old party which resulted in the exclusion of many of those clinging to the ideology of 1911 and of those who were unwilling to accept the Russian orientation. The membership was increased, however, by permitting members of the Chinese Communist Party, as individuals, to register as members of the *Kuo Min Tang*.

*The Party  
Organization*

The base of the organization was established in local nuclei of registered party members, with control of activities to be exercised by the members meeting regularly every fortnight. This local meeting was also empowered to select an executive committee concerned with

<sup>2</sup> The text of the Sun-Joffe Declaration is in *The China Year Book*, 1924, p. 863.

organization, discipline, and propaganda, and a supervisory committee, with the functions of auditing the accounts, maintaining a general control, and prosecuting against breaches of party rules and discipline. From this base the organization was pyramided through sub-district, district, and provincial organizations to the central organization, consisting of an annual National Congress, conceived of as the final authority on policy, and a Central Executive Committee and a Supervisory Committee to supervise and direct party affairs between the meetings of the Congress. In theory, power was to work from the bottom to the top of the pyramid, in contrast to the old order of subordinating the party membership to Dr. Sun Yat-sen, although the party constitution (Art. 21), designated Dr. Sun as the President of the Party during his lifetime. It was also provided (Art. 22) "that the members should follow the direction of the President and work for the advancement of the Party; 2) that the President should have the power to disapprove resolutions of the Party Congress, giving him the final control of policy; and 3) that his should be the decisive voice in the Central Executive Committee." Nevertheless, the provision for a Party Congress to meet regularly, and the establishment of the Central Executive Committee, had both the theoretical and the practical effect of broadening the basis of authority from that of the individual leader to the Party itself. The general chart of organization as approved by the first Party Congress on January 28, 1924, would seem to reflect the views of Borodin, while the peculiar powers vested in Dr. Sun as President would seem to have resulted from the necessity of recognizing the fact that the *Kuo Min Tang* had been for so long under his direction and control, and that "the reorganization was still in its transitional period, and was in need of the active guidance of Dr. Sun Yat-sen."<sup>3</sup>

This general scheme of organization proved sufficiently well adapted to the needs of the Party so that it has been continued substantially unchanged to the present time. But the exigencies of the political situation prevented the holding of the contemplated annual Congresses. Thus only two have been convoked since the first, held in 1924. The second was held in January, 1926, and the third had to be postponed to March, 1929. This has resulted in the national direction, from the Party standpoint, gravitating more completely than was originally contemplated into the hands of the Central Executive Committee.

Party  
Congresses

The committee system of direction, on the other hand, in spite of its obvious defects, has enabled those of divergent views and tend-

<sup>3</sup> T'ang, *Inner History*, op. cit., p. 177. T'ang states that Sun proposed the abolition of the presidency, but that the committee appointed to report on the proposed party constitution overruled him. He also states that the draft of party organization was presented by Sun, implying, although not stating, that it was his work. On this, as well as on the question of Russian influence in the drafting of the Party Manifesto, the views of Chinese nationalist writers should be compared with the account given by L. FISCHER, *The Soviets in World Affairs*, 2 vols., vol. 2, pp. 636-640.

encies to be held somewhat together in at least a nominal common direction of affairs. Thus it has served a useful purpose and has justified its institution.

## 2. THE PARTY PRINCIPLES

*The basic documents*

The principles of the *Kuo Min Tang*, which is to say the philosophy of the national revolution, are set forth in several important documents. These are: 1) the Party manifesto adopted by the Congress of 1924; 2) the series of lectures delivered by Dr. Sun Yat-sen in exposition of his principles, published as the *San Min Chu I*, or *Three Principles of the People*; and 3) the "Fundamentals of National Reconstruction," dated April 12, 1924. Reference should also be made to the "Will"<sup>4</sup> of Dr. Sun, drawn up just before his death on March 11, 1925.

*The principle of nationalism*

The revolutionary philosophy can only be briefly summarized here in its broad outlines. It was based on Dr. Sun's "Three Principles of the People." The first of these principles is nationalism. Dr. Sun believed that the idea of a strong political unity must be established in the thinking of the Chinese people in place of the cultural unity which is the Chinese heritage. He compared China repeatedly, in his lectures, to a rope of sand. The particles are alike but the rope is not thereby made strong unless cement is used to bind the particles together. This cement is nationalism, which to Dr. Sun meant the transformation of the culture society into the political state by means of the development of authority. Thus, basically, the nationalism of Dr. Sun was not anti-foreignism but the transfer of traditional loyalties from the clan-family and the village to the state. Consequently, he emphasized nationalism in the sense of the development of national patriotism. But one way, probably the easiest, to develop patriotism is on the basis of hostility to those who threaten the integrity of the state. For that reason, if for no other, much emphasis is laid on the necessity of presenting a united national front against imperialism, which Dr. Sun found had reduced China to the status of a "hypo-colony," a term he employed to describe a condition below that of the colony. But, it must be emphasized, he felt that anti-imperialism—which describes his position better than anti-foreignism—was not the whole of the principle of nationalism. It might be immediately the most important, but ultimately the thinking of the Chinese about themselves must be changed. That is, they must cultivate the ability to think, and thus to act, in terms of the state rather than of smaller groups. Furthermore, since China is composed of five races, the principle of equality of races must be given an internal as well as an external application.

<sup>4</sup> As to the drafting and authenticity of this document see, H. F. MacNAIR, *China in Revolution*, p. 79; T'ANG, *Inner History*, pp. 193-197. The "Will" is important not so much because of its content as on account of its effect in crystallizing the nationalist thinking in terms of the documents enumerated in it.



The second principle was that of democracy, but a revised conception of democracy as contrasted with the thinking of 1911. By 1924 Dr. Sun had come to draw a clear distinction between government, which should be erected on an authoritarian basis, and control, at which place the sovereignty of the people should be exhibited. The devices of control which he proposed were election and recall of policy-determining officers, and the initiative and referendum. The system of government, controlled through these devices, should be instituted on the basis of the five-power constitution, adding to the organization of the functions of legislation, execution, and judgment, those of examination and censorship. The last two, it was felt, represented a return to past practices rather than an introduction of new conceptions. Government, in Dr. Sun's revised thinking, should be in the hands of superior men, but subject ultimately to control which would ensure the use of power in the interest of the masses.

*The principle  
of democracy*

Furthermore, it was recognized, as it had not been in 1911, that the people were not immediately ready to exercise their powers. Consequently, three distinct stages of progress toward democracy were envisaged. First, a period of military operations would be necessary when the military power would have to be dominant. Second, after military operations had been concluded, would come a period of political tutelage, during which the people would have to be trained in the use of their powers. This would have to be undertaken in the locality, with local popular control made effective, a step at a time, before national democracy could be introduced. Thus, development would be from the bottom up rather than from the top down. Given this method of approach, the period of tutelage could be inaugurated in any province or region whenever military operations had been successfully concluded, without waiting for success throughout the entire country. During the period of political tutelage the Party, rather than the people, would be in complete control of the machinery of government. Then, when the people had been prepared to exercise their powers on a national scale, the period of constitutional and democratic government could be safely and wisely inaugurated.

*Three stages  
of development  
toward  
democracy*

The third principle was that of the people's livelihood. It represented Dr. Sun's answer to the question of the use which should be made of power after it had been attained. Broadly characterized, his program was based upon a social rather than an economic interpretation of history. In the lectures on this principle Sun Yat-sen devoted considerable time to a critical analysis of the Marxian doctrine of materialism, reaching the conclusion that it, together with the conception of the class war, were inapplicable in and to China.<sup>5</sup> Since China is

*The principle  
of livelihood*

<sup>5</sup> It may be noted in this connection that there is an inconsistency, from this standpoint, between the point of view expressed in the earlier lectures and that revealed in the uncompleted series dealing with the principle of livelihood. Dr. Sun's earlier views seem to have been modified after reading MAURICE WILLIAM's book, *The Social Interpretation of History*.

essentially an agricultural country, much attention was paid to the problem of livelihood of the peasant. In proposing lines of solution of this problem Dr. Sun's program is reminiscent of Henry George, involving an equalization of land-ownership by means of an appropriation by the state of value added to the land through social development. Beyond this, such indication as Dr. Sun gave in his lectures of the method of concrete application of the principle of livelihood would seem to justify classifying him as a radical bourgeois social reformer rather than a communist. The discussion of the principle was, however, general rather than particular so that it is difficult to deduce an actual realizable program from it. Because of its generality, furthermore, it was possible immediately to use it as the basis for holding together leaders of divergent social and economic aims and interests and ultimately for justifying attack on and defense of what came to be the communist program.

### 3. THE CONTEST FOR POWER AT CANTON—1924-1926

*The struggle  
with the  
Canton gentry*

While these steps were being taken to reorganize and strengthen the Party, dissatisfaction was growing among the merchants of Canton and the gentry of Kwangtung province. Dr. Sun had returned to power in 1923 because of the support accorded him by Yunnan and Kwangsi militarists. Their interest was, however, not in good government but in enriching themselves by exploitation of the city and the province. Consequently their exactions were heavy. To defend themselves the merchants and gentry, apparently with Dr. Sun's approval, organized protective forces of a mercenary character which were called Merchants' Volunteer Corps. These bodies were organized locally to safeguard life and property against the military. But as the Party propaganda assumed a more and more radical character, and as it resulted in the organization of worker's and peasant's unions, the dissatisfaction of the gentry came to be with the Party rather than with its military supporters of the moment. The result was the organization of a movement to expel Dr. Sun from Canton by making use of the Merchants' Volunteer Corps, and by extending an invitation to Ch'en Ch'iung-ming to return to the city. When the clash came, in September and October, 1924, it was precipitated by the action of Dr. Sun in confiscating arms which were being imported for use of the merchants' forces. Consequently, it came before they were fully prepared to act and the *Kuo Min Tang* forces were completely victorious. Their victory was marked by considerable destruction of property, which did not enhance Dr. Sun's popularity at Canton.

*Sun goes  
to Peking*

Immediately thereafter, he left for the north. Since 1922 he had been in alliance with the Tuan Chi-jui faction in the north, and he sought to join with Tuan and Chang Tso-lin in overturning Wu P'ei-fu. However, without military forces at his disposal he was unable to contribute anything to the decision, which was actually

determined in favor of the anti-Wu alliance on account of the defection of Fêng Yü-hsiang. In spite of his failure to launch a movement against Wu from the south Dr. Sun accepted an invitation to proceed to Peking to collaborate with Chang, Fêng and Tuan in the establishment of a government under which China could be united. He arrived at the northern capital in December, only to find that all of the important decisions had already been made, and on terms unacceptable to him. Already a sick man when he arrived, he died in Peking on March 11, 1925.

The death of Sun Yat-sen had two important but contradictory consequences. The first was that he was transformed overnight into the legendary hero and patron saint of the *Kuo Min Tang*, and of nationalist China. All doubts as to his wisdom were laid at rest; his past mistakes and comparative political ineptitude were forgotten. From one who had been regarded by many as a visionary and by not a few as a chronic trouble-maker he came to be regarded as the fount of all wisdom. This, as well as the Russian influence and direction, had the effect of transforming the *Kuo Min Tang* into a vital force in Chinese politics. Sunyatsenism was a much more vital force than Sun Yat-sen had ever been. His "Will" became the sacred canon of the Party, and his "Three Principles of the People" the nationalist bible.

*Consequences  
of the  
death of  
Sun Yat-sen*

But all of this did not prevent the second consequence from manifesting itself. His death opened the way for a conflict for leadership of the Party and made it possible for the leaders, as part of this conflict, to split on doctrinal grounds. This latter was possible because of the generality of expression of his views and the consequent room which was left for differences of interpretation over their correct application.

In the resulting struggle the balance of advantage rested with the left wing of the Party, supported by the communist members. They had the advantage of an initial control of the central machinery of the Party. The victory over the merchants and gentry of Kwangtung, who represented the right wing point of view, gave them the control of Canton. This position they maintained successfully against attacks in the spring of 1925 by the forces of Ch'en Ch'ung-ming and the Kwangsi and Yunnan militarists. And they were able to control the decisions of the Second Party Congress which was held in January, 1926. From the standpoint of the internal Party struggle, the most important of these decisions was that of continuing the Russian connection. It was this, together with the admission of communists to Party membership, which represented the chief point of difference between the right and left wings of the Party leadership, as was indicated in the program drawn up by right wing leaders at the so-called Western Hills Conference. The refusal to consider their program at the second Party Congress insured a continuation of the schism in the party.

*The left  
in  
control*

*The Russian  
orientation  
confirmed*

The Russian orientation was also confirmed by reason of the difficulties with England which developed after the May 30 incident at Shanghai. Chinese students and others demonstrating in support of workmen on strike against Japanese mill-owners were fired upon by the police of the International Settlement, commanded by an Englishman. This aroused a storm of protest throughout the country and led to a similar demonstration at Canton. Again the demonstrators were fired upon by the British police, the result being the so-called Shakee-Shameen massacre. The immediate reaction to this was the institution of a boycott directed against Hongkong and against British trade in general.<sup>6</sup> The ultimate effect was to confirm the nationalists in the view that Dr. Sun's principle of nationalism meant exclusively anti-imperialism, and to establish this as the most important slogan of the Party. In the struggle against imperialism was presented a cause which could unite all elements of the Party. The inauguration of the struggle also served to strengthen the position of those who were supporters of the Russian relationship, since Russian policy was similarly announced to be that of anti-imperialism.

#### 4. THE NORTHERN EXPEDITION

*The "northern  
expedition"*

But a successful struggle against imperialism required the establishment of a broader base than was presented at Canton. This directed attention to another enemy, in opposition to which there was also a united front within the Party. This was northern militarism. The "northern expedition" had been the dream of Sun Yat-sen from 1917 until his death, and it was taken over as the objective of the Party. The decision was taken at the Party Congress of 1926 to launch the northern expedition immediately, but it was taken in the face of the opinion of the Russian advisers that the action should be postponed. However, because of the constant tendency toward factionalism at Canton, with the dangers to their own position inherent in it, as illustrated in the *coup d'état* of Chiang Kai-shek, directed against the left, in the spring of 1926, Borodin changed his mind and turned to advocacy of an attack on the northern militarists. The new point of view, also, was an outgrowth of the appreciation of the fact that a larger stage was needed on which to act against England and the other capitalist states.

*The plan  
of campaign*

The northern expedition was finally launched in the summer of 1926. The plan of attack, devised by the chief Russian military adviser, General Blücher, involved simultaneous movements north through Hunan and Kiangsi provinces, the immediate objective being Hankow. From Hankow it was planned to move down the Yangtse to Nanking and Shanghai. After Shanghai had been reached another northward movement could be inaugurated toward Peking along the lines of the

<sup>6</sup> Which was continued for eighteen months.

Peking-Hankow and the Tientsin-Pukou railways. In the move to the Yangtse all of the armies were placed under the supreme command of General Chiang Kai-shek, who was also released for the period of military operations from the control of the supervisory organs of the Party. The armies operating through Kiangsi, however, were under his direct command rather than those moving on Hankow through Hunan.

By the time General Chiang had reached Nanchang, Hankow had been occupied by the forces striking directly at the center of the power of Wu P'ei-fu. This rapid elimination of one of the northern militarists had been made possible because of the tactics followed in the campaign. These involved an extensive propaganda among the peasants in advance of the military movement, and a similar propaganda among the opposing forces. The result was that the nationalist armies were augmented by additions from the peasantry and by defections from the ranks of Marshal Wu. Thus, while resistance was weakened, the ability to overcome it was constantly increased. Then, after the armies had advanced, the Party propagandists remained to organize the regions occupied and thus to consolidate the ground won. Since the propagandists were in many instances communist members of the Party and in the others were left wing extremists, the territories in Hunan traversed by the nationalist armies were given a radical and communist indoctrination.

*Propaganda  
tactics  
employed*

After the drive north began the government at Canton came to assume a more definitely communist character. Up to that time, while it had rested upon an alliance of the communists with the *Kuo Min Tang* left, the emphasis had been laid upon the leadership of the left rather than that of the communists. This was clearly revealed when, as part of the truce that had been patched up after Chiang's anti-communist blow, executed in Borodin's absence and directed against the extremists, the communists had been denied the right to serve as heads of departments, in spite of the fact that Chiang had to make his peace with Borodin. This decision had been taken at a plenary session of the Central Executive Committee. But with Chiang away in command of the armies, and with Wang Ching-wei, the outstanding civilian leader of the left abroad, the restraining influences were removed. Consequently, the government which was removed to Hankow from Canton in November was dominated by the Russian advisers. Furthermore, its leaders were controlled somewhat by a desire to weaken the hitherto dominant position of Chiang within the councils of the Party, and a distinct anti-Chiang campaign developed.

*Communist  
dominance  
at Canton*

Appreciating this, General Chiang sought to convoke a meeting of the Central Executive Committee at Nanchang, where he would be in a position to reassert his dominance. Instead it was convoked at Hankow, with Chiang abstaining from participation. The result was his removal from the positions of commander-in-chief and chairman

*Power  
withdrawn  
from  
Chiang Kai-  
shek*

of the Standing Committee, although he was continued as a member of the Central Executive Committee.

### 5. HANKOW AND NANKING

*The Nanking  
affair*

This was the prelude to the long-expected and often-deferred split in the Party, which, for a time, brought the struggle against the imperialists and the northern militarists to an end.<sup>7</sup> For a time even apparently anti-foreign movements, such as occurred when Nanking was occupied by communist nationalist troops, were designed fundamentally to produce internal rather than external consequences. When it was learned at Hankow that Chiang planned to occupy Nanking and to seize control of Shanghai, with a view to gaining the support of the wealthy bourgeois at the latter place, he was forestalled by the entrance into Nanking of nationalist troops, acting ostensibly under his orders, who immediately began to loot and destroy foreign property. The expectation was that this would embroil Chiang with the foreign Powers, who were already sufficiently alarmed over developments so that they were evacuating their nationals from the interior, sending additional contingents of troops to Shanghai, and erecting barricades there for the purpose of defending the International Settlement and the French concession.<sup>8</sup> Chiang, however, was able to avoid international difficulties for the time, although ultimately the government which he was largely instrumental in establishing at Nanking assumed responsibility for and reached an adjustment with the Powers concerning the Nanking affair.

Forestalled at Nanking, Chiang went directly to Shanghai where he was able to secure the support of the bankers and merchants, of the old *Kuo Min Tang* leaders who had withdrawn from participation in Party affairs because of dissatisfaction with the Russian orientation (the so-called Western Hills faction), and of the labor union leaders and members who had not succumbed to the left-communist propaganda. Consequently, he was able to gain control of the city without the employment of force, except as it was used after his establishment in power ruthlessly to crush out communism.

*The struggle  
against the  
communists*

Some of the more moderate members of the Hankow government, disturbed by the extremist policies which were being inaugurated, joined Chiang at Shanghai after he had moved his base north from Nanchang. Others, and notably Wang Ching-wei, who were non-communist leaders of the left wing, attempted to reconcile Chiang with Hankow in order to avoid a disastrous rupture. These negotia-

<sup>7</sup> Attempts to carry on the campaign were made by Hankow and Nanking, but with only temporary advantages won to compensate for reverses which were suffered.

<sup>8</sup> Their alarm was increased when the British concessions at Hankow and Kiukiang were taken over by the Hankow government. Eugene Chin's pronouncements as Hankow Foreign Minister were not designed to lessen foreign apprehensions.

tions failing, Chiang was formally read out of the party by those in control at Hankow, while he established his seat of government at Nanking and invited the support of all who were opposed to communism and Russian domination. The moderate cause was strengthened when, in consequence of a raid by Chang Tso-lin on the Soviet headquarters at Peking, the Arcos raid in London, and the indiscretions of M. N. Roy, a communist agent attached to the Wuhan government, it was made clear that Russia was then more interested in using the Chinese revolution for her own purposes than in facilitating the attainment of the goal of the nationalist revolution in China. The left Kuo Min Tang members were definitely alienated from the communists and brought into a rapprochement with the moderates, accepting the point of view that the Party must be purged of the communists, and that Borodin and the Russian advisers must be sent home. This, however, was not accomplished until the mid-summer of 1927, and it did not, even then, bring internal harmony sufficient to enable the campaign against the northern coalition to be prosecuted successfully. The Hankow leaders asserted their supremacy in the Party, supported by the fact that they controlled the Central Executive Committee, as against Chiang Kai-shek and his supporters at Nanking. And in the struggle the other military leaders, such as the Kwangsi generals, and Fêng Yü-hsiang who had shifted from benevolent neutrality to active participation in the Party after the overthrow of Wu P'ei-fu, served as make-weights as between Nanking and Hankow.

The scales inclined first one way and then the other. Chiang Kai-shek, who had suffered reverses in the campaign he was carrying on against Sun Ch'uan-fang, and thus was weakened at Nanking, resigned his position in August and retired to Shanghai with the other Nanking leaders. The Wuhan leaders then decided to move the seat of government to Nanking, which was done in September, a basis of agreement with the Kwangsi generals who were in control there after Chiang's retirement having been found. This agreement was short-lived, however, and negotiations were begun with Chiang, after a period of retirement of the left wing leaders to Canton. By that time Chiang and Fêng Yü-hsiang had come into alliance. Consequently, by the end of 1927, Chiang Kai-shek had returned to power and a sufficiently united front had been instituted to enable the campaign against the northern militarists to be resumed. The situation then was that all of the country south of the Yangtse was nominally under the control of the reorganized Nanking Party government. The northwestern provinces and Honan were ruled by Fêng Yü-hsiang, who, however, accepted the direction of the Party. Yen Hsi-shan, the Governor of Shansi province, also had thrown in his lot with the nationalists. Consequently, only northern Anhui, Chihli, and Shantung provinces and the three Manchurian provinces remained under the control of the coalition headed by Chang Tso-lin.

*Struggle of  
right against  
left  
continued*

## 6. CHINA UNIFIED BY THE NATIONALISTS

*The northern  
coalition  
defeated*

The military movement to unify China under the auspices of the nationalist Party was resumed in the early spring of 1928. Again the commander-in-chief was Chiang Kai-shek. And again the plan of campaign involved parallel movements north to the objective, Peking. And, just as in the movement north to the Yangtse, Chiang Kai-shek was held up, so that the forces moving in the central part of the country were able to reach the objective ahead of him. This time, however, he was obstructed by the Japanese, who threw troops into Shantung along the line of the Tsingtao-Tsinan Railway for the purpose of protecting their interests. This had been done the year before when, after the establishment of the government at Nanking, Chiang had attempted to carry further the northward movement. At that time a clash had been averted. But this time one occurred between the revolutionary troops in control of Tsinan and the Japanese forces. The affair was localized so that its ultimate consequences were not serious. But it stirred up ill-will, and it prevented Chiang Kai-shek from participating in the actual driving of Chang Tso-lin from Peking.<sup>9</sup> This was accomplished in June, Chang retiring with his troops into Manchuria. Following the policy of keeping the area of their interests free from civil war, the Japanese prohibited the nationalist troops from following Chang to Mukden and thus extending their sway to include Manchuria. But the same end was accomplished subsequently when Chang Hsueh-liang, the son and successor of Chang Tso-lin, who lost his life in consequence of a bomb explosion before reaching Mukden, hoisted the nationalist flag and voluntarily accepted the union of the Manchurian provinces with nationalist China.

*The capital  
moved to  
Nanking*

With the capture of Peking it became possible to accomplish what Yuan Shih-k'ai had successfully prevented the 1911 revolutionists from doing, i.e., to move the capital of united China from Peking to Nanking. To make even sharper the break with the past, the name of the pre-revolutionary capital was changed to Peip'ing. With the removal of the government offices to Nanking the only remaining indication of Peip'ing's former political supremacy was the legation quarter, the diplomats only gradually deciding to transfer their quarters to the new seat of government.

## 7. THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT ESTABLISHED

*The Organic  
Law*

The military period of the revolution having been completed, Chiang Kai-shek resigned his office as commander-in-chief and chairman of the military council, returning to the Party power which had been derived from it. Attention was then turned to the problem of

<sup>9</sup> Yen Hsi-shan was instructed to take over the Peking-Tientsin area to forestall occupation by Fêng Yu-hsiang.



reconstruction. The fifth plenary session of the Central Executive Committee, which was held in August, 1928, authorized the preparation of the Organic Law of the National Government. This was promulgated in October, and with it the country entered officially upon the second stage of the revolution, the period of political tutelage. During it, according to the plans of Dr. Sun, the control was to remain vested in the Party, to be exercised through the Party Congress, the Central Executive Committee, and its Standing Committee. Under the Organic Law, general supervision and direction of the organs of government was to be exercised by a Central Political Council, composed of the Central Executive Committee members and the members of the Central State Council. This established a direct personnel link between the Party and the government. From the governmental standpoint, the highest organ was to be the State Council, whose chairman was made the titular head of the state. Under it a scheme of governmental organization was introduced which embodied Dr. Sun's five-power conception of separate Yuan for the executive, legislative, judicial, examination and control functions.

A structure for the provincial governments was erected in a law of October 25, which was designed to unify the provincial establishments under the control of provincial councils, whose members, including the chairman, were to be designated by the National Government. Above the provincial councils, branch political councils were established at Canton, Hankow, Kaifeng, Taiyuan, Peking, and Mukden, which corresponded to the regional centers of influence competitive with Nanking.

*Provincial  
governments*

The Organic Law, in substitution for a more formal constitution, continued in force as the basis of government until the adoption, on May 12, 1931, of a provisional constitution by a National People's Convention convoked for that purpose. The new constitution continued substantially the same scheme of organization as that provided for in the Organic Law, including the provision made for control of the government by the *Kuo Min Tang* Central Executive Committee, but it substantially increased the powers of the Chairman of the State Council. It contained chapters, however, defining the territories of the state; determining citizenship, and the rights and duties of the people; concerning the application of the principle of the people's livelihood; on education; establishing a division of powers between the central and local governments; and providing for the establishment of local governments. Since the provisional constitution was adopted on the eve of the outbreak of trouble with Japan in Manchuria, and when a serious threat to stability was presented with the recrudescence of communism in south-central China, its ultimate importance is still to be seen. At any rate, it is the instrument under which government is to be conducted until the termination of the period of tutelage, supposedly in 1935.

*The  
provisional  
constitution*

## 8. DOMESTIC POLITICS—1929-1933

*The situation  
in 1929*

If China had been united in fact as well as in name after the overthrow of the northern militarists, and the acceptance of the authority of the Party by Chang Hsueh-liang on January 1, 1929, it would have been possible to move rapidly in the direction of national reconstruction. This movement was strongly retarded, however, on account of the fact that the government had constantly to struggle merely to preserve itself. The head of the government was Chiang Kai-shek, but he, and consequently the Nanking government, immediately dominated by him, directly controlled only the provinces at the mouth of the Yangtse River. Elsewhere, the authority of the government was dependent upon a continuation of alliances with Fêng Yü-hsiang, Yen Hsi-shan, and the Kwangsi generals who were in control of the region centering at Hankow. Furthermore, while the drive against the communists had been immediately successful in breaking their power in south-central China, it had not resulted in their extinction. The movement was driven underground for the time, but propaganda continued, and a portion of the original nationalist armies retained its communist complexion and kept alive resistance to the National government. From the doctrinal standpoint, also, the right wing of the Party was in control of the machinery of the Party and the possibility existed of a revival of the struggle between the right and the left. Immediately, the left group, which came to call itself reorganizationist, pursued essentially a policy of neutrality toward Nanking.

*The Kwangsi  
faction  
defeated*

Consequently, it is not to be wondered at that the central government had to concentrate its energies on the task of maintaining itself. Fêng Yü-hsiang withdrew from personal collaboration with Chiang at Nanking before the termination of the sessions of the conference which was called in January, 1929, to plan the disbandment of the feudal military forces.<sup>10</sup> The leaders of the left denounced the Nanking leadership because of the decision which was taken with respect to the method of constitution of the third Party Congress, which was summoned for March 15, 1929, laying the basis for the subsequent raising of the standard of revolt at Canton. And a direct military struggle with the Kwangsi faction broke out in March. The Kwangsi generals were driven from Hankow by Chiang's troops, supported by those of Fêng Yü-hsiang, who responded to Nanking's call for action in the hope of adding to the territories under his control.

*The Yen-  
Fêng coalition*

The decisive struggle between Chiang and Fêng, however, was postponed until 1930. In the interval each side attempted to weaken the other by charge and counter-charge, and by the traditional methods of Chinese military-diplomatic warfare. Both Chiang and Fêng ma-

<sup>10</sup> This represented a direct attack on the major problem confronting every government since 1911. Agreement on a plan of regional disbandment was reached but not put into effect.

neuvered to secure the support of Yen Hsi-shan and of Chang Hsueh-liang. When the rupture came, Nanking faced a coalition of Yen and Fêng, but it was supported by the benevolent neutrality of Chang, which later was transformed into active support. In the result Yen was eliminated and Fêng was driven into his fastnesses in the north-west,<sup>11</sup> and their territories were brought under the control of Chang Hsueh-liang, who thus resumed the position in north China from which his father had been driven in 1928. The difference was that he professed allegiance to the Nanking government, dominated by Chiang Kai-shek, whereas his father had steadily opposed the nationalists. This position he maintained, under the Nanking government, until his power was broken in Manchuria by the Japanese, and until he was finally compelled to renounce his authority in North China on account of his failure to organize a successful resistance to Japan.

While this struggle for power had been going on in the north, the Nanking government had not found its authority uncontested south of the Yangtse. As has been stated, the reorganizationist leaders were dissatisfied under right wing control of the Central Executive Committee, and they did not like the growing concentration of power in the hands of Chiang Kai-shek. The situation at Nanking seemed to justify the conclusion that the result of the revolution had been to institute a new military control to replace the northern militarism. Consequently, the leftist leaders reverted to the tactics of Dr. Sun. They sought to gain and to maintain control of Canton, supporting General Chang Fa-kwei when he attempted to capture the city. When this attempt failed, they began negotiations with the anti-Chiang leaders in the north. Their first overtures were rejected, but when the Yen-Fêng coalition finally was formed and the standard of revolt raised, Wang Ching-wei and Ch'en Kung-po, the two outstanding reorganizationist leaders, accepted an invitation to collaborate in the establishment of a short-lived new government at Peip'ing. Subsequently a separate government was established at Canton, supported by the Kwangsi leaders who had previously been driven out of Hankow and pushed back to their original sphere of control. The new government controlled Kwangtung and Kwangsi provinces only, but asserted itself to be the heir of the revolution, and it launched an expedition against Chiang and Nanking in the late summer of 1931. The difficulties with Japan led to a suspension of these hostilities, to negotiations, and finally to a reconstruction of authority at Nanking, with a virtual concentration of power in a committee of three composed of Chiang, Wang Ching-wei, and Hu Han-min. This alliance of the right and the left, with more than an inclination to the left, was short-lived. The next reconstruction restored the earlier supremacy of Chiang Kai-shek. But mid-summer of

*Left  
opposition  
revived*

<sup>11</sup> Where he remained inactive politically until 1933 when his voice was raised demanding continued opposition to Japan and denouncing the agreement on the terms of an armistice.

1933 saw his government weakened in north China on account of the extension of Japanese operations, faced by a continuation of a separate régime at Canton, and in the midst of a struggle to overthrow the rising communist power in south-central China.

Chiang's policy of virtual non-resistance to the Japanese was largely determined by the desire to concentrate on the struggle against communism. In his belief that communism represented the outstanding menace Wang Ching-wei concurred. Other left wing leaders, however, wished to risk all in an attempt to resist Japan. Thus they were led to retire from collaboration with the Chiang-dominated régime.

#### 9. THE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT

*The revival  
of communism*

The revival of communist power to the point where it constituted a menace to the authority of Nanking was in part due to the fact that the energies, and especially the military power, of the government were diverted to the north after the initial anti-communist drive of 1927. This enabled the remaining communist forces gradually to strengthen themselves and to develop tactics of their own. The remnants of the communist military forces were driven into hiding in the mountainous regions of southern Kiangsi province. There they maintained themselves, with some difficulty at first. But as they gained the confidence of the peasantry and learned how to maintain themselves in conflict with the provincial military forces by adapting the mountainous terrain to their own purposes they became more powerful and more aggressive. By 1930 they had become strong enough to undertake an offensive directed toward Changsha, which city they occupied but were unable to hold long because of foreign intervention in support of Nanking. Their military successes at this time were ascribable to the fact that Nanking was engrossed in the Yen-Fêng campaign.

*Communist  
policies*

After that campaign was ended, however, the Central Executive Committee called for "the complete extermination of the communist armies and the reoccupation of the sovietized areas." The attempt to carry out this direction was begun in December, 1931, and it was still being continued in 1933, four major campaigns having been carried on, up to that time, against the communist forces. While successes, from the military standpoint, had been gained, the communist armies had not yet been dislodged, nor had the communist influence been greatly lessened. In 1933, southeastern Kiangsi and western Fukien provinces were definitely organized under soviet governments, while the communist sphere of influence extended throughout Kiangsi and was marked in Hupeh provinces. In addition, smaller areas in Kwangtung and Hunan provinces to the south and Anhui to the north of the Yangtse River were subject to communist influences. The areas under communist control were agricultural rather than industrial, so that the development was toward peasant

control rather than proletarian dictatorship. The communist policy had thus been directed toward the accomplishment of agrarian reforms. Large landed estates had been broken up and the land distributed. A banking system, together with coöperative credit societies, had been instituted. Cultivation of the poppy had been prohibited, so that land which had been forced out of food-crop production in order to enrich the military rulers of former days, had again become productive of food. Irrigation and flood-prevention work had been undertaken out of the revenues derived from public lands. And the tax system had been reformed, with a progressive land tax, bearing most heavily on the well-to-do, replacing the old system of levies which had the effect of pauperizing the impoverished. On the industrial side, in the towns under soviet government, wages had been raised, just as they had been for agricultural laborers, hours had been shortened, and, in general, policies had been pursued designed to ameliorate the condition of the poorer classes.

The policies pursued by the communists in the areas under their control seemed to indicate the answer to the question raised by the spread of communism in the face of opposition to it by a government which had at its disposal much larger military forces and infinitely greater resources. The Nanking government had been so much engrossed with military operations and expenses resulting from them that it had been unable to make much headway in the endeavor to achieve the social and economic reforms regarded by Dr. Sun as a fundamental part of his program. Such reformatory work as had been attempted, it was suggested by its critics, had been in the interest of the wealthier classes rather than of the impoverished masses. This had grown inevitably out of the right orientation of the party after 1927, and the deriving of its support from the wealthier merchant classes. After power had been attained by the party it tended to lose its revolutionary character for that reason.

#### 10. THE ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT

It should not be inferred from this, however, that the Nanking government had no record of constructive achievement to its credit. Its greatest accomplishments, disregarding the loss of Manchuria, had been in the field of foreign affairs, and these are discussed in another chapter. In the domestic field, however, it had faced the gigantic problem of public finance realistically and to some purpose. In the face of the aggravated expenditures for military purposes, both in the form of provision for amortization of debts contracted for those purposes and to maintain the armies in the field necessary to ensure its continued existence, provision had been made for the resumption of payments on the general public debt of the state, which Nanking inherited from the preceding Peking governments. And, in a world of unbalanced state budgets, China was enabled to announce the

final balancing of its budget. These achievements must be credited largely to one man, T. V. Soong, who had been at the head of the Finance Ministry almost without interruption since the establishment of the Nanking government.<sup>12</sup> But his achievement was only possible because of the enlargement of income consequent on the attainment of customs autonomy; because of the gradual centralization of financial administration under the Nanking Ministry of Finance; and by following a course of the most rigid economy.<sup>13</sup> But, of course, a program of economy militated against the undertaking of other constructive work.

*Improvement  
in  
communications* An advance had also been made through the centralization of railway administration under the Ministry of Communications. This agency had also worked out extensive plans for railway construction to be undertaken as rapidly as circumstances permitted. It should also be noted that highways had been constructed suitable to motor transport, thus enlarging the communication facilities of the country.

*Economic and  
social  
problems  
studied* In the economic field, outside of communications, the work of the Nanking government perhaps fairly may be classed as exploratory. Extensive studies, aided by foreign commissions, had been made of the currency problem, of education, of the problem of public health organization, of opium control, and of other problems of national reconstruction. In undertaking these studies, preparatory to action, a close relationship to the Secretariat of the League of Nations had been in the process of evolution. Furthermore, legislation had been enacted for the organization of labor unions, for the arbitration of labor disputes, and for the eight-hour day.

*Legal and  
judicial  
development* In the legal and judicial fields the process of constructing satisfactory codes of law and of procedure had been carried further toward completion. Many new and modern courts were established in the areas under the control of Nanking, and progress was made with the establishment of modern prisons.

*The position  
of the  
opposition* But all of this may be said to be the typical program of the capitalist state and did not directly move to meet the need for livelihood of the impoverished masses. This may also be said of many of the proposals for application of the principle of livelihood which were written into the provisional constitution. Consequently it enabled propaganda to be carried on successfully, denouncing the Nanking government as one substantially uninterested in the realization of Dr. Sun's third principle, and furthering the aims of the Chinese communists. No one had stated the position of the opposition, from this standpoint, more positively and clearly than Madame Sun Yat-sen did at the time of the break with the Russians in 1927, in 1929 and again in 1931. To her, and to those who thought in the same terms, the program of Nanking was one of social reform, and not one of revolution. Thus the underlying internal issue, in 1933, seemed to

<sup>12</sup> Having previously served Hankow in that capacity.

<sup>13</sup> It was also possible because he held the confidence of the Shanghai bankers.

be clearly joined between those favoring the maintenance of the moderate, capitalist-supported government headed by Chiang Kai-shek, and those who were promoting what was essentially a peasant revolt. It did not follow that internal stability would be immediately attained with the triumph of Nanking over the communists, since there would still remain room for wide difference of opinion over the program of reform to be promoted. But the issue as between Nanking and Canton was much less fundamental than that between Nanking and communism.

But whatever the issue of that struggle, one conclusion quite clearly emerges from a study of political development in China since 1911. This is that there has been a constantly growing perception of the enlarged and more positive rôle which government has to play in a modern society. No longer was government, whether it be that of Canton or Nanking, or the Soviets, conceived of in terms of the performance of a negative and passive rôle, restricting public authority to the maintenance of peace and order and allowing the economic and social life of the country to be carried on without positive relationship of government to it. In this respect, nationalist China has not been an innovator, but has merely carried further the evolution which was begun with the establishment of intercourse with the West. The Kemmerer Commission on currency reform, for example, was established as the latest in a series of commissions and experts asked to propose solutions of the problem of bringing order out of the chaotic currency situation. Similarly, the League Commission entrusted with a study of the problem of education reëxamined, for the National government, a phase of the national life which had previously been subjected to study. The significant thing, however, is that the successive governments of China began to attempt to relate government to these and other phases of the life of the country in a new way. To begin with, as this tendency began to manifest itself after 1900, the stimulus toward the revision of the rôle of government was applied by the Western States. But now it is China itself which is exhibiting an active interest in the transformation of the rôle of government from the negative to the positive. More and more definitely then it may be expected that government will interest itself in the development of communications, in the improvement of the condition of agriculture, in industrial undertakings and development, and in the direction of social relations. The only question in 1933 was whether the program of activity would be based upon the capitalist principle or on that of communism.

*New rôle of  
government*

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## CHAPTER XIV

### THE PROGRESS OF CHINA: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL

#### I. POLITICAL STABILITY NOT AN ABSOLUTE PREREQUISITE TO PROGRESS

For the Westerner, political stability is the absolute prerequisite of material progress, so intimately is government related to the economic life of the state. Consequently he finds it difficult to understand that the condition of political turmoil in China which has marked the last decade has not produced a corresponding economic chaos. The explanation, which is extremely simple, has already been indicated. It is to be found in the fact that the economic life of the country has been lived apart from governmental interference or direction. The change in this particular has been of such recent development, and has been carried such a short distance even to the present time, that political instability has not prevented economic progress from taking place during the last twenty-five years. The relaxation of the hand of authority, with the resulting increase in brigandage and piracy, and the incessant turmoil due to civil war, have undoubtedly retarded the normal economic development of the country, particularly because the latter has made difficult the undertaking of vitally necessary developmental functions by government. But changes in the economic life of the country have taken place in spite of political disorganization to an extent impossible in an entity such as the economic state of the West. It is in the non-political fields that there have been taking place significant changes which must be appreciated if contemporary China is to be understood. As far as possible their consideration has been postponed so that they might be given more unified treatment at this point in the survey of the past century. These changes have come so gradually that it is only in the last decade that they have become vitally important. But in estimating their significance we must bear in mind that in many cases they really constitute beginnings or tendencies rather than completed movements. This both increases their interest and makes more difficult their authoritative treatment.

*Progress in  
spite of  
political  
condition  
explained*

#### 2. FOREIGN TRADE

An important indication of the economic progress of China since 1900 is to be found in the expansion of the import and export trade and in the change in character of both imports and exports.

Although treaties of trade and commerce were consummated between China and Western nations during the years 1842 and 1843 and as a

*Growth of  
trade followed  
enlargement of  
points of  
contact*

result certain designated ports were formally opened to foreign trade, yet it was not until the last decade of the nineteenth century that the Chinese themselves exhibited an interest in intercourse with the outside world. China's geographical isolation, its huge continental proportions, its tendency to wall itself off from the outside world, the self-sufficient nature of its society, its racial homogeneity, the uniqueness of its civilization and its lack of adequate internal communications, all militated against an expeditious development of contact with the outside world.<sup>1</sup>

Thus it took half a century for China to manifest a real trade interest, although there was gradual expansion of trade during the nineteenth century. This growth was almost inevitable as the points of contact were increased. In 1842 five ports were opened to trade. With each successive application of pressure by the Powers new ports, known as Treaty Ports, were opened to foreigners and foreign trade. After a time the Chinese government opened a few ports of its own free will. The number of treaty ports opened now numbers sixty-nine, and there are eleven places voluntarily opened to trade and foreign residence. The trade naturally increased with this enlargement of the points of contact under the stimulus of foreign interest.

Expansion of  
foreign trade  
after 1900

After 1900, as China committed herself more fully and freely to foreign intercourse, the foreign trade grew more rapidly. The value of imports increased between 1900 and 1910 from over 211 to almost 463,000,000 Haikwan *taels*. During the same period exports increased from almost 159,000,000 to just under 381,000,000 *taels*. The effect of the revolution, but more particularly of the European War, was to check the import trade and, after 1914, to expand the export trade. But in both cases the post-war years, which have also been those of greatest political unsettlement in China, have been marked by rapid expansion. The year 1930 saw a net importation valued at 1,309,755,742 Haikwan *taels* and an exportation valued at 894,843,594 *taels*.<sup>2</sup> Thus in a period of thirty years the foreign trade values increased over three hundred fifty per cent. While these values must be discounted because of a change in price levels and on account of fluctuations in exchange, still they represent an advance which becomes little short of remarkable when the abnormal internal and world conditions are taken into account.

Change in  
character of  
foreign trade

Of much more significance than their increase in value, however, is the change in the character of the imports and exports. Considering the former first, an analysis of the trade warrants acceptance of the statement that "the old order—China importing opium, cottons, and a few sundries—has been completely swept away, and, although the country is looked to as a large-supplier of foodstuffs to the Western world, it is no less an importer on a large scale."<sup>3</sup>

It was opium which first turned the trade balance against China,

<sup>1</sup>ARNOLD, *China's Post-War Trade*, in *Annals of American Academy*, November, 1925, p. 82.

<sup>2</sup>This is a decrease from the high export levels of the three previous years, but an increase over 1926.

<sup>3</sup>*China Year Book* (1924), p. 671.

although its importation was not legalized until 1858. In 1882 it accounted for over thirty-four per cent of the imports. In 1902 importation of other goods had so much increased that only eleven per cent of the total imports was opium. Then in 1906, as part of the reform program, China reverted to her earlier attitude toward the drug, and an Imperial edict ordered that opium smoking should be brought to an end by 1917. At the same time an attempt was made to reach an agreement with England lessening importation from India. This resulted in an understanding with the Indian government by which the export from India to China was to be reduced ten per cent per annum for a period of three years (1908-1911).<sup>4</sup> A new agreement reached on May 8, 1911, "provided for the complete extinction by the end of 1917 of the export of opium from India to China, and of the Chinese production of opium. It also provided that Indian opium, meanwhile, should be barred 'from any province in China which can establish by clear evidence that it has effectively suppressed the cultivation and import of native opium.'"<sup>5</sup>

*The opium trade*

With this agreement as a stimulus, progress was made toward curtailment of domestic production, although the revolution caused a temporary set-back—by reason of disturbed conditions, however, and not because of any change in policy. In spite of China's failure to live up to the 1911 agreement, the Indian government announced that after 1913 no further sales for the Chinese market would be permitted. It was also excluded officially by 1915, on the ground of the ending of cultivation, from fifteen provinces of China. All of this must be distinctly set down on the side of progress, particularly the strides made toward the lessening, province by province, of internal production.

*Curtailment of domestic production*

Unfortunately, after 1915 a different story must be told. As military government established itself in one province after another, and as the authority of Peking declined, cultivation was resumed and by 1923 the only provinces free from the poppy were those so located that it was more profitable to rely on imports from neighboring provinces than to furnish their own supplies. The military must be held responsible for this because in some cases the *Tuchun* forced cultivation, and in others encouraged it in order to augment his resources. A notable exception has been Shansi, where, under Governor Yen Hsi-shan, an active campaign to suppress both cultivation and smoking has been carried on successfully, except as conditions in neighboring provinces have prevented the attainment of complete suppression. Elsewhere smoking goes on openly, with the officials reaping a profit from it as well as from the cultivation. There was some decline in cultivation in 1924-1925, due rather to previous over-production than to any change of attitude on the part of officials. Thus China has become by far the largest producer of opium in the world. As against the two million pounds produced in India in 1924

*Resumption of cultivation*

On condition that native production should be reduced in the same ratio.  
*China Year Book* (1924), p. 552.

China must be credited with over twenty-five millions. This means that it is on China herself, rather than on England, that pressure must be put to reduce production as a means of restricting consumption.

Increased use  
of other  
narcotics

In this same connection must be noted the increased use of other narcotics, such as morphia, by Chinese in recent years. Here the supply comes from abroad and, since it is smuggled, it is difficult to estimate its quantity and source. Such seizures as have been made by customs authorities, however, indicate that the smuggling is done mostly by Japanese and Germans. It is brought in mainly through the ports in leased territory and through Shanghai. Because of its cheapness and the ease of using it, the morphine pill bids fair to displace the opium pipe among the poorer classes.

Foreign trade  
analyzed

Returning to the general question of foreign trade, we find that in 1902 cotton goods and sundries accounted for seventy-two per cent of the imports; and food products, kerosene, and metals for seventeen per cent. In 1910 cotton yarn and cotton goods represented twenty-six per cent of the total imports; rice seven per cent; metals and machinery eight per cent; kerosene five per cent; sugar four and a half per cent; railway materials three per cent; marine products two per cent; cigarettes and tobacco two per cent; coal two per cent; dyes one and a half per cent; matches one per cent; woolen goods one per cent; and other goods of various sorts thirty-seven per cent. By 1930 importation of raw cotton had increased from less than one per cent of the total in 1910 to ten per cent, which meant an increase in value from 4,500,000 to 132,266,000 Haikwan *taels*. The cotton goods imported in 1930 had increased in value, but represented only 10.7 per cent of the total import trade as against thirteen per cent in 1910. And cotton yarn had substantially fallen both in value and in proportion.<sup>6</sup>

Character of  
imports  
indicates  
important  
changes in  
economic system

Without making a more extensive analysis of the import trade, we may fairly say that it reveals a continual broadening of the demand for foreign goods, and that it shows a most interesting change in the character of the demand. The value of machinery imported has increased from nine to seventy-eight million *taels*—from two to six per cent of the import totals. This indicates a change in internal production from hand to machine work. To put it another way, it means that the industrial revolution has reached China. The increased importation of raw cotton and the decrease in importation, both in value and proportion, of cotton yarn reveals the same change. China is beginning to manufacture to supply her own needs in cotton goods. This conclusion is not invalidated by the increased value of cotton goods brought into the country because the Chinese are not yet able to supply their own expanding needs, nor has weaving by modern means been undertaken as extensively as spinning. Since we shall have to return to this question in another connection, we may temporarily postpone the drawing of final conclusions.

<sup>6</sup>These figures are drawn from a table presented by JULIAN ARNOLD, op. cit., p. 84, and from GROVER CLARK, *Economic Rivalries in China* (1932), p. 111.

Referring to another import commodity, kerosene, it may be pointed out that it represents an important change affecting the lives of the people by affording them better lighting at night in places where electric lighting has not been introduced. The development, during the World War, of new markets for China's vegetable oils was partly responsible for the increased demand for kerosene, as was also the increased wealth due to war trade, which made possible a wider replacement of vegetable oils by kerosene for illuminating purposes. But whatever the reason for the change, the improvement in lighting in the homes has significance in the development of the new China. A similar modernization of life is revealed in the importation of matches. The value of match importation had decreased by 1923, but this was due to the fact that China was supplying her own needs in the face of an enlarged demand, rather than to a lessening of the demand. Other changes in the life of the people are shown in the fourfold increase in importation of paper, largely due to the establishment and increase in the number of newspapers; in the introduction of motor cars; and in the importation of photographic, printing and lithographing materials, and telephone and telegraph supplies, and scientific instruments. These and other importations mean that the Chinese, from the material standpoint, are beginning gradually to change their manner of living.

*Also indicate changes in life of people*

In the same way, an analysis of the trade reveals a much wider range of commodities exported. The most notable change, perhaps, is the relative decline in exportation of tea, which represented almost forty-eight per cent of the export trade in 1882, ten per cent in 1902, and less than three per cent in 1930. This is to be explained by the inroads made on the Chinese overseas market by Japanese and Indian teas, by the failure of the Chinese to improve their output, and, recently, by the temporary decline in the Russian demand due to conditions in Russia. Silk, the other great staple of export, has also shown a relative decline in terms of the total trade, although one not at all comparable with the decline in tea exportation. Another interesting development is that of the export of soya beans, bean-cake, and bean-oil, which was negligible in 1900, was eight per cent of the total in 1910 and had increased to 20.7 per cent of the 1930 total, becoming the outstanding export. In value this means one hundred and eighty-five million *taels*. The rise of the soya bean to its present position in the trade parallels the settlement and the development of Manchuria under the stimulation of the Japanese South Manchurian railway.

*Shift in emphasis in export commodities*

Exports are almost entirely raw materials and foodstuffs, except for certain manufactures peculiar to China such as silk piece-goods, carpets, embroideries and laces, hair nets, and a few other items. And yet we find listed among the exports egg products, a new and growing industrial commodity, nankeens, and even cotton yarn. These are indications, small to be sure, that China will some day be found

*Wider range of exports*

competing with the Western states and Japan in their own markets. The increased variety of China's exports is indicated in the fact that in 1910 only thirty-three products were sufficiently important to be listed among the exports, while in 1930 there were over fifty separate types of export, each valued at more than a million *taels*.

*Small part  
played by  
foreign trade  
in China's life*

It must of course be admitted that foreign trade, as such, plays a relatively small part in the Chinese economy. But it deserves consideration both for itself and because of the indications it gives of changes going on within China during the past quarter of a century.

### 3. CHANGES IN AGRICULTURAL LIFE

*Increase in  
internal trade*

These changes may be even better gaged by examining the internal productive processes and internal trade. As to the latter, it is impossible to present reliable and comprehensive figures showing its extent, either in the past or at the present time. But where goods had to be moved on waterways by junk and flat-bottomed boats pushed and pulled by man power, and on land had to be carried on the camel and the donkey-cart or by the wheelbarrow, it is clear that trade on more than a local basis would be greatly restricted. The use of steam vessels along the coast and on the great navigable rivers, together with the building of roads and the construction of railways, has assuredly greatly expanded internal trade, an expansion limited, of course, by the extent to which these innovations have been made. But even the small beginnings which have been made have tended to break down economic provincialism and localism, and to create national markets. Thus it is fair to infer that internal trade has grown even more largely than foreign trade since 1900.

*Agricultural  
methods remain  
primitive*

The agricultural population constitutes today, just as it did in 1842, the largest occupational group in China. Outwardly the village peoples engaged in farming have been the least affected in their lives and economic activities by the contact with the West. This would naturally be the case, since they live in places where there is very little contact with the foreigner, and where they are largely shut off from the new currents. In the interior villages the ground is prepared in the same way that it was generations ago. The primitive plow, drawn perhaps by a donkey and a bullock jointly, is used, and primitive methods of harvesting and threshing are employed. The farming implements and machinery of the West either have been rejected or have never been heard of. There has been little introduction of mechanical devices for labor saving purposes.

*Explanation  
of failure to  
introduce  
agricultural  
machinery*

While this is and for a long time will be the case, there are certain explanations of it other than ignorance or unwillingness to change. In the first place, the farm machinery which has been so highly developed in the United States is not adapted to the needs of Chinese agriculture. It is all designed for extensive cultivation with the minimum use of human labor. Where individual land holdings are small and scattered, as they are in China, the farm machines such as a

tractor or a gang plow cannot be readily used, and are uneconomical for the individual farmer. It could be introduced successfully only by an agreement to disregard boundary-lines in plowing. The Chinese farmer, who is an individualist, can be led only gradually to agree to this as he is shown a positive advantage which he would secure from it. In the second place, Western tools and machines are so expensive that the Chinese could not afford to buy them even though he could see that they would ultimately pay for themselves. The chief advantage urged for them is that they replace labor, enabling one man to do the work of several. But this is not an advantage in China, where labor is too abundant. So long as the man-power available for agriculture is not decreased, labor-saving agricultural devices will make little appeal. On the contrary, they arouse opposition because they mean starvation for the people displaced. If industry should draw off enough men from the farms, or if an extensive emigration overseas or to Manchuria and Mongolia should take place, or if both in combination should happen, so that there would exist an acute labor shortage in agricultural regions, then Western farm implements might make an appeal, if it could be shown how they could be used effectively under Chinese conditions and if the farmers could finance their purchase.

But while there has been little change in the use of implements, there have been significant changes in the agricultural economy. In the first place, the improvement of communications has had its effect on the peasant population. For the first time it is beginning to be possible to produce primarily for sale rather than for use or for purely local exchange. This change will be fully realized, and its consequences manifested, only with the completion of the railroad system. But even now it results in the beginnings of agricultural specialization. Instead of the farmer directly attempting to supply his major wants and those of his family, which is bound to be uneconomical, he can grow the products best adapted to the soil and climate of the locality, and sell in an ever-widening market, supplying his needs by purchase with the proceeds derived from the sale of his crops. Thus one may see, in the light of present developments and also on the basis of experience in other countries, the end of the uneconomical, relatively self-sufficient family or village in China. This is further indicated by the fact that the factory can supply clothing and shoes, for example, more cheaply than can home labor.

This should not, however, be taken to mean that there was no exchange of goods in the nineteenth-century China, or that the family or village was completely self-sufficient. The farmer did not make all of his own tools, for example, nor did he produce everything necessary to his well-being. The existence of market towns, and the development of a town artisan class and of a measure of specialized production in the handicrafts, indicate that there was inter-change of goods. Much of this was local, but some exchange took place over

*Changes in  
agricultural  
economy*

*Exchange not  
new*

a comparatively wide area. The change indicated in the preceding paragraph is in the direction of enlarging this exchange and of increasing specialization to the point of making the farmer ultimately dependent on the town for the satisfaction of his wants. This has the consequence of forcing him to produce primarily, rather than secondarily, for the market, whereas formerly production was primarily for use.

*More extensive  
cultivation of  
staple crops*

The increasing cultivation of crops which must be sold in a comparatively wide market affords another indication of this change in agricultural China. The staple crop of Manchuria, for example, has come to be the soya bean. In Chihli and Kiangsu provinces, the two largest areas, and in Shansi and elsewhere on a smaller scale, cotton is being grown in such quantities that China has become the third largest producer in the world. Again, tobacco is being grown in marketable quantities in almost every province. Some of it is undoubtedly produced for home and local consumption, but more and more it is being grown for the general domestic market, since the making of cigars and cigarettes has become an important home industry. The increased cultivation of the poppy during the last ten years has already been referred to, and it must be recognized that opium is produced for the market rather than for the use of the cultivator. Other examples might be given, but enough has been said to indicate the tendency. It is clear that the farmer who devotes himself to the production of a staple such as tobacco or cotton comes to depend on others for his own foodstuffs, and that others consequently find a larger market for their products. Thus the movement toward specialization is carried a step further. The general movement may also lead to importation of agricultural products if the staple is widely enough cultivated to restrict food producing areas. Thus cotton, either raw or manufactured, begins to enter the list of exports, and rice and grains the list of increased imports. As will be pointed out later, the development of domestic industry is a substantial factor in producing this change in cultivation.

*Attempts to  
improve raw  
products*

The last few decades have also witnessed a conscious movement to improve the raw products. The government has been partly responsible for attempts at improvement, both directly, and indirectly through the government schools. Furthermore, private efforts, both individual and collective, have been made in the same direction.

It has been demonstrated that China can grow American cotton of good quality and long staple. It has also been demonstrated that the native cotton, which is of short fibre . . . can also by the process of selection be greatly improved. . . . Chinese interested in the cotton industry are taking steps to improve the quality and quantity of the raw material, and arrangements have been made for the retention by these interests of an American cotton expert to work in conjunction with the Department of Agriculture of the University of Nanking.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>7</sup> ARNOLD, *Commercial Handbook of China* (1919), vol. II, p. 322.



Steps have also been taken in recent years to weed out diseased silk worms, take more scientific care of the cocoon, and prepare the raw silk in a way better suited to the requirements of foreign high-speed looms. These efforts must continue if China is to regain her former dominant position in the silk trade. The same thing is true of tea-growing. The Chinese are beginning to study the needs of the foreign market, and as a result are attempting to improve cultivation and to undertake more careful selection and grading.

It is in those fields of production which are related to industry or to foreign trade that the Chinese are making the most conscious efforts toward improvement. But in other fields there are indications of change which will be more marked as time goes on. The agricultural departments of some of the schools and colleges are experimenting with a view to finding products which might profitably be introduced. It has also been discovered that the Chinese farmer often saves the poorest part of his crop for seed purposes, and he is being introduced to the idea that instead he should reserve the best part of the crop for future sowing. From this it will be a short step to specialization in the production of seeds. This will undoubtedly increase the yield wherever it is done, and thus ultimately improve the condition of the farmer. Scientific rotation of crops is also being urged, which will help to reduce the cost and the labor of fertilization. It is not without significance that in 1910 the amount of artificial fertilizer imported was entirely negligible, while in 1923 it was valued at four million Haikwan *taels*, ranking twenty-fifth on the list of imports.

*Agricultural  
education*

It cannot be seriously argued that the standard of living of the Chinese farmer has been notably elevated during recent times. In certain sections, due to drought and flood, and the consequent famine conditions, which reached their high-water mark in the great famine of 1921, living conditions became distinctly worse than usual. But with normal conditions restored, there are indications that the standard has been slightly elevated. This is indicated in the great growth in tobacco consumption and in increased importation of other luxuries, in the use of artificial fertilizers, in the amount of third-class travel on the railways, and in numerous other ways. It has been so slight, however, so far as the masses are concerned, as to deserve no more than mention. In many sections, particularly those affected recently by flood or drought, Chihli province for example, the majority of the farmers continue to be not only poor but even below the poverty-line.<sup>7</sup>

*Standard of  
living only  
slightly  
improved*

Another aspect of rural life which deserves consideration is the rural industry. Spinning and weaving, particularly, have long been part of the rural economy. In order to live it was necessary for all members of the household to contribute something to its maintenance.

*Rural  
household  
industry*

<sup>7</sup> See *Chinese Rural Economy*, by J. B. TAYLOR, in *Chinese Political and Social Science Review*, vol. VIII, nos. 1 and 2. He fixes the poverty-line at an annual income of \$150 or under.

And because of the inadequate communications the villagers had to produce everything possible for themselves. Since almost all of the men in the village were farmers, each household was also an industrial establishment, just as it was in the American frontier community. The materials for clothing either were produced on the land as part of the farming operations or were procured by exchange. But in either case they were usually transformed by home labor, particularly that of the women and children. Furthermore, where possible the attempt was made to eke out the family income by production for exchange or sale. Thus industry, outside the trading centers, and except for a limited specialized production, was diffused throughout the numberless villages of the country.

*Changes in  
rural industry*

This continues to be true in spite of the move toward the establishment of the machine economy with its factory system. But even here a change may be perceived. In the cotton growing areas of Chihli and Kiangsu provinces, for example, the home industry continues, but the jobber or small capitalist is making himself more and more a dominant factor. Sometimes he furnishes the tools such as the spindle and the loom, besides supplying the raw cotton or the yarn to the farmer. He then collects the yarn or cloth and sends it to the market. The rural household receives a return only for the work done. In other cases the spindle or the loom, almost invariably of the primitive and familiar kind, belongs to the family, the dealer supplying materials and marketing the product. New type machines, more complicated than the old and with a much greater output per labor unit, are being introduced in some cases, but only gradually where they are used in the home. The improved machines are more usually operated under the supervision of the dealer in a semi-factory system. Here in the textile industry is shown the transitional stage from the old to the new order. The same change is going on in silk spinning and weaving, in paper-making, and in other household industries.

*Paper industry  
illustrates  
change*

As illustrating what is happening to rural industry outside textiles, we may mention the paper industry of Ch'ien-an. Owing to the suitability of the water of a stream near the city and the existence of a supply of white earth, paper has long been made in the villages nearby. The paper shops of the old kind consisted of seven workers. Five of these prepare the raw materials (the paper is made from the mulberry) and dry the paper; one makes the paper and the head man finishes or smooths it. The owner of the plant usually has more than one such shop. He keeps the books and sees to the marketing beside supplying the capital. . . .

One of these small capitalists proved to be an enterprising man. In 1914 he went to Korea and Japan to study paper making in those countries and in 1916 started a "Korean paper mill." This was so successful that the next year he added another and in 1919 purchased some quite elaborate machinery. By this time others had become interested and a number of mills were started. These are of two types, a smaller with thirty workers each and a larger with over fifty work-

ers. The latter use water power and have an output ten times greater than the former. In 1920 there were four of these Korean mills. They are usually owned by a group of partners. 1920 was very successful and 200% profit was made by some. This led to over-expansion, thirty-one mills operating in 1921. The large output however seriously reduced prices (from \$32.00 to \$9.50) and the following year only twenty mills continued to operate.<sup>9</sup>

Here we have an example of the first steps in putting on a factory basis an industry which had been attached to the rural household. In the case of the household industry of whatever kind, it occupied the time of the farmer and his household particularly during the winter and early spring, and served as a side-line to farming operations. As machinery is introduced, and with it the factory system, industry cannot be treated as incidental to farming, but has to recruit its own independent labor supply. In China, as elsewhere, the worker tends to leave the farm, thus lightening the pressure on the soil, or women and children are used, and the new industry, in a different way to be sure, continues to afford a supplementary income to the rural household, just as did the old. In either case such changes as that described are almost imperceptibly working a revolution in the rural economy.

*Industrial activity ceasing to be incidental*

#### 4. INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT

Even in the towns and cities of the nineteenth-century China, industry was in the handicrafts or cottage stage. With few exceptions production was for a strictly local market. The shop and the factory were the same. The instruments of production were simple tools rather than elaborate and costly machines. All, or most, of the processes of an industry were carried on under one roof and by the same people, there being little subdivision of labor and industrial specialization. There was no problem of capital and labor, for instead of the employer and the wage worker we find the artisan, become the proprietor, assisted by the journeyman and the apprentice. All engaged in the same trade were united in the craft guild, which controlled prices, quality, wages, and the terms of apprenticeship, and fixed the number of apprentices in proportion to journeymen.

*Industry in cottage stage of development in pre-modern China*

The old conditions persist to such an extent that it is still true that most of China's industrial output is produced in the home or small shop and with the same organization. But at the same time it must be recognized that the general movement is in the direction of placing industry on a modern basis. Thus while the hand loom persists in both the cotton and silk industries, the modern machine loom has been introduced, together with the power spindle. In 1930 there were over four hundred fifty modern silk filatures and weaving mills, one hundred twenty-seven cotton mills, and sixteen woolen mills. The active cotton spindles numbered over three million. In addition to this, there were over forty albumen factories, more than forty

*Extent of development of modern industry*

<sup>9</sup> Ibid., pp. 244-5.

canneries, thirty-four iron and steel works, fifty-three dockyard, ship-building, and engineering works, one hundred twenty-nine flour mills, upward of a hundred oil mills and bean-cake factories, two hundred seventy-four electric light and power works, twenty paper mills, and other modern undertakings too numerous to list. It must be re-emphasized that these establishments use modern machinery, and that in addition there is the transitional movement going on through the medium of the small capitalist, which has been mentioned. This will undoubtedly result eventually in large additions to the factory and machine economy.<sup>10</sup>

*Importance of  
beginnings  
made*

In comparison with the United States or even Japan, it must be admitted, the new economy is merely in embryo in China, or at the most is at a decidedly infantile stage. Nevertheless, when it is remembered that there had come virtually no change in methods of production before 1900, and when one recalls the difficulties of transportation and communications, together with the size of the country and the rigidity of its organized life, these beginnings assume a greater relative importance.

*Contributing  
elements to new  
development*

Two elements have contributed to the development of the new industry. The first that comes to mind is the influence of the West after China had come to accept more freely the new order of things. The second is to be found in the building of railroads and the establishment of steamship lines. It is unnecessary to dwell further on the improvement of communications except to point out that the large-scale production of the machine and factory system is based upon a national rather than a local market, and that the enlarged market is created as transportation facilities are improved. Thus industry has been stimulated, even more than has agriculture, by the building of railroads. For the sake of both branches of the national economy China should look forward to the early construction of an additional fifty thousand miles of railway as a minimum program.

*Corporate form  
of organization  
not widely used*

Most of the Chinese enterprises of the modern sort which have been successful are individually financed, are family affairs, or are organized as partnerships with two or several members. The joint-stock form of organization has only rarely been used with complete success. This is partly because legal regulation and control has not been effectively established. But even more it is due to the lack of a highly-developed sense of corporate honesty, the same deficiency which has long manifested itself in government. Funds collected by stock subscription have often been used for individual purposes, such as speculation unrelated to the business of the corporation, and have frequently been dissipated. The distrust consequently engendered among possible investors retards the development of larger enterprises than those coming within the means of, at the most, three or four individuals of wealth. It will undoubtedly take time for the

<sup>10</sup> The number of establishments has doubled in some classes and quadrupled in others since 1922.

proverbial honesty of the Chinese to be extended to the joint-stock undertaking. In the long run this may prove to be a good thing, however, if it leads to a multiplication of smaller industrial enterprises of a modern sort, since these can be better controlled and will permit a better adaptation of the old organization to new needs than would otherwise be possible.

While the joint-stock enterprise is only gradually making its way, what is perhaps its necessary forerunner, or at least is related to it and to factory production—a modern banking system—is coming rapidly into existence. Here also the old and new are found side by side. The Shansi bankers still do a limited business in central China and the old-style exchange shops remain. But since the revolution a large number of modern banks of the Western kind have come into being. Many of these are now organized in a National Banker's Association, including the Bank of China, which is the fiscal agency of the central government, and which has branches throughout the country; the Bank of Communications, which is similarly related to the Ministry of Communications; numerous provincial banks; and such institutions as the Chêkiang Industrial Bank, the Bank of the Salt Industry, the Ningpo Commercial Bank, and many others. The modern bank is playing and must continue to play an important rôle in promoting industrial development in China. Further than this, the government has shown a dependency on the modern banks in floating its internal loans and in tiding itself over financial crises at Peking. The government banks have shown unsound tendencies in financing, particularly in their currency issues; but this has been largely due to their governmental connection and to the exigencies of domestic politics, rather than to a failure of the bank managers to appreciate the principles of sound finance. The power of organized Chinese finance was illustrated on at least one occasion when the National Banker's Association was able to dictate the conditions of a loan to the government.

*Modern banks  
established*

##### 5. EFFECT OF INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT ON GUILD SYSTEM

It is unnecessary here to recapitulate the description of the nineteenth-century industrial organization, in and through the guild, which was given in the first chapter. It is, however, necessary to examine briefly the effects of the introduction of machine methods and factory production on the guild system.

In the first place, it must be recognized that much of the strength of the craft guild as a price-fixing and quality-establishing agency was due to the fact that production was local and found an outlet in local or provincial markets which the guild members monopolized. The local organization, which comprehended all who were engaged in a particular type of production in a restricted area, could control its members in these ~~two~~ matters. This control was further strengthened because all the processes of the industry were carried on in the

*Localization  
of industry  
accounts for  
strength of  
guild*

*Business  
organism  
simple in  
cottage system*

one establishment, specialization being the exception rather than the rule. In other words, the organism was simple and it was integrated in the shop. The proprietors, controlling all of the steps in the manufacture of a particular commodity, were able to meet and establish standards and prices by agreement. Inter-guild agreements were necessary only in exceptional cases.

*Modern  
industry  
weakens guild  
control*

But with the broadening of the market as rail and steam communications have developed, the craft guild has lost the ability to control it. Where Shanghai and Tientsin goods compete in central China, for example, neither the Shanghai nor the Tientsin guild can control the competition. Furthermore, the division of industrial production into more and more separate processes, each carried on in an independent establishment, weakens the authority of the guild, which is able to exercise control over merely a part of the enterprise of production. The industrial organism becomes so complex under modern conditions of specialized production that the essentially simple guild organization loses its usefulness. Therefore the conclusion is inevitable that modern industry, as it establishes itself in China, weakens the guild organization and will ultimately bring it to an end unless it finds a basis of adaptation to the new order.

*Necessity for  
apprenticeship  
strengthened  
guild*

In still another particular the new industry has weakened the position of the guild. Under the old conditions of production it was possible to regulate the number of workers in a given industry, since a long apprenticeship was required to produce the trained artisan. By fixing the number of apprentices in a shop, the guild could limit the number of journeymen, and it could also control the number of establishments and prevent undue expansion of production. Furthermore, as the labor supply was restricted, the individual who underpaid his workmen, according to the minimum standards set up by the guild, could not readily replace them.

*Necessity no  
longer exists*

In the new industry the necessity for a long apprenticeship disappears, since the mastery of one process and of the operation of a machine can be readily gained. Thus the labor supply is immeasurably increased and dependence on the guild correspondingly lessened.

*No sharp  
division  
between  
employer and  
employee in  
cottage system*

Again, under the old order, the master had been a workman himself before he became the proprietor, and he lived as master in intimate contact with his workmen, who were usually few in number. Consequently there was an intimacy of relationship which made it difficult to differentiate clearly the employer from the workman. This also made it possible for master and man to be united in the one organization, as they were in the guild. Since the affairs of the shop were known to the workers almost as well as to the proprietor, the problem of fixing wages was simplified. The whole relationship was normally not that of employer and employee, in the modern Occidental sense, but that of fellow-workers.

Here again the new order has produced, or is inaugurating, a change which will become increasingly important as the industrial

plant becomes larger. In China, just as elsewhere, the factory system impersonalizes industry. It produces an industrial wage-worker who is no longer in intimate contact with the artisan proprietor, and who is not himself an artisan. The result is that the proprietor, who is an industrial capitalist rather than a former workman, will not find himself at home in an organization which includes the wage-worker, nor will the latter find that the old organization serves his purpose.

*Separation of  
classes in  
modern system*

At present, in the places where modern industry is developing, the guild is taking on the character of an employers' association, and the workers are developing their organization in the labor union. The latter is in an embryonic stage as yet, except in such places as Shanghai, Canton, and Hongkong. The recent strikes in all three places demonstrate the power and effectiveness of action of organized Chinese labor. The organization for other than nationalist purposes, however, will have to be built on national rather than local lines if it is to be as effective in purely industrial disputes.

*Guild becoming  
an employers'  
association*

The guild as an employers' or trade association may serve a useful purpose or it may give way to some other organization. Recently there have come into being Chinese chambers of commerce, which are modeled on the foreign chambers of such cities as Shanghai and Tientsin, which, in turn, find their prototypes in those of English and American cities. The Chinese chamber of commerce is essentially an inter-guild organization, although it numbers individual enterprises as well as guilds in its membership. It serves a distinctly useful purpose in integrating the increasingly complex business community. Here it serves modern industry much as the guild itself served the craft in pre-modern times. It is by perpetuation of the guild as an employers' association, and by the establishment of chambers of commerce on the basis of the guild, that adaptation is already taking place.

*Chinese  
chamber of  
commerce*

An original development, rather than a purely imitative one, is to be found in one of the functions of the chambers of commerce as set forth in the law providing for their organization. They may legally serve as a court, acting through one of their committees, to settle industrial disputes where the parties in controversy are not members of the same guild, and to bring to an end conflicts between employers and employees over wages. This latter form of activity, however, will lead to trouble unless the workers are given active representation. If local unions should be given representation as workers' guilds, this defect would be remedied and the field of usefulness of the chamber of commerce court would be enlarged.

*Arbitral  
functions of  
chamber of  
commerce*

It should be noted in this connection that the chamber of commerce court does not supplant, but rather supplements, the guild as an arbitral agency. Disputes between members of the guild are still subject to its adjudication, while disputes between those who are members of different guilds are arbitrated through the more inclusive organization. The craft guild in all probability will ultimately adjust

*Chamber of  
commerce  
supplements  
guild*

itself to the new conditions by broadening into an organization of the related crafts. The beginnings of this development may already be perceived in the attempt to establish such an organization as the Lu-Pan Industrial Union in Peking, with the intention of drawing together into one unit all of those (masters) connected with the building trades. This would not interfere at all with the extension of the chamber of commerce idea, as the chamber would continue to find a reason for existence as an integrating agency for the business community.

*Adjustment the  
keynote of  
Chinese life*

The keynote of Chinese life has been adjustment, and the utility of coöperation, rather than competition, has been fully accepted. Through the adaptation of the guild system to the new conditions there may be successfully devised a new mechanism of adjustment which will enable modern China to escape some of the evils inherent in the industrial system which is being imported from the Western world. The greatest obstacle to be overcome, however, does not lie in the realm of competition for markets, but in the field of labor relations, since the problem of keeping employer and employee on good terms has not yet been solved.

#### 6. LABOR ORGANIZATION AND PROBLEMS

*Labor unions  
formed*

Organization of labor had not been unknown in the past, but it was temporary in character and was usually designed to effect some immediate end through collective action. Even so it proved on numerous occasions to be tremendously effective if the end aimed at could be quickly reached. Permanent organization was unnecessary under normal conditions, because the workers were entitled to, and did, participate in the guild meetings. Consequently it is only recently that permanent labor organizations of the Western variety have been formed. Such an organization was formed at Shanghai in 1919 and was called "The Union for the Improvement of Chinese Labor." The main purpose, however, was announced to be mutual benefit and protection, rather than defense against employers. This union was designed on a national basis, with the intention of establishing branches in other places. Many other similar organizations have been launched in Shanghai, Canton, Tientsin, and other industrial cities. It is difficult to distinguish those which have a political origin and objectives from those which have objectives such as are professed by labor unions in Western countries, but it is beyond question that the latter have begun to find a firm footing in the country. And although they may have been established primarily for mutual benefit and improvement purposes, they will undoubtedly be directed more and more toward the objective of increasing wages and lessening the hours of work. Even now strikes for such purposes are numerous, although again it is difficult clearly to distinguish the political from the non-political strike. A Peking vernacular paper lists strikes from September to December, 1922, to the total of forty-one. Seventy and

*Strikes*



nine-tenths per cent, it says, were for increased wages; twelve and two-tenths per cent were in opposition to the foreman; twelve and two-tenths per cent were sympathetic strikes; and four and seven-tenths per cent were for the right to organize a union.<sup>11</sup> It may be noted that the formation of unions was neither prohibited nor authorized by national law in China until after the establishment of the nationalist government. A trade union Act was passed in October, 1929, which established the right of organization subject to a number of definite restrictions.

The remarkable thing is not the number of strikes in recent years, but rather the fact that there have not been more of them. The constantly increasing cost of living has created a serious situation both for the factory workers and for the much larger number engaged in the handicrafts and trades. A careful study of prices, wages, and standards of living in Peking<sup>12</sup> shows that prices in that city have been steadily mounting since 1900 in the various dietary staples and in clothing such as is worn by the workers. There have been variations and fluctuations, but the constant trend has been upwards. This rise has been especially marked since 1920. The problem of living has also been complicated by the copper exchange, which in its turn has been increasing. This is due to a continual enlargement of the supply of coins and to their debasement. Again, the worst conditions have developed since 1920, with the result that wages have begun to be paid in silver instead of copper. During the years since 1900 guild action has brought about several wage increases, but the real wage of the workman is lower today than it was in either 1900 or 1913, the years taken as the bases of comparison. "The guilds have a minimum standard of living which they attempt to maintain. If conditions give the workers a temporary increase in their standard of living the guild does not attempt to help them maintain the increase. It will not try to raise wages until prices are such that real wages have reached the customary minimum."<sup>13</sup>

*Rise of prices*

The rise of prices at Peking is probably fairly typical of the entire country. Prices at Canton, as a matter of fact, are reported to have reached an even higher level than at Peking. In the absence of similar detailed studies of other cities, it may be assumed that, so far as they have been operative, the factors which have produced price changes in one place have had similar results elsewhere. These factors have not been political so much as economic. "The various political events, revolution, civil war, attempted restoration of the Emperor, have had but little effect on prices unless they have been accompanied by disturbances sufficiently severe to affect the harvest by destroying crops in the field, or to make transportation difficult by commandeering-

*Causes of price increases*

<sup>11</sup>*China Year Book* (1924), p. 658. Also J. B. CONDLIFFE, *China Today: Economic*, pp. 105-110.

<sup>12</sup>MENG, T. P., and GAMBLE, SIDNEY, *Prices, Wages and the Standard of Living in Peking, 1900-1924*, in special supplement to *Chinese Political and Social Science Review*, July, 1926.

<sup>13</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 110.

ing rolling stock and cutting communications.”<sup>14</sup> Among the economic factors may be mentioned drought and flood over wide areas which have affected production adversely, and population increases.

*Methods of  
improvement  
of labor  
conditions*

To better labor conditions, three methods appear to be available. First, industrial strife may develop, as it has in many Western countries, concessions in the form of ameliorative laws or betterment of conditions being extorted through pressure from below either on the government or on the employer. This seems to be forecast from the organization of unions and a corresponding multiplication of strikes in recent years. Second, organizations such as the chamber of commerce court, with adequate labor representation, may prove a medium for the adjustment of difficulties. This would better harmonize with the traditions and procedure of the past. Third, voluntary amelioration from the top, perhaps as a means of forestalling the application of pressure from below, might prove successful. This would accord with the more enlightened practice in Western countries.

*Advanced  
practices of  
some enterprises*

Some employers are already developing the third procedure. Chang Ch'ien has created a “model city” around his factories. The *Commercial Press* of Shanghai, until the destruction of its plant during the 1931 Sino-Japanese hostilities at Shanghai, provided school privileges for children, maintained a small hospital for its employees, gave its women employees a month off before and after confinement, and furnished an attractive resting place for its employees. Withal it was able to declare a fifty per cent dividend in 1922, and its shares appreciated almost one hundred per cent. The Han Yeh P'ing Corporation similarly provides for its employees, as does Mr. Y. H. Moh, known familiarly as the “Cotton King” of China. All this is good as far as it goes, but it is weakened by reason of the fact that it is done from the top down. Furthermore, the “model employer” leaves wages low, expecting that compensation in the form of gardens and rest rooms will take the place of higher pay. In general the movement suffers from the fact that it is done “on the best foreign lines,” which have not served to prevent industrial strife in the West. And finally, these individual achievements serve to obscure the fact that good working conditions are not the rule.

*Need for  
regulation*

It must be recognized that most employers in China, as elsewhere at a similar or even more advanced stage of development, feel no interest in voluntarily improving the condition of workers by raising wages, lessening the hours of work, protecting women in industry, and refusing to make use of child labor. Wages are very low, and yet strikes have been necessary to raise wages in such places as Shanghai in order partially to keep pace with the increase in the cost of living. Even among the more enlightened employers there is no sentiment against the employment of women and children, and certainly there is little among the masses even of the industrialized workers, for the income from the labor of women and children appears to be necessary

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 111.

to eke out the family income. Higher wages must be paid before there will come any pronounced demand from below for the safeguarding of women and children in industry. In this respect the enlightened employers are far in advance of the demands of labor. Government regulation has been attempted (the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce has promulgated regulations governing such labor), but political stability is a prerequisite to effective governmental action.

Just how far legal regulation and control of industry will develop in the future is problematical. The old tradition is to allow the economic life of the country to control itself, subject to the interposition of the magistrate when the public peace is threatened. This tradition is continued, as has been pointed out, in the development of the chamber of commerce court. But the new point of view toward governmental functions will probably continue to express itself, when political stability has been attained, through the development of some measure of legal regulation of industrial conditions.

*Some measure  
of legal  
regulation  
may ultimately  
come*

#### 7. EFFECT OF FOREIGN PARTICIPATION IN CHINESE INDUSTRY

At present, even if there were political stability, the problem of regulation and control of the new industry would be more difficult of solution than in most countries because of the extent of foreign participation in it. For example, about forty per cent of the modern cotton spinning plants are Japanese owned or controlled, and an additional ten per cent are British owned or controlled, leaving only fifty per cent to Chinese control. While the same proportions do not hold true for other industries, foreign participation in some industries being considerably less, and in others even greater, there is generally a substantial foreign interest in Chinese factory production. Inflation in Japan following the war, together with the efforts of the Japanese government to encourage investment in industrial undertakings in China, helps to explain the striking movement of Japanese capital to China, and the cheapness of Chinese labor interests foreign capital in general in the establishment of factories in China. The problem of control arises from the fact that the foreigner is protected by the treaty system. It is further complicated by the establishment of many enterprises, some of them Chinese-financed, in the foreign residential areas, where they still are largely removed from Chinese control.

*Extent of  
foreign interest*

It is readily apparent that the old idea of industrial self-control and regulation cannot be maintained unless the entire industry is brought within the controlling organization, whether it be the craft guild or an industrial guild. Even government regulation can not be fairly introduced unless it can be extended over all engaged in the same type of production. For example, the native cotton industry cannot establish regulation as to price, quality, wage and labor conditions, and make them effective, so long as the foreign mills in

*Foreign  
participation  
makes difficult  
organization  
and control of  
industry*

Shanghai are unregulated. Of course the reverse is also true. One difficulty encountered by the Shanghai Child Labor Commission of 1924 in framing recommendations for the consideration of the Municipal Council lay in the existence of competitive industry in the same industrial area which would not be affected by any regulation so enacted. "It is obvious," reported the commission, "that any action which might have the effect of raising the cost of production within the settlement would not only be unfair to industries competing with those outside, but would also be unwise from the more general point of view, since it would tend to the subsidization outside the settlement of the very evils which were being attacked within."<sup>16</sup> So long as the settlements remain under foreign jurisdiction, this anomalous condition will continue. Chinese regulation, whether in law or through the organization of the native industry, will not extend over the foreign-controlled industry located in the concessions, and regulation in the concessions will be qualified in extent and operation.

*Restoration of  
the concessions  
would not  
improve  
condition of  
women and  
children in  
industry*

From this it may be argued, as the Chinese are maintaining for this and other reasons, that the foreign concessions should be restored to the control of China. This is part of the demand of the new nationalism. So far as social legislation is concerned, however, this would probably not result in the immediate curtailment of the hours of labor for women and children or in other safeguards for them in industry, for non-communist and non-radical Chinese opinion on this point is not yet highly developed.

*Possibility of  
race troubles  
growing out of  
industrial  
disputes*

Another problem presented through the foreign-managed enterprise, no matter where it is located, comes from the fact that in all labor disputes there is the possibility of race or national trouble developing. A strike in a Japanese, British, or American mill, growing out of treatment of the laborers by the foreman, or due to a controversy over wages, readily takes on the character of an anti-Japanese, anti-British, or anti-American movement, and leads to an international difficulty. The 1924 strike of the Hongkong seamen, and that in the Japanese mills in Shanghai in 1925, will serve to illustrate this ever-present possibility. The recent growth of nationalist sentiment makes the danger particularly acute now, and such a diversion or enlargement of issues is political and partly artificial in character. But it is a factor which has to be seriously reckoned with now and for the future.

*Summary*

These, then, are the significant economic changes which have been taking place in the past twenty-five years: 1) an expansion and change in the character of the import and export trade; 2) some progress in agriculture, and, through improvement of communications, an enlargement of the market for agricultural products; 3) the introduction of modern machine production, and the factory

<sup>16</sup>From the report of the Shanghai Child Labor Commission, published in full in *China Year Book* (1924-25), pp. 545-561.

system in industry; and, as a result of this, 4) changes in economic organization which are of great significance for the future.

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## CHAPTER XV

# THE PROGRESS OF CHINA: INTELLECTUAL AND CULTURAL

### I. POLITICAL REVOLUTION AND INTELLECTUAL RENAISSANCE

*Revolution of  
1911 not  
produced by  
reconstruction  
of ideas*

NORMALLY a fundamental change of ideas, if not a modification of a cultural heritage, precedes and makes possible a political upheaval which can be called a true revolution. But in China the intellectual revolution has paralleled the political and to a degree may be considered a consequence of it rather than its cause. To a large extent the 1911 revolution was an anti-Manchu revolt, which assumed a republican character for lack of any alternative to Manchu misrule, rather than an expression of a change in the political philosophy of the peoples or even of those who became the new rulers of the country. There were notable exceptions to this among the leaders, but they were distinctly exceptions. So far as a new philosophy had developed between 1895 and 1911, it was imitative and exclusively political and was not founded on a thorough-going reconstruction of Chinese thought.

*Renaissance  
subsequent to  
Revolution*

Since 1911, however, there has developed, slowly but surely, a new intellectual and cultural atmosphere, which within the years since 1920 has taken the form of a renaissance outside the political field. This new appearance is more significant for the economic, social, and political future of China and her peoples and of the world than is any single recent development in the Far East. Consequently it is necessary to examine it as closely as possible from the standpoint of its causes and its consequences, both immediate and remote, as a most important phase of the history of the Far East in modern times. While it is of major significance at the present time, nevertheless it must be remembered that it has, as yet, affected largely only the educated class, and that its full effects will be felt only as it penetrates the masses.

### 2. EDUCATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

*Effect of  
classical system*

Education is a primary cause of the change in Chinese ideas. Prior to 1898, and indeed before 1908, there was no attempt at public education in the country. The Empire's relationship to education was restricted to the setting of the examinations which have already been described. The consequence of the examination system was the development of education in terms of preparation for the successive tests set by the government. As long as these were founded upon the classics and the classical essay, the educational incentive was directly

away from innovation and the propagation of new ideas. In other words, education was developed entirely in terms of the past, and not at all in relation to the present and the future. Furthermore, the result of education was a retentive memory rather than the abilities out of which develop creative thought. In addition to this, the intimate relationship between the "educated" class and officialdom created a vested interest in the maintenance of the old intellectual order. This served as a serious obstacle to educational change, since the acceptance of a new educational content would minimize the importance of the classically trained official. Consequently it was only slowly that even the more enlightened officials, those in closest contact with foreigners, came to appreciate the importance of "Western learning."

Thus it was left to foreigners to begin the opening of the Chinese mind as the second and more important part of the process of "opening" China. Of the several foreign groups in China it was the missionary element which had a natural interest in education. The traders dealt with the Chinese through the *compradore*, made no effort to learn the language, and on the whole kept aloof from the Chinese world in which they found themselves. The business of the missionary, on the other hand, necessarily brought him into contact with the Chinese community so far as it would receive him. And he shortly found that it would receive him more readily if he offered services which were not directly evangelistic as a preliminary to the bringing of his religious message. Consequently a primary incentive for the establishment of schools, and also hospitals, lay in his desire to come into readier contact with the Chinese people than was possible when he limited himself to evangelistic work.

*Foreign  
missionary  
interest in  
education*

Another explanation, just as important, of the missionary interest in education is to be found in the desire to perform the same service for the Christian community that the church school performs in Western countries. The value of an educated constituency was certainly appreciated, particularly in view of the premium put on learning in China. Christian education on as wide a scale as possible was also necessary if the Christian ethical system was to displace or modify the Confucian. Furthermore, it was incumbent on the church to train a native leadership if its religious work was to be carried on successfully. This desire to train an adequate church leadership unquestionably explains much of the interest in education. The undertaking of medical education and the establishment of hospitals may be ascribed as much to a recognition of a great need as to the desire to establish contact with the people on a broader basis. The recognition of the social implications of the teachings of Christ would help to explain the willingness to serve the Chinese in these and many other ways. But the ultimate aim, naturally, was the evangelistic, and the attempted realization of this aim governed and

*Further  
explanation  
of interest in  
education*

colored, to a variable extent, the non-evangelistic phases of missionary work.

*Educational  
work other than  
through estab-  
lishment of  
schools*

The missionary was also immediately and naturally forced into the work of dictionary making, language study, and translation as a preliminary to evangelization, for only as he was able to communicate directly with the Chinese, and as he could put his materials into a form which they could use, could he expect to accomplish his religious ends. At first his translation work took the form of the preparation of religious tracts. But again, in order to broaden the base of his approach, he was ultimately brought to translate secular literature. This work was distinctly educational in character, and led to the development of a more formal interest in education as a method of approach to the Chinese community.

*Educational  
effects of  
peculiar  
missionary  
interests*

Nevertheless, however much humanitarian and other interests may have prompted him, education was, for the missionary, a means to an end other than that of promoting an intellectual rebirth. The result of this was that those put in charge of schools were often selected primarily because of their interest in the spread of the gospel rather than because they had been trained as educators. They frequently emphasized the religious exercise in the school rather than the class room activity, and consequently made, and for some time were qualified to make, no significant study of the educational problem in China. The schools were of the primary division until toward the end of the nineteenth century, and were often mere adjuncts to the mission.

*Higher schools  
established*

The first higher schools established were Roman Catholic Seminaries. After the founding of St. John's University at Shanghai in 1879, however, mission schools of nominal collegiate rank multiplied rapidly. For some time they corresponded, in grade of work done, to the American high school, although they were called colleges or universities. Until recently the same criticism could be made of these higher schools that has been made of missionary education in general—the teachers were missionaries first and educators second, so far as interest and training were concerned. Consequently the work done in the higher schools was open to serious criticism from the standpoint of the educationist. It would probably be fair to say that this continued to be true until after the end of the first decade of the present century. Schools—primary, middle and higher—multiplied, and from 1900 to 1910 the number of students increased, but methods and objectives remained approximately the same.

*Methods of  
instruction*

The method of instruction employed in the college was usually the lecture, combined where possible with the use of a text book. There was little science teaching and less use of the laboratory method. Consequently the emphasis in the mission school on the whole differed but little from that in the Chinese private school. The student continued to do memory work and was little stimulated to thoughtful examination of the world in which he lived. Western



subjects were taught together with the Chinese classics, but they were unrelated to the experience of the student. He read and remembered and passed or failed in his examinations according to the retentiveness of his memory.

Public education in China dates from the end of the nineteenth century. Tungwen College had been established in 1865, it is true, but that did not mark the inauguration of a system of public schools. The first real Chinese university, Peiyang University, was founded by Li Hung-chang in Tientsin in 1895. Two other universities, the Chiao-tung-pu Nanyang and the Peking Universities, were established before 1900. Otherwise the sole public interest expressed was in the naval and military schools for the training of officers.

*Public  
education a  
later  
development*

The beginning of a new day was heralded with the modification in the examination system and the establishment of a national school system proposed as part of the reform program of 1898. But the new era was only inaugurated with the abolition of the examination system in 1905, and the setting up of an elaborate educational program in 1908, as a basic part of the preparation for the introduction of constitutional government. Schools were built and many temples were transformed into schools for the teaching of Western learning. The multiplication of schools has gone on under the Republic, so that today there are about one hundred thirty thousand government schools of all grades, from the primary school to the university, enrolling approximately four and a quarter million students.

*Educational  
programs of  
1898 and 1908*

This expansion has been so rapid that it has been impossible to provide trained teachers for the modern schools. Consequently many who had only a smattering of Western knowledge were pressed into service. Many came from the mission schools, others were supplied from the stream of students who went to Japan to study after 1900, and some, particularly in the higher schools, had been trained in Europe and in the United States. As has already been pointed out, many of those who went to Japan to study were more interested in securing diplomas than in gaining knowledge. Those who studied in the Western countries lacked the background which alone could enable them to profit fully from their studies. And few of the students, trained either in or out of China during the first decade and a half of the nineteenth century, were primarily interested in the problem of education. Western learning was considered to be an open sesame to public office and was sought for that reason. Consequently it was usually the disappointed office-seeker who turned to teaching as a means of support, just as had been the case at an earlier time.

*Training of  
teachers*

The ability of the foreign-trained Chinese to waken his country was conditioned by the degree of his own awakening. Increasing numbers who went abroad to study after about 1910 were prepared to study Western subjects in Western colleges and universities. They had some proficiency in the use of foreign languages, notably English, and they had been trained, partly by foreigners, in institutions of

*Defects in  
educational  
system and in  
training  
provided*

standing such as St. John's University and the American indemnity school, Tsinghua College. But, it must be repeated, they had studied history, philosophy, political science, and other subjects as though they were American or English boys rather than as Chinese, interested in them in relation to Chinese life and the Chinese environment. This process usually was continued in the Western college which they attended. They knew John Stuart Mill, but their teachers, who were in the main unfamiliar with China, did not, or were not able to, lead them to examine his ideas of government in relation to China. If they studied sociology, it was in relation to Western conditions and problems rather than to those of their own country. They tended to view China as if she were a Western country in direct ratio to the length of time they studied abroad. Upon their return they faced a serious problem of readjustment, which at first developed an extreme pessimism and only gradually led to a constructive criticism of Chinese society, based upon an attempt at gaining an intelligent understanding of its nature as contrasted with Western societies.

*Improvement of  
instruction*

As time went on there came into being a more intelligent educational approach in the schools in China. The foreign teacher and the foreign-trained Chinese alike began to stress the understanding of some of the problems of life in China, and this called for a re-direction of the educational program. This was a result partly of the selection of teachers for mission schools because of some measure of training for the work rather than because of a "call" to save the heathen, and partly of a change in the class of studies pursued by Chinese abroad. Furthermore, normal schools were established as part of the governmental program, and teachers for the lower schools were given some training.

*Change in  
point of view  
and emphasis  
after 1916*

It is also important to note that after 1916 advanced students tended to emphasize preparation for private pursuits rather than training to secure public office. It was politics which engrossed the attention of scholars from 1898 until the time when it became increasingly apparent that the political revolution of 1911 had failed to transform China into an Occidental state of an advanced sort. It seems to have been only within the last few years that the truth has been appreciated that political change is dependent on social, economic, and intellectual change. Unfortunately this appreciation came only after the Western-trained Chinese found that the Republic, on the whole, left control in the hands of the old-style mandarin instead of effecting an overnight transfer of power to themselves. The point of view of the intellectuals after 1916 is fairly represented in the words of one of their number, who wrote:

In my humble opinion, politics is in such confusion that I am at a loss to know what to talk about. . . . As to fundamental salvation, I believe its beginning must be sought in the promotion of a new literature. In short, we must endeavor to bring Chinese thought into direct contact with the contemporary thought of the world, thereby

to accelerate its radical awakening. And we must see to it that the basic ideals of the world thought must be related to the life of the average man.<sup>1</sup>

One result of the change in intellectual point of view has been the introduction of vocational education and its acceptance as part of the educational process. This in itself marks a distinct break with the age-old conception of education as a training of the mind (memory) and not a training of the hand. This same departure has been marked in the higher technical schools, where a willingness to work with the hands in the laboratory and the field has been gradually cultivated. In medical study the laboratory method has been introduced, so that students now learn partly by experimentation rather than wholly by listening to lectures, reading in books, and looking at pictures. Engineering students have begun to combine field work—application—with class room instruction. The recognition that one can work with his hands and still remain a scholar has had a distinctly emancipating effect on the Chinese mind. The development of the experimental attitude of the scientist has also encouraged a critical approach to literary and social studies

*Vocational  
and technical  
education*

### 3. THE PRESS AND THE INTELLECTUAL AWAKENING

Another influence, besides the school, in producing an intellectual awakening, has undoubtedly been the press. It has provided the vehicle for the expression of new ideas, and has served as a medium of information concerning movements and events in the foreign as well as the Chinese world. There have long been foreign-language papers, mainly English, which have served a useful purpose in carrying on discussions of happenings in China and elsewhere. There have been substantial journals, such as the *Chinese Repository*, devoted to "things Chinese." But, after all, these foreign undertakings existed primarily for the information of foreigners and the expression of the Western point of view, rather than for the purpose of stimulating thought among the Chinese and affording it an outlet. It is in the native publications that China is beginning both to evaluate and to express herself. The first Chinese newspaper was brought into existence in 1870. Two others were established before the war with Japan. After that war others appeared. The suppression of the Boxer movement, the inauguration of the Manchu reform program, and the growth of anti-Manchu sentiment were all instrumental in encouraging the founding of organs of opinion. But it was particularly after the revolution of 1911 that papers multiplied, until today every important town has its own newspaper. The improvement of communications has widened the area of circulation of the more important papers and has also made it possible for them to carry more than local news. Many, if not most, of the newspapers are mainly propaganda sheets, some of them foreign subsidized, and some of them

*Development  
of the press*

<sup>1</sup> *China Year Book*, 1924, p. 643.

personal organs of individuals or factions. But they all serve the purpose of stimulating discussion and provoking thought, about foreign relations and about domestic politics and problems.

*Magazines*

In addition to the newspapers, and as a later development, there have come into existence periodicals ranging from the woman's magazines to the literary and the scientific journals. These latter, especially, are significant as affording an outlet for the new thought of the student-teacher class. A good example of the scholarly journal is the *Chinese Political and Social Science Review*. Other magazines devoted especially to the expression of new ideas are the *New Youth*, founded in 1915 by the Dean of the Peking National University, which suspended publication in 1917 but was revived under the editorship of six university professors in 1918; the *Weekly Review*, also a Peking University publication, devoted mainly to politics; and the *New Tide* (later called *The Renaissance*), a publication sponsored by the students of Peking University. Other schools have also established their publications, in which appear stories, plays, essays, and serious articles of social interest.

*Effect of  
improved  
communications*

Finally, we may mention, as an intellectual force, the increased movement of peoples. Railroads have helped to create a more dynamic intellectual life by broadening the horizon of the thousands who travel on them each year. The coolies who served behind the lines in France, and after the war returned to the villages of China with their tales of the outside world based on personal observation, helped to arouse the curiosity which the papers and magazines have still further stimulated in trying to satisfy it.

#### 4. THE LITERARY REVOLUTION

*Use of  
vernacular for  
literary  
purposes*

One expression of the new tide has been the "literary revolution" which has been under way since 1917. This was formally inaugurated by Dr. Hu Suh (Shih), an American trained scholar and a member of the Faculty of Peking National University. At the beginning of 1917 he publicly announced his intention thereafter to write only in the spoken language, discarding altogether the old literary language as his medium of expression. The latter had long occupied the same position among Chinese scholars as that enjoyed by Latin among the scholastics of Europe at the time the national languages were coming to literary birth. The *Wen Li*, or Chinese classical language, had been "dead," except for its use by scholars, for a long time, but it had maintained its literary supremacy in spite of the fact that the mandarin dialects were not only widely spoken but had "produced a vast amount of literature, a literature more extensive and varied than any modern European language ever possessed at the time of its establishment as a national language."<sup>2</sup> This literature was in the novel form mainly, a form which had not been recognized and incorporated in the classical tradition. The maintenance of the

<sup>2</sup> HU SHIH in *Chinese Political and Social Science Review*, vol. VI, p. 97.

authority of this Chinese "Latin" was due to the distinction which its mastery gave to the scholar. Even more, however, its position came from the fact that it was enforced "by the power of a long-united empire, and supported by a fairly extensive system of education where the sole aim of its students has been to win office, honor and recognition on the strength of their ability to read and write in the classical language."<sup>3</sup> Thus the abolition of the examination system and the collapse of the Empire were direct fore-runners of the departure from the use of the classical language by scholars. In addition, it was necessary to overcome the inertia developed from a long-continued tradition. This could be done only by a frank and open recognition of the divorce of the classical language from the life of the nation, and of the possibility of using the vernacular for literary and scholarly purposes. This conscious defense of the vulgar tongue was supplied by Dr. Hu. Others were attracted to the support of his cause, though for a time there was considerable opposition to the new movement.

In 1920, the Ministry of Education issued an order to the effect that, beginning with the fall opening of the year, the national language should be taught in the first two grades of the primary school. In the course of a few years, all the grades in the primary schools will be using the living tongue in the place of the classical. This change has of necessity affected the middle and normal schools where the primary teachers are trained, and these higher schools are anticipating the coming change by voluntarily adopting texts in the vulgate. Most of the recent publications have been in the vulgate. The newspapers and periodicals have in most cases ceased to publish poems in the classical language, and "new poems" in spoken Chinese are taking their places.<sup>4</sup>

The significance of this loosing of the fetters of old literary forms is obvious. It indeed prepares the way for a revival of creative literary activity in a new and flexible medium. The break with tradition in this fundamental respect also is helping to free the mind of educated Chinese and stimulate them to constructive rather than reproductive effort. The old classical tradition represents a literary refinement which had been carried to its ultimate conclusion generations ago. The departure opens the gate to a new literary life.

Of importance also has been the language simplification movement, and its concomitant of mass education to reduce illiteracy. Language simplification was undertaken in 1913 by a conference which met under the auspices of the Ministry of Education. This conference worked out a phonetic alphabet of thirty-nine symbols or letters, the mastery of which enables a person to read the newspapers and other simple literature.<sup>5</sup> This system was tried out for five years in some of the higher normal schools. Phonetic systems, however, have found their widest use in Protestant Christian circles.

*Language  
simplification*

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., p. 97.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid., p. 99.

<sup>5</sup> TYAU, M. T. Z., *China Awakened*, p. 11.

*Mass education*

Closely joined, in objective, to this movement toward simplification of the language is the mass education movement which is associated with the name of its principal leader, Mr. Y. C. James Yen, and which is organized through the National Popular Education Association. Mr. Yen and his associates worked out a course of study based on a thousand characters. These represent the words in most common use in the vernacular. Their mastery enables the individual to "write simple business letters, keep accounts, and read simple newspapers intelligently." This, by demonstration, can be accomplished in four and a half months with an application to study of an hour and a half a day. The teachers volunteer their services and come from the teacher and student groups. The movement has spread rapidly and has met with considerable interest and support among the illiterate masses. The work has been confined largely to the towns up to the present time.

## 5. INTELLECTUAL FERMENT

*Critical attitude*

The transfer of the interest of Chinese intellectuals from the realm of politics, since the establishment of military rule in the country, has resulted in an intellectual ferment of which the literary revolution is only one expression. The searchlight of criticism has been directed toward all institutions and practices, both Chinese and foreign, in an attempt to evaluate them in terms of contemporary Chinese life and problems, and in the light also of modern science and thought. The pragmatic test of social utility is being generally applied. This shows the influence of John Dewey on this generation of Young China, and is due to the number of Chinese who, while in the United States, came in contact with him and his school of thought. This influence was strengthened when he was invited to China to lecture at Peking University and throughout the country. Another strong influence has been that of Bertrand Russell, whose philosophy has also captivated a group among the intellectual leaders of the new China.

*Effect of war on Chinese thought*

It must also be recognized that the World War and its aftermath helped to stimulate a critical attitude of mind by lessening Chinese respect for the foreign system which permitted organized slaughter on such a stupendous scale, while theoretically accepting the Christian principle of peace. The anti-German propaganda which reached China also served to provoke thought about the Western world and its institutions. But above all the Shantung award at the Paris Conference led to an outburst of feeling, national and patriotic in character. From that moment dates the expression of Chinese nationalism, a nationalism which has become increasingly intensified since 1919.

## 6. THE STUDENT MOVEMENT

*Student protests against treaty of Versailles*

It was the students in Peking who voiced the first protest against the Paris decision when news of it reached China. They paraded to the legation quarter to ask the intercession of the American and

other allied representatives. Denied admission to the legation quarter, they turned toward the homes of some of the *Anfu* Cabinet members, who were supposed to be tools in the hands of Japan. Tsao Ju-lin, Minister of Finance, was the most notorious of them. His house was partially wrecked, but he himself escaped and took refuge with the Japanese. The students then demanded the resignation of these ministers, and asked that the Chinese representatives at Paris be instructed to refuse to sign the peace treaty with Germany. Police measures were taken against the students, both in Peking and in other cities where student "unions" had been formed when the news from Peking arrived. The jails were filled, but the agitation did not cease. For every student imprisoned, several others appeared as agitators to stir up the people. The chambers of commerce and guilds joined the students, who went on strike, supplementing their propaganda work by proclaiming a boycott of Japanese goods. This boycott was maintained on a national scale for some months, and Japanese pressure on the Peking government for action against the merchants was unsuccessful in bringing it to an end. The power of the non-political classes was conclusively demonstrated, for the government was forced to give way. The treaty was not signed and the "traitors" were forced to resign.

However, the immediate accomplishments of the movement were not so important either as its ultimate implications or as the methods employed. Strikes among students for various reasons were a commonplace of school life. But for the students to go on the streets teaching and preaching to the masses concerning the wrongs done China in the present and the past, for them to organize demonstrations and to parade with banners proclaiming the national cause, and for them to suffer imprisonment willingly to carry conviction—these were new things which were soon to become common without losing their effectiveness. The boycott of foreign goods was not new. It had been used both during the nineteenth century and at the beginning of the twentieth. It had been used effectively at the time of the twenty-one demands. But its effectiveness as a national weapon was more conclusively demonstrated in 1919 than at any previous time. Beyond all this, the national character of the movement was in itself significant, for it indicated a perception of China as an entity, in striking contrast with, for example, the localism exhibited in 1895 and even in 1900.

The initial uprising, of course, subsided, although the voice of the student was heard from time to time between 1919 and 1925. But the educational aspects of the movement continued. Schools for the masses were conducted in an endeavor to reduce illiteracy, and to rouse the people to an appreciation of China's wrongs. These were supplemented by street-corner discussions led, or participated in, by students. Much criticism came to be voiced against mission schools as propagators of foreign ideas, and a distinct anti-Christian move-

*The boycott*

*Criticism of  
West*

ment developed among the students. The West, generally, suffered as a result of the growing belief that Western countries would not voluntarily aid China to recover her ancient position in the world.

*Introduction  
of Communist  
ideology*

This feeling was only temporarily lessened as a result of the Washington Conference. Within a year Dr. Sun had inaugurated the collaboration with Soviet Russia and had begun the development and dissemination of the new Kuo Min Tang ideology which was radical from the internal standpoint and anti-imperialistic from the standpoint of foreign relations. His movement attracted a large following from the student class whom the Soviet representatives had already begun to cultivate, having established sympathetic relations with the intellectual group represented by the national University at Peking. The Russians applauded their critical attitude of mind while "treaty-port" Westerners were inveighing against the new thought as immature, radical, and the result of Bolshevik propaganda. With the organization of the Chinese Communist Party and its admission into the Kuo Min Tang, furthermore, a new stream of ideas began to flow through the southern part of the country, adding to the intellectual ferment as well as to the political confusion.

*Student  
support for  
anti-imperialist  
program*

Student support of the Kuo Min Tang as the anti-imperialist party was confirmed at the time of the Japanese mill strike in 1925 when, as a consequence of student parades in support of the strikers, the "incident" of May 30 occurred. Shanghai settlement police, commanded by an Englishman, fired on the parading students, killing some and wounding others. This led directly to the so-called Shameen massacre, when students at Canton were fired upon when parading in protest of the British action at Shanghai. The result was the revival of the boycott which had been instituted at the time of the Hongkong seamen's strike. Kuo Min Tang support and direction of the boycott which grew out of student activities naturally strengthened the ties between the students and the Party. The British connection with the two incidents had the effect of diverting hostility from Japan to Great Britain, establishing the latter in the rôle of the imperialist enemy. This shift was made much more easily than it would have been a few years earlier by reason of the marked conciliatoriness of Japanese policy toward China during the years immediately after the Washington Conference. Anti-British sentiment was subsequently intensified by the Wanhsien incident in 1926, when a British gunboat fired on that Yangtse village as a punishment for the action of Chinese forces in firing on British merchant vessels. After the establishment of the Nanking government, however, anti-British sentiment abated as English policy clearly became that of conciliation of nationalist China, and as the nationalist movement became less radical. Until 1927 the unity maintained by the Powers at Peking helped to generalize this anti-British into an anti-foreign sentiment. Anti-foreignism, however, must also be explained in terms of the general anti-imperialist ideology of the Party. But it is obvious that



this attitude of Chinese nationalists was not due to the desire to get rid of the foreigner and end intercourse with him. It represented rather a desire to get rid of the restrictions of the so-called "unequal treaties" so that China might assume a position of equality in the family of nations. Beyond this it represented a revulsion from the feeling that China can rely on the West for a solution of her international problems, and from the feeling that institutions, practices, and ideas are good because they are Western. Consequently, it served to strengthen the tide of critical discussion.

An added stimulus to critical thought was applied by Japan when she moved to sever Manchuria from China. The Chinese government relied for support on an essentially Western institution, the League of Nations, and on Western states acting through the League. But, in spite of the condemnation of Japan at Geneva, the Chinese found themselves immediately confronted with a loss of territory. The reaction, in student circles was similar to that already noted, i.e., the development of the attitude that China must rely on herself, not on other states or on international institutions, for protection and to secure a redress of her grievances. Thus the Manchurian affair has strengthened the intellectual reaction against imperialism; it has added strength to the view, already widely expressed, that a primary emphasis must be placed on arms and on military training; and it has confirmed the Chinese in their nationalism, weakening the position of those advocating internationalism. As Dr. Sun had previously put it, only a strong nation can afford to think internationally.

*Reaction to the  
Manchurian  
affair*

## 7. CHANGES IN FAMILY SYSTEM

The strongest evidence of conscious criticism of Chinese institutions is presented in the attack on, and the open repudiation of, the ancient clan-family system. Many factors had been at work to weaken the family system even before the young intellectuals began consciously to repudiate it. Among them may be noted, first, the enlarged movement of the people as the railway system has been extended. This made migration from the ancestral home easier and thus weakened the attachment to it. It also tended to break up the patriarchal family into smaller groups. The introduction of the Western industrial system has had a similar effect by attracting workers from the villages into the towns and cities, where they have been removed from the family authority, and have been forced to set up separate establishments. The century of Christian propaganda, with its attack on ancestor-worship, concubinage, and other practices connected with the family system, has been another factor. Yet another has been the enlarged knowledge of the West, and an appreciation of some of the advantages presented by its emphasis on the individual, and by its single household system. This knowledge at least afforded an opportunity to evaluate the Chinese system on a comparative basis.

*Forces  
weakening  
the family  
system*

Another factor, which has been both a cause and a consequence

*Education of  
women*

of the weakening of the family system, is the gradual emancipation of women. This commenced with the provision of girls' schools as part of the Republican educational program. Their education had been largely disregarded in Imperial days, as they could not take the examinations and in any case were considered to have no need of a classical education. Some of the mission schools, however, had made beginnings. Since 1911 facilities have been increasingly afforded for the higher, as well as the elementary, education of girls and women, both by the government and in mission and private schools. This has resulted in taking girls out of the home and bringing them in contact with one another and with the world, and it has postponed the marriage day among the educated classes. Furthermore, increasing numbers have been going abroad to study, which further postpones the day of marriage. The first girls to go abroad to study were sent to the United States in 1907. Now there are over two hundred Chinese girls studying in American institutions of higher learning. Naturally, as this education has proceeded, some women have prepared themselves for occupations other than running a home. The chief attraction has been into medicine and nursing, but some have taken a legal training, and others have become journalists. Thus there has been created, for the first time in the history of China, a class of economically independent unmarried women, a group which tends toward constant enlargement.

*Participation  
of girls in  
student  
movement*

The girls in the schools took their place by the side of the boys in the 1919 student agitation, and in the subsequent student movement. This unprecedented performance produced no bad consequences, but it did suggest that women are likely to take a new initiative in China's life. Perhaps partly as a consequence of it, co-education has been introduced into some of the colleges and universities, and may ultimately be given a trial also in the lower schools.

*Revolt against  
marriage  
system*

The young men, particularly the American educated students, had been gradually moving toward revolt against the marriage system of the country, which deprived them of a voice in the selection of their brides, although the first generations of returned students generally acquiesced in that as in other features of the old order. But today the voice of the newly educated women has been joined to that of the men in opposition to such an exercise of parental power. The result is that family arrangements are being disregarded and the contracting parties are beginning to make their own choices. Parental authority is being further weakened by the refusal to take up abode in the family residence. In some cases, it must be admitted, the marriage ceremony is being dispensed with, as a sign of complete emancipation. The pendulum is swinging from one extreme to another, although extremism would seem to constitute the exception rather than the rule. On the whole, then, the effect of the education of women has been to weaken the family system, though it has not been consciously directed toward that end.

Finally we come to the part played by conscious criticism of the system in terms of its utility. The reaction against parental or family selection of mates has just been mentioned. But that is an obvious and surface criticism of the system in only one of its aspects. It has taken historical studies to show that the clan-family status represents one of arrested development, a stage through which other groups have evolved to the society founded on the individual. This realization has made it possible for a few intellectuals consciously to repudiate the whole system as one unsuited to the China of tomorrow. Some Chinese, though again a comparatively small number, have perceived the deadening effect of life lived in terms of ancestral ways of acting and thinking, and in a society whose members have as their chief function the production of off-spring to carry on the ancestral rites. It is interesting to note that birth control advocates have received a hearing in contemporary China. Extremists have gone so far even as to attack ancestor-worship, which is the center and core of the system. It is only fair to note that, in the face of this conscious criticism, the family system has found its strong defenders, some of them foreigners. The principal rational defense made of it is on the ground of its cohesive force. It is well pointed out that China has outlived her ancient neighbors, both far and near, largely because her life has been preserved through the clan-family. The lack of restraint of China's "younger generation" is pointed to as a symptom of disintegration and decay more serious than her political chaos. But without entering further into the argument it may merely be pointed out that both attack on, and defense of, a system long accepted without argument as sound is an indication that the old order is changing.

*Conscious  
criticism of  
family system*

Before leaving the question of the family system, we must emphasize the fact that only a small number of Chinese have repudiated or questioned the soundness of the family system. The changing point of view is expressed by the younger generation of foreign-educated Chinese, and by well-to-do Chinese living in the cities, more particularly the places of foreign residence and trade. The village point of view, on the whole, is still the pre-modern one. The changes, however, although restricted to a small group, are significant because of the fact that the attitude of that group will ultimately determine that of the nation. What has been said, by way of caution, concerning the family system, is also true of the rites connected with ancestor-worship. The masses still perform them, although the younger intellectuals have attacked them. Ancestor-worship is being slowly undermined, but is far from having been destroyed.

*Extent of  
change in view  
of family  
system*

The intellectual attack on ancestor-worship is indicative, from another point of view, of the purely rational and skeptical attitude of mind of many of the student class and their teachers. It is founded on a lack of belief in a spirit world and, consequently, a loss of faith in the efficacy of ancestral rites

*Indicative of  
skeptical  
attitude*

## 8. RELIGIOUS SKEPTICISM

*Attack on  
religious beliefs*

This same skepticism has led to an attack on religious belief in general, and is a root cause of anti-Christian sentiment, together with its foreign origin and support, and the feeling that it is an advance agent of Western imperialism. But Buddhism and Taoism, and the religious growths on Confucianism, have come in for attack as well as Christianity.

*Confucian  
worship*

The Confucian ethical system, apart from the elements of worship connected with it, is not so severely criticised, nor is a strong attempt being made to uproot it. It remains fundamentally supported by whatever of soundness inheres in a moral system which has found acceptance for long ages, and by the authority of tradition, and respect for the Sage whose name has for so long been almost synonymous with that of China.

The recent intellectual repudiation of Confucian worship has not yet seriously affected the masses of the people, although it may do so in time. The disappearance of the Empire carried with it the end of the worship of Heaven by the head of the state, except as it was temporarily revived by Yüan Shih-k'ai. The attempts to establish Confucianism as the national ethical system by constitutional enactment failed. Some of the official ceremonies in the provinces have been discontinued. But the rites in honor of Confucius have been largely maintained, conducted either by officials or by the Confucian societies which have come into existence. Honors are also paid the Sage in many of the government schools. Consequently the masses are likely to cling to the elements of worship in Confucianism for some time to come.

*Nature of  
ethical system*

The Confucian politico-ethical system was essentially concerned with the ordering of affairs in this world—with the relations of father and son, husband and wife, brother and brother, friend with friend, and ruler with people. These relations were formalized to a high degree by the Great Teacher and his successors, notably Mencius and Chu Tzu. The five cardinal virtues emphasized in the system are kindness, rectitude, decorum, wisdom, and sincerity. Confucius proclaimed, "What you do not like yourself do not extend to others"—the golden rule negatively stated. Neither Confucius himself nor his commentators claimed to do more than to formulate and systematize the wisdom of the Ancients. Consequently they continually point to the past as expressive of the highest type of life, thus inculcating a backward rather than a forward view. The emphasis on filial piety as the highest of all virtues has led to the development of ancestor-worship, which has supplied a quasi-religious authority for the backward look. It is these two features of Confucianism that are being consciously combated by the skeptical intellectuals rather than the Confucian ethical system.

As a matter of fact, authority for their skeptical attitude is found

in the very teachings of Confucius and Mencius. They took the position of the agnostic, so far as the conception of God and of life after death is concerned. Why trouble about the unknowable as long as there are the problems of this life to be solved? They did not repudiate the conception of God, but they did not develop it.

*Confucian  
authority for  
skepticism*

It is true that the official worship of Heaven by the Emperor was closely associated with Confucianism, but it merely represented the maintenance and development of an old ceremony. It is also true that worship both of Confucius and of lesser lights in the firmament, together with ancestors, established itself as part of the system, and that the Sage himself was canonized by Imperial order in 1907. But these elements represent growths on a politico-ethical system which, it is felt, can be pruned off, as has been the worship of Heaven, without impairing the validity of the system.

*Confucian  
worship*

The other great indigenous philosophy—Taoism—long ago lost its philosophical character. As a religio-philosophical system it was essentially mystical and quietistic. It derives its name from its emphasis on Tao.—

*Taoism*

... an impersonal Principle or Power, which, viewed in the absolute sense, is inscrutable, indefinable, and impossible to name. Viewed in the relative sense, it appears under many guises and in every part of the universe. It cannot be correctly translated as God. Indeed, in one obscure passage he says, "It appears to have been before God." Tao is, however, the source and support of all things. Calmly, without effort, and unceasingly, it works for good; and man by yielding himself to it, unresisting, unstriving may reach his highest well being. Suffering is the result of man's departure from the Tao state of pristine innocence and simplicity. It would be well to give up all study and the pursuit of knowledge, and return to the absolutely simple state of Tao. War, striving, suffering, would then all cease, and, floating along the placid river of time, the individual in due course would be absorbed in the ocean of Tao.<sup>6</sup>

This lofty mystical philosophy was too abstruse for the masses, and never gained the foothold among the educated that would enable it to displace Confucian philosophy. Consequently it early degenerated into a system of magic and superstition. The Taoist priests are "the prime leaders of magic and sorcery, which, as in other nations, is of prehistoric origin, and are the high priests of Animism. . . . They are open to any kind of engagement, whether exorcizing devils, releasing souls from hell, seeking the advice of the gods through divination or through a spiritualistic medium, organizing public processions to escort away with great *éclat* the demons of plague, arranging theatrical performances to celebrate the 'birthdays' of the gods—indeed there is not a stroke of superstitious business in which they are not prepared to take a hand and turn a doubtful penny."<sup>7</sup>

*Its debasement*

This system, and that of the *Féng Shui*, which is closely associated

<sup>6</sup> SOOTHILL, *The Three Religions of China*, p. 49.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 143.

*Effect of belief  
in Fêng Shui*

with it, held the common people, and many of the educated, in its grip. The latter, particularly, has held back the introduction of the railway and other Western machines, since the superstitious feared their effects on the spirits of the air and water. Of course, many of the essentially hard-headed and reasonable Chinese professed disbelief in the whole régime of superstitious and magical practices even during the nineteenth century, but they seldom failed to avail themselves of the services of the priest in time of stress, on the off-chance that there might be something in it.

*Western  
education  
weakening hold  
of superstitions*

The breath of Western scientific education, however, is beginning to clear away the mist of fear of the super-natural among the educated and partly educated. And skepticism as to the wonderfully developed spirit world of the Taoists is certain to spread as education is more widely diffused among the masses. As a matter of fact, the idols in many temples have been destroyed or relegated to obscure corners since 1911, and the temple itself dedicated to Western learning. It will, however, be a long time before superstitious belief in demons and spirits is wholly eradicated. The introduction of modern medical science, the erection of high buildings, the construction of railways, the operation of machines, and the development of criticism are, however, all moving toward that end.

*Status of  
Buddhism*

Buddhism, the third great religion of China, is also feeling the sweep of the twentieth-century tide. In its original form "Buddhism is founded upon the permanent impermanency of all things, an exaggerated estimate of suffering, and the extinction of self as the only way of escape. Neo-Buddhism, or Mahayanism, recognizes a Being who transcends the impermanent, and its objective is salvation to a permanent heaven through faith in, and invocation of, saviors."<sup>8</sup> It is the Mahayan form of Buddhism which has gained the strongest foothold in China. It was introduced into the country in the first century before Christ, but it made little progress for two and a half centuries, during which time no Chinese were permitted to become monks. After the interdiction was raised, it spread rapidly in spite of numerous persecutions due to the hostility of Confucian scholars to the new sect. Not making much headway among the scholars, it appealed particularly to the masses of the people. Even before its introduction into China, Buddhism had begun to lose its elevated character. This process was continued in China. The monks were usually ignorant and superstitious, incapable of appreciating the high moral teachings of the Buddha, even if they had known them. "As a so-called religion of the people it is hardly distinguishable from Taoism, whose deities it has had to borrow largely in order to popularize its own temples. Its hold on the people is restricted mainly to beliefs and ceremonies connected with death and burial."<sup>9</sup> On the other hand, Taoism has borrowed fully as much imagery from Bud-

<sup>8</sup> Ibid., p. 108.

<sup>9</sup> *China Year Book*, 1924, p. 614.

dhism as it has furnished it. And, in spite of its defects, Buddhism has had many good effects on China. "It has filled the land with beautiful pagodas. It has taught landscape gardening and encouraged sculpture and painting. Its symbols are common in all decorative art. The lion is seen at every palace gate; the umbrella is the emblem of imperial and magisterial authority; the rosary is, or was, a part of the ceremonial dress of every high official. The swastika, the net of metempsychosis, the wheel of the law—all these and many other symbols are woven into their fabrics, carved in their wood-work, and frescoed upon their ceilings."<sup>10</sup> Not all priests have been debased and ignorant, and at different periods Buddhism found many adherents among the educated gentry. But during the nineteenth century the dark side of the picture was certainly uppermost.

Consequently it is meeting today the same criticism and rejection on rational grounds as is Taoism, although it still maintains itself among the masses. But unlike Taoism, it is now showing recuperative and reconstructive powers which may enable it to meet a large part of the criticism leveled against it and thus become again a vital power in Chinese life. Just as in Japan, Ceylon, and elsewhere, there is a strong reform movement in contemporary Chinese Buddhism. It has made little headway yet, but this does not argue that it will not result in revivification of the religion. Partly it is taking a philosophical turn, motivated by a desire to return to the understanding and application of the teachings of the Buddha. This means cutting through the superstitious growths and accumulations of the ages. Partly it is represented by a change of method and a revival of proselytizing. Here it is borrowing from the West. There has developed a Buddhist missionary activity which is an attempt to meet Christianity on its own ground. Young Men's Buddhist societies are springing up, and social welfare work is being inaugurated. But on the whole, so far as China is concerned, it must be recognized that the revival is merely in its beginnings, and it is too early to tell what its effect will be.

*Buddhist  
revival*

Christianity is being criticized severely also, and on several grounds. Its foreignizing influence is being attacked as part of the nationalist agitation. The fact that mission work has been so long foreign financed and controlled has made organized Christianity appear as an essentially alien thing. The extent to which the converts to Christianity drew apart from the normal village life, and failed to participate in many common village activities, centering their interests in and around the church or mission, emphasized this point of view earlier in the present century. The relationship of this to the development of Boxerism has already been alluded to. But, more particularly of recent years, the educational work of the missions has been criticized on the ground that it is essentially foreign in content, and unadapted to the needs of Chinese life. It is held to have a

*Criticisms of  
Christianity*

<sup>10</sup> WILLIAMS, *China Yesterday and Today*, p. 310.

denationalizing effect at the time when China is dominated by the Western nationalist philosophy.

*Partial  
validity of  
criticisms  
recognized*

That these criticisms are at least partially valid is recognized in mission circles and among Chinese Christians. This has led to two distinct but closely related movements. One is the development of an independent Chinese church, which is largely self-supporting and entirely self-controlling. Practically all Protestant missionaries look to the ultimate transfer to this native church of the evangelistic side of the missionary activities, although there is difference of opinion concerning the rapidity with which it can be effected. It is hoped that thus the church will in time cease to be a mere adjunct to the mission, which has thus far tended to dwarf it. As this happens the foreign Christians will appear in China principally as advisers to the Chinese. In the second place, there is a movement toward giving control of the mission itself to the Chinese. This has already been done by the Y.M.C.A., and it seems to be only a question of time until the several mission boards follow fully in the steps of the Christian Associations. As this is done, Christianity in China will be nationalized, as it has been in other countries. The Roman Catholics, whose ranks are substantially larger than those of the Protestants, seem to be moving toward the establishment of a native hierarchy, and consequently toward minimizing foreign control of the church. But naturally, because of fundamental differences in organization, their procedure in meeting this type of criticism has to be quite different from that of the Protestants.

*Study of  
problem of  
Christian  
education*

In the field of education, the Christian institutions have been studying the problem presented by criticisms which have been made. The result has been an attempt to view the whole problem through Chinese as well as foreign eyes. An elaborate study of the question of Christian education in China was made in 1922 by a commission representing the mission boards and societies conducting work there. This commission had several Chinese members. The report made some severe criticisms of the educational work done in the past, and presented an elaborate program for the future. From this study, as well as from numerous other indications, it is clear that Christian educational work is undergoing revision to meet the criticisms which are being levelled against it.

*Change in  
church*

The intellectuals, however, are attacking Christianity at a much more important point than its foreignism. They are examining it in the way they have examined the more indigenous systems. And some of them have reached the conclusion that the missionary is seeking to get the Chinese to discard one set of superstitions in favor of another set. Some of them are declared atheists, and more are agnostics, and as such they are reproducing many of the arguments against Christianity which are heard in Western lands. The endeavor to meet their strictures, as well as the liberal theological training received by many of the missionaries, has led to a split in the ranks of the



workers in the field similar to that within the churches of the United States. Thus there are now modernists in China, emphasizing the social message, and giving a liberal interpretation to the Bible, and there are fundamentalists who insist that the primary function of the church is personal salvation. This cleavage disregards denominational lines and may ultimately serve to displace them, particularly if there comes a similar division within the Chinese church. In passing it may be noted that the Chinese have never understood denominationalism or appreciated the necessity of it, or of competitive Christianity. Consequently what bids fair to develop is an independent Chinese Christian church, with both a liberal and a conservative constituency, unless agnostic views become so widespread as virtually to eliminate Christianity. This latter seems improbable. The chief ultimate result of the present criticisms would appear to be that of forcing those interested in Christianity, whether foreign or Chinese, to find some rational basis for the defense of their views.

#### 9. CHINESE ARTS AND ARCHITECTURE

Another field in which new ideas have penetrated and Western influence has been felt, although but slightly as yet, is that of art. There had been a high artistic development in pre-modern times, notably in painting. Many of the compositions deal with nature, or with man in relation to nature. Others are concerned with religious subjects, showing the strong influence both of Buddhism and Taoism. Most stress was laid on the loftiness of the sentiment and on the tone rather than on the technical accuracy of the reproduction. A strong current of symbolism runs through the whole stream of Chinese art. Pictures were considered to be "voiceless poems" and they conformed more closely to the canons of poetry than to those of Western art. In its chosen field, and within its limitations, Chinese art was certainly as highly developed as that of Europe. The principal weaknesses, from the Western standpoint, lay in its lack of perspective and in its technical inaccuracy. Scientific knowledge will tend to remove the latter, particularly in the realm of portraiture, while study in the West, and of Western art, will aid in introducing the idea of perspective. So far as the present is concerned, the contact with the West has not been beneficial. What has been gained in perspective and accuracy has been more than compensated for in a loss of the best qualities of the native art. Western qualities are essentially complementary to Chinese qualities, but the attempt to combine the two has so far resulted in a loss of the advantages of both.

*Influence of  
West on art*

The same thing has been true in architecture. The old style buildings were monotonous in their similarity, but they were distinctively Chinese. The principal distinguishing feature was the roof, with its upward-curved edges and its elaborate decorations. The introduction of "foreign-style" houses was for a time purely imitative, and produced buildings entirely without distinction except that re-

*Architecture*

sulting from a complete lack of harmony with their surroundings. Recent attempts, partly by foreign architects, to work out a harmonious combination of Western and Chinese ideas have been partially successful, indicating that the ultimate effect of the introduction of Western ideas may not be unproductive of good results.

*Old art  
maintained*

The vogue of things distinctively Chinese in Europe and America in the last few years is preventing a blind imitation of the West, and is consequently aiding in the maintenance of Chinese art. For a time there was a serious danger that a complete swing from the old to the new would take place, instead of the development of a new art, distinctively Chinese because founded on the past, and yet new because modified in the light of contributions to knowledge from the West.

#### 10. THE THEATRE

*The native  
theatre*

The Chinese theatre is being more beneficially affected by the stream of ideas imported from the Occident, although as yet the improvement is noticeable only in what may be described as amateur circles. The art of the theater, so far as stage settings, or their lack, is concerned, is about at the point reached in Elizabethan England. No curtain is used, nor are stage sets prepared. The property man is placed on the stage in full view of the spectators, and he thus performs his functions publicly. Plays of a serious kind, usually historical dramas, are staged, and many broad farces are performed. In either case, the burden of creating an illusion rests solely on the actor and the audience, since the aids presented to a Western audience are lacking. But the acting in the professional theatre is excellent, for there is present much natural ability to build on, and the actors undergo a rigorous training before being admitted to the stage.

*Western  
contributions  
to dramatic art*

The contribution that is coming from the West is on the mechanical side of play production, and in the development of dramatic subjects new to the Chinese theatre. Furthermore, Western influence is stimulating the presentation of a coherent drama, divided into acts, in place of the customary long series of short episodical plays. It is among the foreign-educated students, who have been interested in the dramatic literature of the West, and in the Chinese middle schools and colleges, that an attempt is being made to write and produce plays in the Western manner. This in itself is interesting, for the Chinese scholar of the past has regarded the theatre as beneath his serious interest. Many of these plays produced in the schools are remarkably good when the difficulties of staging are remembered, and the acting is even better.

*The moving  
picture*

The moving picture, entirely a Western innovation, has been introduced into the treaty ports, and to some extent outside them. This is a favorite form of entertainment offered, for example, by the Y.M.C.A. The pictures themselves are partly Occidental in content and on the whole tend to give the Chinese rather a distorted idea of Western life, especially as regards the relations of the sexes. There

are now, since 1919, Chinese producing companies, and native production promises to become important. The broadening effect of some of the news, scenic, and educational pictures must be recognized, however, for the moving picture offers a wonderful opportunity to bring the material features of Western civilization before the eyes, and vicariously into the experience, of the Chinese people.

The contact with the West has in other respects changed the life of the Chinese, particularly the educated group, on its recreational side. The Confucian scholar, devoted to his studies, took no physical exercise of any kind, whether as a youth or as a man. The most he did was to take slow-paced, meditative walks. The foreigner has brought with him his games and sports, which in recent years have been taken over by the Chinese in the schools. Tennis, basket ball, soccer football, and track and field sports attract much interest and attention. The Y.M.C.A. has played a major part in fostering athletic exercises in the schools and the returned students have also had their influence. Chinese field meets are now held both locally and regionally, and Chinese athletes compete successfully with representatives from Japan and the Philippine Islands in the Far Eastern Olympics.

*Western games  
introduced*

The significance of this change may be realized when the new activity is contrasted with that of the scholars who wondered why the barbarian foreigner did not have a servant do all of these things for him. The students of today are being brought to an appreciation of the value of physical health which did not exist before the revolution. They are learning to appreciate the body as well as the mind, and are beginning to take care of it. By implication this means also that a knowledge of hygiene is being given them, and with it some knowledge of sanitation. Ultimately it may mean a transformation of Chinese living conditions.

*Significance of  
this change*

The interest in hygiene and sanitation is, of course, not solely due to the development of interest in sports. It is due even more to the spread of modern medical knowledge, as medical education has been improved and modernized under Western influence. The two combined, however, are tending to produce a more vigorous student and scholar class, and to improve living conditions, though almost imperceptibly.

It is true that all of the movements and changes noted have affected only the upper classes, and those living at, or in the vicinity of, the treaty ports, and that most of the people are still largely untouched by them. This has led many foreigners to minimize their importance and significance. Not only that, but it has caused some of them to criticize severely the student class because it alone appears to be in ferment, and to be discarding the garments still worn by the nation. But it must be remembered that the students have always had a position of peculiar prestige and importance in China. As they go, the people will ultimately go. For a long time they were the strongest conservative and anti-foreign influence in the Chinese state. Now

*Extent of  
change in China*

they have begun to move, and move rapidly. Many of their ideas are immature and crudely put, it may be conceded. They are ill-disciplined, as compared with their Confucian forebears, and are even a trifle over-assertive in the strength of their new knowledge. Perhaps it is a wine which has gone to their heads.

Chinese  
applying  
Western ideas

But the root of much of the criticism of them lies in the fact that they have begun to make logical application to their own lives and country of ideas brought to them from the West—such conceptions as nationalism and democracy. At the same time they have begun to view Western institutions, beliefs, and shibboleths critically. They have taken from the West the scientific method with its spirit of honest inquiry, and are beginning to make use of it.

China entering  
on dynamic  
phase

What it will lead to, it is impossible to tell with certainty. At present it has led to intellectual ferment. Certainly China is no longer inert and static, but has entered upon a dynamic phase of life which may, and should, lead to a literary, social, and cultural renaissance.

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## CHAPTER XVI

### THE PROGRESS OF JAPAN: INTELLECTUAL, SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL

BEFORE resuming the consideration of the political and economic progress of Japan, it will be well to paint in the larger background formed by changing ideas and social institutions. Since culturally Japan is still in a transitional state, this cannot be done in definitive terms. Some broad lines of development are quite clear, however, and a beginning may fairly be made with them.

*Japan still in  
transition*

#### I. RELIANCE ON LEADERSHIP

It is clear that modern Japan is what the group of able men who assumed power after the Restoration sought to make her. They were interested in establishing a strong state—one capable of maintaining its independence in the face of Western aggressive tendencies, and of playing a dominating rôle in eastern Asia. To accomplish their purpose, they borrowed freely from the West those things which they felt would secure the material foundations of the state. First, they imported Western military and naval armament and methods. This was in line with the national military traditions, it is true, but it was also the result of an acute understanding, developed by experience and observation, of the basis of real independence in the modern world. They sensed the weakness of the agricultural state and consciously and purposefully promoted the development of modern industry, going to the West for their models and their machines. This led to the establishment of a modern banking and currency system, to the building of railways, and to the fostering of a merchant marine, both for coastwise and foreign trade purposes. It was not necessary for Western governments and capitalists to force these measures on Japan. The leaders of the country, after foreign intercourse had been accepted and the Restoration accomplished, went or sent abroad for instruction and information. They freely imported foreigners to teach them what they wanted to know, and they retained them as long as they felt a need for their instruction. It must be emphasized, however, that their interest in the West was largely material and almost entirely utilitarian. Consequently they failed to grasp the social implications of the industrial system of the West. As a matter of fact, with certain exceptions which will be noted, it has been left to the West to bring to Japan such moral and philosophical conceptions as it had to offer to an Eastern peoples,

*Point of view  
of leaders*

while Japan sought out for herself the mechanical and material benefits presented by the Occident.

*Materials at  
disposal of  
leaders*

In producing modern Japan the leaders of the state had certain materials to build with and certain foundations to build on. They had to deal with people accustomed to, and acquiescent in, leadership. The hierarchical series of loyalties developed with the feudal system was continued. The propaganda preceding the Restoration made it possible to concentrate the loyalty of the clan groups in the form of devotion to the Emperor, and through him to command support for the program of change and development which they inaugurated. The revival of *Shinto* as the national religion afforded an additional support for the new system which they sought to create. Furthermore, they did not have to build up a spirit of patriotism and of nationalism, as had to be done in China. The loyalty to the Emperor was almost automatically transferred or transformed into an abstract national patriotism.

## 2. CHANGES IN LIFE OF PEOPLE

*Material  
changes*

This acceptance of leadership alone made it possible for Japan so rapidly to take on the appearance of a Westernized state. It was this which enabled the Japanese to change almost overnight from open hostility to foreigners to an outward acceptance of many of their ways. For the people followed the example set them and began to imitate the foreign world in many particulars. Here, again, they tended to interest themselves in the material things rather than in the ideas, and moral and cultural values, of the West. Western shoes have begun to replace the Japanese sandals and *gêta* in the cities. Western clothes are worn in place of the kimono to an increasing extent. With coat and trousers or skirt, has been introduced Western furniture. Meat and milk are finding their way into the national diet, partly by reason of the introduction of meat into the diet of the military conscript. With meat come the knife and fork in addition to, or in place of, the chopstick. Electric lighting is now almost as common as are Western clocks. But Western ideals of liberty, equality, and morality were not so freely drawn upon and diffused.

*Change in dress*

Part of this change may be due to the vogue of things foreign during the first years after the Restoration. This vogue was started by the makers of modern Japan to serve national ends. But it was partly due to other causes. Foreign clothing, for example, is less expensive than Japanese, particularly for the upper classes and for women and children. It is also better adapted to certain types of work. In other words, what is lost esthetically is compensated for in added utility. Even though foreign clothing is adopted for business purposes, the old costume is often worn at home, except where the house interior has been foreignized by the introduction of furniture. The adoption of a foreign-style uniform for the army and navy, which touch most of the young men, the requirement of a modified

sued a little farther before marriage than has heretofore been the case. Outside of the well-to-do classes it must be understood that women in Japan, both before and after marriage, are vital parts of the national economy. Since the larger part of the population is engaged in agriculture, it follows that Japanese girls and women in the rural districts help with the rice cultivation, are the chief tenders of the silk worms, pick the tea, and spin and weave in the home. In the industrial world, it should be noted that sixty per cent of all factory workers are women, while eighty per cent of the operatives in cotton mills are women. Child labor in Japan, furthermore, means primarily the labor of girls, for eighty per cent of the children employed are little girls.

Something is said elsewhere about factory legislation and the need for it. At this point reference may well be made to the conditions under which the girls and women live and work. There are of course notable exceptions, but on the whole the conditions of life are terrible. Here we have another illustration of the way in which the Japanese imported the material civilization of the West, its machines and devices of the most improved kind, without attempting an investigation of the methods which had begun to be developed of conserving human values.

The factory operatives are secured by systematic recruiting in the country districts. The advantages of life in the town are sufficiently vividly pictured to cause the girl willingly to leave the rural district. But the governing consideration is a money payment to her family, which often is barely able to eke out a living from the soil, and the prospect of what appears to be a substantial addition to the family income, which will continue until marriage. Incidentally, the movement of women to the factories tends to promote later marriage among the poor more effectively than does education among the wealthy.

*Recruiting  
women for  
industry*

When the girl reaches the factory she is often housed in a closed compound, where the girls are locked up to prevent them from running away. They have no privacy, only mat space for sleeping being allotted to each one. Sometimes, where there is a day and night shift, the bed is continually occupied. The hours are long, and fatigue interferes with normal recreation even when it is provided in suitable form. Due to the conditions under which they work and sleep, tuberculosis is rife among both men and women factory workers. Moral conditions are also bad. "A Japanese factory expert has affirmed that in some factories it is not uncommon for more than half the girls to lose their virtue in a year. The long hours leave the workers so weary that any sort of excitement is welcome, and consequently vicious pleasures and pastimes are encouraged and common. The most usual amusements are drinking, gambling and sensuality."<sup>3</sup> The consequence is that by reason of disease, desertion, and also

*Conditions of  
life among  
factory workers*

<sup>3</sup> BRYAN, *op. cit.*, p. 139.

because of approaching marriage, there is a labor turnover of about eighty per cent among the women operatives, and recruiting must go on ceaselessly.

*Failure to  
appreciate  
social  
implications of  
industrialism*

From the standpoint of health, as well as of industrial efficiency, the nation loses tremendously by the maintenance of these conditions. Here is where the Japanese leaders have failed most seriously, even on a purely utilitarian basis, in making importations from the West. They did not appreciate the social ideals or even the efficiency ideas, which had begun to express themselves in the Occident. They saw the machine, but not the social implications of the machine economy. Consequently they have made no systematic attempt to conserve the health of the nation by insuring reasonably good living conditions for the future mothers who are engaged in industry. Christian employers often offer notable exceptions to the rule by attempting to look after their employees, and the Christian ideal of the sacredness of human life has spread somewhat beyond the Christian community. But so materialistic has become the outlook of the Japanese industrial leaders that a satisfactory social program may be expected to be developed by them only when it is demonstrated that it is good business, and to the practical advantage of the nation, to give attention to the welfare of the women workers. They will, of course, be helped to gain this appreciation as labor organizes to protect itself.

*Pre-marital  
relations of  
men and women*

The statement that this large proportion of the girls in the factories lose their virtue does not constitute the moral indictment of the factory system that it would in many other countries. Pre-marital relations between the sexes are quite common in many of the rural districts, although the proportions would not seem to be nearly so great. And this does not serve as a bar to marriage for the girl, as to a large extent it does elsewhere.

*Prostitution*

The difference in moral code is further illustrated in the openness with which the trade of the prostitute is plied. It is carried on under governmental supervision as a recognized occupation, although not an honored one. It is estimated that there are not less than fifty thousand licensed prostitutes in the country. These women are kept in a condition of bondage, as otherwise it is difficult to hold them.

Most of them soon loathe the business, but are helpless, hopeless prisoners,—for the keepers who paid their parents a few score or hundreds of yen and loaded them with beautiful clothes, charge all these items to their account, so that they are under a heavy debt which must be paid before they can leave. This debt the laws of the land theoretically ignore but practically recognize, for the "keeper" keeps the books as well as the brothel, and the police and officials are often on his side.<sup>4</sup>

Aside from the official attitude, the principal support of the system lies in the poverty of the lower classes. "The girl goes to the brothel

<sup>4</sup> GULICK, *Working Women of Japan*, p. 105.



in obedience to her parents, who send her there to earn a living for herself and to help them out of special financial difficulties. Thus from first to last, so far as the girls, the parents, and the keepers are concerned, the question is economic."<sup>5</sup> Many of the prostitutes, it should be said, come from the former *eta* or pariah class.

To the number of licensed prostitutes, from the standpoint of morality, must be added the hotel and tea-house girls, for many of them are virtually in the same class. The *Geisha*, the class of entertainers, are also sometimes put in the same category. Their occupation, as that of the tea-house girls, may, and often does, lead to prostitution. But, occupationally, they are highly trained public entertainers.

As the economic condition of the lower classes is improved, the willingness of parents to see their children engaged in these occupations is certain to lessen, and to the extent to which the parental control weakens as a result of the introduction of the individualistic ideas of the West, the system is bound to weaken. Furthermore, partly as a result of the sensitiveness of Japanese to foreign opinion, there is a growing condemnation of the open connection of the government with prostitution through the licensing system. This has the effect, not always of ending prostitution, but of pushing it more underground and out of the public view. Such a development should ultimately lead to the same reaction as is found in Western countries. Certainly prostitution is a less prominent feature of the Japan of today than of yesterday.

## 5. THE FAMILY SYSTEM

Due to the emphasis on material development, there has been less change in the social than in the economic institutions of Japan. The family is still the basic unit of society, although the government deals with the individual as it does not, as yet, in modern China. Aside from ancestral worship, and from the Confucian emphasis on the family, and of the view of the nation as an enlarged family group, its principal support is to be found in the system of rural economy. "The family system, by which all is subordinated to family, is convenient to farmers for it means increased labor and economy of living . . . generally speaking, the family system at one and the same time keeps young men from striking out in the world and compels their early marriage so that the helping hands to the family may be more numerous."<sup>6</sup> Industrial development has not broken down this point of view as yet, because of the extent to which the labor of girls is used. This is another method of adding to the family income. Marriage in industrial centers, however, often results in the establishment of individual homes. The ultimate effect, furthermore, of the expansion of the industrial system will be to weaken the family system, as it promotes a movement from the village into the town.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid.

<sup>6</sup> ROBERTSON SCOTT, *Foundations of Japan*, p. 329.

Modifications  
of family  
system

But while the family system remains, certain modifications in it have been going on. In more advanced circles the marriage arrangements are not so exclusively in parental hands. The practice of "free" marriage is becoming more widespread each decade. By this is meant, sometimes, merely the right of an interview before the marriage arrangements are completed. In a more extreme form it carries with it a right of selection. Reference has already been made to the tendency to break up the household into its component parts with the drawing of the population into the cities. Under the influence of Western example, and also of teaching in the Christian schools and missions, the same thing is happening for other than economic reasons among the middle and upper classes. The tendency toward later marriages also has its effect on the family and indicates the weakening of family control.

#### 6. ABOLITION OF CLASS DISTINCTIONS

Effect of  
abolition of  
feudalism

One social change made after the Restoration was a redivision of society. Two distinct classes were recognized—the nobility, which was graded into various ascending ranks, and the commoners. Class distinction, as between groups of commoners, was legally brought to an end. This brought the *samurai* down and elevated the pariah classes such as the *eta*. Of course this did not prevent the establishment and perpetuation of distinctions due to occupation and wealth, but it did take away special privileges and particular disabilities. Thus the *eta* are no longer legally restricted to the performance of the most menial and unpleasant tasks. They are not required to live in separate villages. And the ban on marriage outside their group no longer exists. However, while for the *samurai* the change had immediate and real consequences, for the *eta* it has been more nominal. They have so long regarded themselves, and been regarded, as pariahs that it will take several generations more before they are merged in the general population if, indeed, that ever completely comes to pass.

#### 7. NEW CLASS ALIGNMENTS

Tenantry

As the feudal class divisions were modified or ended, new ones began to arise. In another place reference is made to the growth of a class of tenant farmers. This indicates that there is also a landlord class. Of course some farmers are part tenant and part owner, and many landlords are also farmers. But the general movement is in the direction of the two extremes<sup>(8)</sup>—landlords who live on rents paid them, and<sup>(9)</sup>tenants who own no land. This has already produced friction and class antagonism. The Japanese landlord is prone to consider only the economic return and not to concern himself with the condition of his tenant. His point of view is generally that of the absentee landlord in other countries, even when he lives in the rural district. He usually receives his rental in rice rather than money, which leads to ill-feeling, since, when the crop yield is small and prices high in consequence, the landlord gains more than the tenant,

and he also gains rather than loses when the yield is good. On the other side, this method of payment leads the tenant to try to pay his rent in the poorer part of his crop. Since he gives a large proportion of it to the landlord, he sometimes curtails expenditure on fertilizer and other means of enlarging his production. Consequently the landlord has his grievances against the tenant. In many parts of the country the tenants are being driven steadily into debt, since their yearly necessary expenditure is greater than their incomes. This is also true, although not so extensively, of the small owner. Since interest rates are very high, a hopeless condition results.

One answer to the tenant's problem is found in a drift to the industrial city. This has become so pronounced in recent years that the good tenant is at a premium, and both the landlords and the government are being forced to consider ameliorative measures. The government is helping by establishing land banks to make loans to the farmer at low interest rates. These are now to be found in almost every prefecture. The landlord is beginning to develop a sense of social responsibility. Some are more considerate in their demands; others help to provide better manures for the paddys and fields; others are seeking, in coöperation with the government, to train the farmer to the improvement of his methods.

Rural coöperation is developing somewhat, partly promoted by the landlord, but more largely independent of his direction. Paddy adjustment, among other things, showed the possibility of securing better results by coöperative action. There are all manner of rural or village societies for almost every conceivable purpose. Some are purely economic in character and end, but they range from societies to encourage the habit of early rising to agrarian coöperative institutions of a more usual sort. These societies are made up of all or part of the young men of the village. Many of them are valuable chiefly because they absorb their surplus energies.

But withal it must still be recognized that class division and class feeling are on the increase in the rural districts.

Influenced by the labor movement, which developed in the industrial centers during and after the war, this depressed class (i.e., the tenants) has of late shown spirit. It has begun to assert its claims against landowners. At the end of 1920 there were as many as ninety associations of tenant farmers, and sixty of these had been started for the specific purpose of representing tenants' interests against landowners. Strikes of tenants began and continue. The end of this movement of a proverbially conservative class is not at all certain.<sup>7</sup>

Since 1920 it has been estimated that the number of tenants' associations has increased to four hundred, one third of which are decidedly militant. It has been the general rise in the cost of living since 1914, and especially during the post-war period, which has produced this movement of protest.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid., p. 88.

*Division in  
industry*

In the industrial realm, also, class division has developed as a consequence of the establishment of the factory system. The reasons for this need not be discussed here, since they are the ones which have produced the same division in other countries. In Japan, as elsewhere, the economic separation of the employer and worker is ever growing more pronounced. Wages for the worker are low, hours are long, and living conditions are bad.

*Obstacles to  
organization  
of labor*

The movement toward organization of the workers is described in another connection. Here, however, certain obstacles in the road of effective organization may be indicated. In the first place, unionism has been associated in the public mind with socialism. Socialism embraces one set of the "dangerous ideas" which the government has bent its efforts to keep out of the country, as being inimical to the public peace and welfare. Consequently unionism has been branded as unpatriotic, a brand which serves to keep many out of the organizations formed. In the second place, the enforcement of the "peace preservation law" makes it difficult for union meetings to be held, or for other than benefit activities to be undertaken. In the third place, the proportion of women workers, as compared with men, handicaps effective organization and action. The woman is a temporary worker, pending marriage, and is in industry primarily to supplement the family income rather than as a self-supporting economic unit. Thus it is more difficult to interest her in organization. Her docility also has to be taken into account. Since so many workers are women, it is obviously difficult to organize the factory so as to bring effective pressure to bear on the employer. A fourth obstacle to the organization of labor may perhaps be found in the fact that modern industry tends to be diffused in many small factories rather than to be concentrated in a few large establishments.

*Association  
of labor  
movement with  
socialism a  
handicap*

In a country where it is assumed that the initiative will come from above, where the people are indoctrinated with the claims of authority, and where the rights of the state are elevated at every point above those of the individual, it is not strange that the impetus toward the assertion of the rights of the masses has come from the outside. The initial internal political liberalism lost its chief leader with the death of Itagaki. It was made futile, from the political standpoint, with the promulgation of the constitution, and with the establishment of the military bureaucracy in control of the state. Had it been allowed to develop, out of it might perhaps have come an economic and social liberalism. The early labor reform movement itself was handicapped because it was an Occidental importation, with the leaders dividing into an evolutionary or socialistic group, and a revolutionary or anarchistic group. The implication of a group of the radical leaders in a conspiracy against the Emperor in 1910, as a result of which some were executed and others imprisoned for life, was a fatal blow for the labor movement.

[It] became associated in the public mind with disloyalty and principles dangerous to the nation; which was just what its opponents desired for its overthrow. Suspicion of the labour movement has since continued, and, during the suspension of law and order during the recent earthquake in Japan, occasion was seized by rabid patriots to assassinate the leaders of socialism and labour.

. . . All the authorities have to do, in order to destroy any new movement, is to brand it with the feared and hated name of socialism. . . . Labour unions are included in the regulations affecting socialism and anarchy, which is sufficient to give them the quietus. Nevertheless, there are many socialists still in Japan, some of them in labour circles, as well as among some young men of the middle class, but they can find no vent for expression.<sup>8</sup>

There are some counter-currents, however, which should be mentioned. There is, first, the fact that the working men and their children have had enough schooling to be able to read. Thus they are certain to realize, sooner or later, that their lot is different in many respects from that of their Occidental fellows, and to begin more strongly to insist on a recognition of their rights. Of course the laborer will have to overcome the emphasis his education has placed on the virtue of submissiveness to authority. In the second place, some employers and corporations, for example the Kanegafuchi Spinning Company, are beginning to show an interest in the well-being of their employees. In other words, under the influence partly of Christian teaching, partly of Western example, and partly of a recognition of a sound business principle, a social responsibility is beginning to appear. A third important influence is foreign opinion. Japanese sensitiveness to the opinions of others has become almost proverbial. As the social backwardness of Japan is revealed to the Japanese representatives at labor conferences, and as there is increasing foreign criticism of conditions, the Japanese leaders tend to seek to remedy conditions, at least to the extent of lessening the volume of criticism. In the fourth place, the broadening of the franchise gives the workers a possibility of political action which has hitherto been denied them. It is possible that legislation in the future will gradually cease to represent exclusively the point of view, and conception of interest, of the industrial and commercial magnate. Thus, while to-day "the Japanese capitalists, as a class, are indifferent to labor interests and even labor questions, while the universities are more concerned with the economic than the human aspects of labor,"<sup>9</sup> while the laborer has not yet awakened to his own condition and the possibilities of redress, it is still possible to perceive an upward trend and to believe that it will be confirmed with the passage of time.

*An upward  
trend apparent*

Two other forces have operated in recent years to produce an intellectual and social outlook different from the conventional one, and these should also be noted at this point. In the first place, the ending of the World War on the basis of Allied success, coupled with

<sup>8</sup> BRYAN, op. cit., p. 143.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid., p. 144.

the emphasis, at least in propaganda, during the last year and a half of the war, on democracy and its concomitants, weakened the authoritarian point of view in Japan, and stimulated to active expression an already existent liberal movement. Politically, as is noted elsewhere, this liberal movement resulted in a broadening of the franchise to the point of universal suffrage. It also resulted in a distinct, if temporary, liberalization of both foreign and colonial policy. And, of even greater ultimate importance, it began to be appreciated among the intellectual and upper middle classes that the social thinking of Japan had not kept abreast of her material development. It is not going too far to say that between the end of the war and the overthrow of the Mensei-to government in 1931 the social ideas of the Japanese experienced more radical change—that there had been a greater liberalization of thought—than in the preceding three or four decades. Unfortunately, the undertaking of military adventures on the continent after September, 1931, which threw political control back into the hands of the military party, had the effect of bringing about a reaction in social thinking by a reassertion of the supreme importance of the state, and by a re-emphasis of traditional values. For the time, at least, liberalism in Japan again became impotent. At the same time, the exemplary force of Western ideals of social conduct was lost.

Another great influence in Japan, as in other countries, has been the Russian revolution. The government and the ruling classes have been tremendously afraid of the new Russian ideas and of the effect of their introduction into Japan. Consequently every effort has been made to keep them out of the country. Furthermore, a counter-current has been maintained against them to neutralize their effect, in case they should, in spite of all precautions, find their way into Japan. But the counter-current has inevitably produced an interest in the current which it is designed to neutralize and minimize. And it has been impossible to prevent Japanese thought from feeling the Russian influence to some extent. Coming just at a time when labor unrest, in both town and country, was beginning to manifest itself, a movement which is frankly based on the conception of control of the state by the workers, and which has had world-wide repercussions, was certain to have some effect on the Japanese labor movement. That it has not had a greater effect, is due to the abhorrence of "socialist" ideas as unpatriotic, an attitude which had been cultivated prior to the war. Thus two streams of ideas, the one from the capitalistic states of the West and the other from communist Russia, met in Japan to modify thinking about social relations after the end of the war.

#### 8. LITERATURE AND THE PRESS

In the realm of literature Japan has felt the force of the Western impact almost as much as in the field of economic and social development. This is readily understandable, since most of the old literary

forms have developed under foreign (i.e. Chinese) influence. The great exception is to be found in poetry, the canons of which have been, and remain to-day, distinctly and distinctively Japanese. Its peculiar quality is produced by the use of alternate lines of five and seven syllables. The usual length is five lines, the first and third of five syllables, the second, fourth, and fifth of seven, giving a total of thirty-one syllables. This length is not invariable, a shorter form of seventeen syllables often being used, but the alternation of lines of five and seven syllables is compulsory. The poems composed under these restrictions are suggestive rather than fully expressive. They convey impressions rather than unfold themes. Consequently Japanese poetry is essentially lyrical, the epic form being entirely foreign to its meter and spirit. The men and women of the Court and upper classes, both in ancient and modern times, have engaged in the production of verse as one of their principal avocations. Poetry writing competitions have been frequent, and often the winner comes from one of the lower classes, whose interest in poetry has also been noteworthy. While Japanese poetic forms have been virtually unaffected by the modern world, except for the work of Toson and a few others who broke through the restrictions as to length, the old forms have been widely used to express new ideas and impressions. In this way, certainly, modern Japanese poetry has felt the impact of the West without losing its distinctive Japanese flavor.

In fields of literature other than poetry, the production of pre-modern Japan was equally important. But it was so largely influenced from the continent that it was not so distinctively Japanese as the poetry. The earliest work extant is the *Kojiki* (Record of Ancient Matters), which is a saga of the beginnings of things and of the development of the Japanese nation. It was written in archaic Japanese. Almost immediately, however, it was displaced by the *Nihonji* (Chronicles of Japan), a work of similar content but written in the "classical" or quasi-Chinese language. This classical language, together with an imported Chinese literary canon, dominated Japan until a literary renaissance set in sometime after the firm establishment of order under the Tokugawa *Shoguns*. The Chinese influence continued, but there was a conscious attempt to break away from it. This was particularly marked in the field of historical writing and of religious investigation. There was also developed, under the Tokugawa, a wide variety of non-historical writings. Folk-tales and children's stories, moral discourses and novels, appeared in profusion.

With the Restoration, the interest in things Japanese ceased for a time, and attention was concentrated on Western literature, particularly the English. The years from 1868 to 1885 were not productive of literature. The Japanese gained a certain familiarity with the new world of letters through study, both at home and abroad, and through translation of Western books. But for obvious reasons the chief constructive interest of the nation was centered on political and economic

Chinese  
influence

Western  
influence

reconstruction. This, together with the cult of the West, made literary production difficult if not impossible. The chief interest in Western literature was in that of England at first and subsequently in that of the continent.

*Romanticism* In general the next two decades were dominated by romantic schools, one headed by Shoyo, a Shakespearean student, a second by Koyo, whose principal contributions to Japanese letters lay in the objectivity of his descriptions, and in his brilliant style, and a third by the idealist Rohan. The intensification of national feeling resulting from the war with China, together with the optimism resulting from the triumph of Japan over her large neighbor, set the tone for much of the literary output of the years from 1895 to 1904-1905. From the standpoint of style the decade 1895-1905 was significant because of the high level reached. During these years the predominant Western influence gradually changed from English to Russian.

*Realism* Rapidly, after 1900, romanticism gave way to naturalism and realism. The displacement of English by continental literature was partly responsible for this change. The attitudes developed by scientific study, however, and the pessimism engendered by the sacrifices and losses of the Russo-Japanese War, also contributed materially to the changed point of view. To some extent, also, it may be accounted for as a natural swing from the extreme development of romanticism. In its earlier stages this naturalism was distinctly beneficial to Japanese letters, resulting in many notable contributions to the literature of the nation, and securing recognition for writers whose work, although noteworthy, had seemed destined to obscurity. But the movement, with its emphasis on subject, caused a decline in style and, with the passage of time, naturalism, with its free treatment of sex relations, resulted in decadence and sensualism.

*Idealism* About 1912 an independent stream, which had been running parallel, with the current of naturalism, became the main stream. Idealism in literature had been preserved through the writings of Soseki Natsume, a student of the classical as well as of the Western learning. After 1912 idealism became stronger as a result of a reaction against the extreme tendencies of the naturalistic writers. This reaction was confirmed and redirected as one of the consequences of the World War. Since the war, with the growth in importance of class struggles and alignments, Japanese literature has been strongly affected by the problem of class adjustment.

*Western ideas* It is in literary circles that the non-economic ideas and ideals of the West have found their greatest hearing. And it is through literature, rather than the schools, that new ideas are coming into circulation in modern Japan.

*The drama* While the drama has not been so greatly affected as the novel by the three-quarters of a century of foreign intercourse, it has not entirely escaped. Prior to the Restoration there were four forms of dramatic art. For the Court, the *Daimyo*, and the *samurai*, there was



the *Nō* performance, a stately dance to singing, the themes being religious or martial. The costuming of the performers was extremely elaborate. Because of the somberness of the *Nō* dance, it became customary to insert a farce into the interludes. This was called the *Kyōgen* (Mad Words). For the common people, since they were excluded from the *Nō* performance, two other forms developed. The first was a dramatic ballad, given to the accompaniment of a musical instrument called the *Samisen*. Puppets were used in connection with the singing of the ballad. The themes were not light or laughter provoking any more than was the *Nō* dance. Consequently, the *Kabuki*, or farce, came into existence, and with it arose the theatre in the Western sense. By the end of the pre-Restoration period it had come to be a fixed custom, at first decreed by law, that women's parts should be played by men. The actors were invariably professionals, highly trained for their work. A revolving stage had come into use, together with other mechanical arrangements. The dramas themselves were either historical or domestic in theme.

Since the Restoration the nobility have begun to patronize the plebeian theater, although they still interest themselves in the *Nō* representations. Women have in recent years appeared on the stage. New theatre devices have been introduced. But so far as the professional stage is concerned, the dramatic art remains essentially Japanese. Some of Shakespeare's plays have been translated and produced, as have those of a few continental European dramatists, but without marked success. There are some playwrights of reputation who find their models in the West, but their plays are produced more often by amateurs than by professional actors. They find a greater acceptance for their work in the periodicals than on the stage.

One of the most noteworthy developments in Japan has been that of the press and of periodical literature. The newspaper is something entirely modern and its real development is a matter of the last twenty-five years. Some papers made their appearance shortly after the first treaties were signed, but the life of most was short. Only two existed in 1868. Others were established in 1871-1872, and as the agitation for a constitution commenced the papers multiplied. They were mostly organs of individuals who were opposed to the government. This led to the establishment of official journals. They were all interested in attack and counter-attack rather than in gathering and presenting the news of the day. Consequently they lost the support of their readers, who in time became disgusted with polemics. The result was that they were seldom sound enterprises from the financial standpoint. One of the notable exceptions was the *Jiji Shimpō* which was founded in 1882. It, however, was conducted as a politico-literary enterprise rather than as a purely commercial one, as were the other Tokyo papers. The newspaper considered purely as a business venture was first developed in Osaka. The Osaka *Asahi Shimbun* and the Osaka *Mainichi Shimbun* were brought into being, not to

Modern  
tendencies

The press

spread the ideas of the owners and editors, but to earn for them by gathering and selling the news. They were so successful that others were established for the same purpose. From that time, in spite of many handicaps, including government supervision, the number has multiplied, until now every town of any importance has its own paper, while there are more than fifty daily papers in Tokyo. To the nine hundred Japanese newspapers must be added several foreign language papers, some of which are excellent journals.

*Periodicals*

Periodicals of all kinds, including religious publications, scientific journals, commercial, engineering, and financial weeklies and monthlies, women's and children's magazines, and comic papers are published in Japan.

*Censorship*

All of these publications are kept under a more or less strict censorship, although the newspapers and political journals are the only ones seriously affected.

"Warnings are issued by the censor as to what must not be mentioned, as occasion demands, and violation of the order is punished by fine. Every journal on its establishment must deposit (with the authorities) a sum varying from 2,000 yen downwards according to place and frequency of issue, and a fine is deducted from the deposit for every offense. When the deposit is thus exhausted it must be renewed. . . . The average number of summonses for violation of ban on news each year is about 250, and the number of issues forbidden sale or suspended is about 175. The same censorship is exercised over publication of books, the number thus prohibited annually being about five hundred out of a total publication of over 20,000 volumes, 37 of these prohibitions being in reference to books imported from abroad." <sup>10</sup>

The purpose of the censorship is to prevent the spread of "dangerous thought," or of information which it seems undesirable, for various reasons, to have reach the people.

*Power of the press*

In spite of this control, it must be recognized that the press has become increasingly powerful. If its case is reasonably good, a virtually unanimous press opposition can bring about the downfall of a government, or the modification of a policy, in Japan as in some other countries. The censorship is not maintained to prevent criticism of the Cabinet or of administrators, but to prevent the spread of ideas subversive of existing institutions.

## 9. JAPANESE ARTS AND CRAFTS

*Painting*

Japanese art, and the native crafts of an artistic character, have not shown much positive advance in the modern period, and in some respects have suffered an actual decline. Painting and decorative work had been very highly developed prior to the Restoration. While they show a strong Chinese influence, as does much of the culture of ancient Japan, in many respects the Japanese pupils surpassed their continental teachers. They excelled in line work, as did

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 247.

the Chinese, the reason being the development of fine brush work as part of the technique of good writing. The subjects treated were found in nature, and landscape work was especially good, although the draped figure was excellently portrayed. Nature was followed quite closely in landscape painting, except so far as perspective is concerned, and so far as the treatment was not purely imaginative. Old Japanese paintings and prints are designed to suggest the subject rather than to represent it in detail. This makes it impossible to compare the treatment fairly with that of European masters.

After the Restoration the attempt was made to introduce the methods and canons of Western art, a teacher being imported from Italy for that purpose in 1875. But European art encountered a long and honorable native tradition, and there was soon a swing back to the Japanese school. This was encouraged by the foreigners themselves, for the very good reason that the world would lose more than it could conceivably gain by an Europeanization of Japanese art. The Japanese public, furthermore, has not shown itself interested in Western-style paintings to the extent of encouraging the few who have completely made the break from the native tradition. Some of the younger painters have attempted to draw upon the West, not by way of imitation, but by way of combination of the best elements in the two schools. So far nothing especially noteworthy has come from this movement. Thus it may be said by way of summary: there is a strong conservative influence which strengthens the tendency toward maintenance of the ancient canons; there is a small group of painters who are attempting to paint in the Western manner; and there is a middle group which seeks to preserve the Japanese tradition, but which has studied in the West and seeks to develop the ancient art by combining with it contributions to technique drawn from abroad.

*Modern  
tendencies*

Ancient Japan also excelled in metal work of all kinds. The bronze work ranged in size from such great statues of Buddha as those at Kamakura and Nara to small temple and house ornaments. The casting achievements of the large-scale work are only excelled by the exquisiteness of the small. The latter work was not all in bronze. The remarkable sword forging and sword ornamentation, as well as the *netsuké*, tiny carved ornaments for pipe-case and tobacco pouch, come to mind as examples of work done in other materials. Ivory and wood sculpture and carving were also highly developed. Buddhism and the military society both stimulated achievements in all of these lines.

*Metal work  
and carving*

Some of the modern work compares very favorably with that of the past. But the increasing demand for cheap ornamentation, both in Japan and in the West, and the time factor which now enters into production, have tended to commercialize the work, and have resulted in a lessening of achievement. Much of the work done is decorative rather than artistic in the highest sense of the term.

Development  
of artistic  
crafts

The demand for quantities of Japanese porcelains and pottery in the West has had a bad effect on the ceramic industry. The best pieces are produced for the domestic market and are fully equal to the standards of the past. The same is true of Japanese *cloisonné*. Much of the modern work is inferior. However, the work of some of the artists is not only equal but actually superior to the best of the past. "The use of silver, instead of copper, as a base, and the setting of designs on the surface in greater relief by the *ishime* process, indicates still more the recent progress of the art. Ando has successfully imitated the French process of translucent designs, and Ota is producing the red monochrome that is the ambition of all workers in this beautiful craft."<sup>11</sup> Lacquer and damascene work, embroidery, and weaving have also been developed at least as highly in modern times as in the past. The reception accorded to native Japanese work in the West, together with the patronage of the Imperial Court and the nobility, have all served to promote the preservation and development of these and other native crafts. One modern influence, the commercial, has tended to change the artist into a mere artisan, it is true, but the other influences have aided in preserving the artist. Many of the examples which reach the European and American market are inferior, cheap goods. They represent the commercial output. That which is absorbed in Japan, or only occasionally reaches the West, represents the artistic achievement of the modern Japanese master.

Pre-modern  
architecture

The characteristic feature of private architecture in Japan has been its extreme simplicity, together with its flimsiness of construction. In the towns the roof is of tile while in the rural districts it is thatched, except in the case of the wealthier farmers who also use tile. The interior walls are sliding panels, which can be entirely removed if it is desired to combine two or more rooms into one. Public buildings such as Buddhist temples are, however, of marked elaborateness, not so much architecturally, perhaps, as in their decorative features. The style is Chinese and it has been essentially unmodified in the Japanese environment. *Shinto* shrines represent the native architectural genius and the primitive simplicity of the people. They are enlargements of the primitive wooden huts of the early inhabitants. The distinctive feature is the *torii* under which the worshiper passes in approaching the shrine. It consists of two upright trunks, the upper ends of which are mortised into two horizontal logs which project beyond them on either side.

Western  
influence on  
architecture

The temples and shrines have been left architecturally unaffected by the contact with the West. Government buildings, on the other hand, are being built in a Western or pseudo-Western style, which almost completely fails to harmonize with the surroundings. In the cities, foreign-style dwellings, stores, and manufacturing establishments are increasingly common. As yet no style of building has been

<sup>11</sup> Ibid., p. 215.

evolved which offers the advantages of the foreign building and at the same time fits altogether harmoniously into the Japanese scene.

#### 10. RELIGIONS

One of the most prominent features of the Japanese landscape is the temple or shrine, from which it might be inferred that the people are very devout and intensely religious in their interests and outlook. Consequently this description cannot be concluded without a consideration of the status of religion in modern Japan.

The three organized religions are *Shinto*, the official cult, Buddhism, and Christianity. Confucianism does not exist as a distinct cult, although probably most non-Christian upper-class Japanese would describe themselves as Confucianists. The family system, and ancestor-worship, are of course indigenous, but the Confucian code of morals, emphasizing the filial virtues, reinforces and preserves the native system.

*Three religions*

*Shinto*, "the way of the Gods," the original faith of the Japanese, was revived as part of the movement which culminated in the Restoration of Meiji. It is the officially favored religion, although the government professes not to regard it as a religion. In essence it is a system of ancestor-worship. *Shinto* deities and shrines alike are classified according to their official status. The national shrines, of which the Great Shrine at Ise must be placed first, are devoted to the worship of deities of the mythological age. Each village has its shrine, dedicated to a local hero or personage of meritorious deeds. Between the two are those dedicated to the memory of distinguished patriots. In addition, each household has its own shrine, before which it worships the family ancestors, for the spirits of all of the dead are kami, or "god-like" beings. The total number of shrines in 1928 was 112,190, of twelve grades. These are served by 14,804 priests. This represents a constant decrease in the number of shrines officially maintained and in active use, since the total number in 1908 was over 162,000. The number of priests remains about the same, the decrease being slight. There are thirteen officially recognized *Shinto* sects, and the total number of professed believers in 1922 was upwards of sixteen million people.<sup>12</sup>

*Shinto*

The principal importance of *Shintoism* in modern times has been nationalistic rather than religious. It has been used to develop devotion to the Imperial House and to the state by cultivating an intense patriotism based upon the supposedly divine origin of the nation and of its rulers. With the spread of education its hold on the masses has begun to weaken, although it is principally among the more highly educated classes that an appreciation of its incongruities in the modern scientific world has been felt. The rulers, however, feel that in this cult of patriotism they have an excellent means of preserving the political, economic, and social *status quo*. As a conse-

*Importance of Shinto*

<sup>12</sup>*Japan Year Book*, 1926, p. 187; 1930, p. 155.

quence the people are encouraged in their beliefs by those who have themselves rejected them.

*Buddhism  
introduced*

Buddhism was introduced into Japan from the continent in the sixth century. It established itself, after a struggle, by its customary compromise of admitting to its pantheon *Shinto* deities as Buddhist incarnations, and also by making concessions to the martial spirit of the Japanese. Its principal contribution to Japan has been in its influence on the art, literature, and general culture of the country, rather than in the realm of moral development and individual conduct.

*Buddhist sects*

At present there are twelve major Buddhist sects, with numerous sub-sects. Of these, three show the most vitality, and the most power of adaptation to modern conditions. These are the *Zen*, *Nichirin* and *Shin* sects. This tendency toward division has been one of the characteristic features of Japanese Buddhism. Including those of all sects, there were, in 1925, more than seventy-one thousand Buddhist temples, tended by more than fifty-four thousand priests. There are about forty-eight and one half million adherents to Buddhism. Since, however, many Buddhists are also *Shintoists*, and vice versa, these figures are not of much absolute value in indicating the comparative strength of the two cults.

*Buddhist  
revival*

What seems as clear in the case of Buddhism as in that of *Shintoism* is that its hold on the people is more nominal than real. At the middle of the last century Buddhism was inert and stagnant. Its power came from the momentum acquired during previous ages and from the lack of alternative except that presented in Confucianism, which never found a footing among the masses. As in China, the Buddhist priest was related to death rather than to life. The disestablishment of Buddhism after the Restoration, and the competition of Christianity, served initially to weaken it, but later to restore to it a measure of its old vitality. The result has been that Buddhist Young Men's Associations have been organized, Sunday schools for children have been established, and propaganda has been undertaken in Formosa and elsewhere. Some of the priests have begun to interest themselves in the problems of their parishioners, and have attempted to re-center the village life around the temple. But, on the whole, Japanese Buddhism has not developed an adequate moral code or any social program suited to the needs of modern society.

*Early  
Christianity*

Christianity, as has been pointed out, was first introduced into Japan in the middle of the sixteenth century, but it was banned at the end of the century after it had begun to find a firm footing among the people. This early work was Roman Catholic. The Protestants were the first Christians to re-enter the field after the re-opening of Japan to foreign intercourse. Both the Roman and the Orthodox churches soon were at work, the former representing mainly French Catholic, and the latter Russian, Christianity.

The evangelistic work made slow progress for a long time, and

even now there are only about three hundred thousand converts, more than half of whom have been taken into the churches in the last two decades. This seems slight progress to have been made in a period of over sixty years. On the other hand, the influence and importance of Christianity cannot be measured by the number of enrolled church members. Through the mission schools, the Y.M.C.A., the Y.W.C.A., the Salvation Army, and many other philanthropic enterprises, the Christian ideal has been diffused among the people much more widely than statistics can reveal.

*Progress of Christianity*

The greatest obstacle to successful evangelistic work has been the intense and narrow nationalism which has regarded Christianity as alien and cosmopolitan, and consequently as something which would have a weakening effect on the state and on individual loyalty to it. Next to this the materialism of modern Japan has been a handicap to the work of conversion. "Sectarianism in Christianity does not puzzle the Japanese much, as he is accustomed to it in *Shinto* and Buddhism," but he "considers the moral ideals of Christianity too elevated for the average man, especially in business and domestic life."<sup>13</sup>

*Obstacles to evangelization*

The comparatively rapid increase in the number of converts in recent years may be explained in three ways. It may be due to the fact that much spade work had to be done over an extended period of time before results could reasonably be expected. Thus from now on will be the period of harvest. It may represent a growing recognition of the necessity for elevating moral standards and developing a social program. Since the other cults offer little in the way of a moral or social code suited to the needs of the times, there may be a movement toward Christianity. Or it may be the result of the partial Japanization of the Christian churches, so that there is no longer a fear of them as alien. Possibly all of these factors help to explain the acceleration of conversion.

*Explanation of acceleration of conversion*

The Japanese churches and other Christian institutions have been slowly moving toward self-control. Even in matters of finance dependence on foreigners has steadily lessened, some of the churches having moved to the point of financing themselves entirely from contributions of their Japanese members. In fact the Christian community has not increased proportionally as greatly as have the contributions to its support. This tendency toward independence has been accelerated in the last few years, since "a movement has recently appeared among Japanese Christian churches with the object of severing financial and other connections with the foreign mission boards, mostly British and American, and to take a free hand in their evangelistic work. This independence movement, it is significant to say, was voiced first immediately after the enforcement in 1924 of the new anti-Japanese immigration legislation in America, and has fast gained ground, meetings of influential Japanese Christians, exclusive of those of the

*Independence movement in Japanese churches*

<sup>13</sup> BRYAN, op. cit., p. 262.

Roman Catholic and Russian Orthodox churches, having been held in Tokyo to discuss the ways and means for carrying the movement to realization."<sup>14</sup>

*Social influence  
of Christianity*

This movement, it should be noted, is not directed against the missions, but is designed to render the church entirely independent of the foreign-supported mission. It should be added that this movement, generally speaking, has the support of the missionaries in Japan, just as does the similar movement in China. It is felt by many that Christianity can be much more effectively spread in Japan by Japanese through a purely Japanese institution. Through the spread of Christian ideals by means of the church a sounder social system may be developed than that which has resulted from the modernization of the economic life of Japan. Thus the remedy may be introduced from the West for the evils developed partly as a result of Japanese material borrowings from the West.

In spite of the numerous cults and sects, however, and of many picturesquely placed and beautiful shrines and temples, it cannot be said that today the Japanese are an intensely religious people. On the whole, the effect of the emphasis on the material, the spread of modern scientific knowledge, and the bringing of people in large numbers into the cities to engage in factory work, has been distinctly to weaken traditional beliefs. The lack of faith is reported to be most noticeable among the industrial workers. Certainly the hold of the national cult of *Shinto* has been weakened in recent years among them. This lessening of faith has been causing the political and industrial leaders a great deal of concern, for it has presented them with the necessity of replacing it, as a bond uniting the individual and the state, with something as useful and more in harmony with contemporary ideas. As has been intimated, Christianity may ultimately be turned to for a solution, or there may conceivably come a Buddhist revival. At any rate, here is presented one of the problems of the future unless the character of the Japanese, and of the state, is to be radically changed. Religion in Japan has been distinctly a conservative force, and if its hold on the industrial masses continues to be weakened, "dangerous ideas" of a secular nature, so long feared and guarded against, may find a wider hearing with disastrous results to the established order.

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## CHAPTER XVII

### THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC PROGRESS OF JAPAN—1895-1926

*Consideration  
of Japanese  
development  
interrupted  
at 1895*

THE consideration of the internal political history of Japan was interrupted at 1895 in order that the wars with China and Russia and their consequences might be fitted into the picture. It now becomes necessary to return to the point then reached, and outline internal developments after 1895, so that the international position and policies of Japan after 1905 may be adequately treated.

*Essential  
features of  
constitutional  
system  
recapitulated*

It will be remembered that the constitution was promulgated in 1889 and the new governmental system inaugurated in 1890. The new machinery was not designed to give control to the electorate, since the House of Representatives was denied the powers necessary to enable it to control the executive. Consequently the years from 1889 to 1894 were marked by a constant struggle between the clan leaders, entrenched in the Cabinet, and the parties, controlling the House of Representatives. The powers of the Diet proved extensive enough to enable the lower house to embarrass, but not to control, the government.)

#### I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF PARTIES

*Nature of first  
parties*

The parties, led by Itagaki and Okuma, had been organized partly as a means of carrying on the struggle against the control of the government by the Choshu and Satsuma clans and, partly because of a desire to make the political system at least semi-popular in character. For a long time the parties were really personal followings of such men as Okuma and Itagaki, held together by the personality of the leader rather than by any common set of beliefs as to public policies. Both the *Jiyu-to* (Liberal party), led by Count Itagaki, and the *Kaishin-to* (Progressive party), organized by Count Okuma, professed to stand for the same things—the establishment of a constitution and of a representative system of government, with the abolition of clan control—and yet the two groups were unable to amalgamate until 1898, and then only temporarily, because they were factions organized around the personalities of two dominating individuals.

*Party  
opposition to  
the Government*

The establishment of the Diet afforded the party leaders a convenient center from which they could work toward the restriction of clan domination by the introduction of the principle of party control exerted through the representative branch of the government. From the first they indicated their intention to oppose a government which they could not control, in the hope that by such opposition they could force the acceptance of the principle that the Cabinet must

be so constructed as to be able to secure a working majority in the House. By means of this systematic opposition, the House was able to bring about the downfall of successive ministries, but it was not able to determine their successors. The government, for its part, in its endeavor to break down the resistance of the forces opposed to it, resorted to successive dissolutions of the House, and tried to control elections through manipulation of the election machinery. But no basis for compromise between the principles of party responsibility and non-responsible government could be found, since neither side was willing to give up its pretensions. Even Ito himself was unable to break down the opposition of the House, except by resort to the Imperial rescript. As a result of this situation, he seized upon the Korean trouble in 1894 as a means of rallying the nation to support of the government.

In this he was temporarily successful, but out of the war grew another conflict, this time within the oligarchy itself. From the time of the Restoration there had been two elements in the oligarchy with divergent views as to national policy. This divergence showed itself first in a definite way at the time of the Formosan difficulty, when the oligarchs split over the question of war or peace. The peace party, as has been related, gained the upper hand, which it retained until the time of the Sino-Japanese War. With that war the other party, led by Prince Yamagata, came into control, and from that time on, step by step, it pushed the Ito group into the background, so that while Ito brought party strife to an end by a resort to a foreign war, he raised a more formidable opposition to his dominance than that represented by the parties.

This militarist control was a logical outgrowth of the clan system of government. When the army was reorganized after the Restoration, and the navy brought into being, the two strongest of the clans monopolized the highest positions in those services, Satsuma going into the navy and Choshu into the army, which branch of the service was organized on a national basis by Yamagata, a Choshu man. All of those in high rank, whether of his own clan or not, owed their positions to him and recognized him as their leader. Naturally both the army and navy men were interested in the development of their respective services. At first the army was considered to be more essential to the national protection and aggrandizement, and it consequently played the more important part in the struggles within the oligarchy.

Normally, the two protective services would be considered to exist for the purpose of giving effect to national policies as determined by the civilian branches of the government, but Prince Yamagata was a political as well as a military figure, and he was politically interested in the development of the army, and in its utilization for the carrying out of the dreams of the great pre-Restoration imperialist, Yoshida, whose pupil he had been. Adequate provision for this

*Conflict within  
the oligarchy*

*Militarist  
control a  
logical  
outgrowth of  
clan system of  
government*

*Establishment  
of control by  
Army and Navy*

could not be made so long as the peace and internal progress faction in the oligarchy was in control of the policy-determining branches of the government. But in the midst of the war with China the Privy Council was persuaded to issue an ordinance providing that the Ministers of War and Marine must always be selected from high officers on the active list of the army and navy.<sup>1</sup> The consequence of this was that no Cabinet could be completed unless the Satsuma and Choshu military men, and this meant primarily Yamagata, were willing to support the Cabinet. Their support was usually conditioned on the willingness of the Cabinet to make adequate provision in its budget proposals for the expansion of the two forces, and thus on its acquiescence in a policy of expansion on the continent.

Ito was Premier in 1894, and the enthusiasm generated by the successful struggle against China, together with a virtual alliance with the *Jiyu-to*, which was cemented by conferring the post of Minister of the Interior on Itagaki, enabled him to maintain himself for four years. He was succeeded by Count Matsukata, in whose short-lived ministry Count Okuma was included "not as a leader of the Progressive Party, of course, but in order to separate him from his party."<sup>2</sup> Since this government was unable to control the Diet, Ito was again called upon to form a ministry.

By 1898 it had become clear that a severe struggle was going on within the oligarchy, as well as between the clan leaders and the parties. These two contests were merged when Ito suggested to the other clan leaders the formation of a government party, a proposal which was vetoed by Prince Yamagata, who, however, concurred in Ito's next proposal, which was that the party leaders should be invited to form a government since none of the clan leaders could command a majority in the House of Representatives. In retrospect, it appears that Yamagata's concurrence was dictated by his belief that a party government would be unsuccessful, and that in any case it could ultimately be controlled through the Ministries of War and Marine.

Consequently, in 1898, Okuma and Itagaki, who had amalgamated their followings into a new party, the *Kensei-to*, or Constitutional Party, were invited to form a government. This first so-called party government lasted only four months. From the first there was dissension between the two wings of the new party, principally over the distribution of the offices. The coalition had not been in existence long enough for the two elements to fuse, or to reach a completely satisfactory agreement as to program. The leaders were taken by surprise when invited to form a government, as it was probably intended that they should be, and the agreements reached were hastily

<sup>1</sup> This ordinance was modified in 1908 so that officers on the retired list might serve, but that did not deprive the army and navy of control.

<sup>2</sup> HORNBECK, p. 152.

*Ito able to  
maintain  
himself—  
1894-98*

*Party leaders  
invited to form  
government*

*Experiment  
of party  
government  
premature*

concluded. The experiment proved premature, and left the clan leaders more securely entrenched in power than before.

After this demonstration of the futility of entrusting governing power to the parties, Prince (then Marquis) Yamagata consented to form a government which, while non-party from the standpoint of personnel, had a working arrangement with the *Jiyu-to*. Thus the clan leaders were moving toward a recognition of the party while remaining unwilling to entrust it with power. This Yamagata ministry also represents the triumph of the military faction in the oligarchy.

*Yamagata  
ministry*

It was clear that Ito was the only one strong enough to hope to oppose the entrenchment of the Yamagata faction in permanent control, and that he could do so only provided he could find sources of strength outside of the oligarchy. He frankly recognized this when, in 1900, he reëntered the arena as the organizer and recognized leader of a new party, which took the name of *Rikken Seiyu-kai* (Constitutional Government Friend's Association), and which from the time of its organization became the strongest single force in the Diet. At the same time the Progressive Party was reorganized, with Okuma still the leader, as the *Kensei-bonto*. These developments left Yamagata without support in the Diet and forced him to retire from office. Ito, as his successor, found himself with adequate support in the House of Representatives, but confronted with the opposition of the House of Peers which, representative of the clan idea, resented the fact that Ito had gone over to the parties, and, under the direction of Yamagata, made war on him. Furthermore, Ito proved unsuccessful as a party leader, alienating some of his supporters by his dictatorial methods, and others by his refusal to take care of his followers at the expense of the public services by allowing them to monopolize the offices. From this time it became apparent that the parties were more interested in the spoils of office than in controlling the government in the public interest.

*Ito organizes  
Seiyu-kai*

*Unsuccessful  
as party leader*

In 1903 the leadership of the *Seiyu-kai* was turned over by Prince Ito to Prince Saionji, one of the Court nobility, who continued to serve as its leader until the end of the Meiji era. When the Ito ministry was overturned in 1901, a protégé of Prince Yamagata became Premier, the Elder Statesmen retiring into the background, although continuing to dominate as the makers of ministries, since their advice was invariably sought, and followed, by the Emperor when it became necessary to select a new Premier, or to decide upon important departures in policy.

*Elder statesmen  
control from  
behind the  
Throne*

During the first decade of Japan's constitutional life the various parties had learned their lesson. They had found that opposition to the government deprived them of any share in the spoils of office, and they had learned that political activity was expensive, with its campaigns and canvassing, and its competitive buying of votes. Its expensiveness was decidedly enhanced by reason of the successive

*Party interest  
in spoils*

dissolutions, with the expenses of the election recurring not every four years, but sometimes every few months. Therefore, not being able to control the government and, consequently, to determine its constitution and the distribution of the spoils, the parties began to compete with one another for the privilege of an alliance with the government of the day in order that they might reap some of the rewards of political life and activity. This meant stagnation, as far as political progress was concerned, but it brought with it a comparative harmony in internal politics, which had been sadly lacking during the first decade after the promulgation of the constitution.

## 2. THE PARTIES AND THE GOVERNMENT 1901-1912

*Period of  
alternating  
premiership,  
1901-12*

*Seiyu-kai the  
government  
party*

*Reasons for  
alternation*

*Financial  
difficulties*

Count Katsura became Premier as the struggle against Russia reached its last peaceful stages. When the war broke out party strife again came to an end. This time, however, this merely meant that the opposition party ceased to oppose, for the Katsura government had enjoyed the support of the *Seiyu-kai* from the time of its organization. This condition continued to the death of the Emperor and the end of the Meiji era. Two men, Katsura and Saionji, alternated in the premiership from 1901 until 1912. Saionji, as the leader of the *Seiyu-kai*, was logically entitled to its support, while it might have been expected to oppose his rival, who was a bureaucrat opposed in principle to the parties. Not logic, but expediency, prevailed, however, for Katsura enjoyed *Seiyu-kai* support equally with its leader. Nor was it always a loss of support in the Diet which caused one to retire in favor of the other. When one had enjoyed power for a considerable time the Diet was apt to become bored with his government. Furthermore, as the time for elections to the House of Representatives would approach, the interest of party members in support of the government would decline, its demands on it would become excessive, and then the Premier would retire. Still another and a more important factor in causing the resignation of the Premier was the difficulty of finding a solution for the financial problem. The end of the war with Russia left the nation saddled with a heavy debt, and with a mounting expenditure made necessary by the attempt to consolidate and extend the gains of the war and to promote internal development. Katsura retired in favor of Saionji in 1905, when peace approached, and left him to grapple with the financial problem. When Saionji failed to work it out, and as the people became increasingly restless under the heavy burden of taxation, Katsura resumed the helm in 1908, with a program of reform which failed to meet the situation. Saionji again tackled the problem in 1911, only to give way to Katsura in 1912. It may be noted here that the principal obstacle to a solution of the problem of balancing revenue and expenditure, and the thing which contributed most strongly to the overthrow of these several ministries, was the demand of the army, and particularly of the navy, for increased appropriations. An elaborate program of naval expansion,

to be spread over a period of years, was proposed immediately after the war. Financial difficulties forced extension of the period, but the program remained, together with Prince Yamagata's insistence on its ultimate realization, to complicate the problem of finance.

*Financial  
program of  
army and navy*

### 3. RESUMPTION OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

In 1912 there began a new development which augured a renewal of the process of political evolution which had been checked by the long continued *Seiyu-kai* support of the government of the day. When Prince Katsura resigned in 1911 he announced the intention of retiring from the political arena. One explanation given at the time for his retirement was that he had grown restive under the dominance of Prince Yamagata, who remained as the power behind these alternating ministries. Furthermore, Yamagata had secured a post in the Imperial Household for him, and this automatically forced his withdrawal from politics. In 1912 the resignation of his successor precipitated a conflict among the Imperial advisers, as a result of which Katsura was enabled to emerge from his temporary obscurity and resume an active political life. His emergence carried with it a break with his former patron, Prince Yamagata, however, and led him to seek a new support, as had Ito before him, by the organization of a political party. Katsura's party, called the *Doshi-kai*, or Unionist Party, was recruited largely from the *Kokumin-to* (Constitutional Nationalists), which name had been taken by the Progressives in 1910. The seceders were animated by the desire to participate in the spoils of office, long denied them as members of the party of opposition. The *Kokumin-to*, with reduced strength, continued as an opposition party under the able leadership of Mr. Inagai. This raid on the *Kokumin-to* netted for the new *Doshi-kai* only about seventy parliamentarians, and Katsura's attempt to add to this number from the ranks of the *Seiyu-kai* proved unsuccessful. Consequently, with no majority in the legislature, confronted with the opposition of the *Seiyu-kai*, unsupported by public opinion, and without substantial backing among the Elder Statesmen, the Katsura government fell. It carried with it Prince Saionji, however, for Katsura persuaded the Emperor to order Saionji to bring to an end his party's opposition to the Cabinet. This Saionji could not accomplish, and he therefore felt obliged to retire from politics, since he had been unable to carry the Emperor's will into effect.

*Katsura retires*

*Reenters  
politics and  
organizes new  
party*

*Not able to  
secure  
parliamentary  
majority*

The resignation of Katsura paved the way for another clan government, supported as in the past by the *Seiyu-kai*. Admiral Yamamoto, a Satsuma clansman, became Premier in 1913. The support of his Cabinet by the *Seiyu-kai* led to a revolt in the party which resulted in the formation of the *Seiyu* (Constitutionalists) Club, an organization consisting of the more idealistic members of the party. A naval scandal brought about the downfall of the Yamamoto government

*Return to clan  
government*

and, since none of the bureaucrats were able to form a Cabinet, seemed to prepare the way for the introduction of party government.

*The Okuma  
Ministry*

Count Okuma, eighty years old, and "the man of all men in Japan who had consistently and indefatigably upheld and advanced the course of self-government,"<sup>3</sup> accepted the premiership early in 1914. His program "emphasized economic reform, the eradication of corrupt practices, and the establishment of responsible government. Education should be fostered, peace maintained, productive enterprises advanced, and taxes reduced."<sup>4</sup> The *Seiyu-kai* refused to support Count Okuma's Cabinet and he immediately dissolved the Diet and appealed to the country for support. For the first time since its formation, the *Seiyu-kai* found itself unable to command a majority in the House of Representatives, for a new party formed by union of the *Seiyu-Club*, the *Doshu-kai*, and a personal following of Count Okuma's, and taking the name of *Kensei-kai*, became the majority party.

*Summary of  
party views  
and differences*

Since, with one exception to be noted later, the organization of the *Kensei-kai* produced the last change in the party system, at this point it will be well to describe briefly the major parties. After 1905, when the struggle to overthrow the clan system and to establish responsible government was given up for the time, a change in party objective became apparent. The tendency to struggle merely for participation in the spoils has already been referred to. But a more significant change was due to the development of modern industry, and the rise of a capitalist class whose interests needed to be protected. The *Kokumin-to* early came to have a close relationship to the industrialists, a relationship which was taken over by the new *Kensei-kai* after 1914. Consequently it stands for the reduction of the income and business tax, and in general for policies which will advance the interests of its constituents. In the field of foreign affairs, its policy is that of economic rather than territorial imperialism, as was well evidenced in the twenty-one demands served on China by Count Okuma's government. The *Seiyu-kai* has had much closer relations with the bureaucrats, and it participated in the benefits of their policy of expansion by force rather than by economic penetration, although after 1918 it also came to stand primarily for economic expansion. While not antagonistic to the industrial capitalists, its constituents are the large land-owners and the commercial interests. Consequently, in the matter of taxation, it stands for the reduction of the land rather than the business tax. The *Kokumin-to*, the weakest of the three, has a following in the industrial centers. But as a party which has no hope of gaining the spoils of office, or of materially affecting public policy, "it can permit its principles to become

a) *Kensei-kai*

b) *Seiyu-kai*

c) *Kokumin-to*

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., pp. 167-8.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid., p. 167.



slightly idealistic, and it talks about reducing the indirect taxes on consumption, which are paid by the non-voting masses."<sup>6</sup>

#### 4. EFFECT OF THE WAR ON POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

Count Okuma's pledges were never carried into effect. Before economic changes could be inaugurated or tax reduction considered, the European War broke out, and with Japanese participation, and subsequent developments, interest was shifted from internal conditions to foreign policy. This aspect of Okuma's ministry will be considered in another connection. Here it is sufficient to notice the fact that the most serious opposition which developed to his government was based on the claim that its foreign policy was not strong enough. It was overthrown in 1916, partly as a result of Prince Yamagata's opposition to its party character as well as on account of its alleged failure to pursue a more vigorous continental policy.

*Shift in  
interest from  
internal to  
external  
questions*

Upon the recommendation of the Elder Statesmen, Count Terauchi, Yamagata's protégé, who had made his principal reputation as an iron-handed Governor-General of Korea, formed a non-party Cabinet supported in the Diet by the Seiyu-kai. He immediately dissolved the House and used the influence of officialdom against the *Kensei-kai* candidates, with the result that it lost its control without, however, the *Seiyu-kai* securing an absolute majority. Terauchi continued in control until 1918, when, due to the artificial raising of the cost of rice, there developed widespread dissatisfaction, which found an outlet through riots in the industrial centers. Advantage was taken of this condition to procure the resignation of Count Terauchi.

*Non-party  
Cabinet  
formed by  
Terauchi*

He was succeeded by Mr. Hara, leader of the *Seiyu-kai* after the retirement of Prince Saionji, and the first commoner to assume the premiership. This elevation of a commoner was dictated by several considerations. In the first place, he was the recognized leader of a powerful party. In the second place, during 1917 and 1918 such great emphasis had been laid on the idea of democracy, as part of the war propaganda throughout the world, that it seemed fitting to show that Japan had accepted the new ideas. This was especially desirable because of the criticism which had been leveled against the militarism and clan government of Japan after 1914 in the Western world, and notably in the United States. And in the third place, there was no bureaucrat capable of forming a government.

*A commoner  
becomes premier*

The Diet was again dissolved in 1920 "on the avowed ground that he (Mr. Hara) considered it a public danger that the *Kokumin-to* and the *Kensei-kai* had introduced an universal suffrage bill into the Diet,"<sup>7</sup> but in reality to enable the *Seiyu-kai* to secure a stable majority. In this it was eminently successful, and consequently its power seemed secure for some time to come. Unfortunately Premier Hara was assassinated by a nationalist fanatic in 1921 while the Washington Conference was in session. His place was taken by Viscount

*Seiyu-kai  
majority  
secured*

*Effect of  
assassination  
of Hara*

<sup>6</sup> IWASAKI, *Working Forces in Japanese Politics*, p. 105.

<sup>7</sup> *Japan Year Book*, 1921-22, p. 62.

Return to  
non-party  
government

Takahashi, who also succeeded to the leadership of the party. In 1922, however, there came a split in the *Seiyu-kai* over the Premier's policy of cabinet reconstruction. This resulted in the formation of a new party, the *Seiyu-honto*, and the overthrow of the government. The Elder Statesmen still living in 1922, Prince Saionji and Marquis Matsukata, dictated the choice of the new Premier. Admiral Kato, who had made a very favorable impression on the non-Japanese world as a member of the Japanese delegation at the Washington Conference, took office on a platform of complete fulfilment of the Washington agreements. While engaged in carrying out his pledges, Admiral Kato died on August 24, 1923. The great earthquake which came in September, 1923, and which resulted in such great losses, found Japan under a hastily formed transitional government headed by Admiral Yamamoto, which soon gave way to a more permanent non-party cabinet headed by Viscount Kiyouri. Thus for two years Japan was ruled by non-party governments, supported by the old government party but not founded on it.

Party  
government  
again formed

It was not until after the elections of May, 1924, that a party government was again formed. In the elections the *Kensei-kai* returned 151 members to the House, the *Seiyu-honto* 116, the *Seiyu-kai* 100, and the remainder were independents or members of unimportant factions. The leader of the *Kensei-kai*, Viscount Kato, who had been the Foreign Minister in Count Okuma's 1914-1916 government, was invited to organize a Cabinet. He came into power on the basis of a coalition of the *Kensei-kai* and the *Seiyu-kai*, produced out of the desire to overthrow the non-party Kiyouri Cabinet. With the attainment of the objective the coalition was disrupted and in 1925 the second Kato government, supported only by the *Kensei-kai*, was formed. *Kensei-kai* control lasted until 1927 when the government resigned because of Privy Council disapproval of its bill for the relief of the Bank of Taiwan. Baron Tanaka, a military man who had been made leader of the *Seiyu-kai* in the hope of strengthening it, was thereupon summoned to the premiership, holding his government together, in spite of the lack of a majority, until 1929.

Mensei-to and  
*Seiyu-kai*  
cabinets

When Tanaka finally resigned on account of growing dissatisfaction, he was succeeded by the head of the *Mensei-to*, a new party which had been formed in 1927 by an amalgamation of the *Kensei-kai* and the *Seiyu-honto*. While the strongest single party in the house it did not have a majority at this time. This was secured, however, in the election of 1930 which gave the *Mensei-to* 273 seats to 174 for the *Seiyu-kai*. But in spite of its apparent strength the *Mensei-to* Cabinet was forced out of power at the end of 1931 because of dissatisfaction with its financial program and on account of the alleged weakness of its Manchurian policy following the Mukden incident of September 18, 1931. A *Seiyu-kai* ministry was then formed, headed by the veteran politician and former liberal Mr. Inukai, who had joined the party in 1925 and had succeeded Baron Tanaka as its President. Dissolution was resorted to in order to give the government a

majority in the Diet, the general election of 1932 resulting in a return of 304 Seiyukai members as against 147 for the Mensei-to. The subsequent assassination of Inukai brought about the institution of a non-party government supported by the Seiyu-kai but dominated by the Minister of War, General Araki.

This brief outline does not indicate that there has been much real political progress in Japan since 1895. The parties have been opportunistic and have followed individuals instead of developing competing programs designed to promote the general interest. Universal male suffrage was finally instituted in 1925, after a broadening of the franchise in 1900 and again in 1918-19, but without any notable political consequences. Politics have, on the whole, been conducted on a spoils basis, with the result that the parties and the Diet alike have incurred a measure of popular opprobrium. Dissatisfaction has resulted in a movement among the young men, especially in army circles, looking toward the re-establishment of bureaucratic government unhampered by parliamentary processes. It may also be noted that attempts have been made to organize parties designed to speak for the proletarian and peasant interests, but without any great success.

*Lack of political progress*

# 5. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

It has been in her economic life, however, that Japan has undergone the greatest changes since 1895. Here there has been much progress, if the development of a modern industrial system, the building-up of a great merchant marine, and a great expansion of foreign trade, may be considered indications of progress. Before the war with China, as has been pointed out in another connection, there had been laid the foundations for the development of industry and commerce. Railways had been built; modern banks had been organized, and experimentation which finally led to the establishment of a satisfactory banking system was begun; the currency system had been reorganized and, shortly after the war, put on a gold basis; a modern postal system had been instituted; telegraphic and telephonic communication had been introduced; and a merchant marine, with the accompaniment of a ship-building industry, was in existence. Thus the basis for industrial development had been created. There had also taken place, largely under government auspices, some changes in the direction of establishing a new industrial technique. But, on the whole, it may be said that it was only after 1895, and particularly after 1903, that Japan began to be transformed into an industrial nation,\* and that Osaka and other cities began to take on the appearance of, say, Birmingham or Fall River.

*Economic foundations laid before 1895*

The three foreign wars in which modern Japan has been engaged have had pronounced effects on her industrial progress. Each has resulted in an expansion of industry; each has been followed by boom times, marked by much speculation, the temporary appearance of many new undertakings, and general over-expansion in industry; and

*Effect of three foreign wars on economic life*

each era of unlimited prosperity has been followed by a period of marked depression, carrying with it the collapse and disappearance of many of the unsubstantial prosperity-created undertakings. But the deflation of industry has invariably left Japan more distinctly industrialized than she had been before the war, and ready to begin a gradual progress on a more substantial basis.

*Imports and  
exports*

A few figures will help us to visualize the economic development of Japan after 1895. Exports in 1885 were valued at slightly over thirty-seven million *yen*, and imports at more than twenty-nine million *yen*, making a total of sixty-six and one-half million *yen*. The war year (1894) saw this total increased to well over two hundred thirty million *yen*. The next war year (1904) found the total again increased to six hundred-ninety and a half million *yen*. The import trade of 1914 was valued at almost five hundred ninety-six million *yen*, while exports had increased to nine hundred ninety-one millions. In 1919 the export total had risen to two billion *yen*, and the import total to slightly over two billion. The depression of 1920 and thereafter, together with similar conditions in Europe, immediately reduced the totals, which, however, by 1929 had surpassed those of 1919. Even when we make all necessary allowances for changes in price levels, and for fluctuations in exchange, these figures serve to indicate a tremendous expansion in trade.

*Analysis of  
foreign trade*

*Excess of  
imports,  
1895-1924*

An analysis of this trade reveals several significant facts. From 1882 to about 1894 there was an almost invariable excess of exports over imports, due largely to the fact that the Japanese people, agricultural in their interests, were still living the life of the past, and that need for Western commodities had not yet become strongly felt. After 1895, with but few variations, the excess lay on the side of imports—the so-called balance of trade remaining unfavorable to Japan until the outbreak of the European War, when the tables were again turned until after the end of that struggle. The depression following the war, coupled with the return of her normal competitors to the trade arena, and the necessity for large imports to repair the damages of the great earthquake of 1923, again turned the balance against Japan.

*Change in  
character of  
exports and  
imports*

A more significant conclusion from an analysis of the foreign trade is that its character gradually changed after 1895. Thus the imports came to be raw materials and partly finished commodities rather than finished manufactures, while the exports became finished or semi-finished industrial products. The culmination of the change in character of the import and export trade is fairly represented by its distribution in 1919. Crude articles for food accounted for only 3.1 per cent of the exports but for 12 per cent of the imports; 4 per cent of the exports and 4.2 per cent of the imports were manufactured articles for food; raw materials other than food stuffs amounted to 5.2 per cent of the exports and 50.3 per cent of the imports; material for manufactures accounted for 43.2 per cent of the exports and 20

per cent of the total imports; and 43 per cent of the exports and only 12 per cent of the imports were finished goods. During the period of beginnings, from 1895 to the end of the Meiji era, when the balance of trade was consistently unfavorable, not only were many of the raw materials for industry imported, but machinery and industrial tools had to be purchased abroad, and the national industry was unable to meet the demand for manufactured goods. In the decade after 1914 all of that was changed, and Japan not only supplied most of her own industrial needs but also began to find a surplus for export.

Another way of illustrating this transformation of Japan into an industrial and capitalistic society is from the growth of the joint-stock form of enterprise. As late as 1905 there were only 83 joint-stock companies with a paid-up capital of a little over two million *yen*, as against 148 ordinary and limited partnerships with a paid-up capital of over a million three hundred thousand *yen*; whereas in 1914 there were 198 joint-stock companies with a paid-up capital of almost twenty-one million *yen*, while the 293 partnerships had a capital of only six million *yen*.

*Growth of joint-stock enterprises illustrates change in economic life*

Again, the number of machine looms in 1905 was only 19,040, as compared with almost 716,000 hand looms. By 1914 the number of machine looms had increased to almost 123,000, while there were less than 400,000 hand looms, indicating a substantial encroachment of the new on the old industry. This expansion was accelerated after 1914, and the expansion in that one industry may be taken as fairly typical of all others. The old, essentially esthetic, industries have continued to exist by the side of the new large scale production, but with a decreasing importance in the national economy. The tastes and habits of the Japanese, which disincline them to the standardized product, will undoubtedly perpetuate the market for the goods of the hand-worker, but factory production is rapidly developing an industrialized Japan.

*Increased use of modern machinery*

It must be emphasized that the government has taken the initiative in the establishment of industries using modern machinery. Its interest has been in releasing Japan from dependence on the West for the materials essential to every-day life, and in building up a substantial export trade. This has led to an emphasis on utilitarian and large-scale production rather than the development of the esthetic and artistic native handicrafts. The new industry, consequently, parallels that of the West. Without attempting an exhaustive enumeration, it may be pointed out that cotton and silk spinning and weaving, ship-building, match making, paper making, brewing and distilling, the manufacture of artificial fertilizers, and iron and steel works are among the more important modern industries. During and since the World War there has developed a chemical industry. In the modern industries the aim is standardization and large scale production.

*But handicrafts continue*

*Industrial development parallels that of the West*

Electrical enterprise has also become important in modern Japan.

*Electrical  
enterprise*

Electricity is used for lighting in all parts of the country, in addition to which it is being used extensively in industry for motive power. The rapid flowing streams are beginning to be utilized to generate electricity, so that the current is cheap and power plentiful. No country has greater hydro-electrical possibilities than Japan. As it is fully developed, it may partially compensate for the comparative inadequacy of her coal supply.

*Reemphasis on  
native crafts*

Prior to, and for a time after, the Russo-Japanese War the vogue of the West was so great in Japan that the native industries suffered an eclipse. At first they tried to adapt themselves by imitation and by acceptance of unfamiliar standards of artistry. The result was the creation of a hybrid which had no merit from the standpoint either of the West or of Japan. It was the foreigner who began to emphasize the esthetic values of the old Japanese handicrafts by his interest in them rather than in the Westernized product. Subsequently the Japanese themselves awakened to the possibilities of their native crafts, and Western influence came to be deprecated. This has led to a revival of interest in essentially Japanese goods. The ceramic industry was one which had most strongly felt the Western influence and which is now beginning to revert to Japanese standards and patterns. The making of lacquer goods, cloisonné, and damascene ware has also been rehabilitated in Japanese eyes. Silk production in the home, for the making of Japanese *obi* and other garments, without standardization of pattern, is another native enterprise which has considerable importance. It must not be understood that these native industries ever disappeared or lost their economic importance, but only that they lost temporarily in popular esteem because they were non-Western, that they tried to lose their distinctive characteristics for a time, and that now they are resuming their natural position.

#### 6. EFFECTS OF INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT

*Conditions  
developed with  
factory system*

The introduction of the factory system into Japan has strengthened the material foundations of the state, but it has brought with it all of the evil conditions found in the industrial societies of the West. The industrial city, with its smoke-laden air and its crowded slums; the hordes of women and children driven from the home to work in the factory and the mine, instead of eking out the family income by working at home in a leisurely fashion at one of the handicrafts; the divorce of the workman from ownership of the tools of the trade; the submergence of the artisan in the wage-earner who performs one routine operation hour after hour; growing inequalities of wealth, without the maintenance, in the industrial centers, of the feudal-family tradition of mutual aid; the development of group and class antagonisms—all of these features of industrialism are rapidly becoming characteristic of modern Japan.

These changes came so rapidly that no attempt was made, for

a time, to grapple with the problems they created. As a matter of fact, the leaders, as well as the great majority of the enfranchised people, at first remained indifferent to them, and as a capitalist class developed it attained sufficient power, in union with the parties, to prevent consideration of proposals for the amelioration of the condition of the workers. At the same time, the old nobility and the landed gentry felt no responsibility for conditions and consequently overlooked them. The first proposals for factory legislation were made in 1897, but it was not until 1911 that a measure was finally enacted, and not until 1916 that this measure was put into force. The law was significant because of the fact of its enactment rather than on account of the advanced character of its provisions. The act applied only to factories employing fifteen or more workers and to certain dangerous industries regardless of the number employed in the establishment. Employment of children under twelve was prohibited, subject to certain exceptions. The maximum number of hours of work for women and children under fifteen was fixed at twelve, but again subject to exceptions under which, in certain cases, a fourteen-hour employment was permissible. And two rest days a month were required. But, on the whole, the provisions of the law were based upon existing practice, and thus the minimum standards established were low and so many exceptions from the operation of the act were provided that its application was made almost farcical. The amendment of the act in 1923, effective in 1926, and a further amendment in 1929 finally brought within its control all factories using power-driven machinery. The amendments were also designed to make Japanese labor conditions, from the standpoint of hours of work, approximate more closely to the international standards accepted in the Washington Conference Convention of 1919.

*Failure to  
enact  
satisfactory  
factory  
legislation*

*Act of 1916*

A plentiful labor supply due to her expanding population, to the attraction of city life for the rural laborer, and to the constant recruiting of young women for industrial service, meant that wages were low in Japan until after 1914, and notably until 1918, when the tremendous overnight expansion of industry, with its boom times and its apparently unlimited demand for workers, brought about rapid wage increases. These, however, were virtually absorbed by the mounting cost of living, and by an increased consumption consequent on the new prosperity. And it was a question whether the new wage levels could be maintained after the war. The demand for raw and finished silk in the United States was one large factor in producing this post-war boom; another factor was the artificial maintenance of high prices in the cotton industry through agreements among the brokers. The boom collapsed in 1920, however, just as similar periods of prosperity, marked by speculation, over-expansion, and over-capitalization, following the wars with China and Russia, came to an end.

*Post-war boom*

<sup>8</sup> HERSHEY, *Modern Japan*, pp. 174-5.

*Industrial  
depression  
after 1920*

The immediate cause of the slump was the refusal of the Bank of Japan to continue to loan to private banks, and its further action in calling in all loans due and payable. But by 1920 the American demand for raw silk had been curtailed, shipping had suffered severe setbacks as a consequence of the end of the war monopoly of the Pacific carrying trade, and the China demand for Japanese cotton goods was lessened as a consequence of the boycott instituted when the decisions of the Paris Conference as to Shantung were made known in China. And, in any case, over-expansion ultimately brings its own penalties. This depression continued through the period of the Washington Conference, and one difficulty faced by the government was that of preventing further dislocation of industry as a result of the fulfilment of the pledges which made it impossible to carry out the already accepted program of capital ship construction. Partly to avoid throwing men in the shipyards out of work, a new program involving construction of cruisers was proposed. The repairing of the damage done by the great earthquake also quickened the stagnant industrial life.

*Taxation heavy  
due to  
constantly  
increasing  
expenditure*

It should be pointed out here that the problem of living had been greatly complicated for the people by reason of the heavy burden of taxation which they have had to bear during the twentieth century. Public expenditure increased, from 1902 to 1914, from almost three hundred million to about five hundred fifty million *yen*. After the entrance of Japan into the war, her expenditure mounted rapidly until the budget totals ran well over a billion *yen*. This was due in large part to her continental adventures, and to the expenditures made necessary by the military and naval program accepted in 1916 and revised in 1920, although general administrative expenditures also increased. During the same period, 1902-1914, the national debt increased from five hundred million to two billion five hundred million *yen*. The war with Russia was largely instrumental in bringing about this increase, but borrowings for railway development, after the railways were nationalized in 1906, and for the promotion of Japanese interests in Manchuria, materially helped to swell the total. This was further increased after 1914. As an offset to the latter, must be put the loans made by Japan to China from 1914-1918, many of which were political, and upon which payments both of interest and principal are in arrears.

*Methods of  
securing  
revenue*

Every possible expedient has been resorted to in order that these heavy charges may be carried. For example, the government instituted a tobacco, a camphor, and a salt monopoly for fiscal reasons, the first two following the war with China, the camphor monopoly also being designed to foster that industry in Formosa, and the third during the war with Russia. But nothing could avail to keep taxes from constant increase, so that, taking into account various luxury taxes, registration fees, and land, income, business, and inheritance taxes, the burden on the individual is very great. To these, of course,



must be added the levies for local purposes. Thus, in the last analysis, it is not alone industrialization which has made the poor grow poorer, even though that is responsible for the widening of the gap between the poor and the rich.

### 7. LABOR PROBLEMS

Before turning from this general question of economic conditions in modern Japan, we should say a word about the development of labor organizations. What amounted to a ban on the creation, or at least the effective utilization, of labor organizations was a clause in the "Peace Regulations" promulgated in 1900 which reads: "Those who, with the object of causing a strike, seduce or incite others shall be sentenced to major imprisonment of one to six months with additional penalty of  $y$  3 to 30." This virtually condemned labor organizations to service merely as benevolent and social agencies. In spite of this, however, organization began shortly thereafter, although the various organizations changed so much from time to time that it was impossible to estimate their strength. In 1912 the Japanese Federation of Labor was established. Since its reorganization in 1920 by Mr. Bunji Suzuki, it claims an enrolment of about fifty thousand members, who, however, have as yet not reached the point where they have sufficiently defined views to enable them to act unitedly. The position of this and other similar organizations was improved when the ban on them was partially lifted in 1919.

During the era of war and post-war prosperity, strikes multiplied in Japan, in spite of the lack of well-developed labor organizations. The principal reason for most of the strikes, several of which attained considerable dimensions, was an unsatisfactory wage scale. While the depression after 1920 lessened the amount of labor agitation, increasing friction between capital and labor may be expected in the future, unless more liberal and enlightened action is taken to ameliorate the condition of the industrial population.

### 3. THE POPULATION PROBLEM

Industrial development has made many Japanese wealthy, and has undoubtedly added to the ability of the state to carry heavy financial burdens, since it has added to the taxable wealth. That it has not more successfully raised the standard of living for the masses has been due partly to the usual absorption of the largest share of the benefits by a comparatively small number of people; but fundamentally it has been due to the great increase in population since the Restoration. Before 1867 the population had remained fairly stationary at about twenty-six millions. In 1913 the official estimate placed it at a little over fifty-three millions, and by 1920 it had increased to almost fifty-six millions. Since then it has increased (1930) to over sixty-four millions. Better sanitary arrangements and modern medical methods conspired to reduce the death rate, while the birth

rate underwent no decline. Twenty-five millions could be supported by the agriculture of pre-modern Japan only at a comparatively low standard of living. If the population had continued stationary, however, improvements in transportation and in agricultural methods, together with the cultivation of new lands and the more scientific utilization of the wealth in timber, would have materially aided in improving the living conditions of the people even though there had been no great development of industry. But the agricultural resources of Japan are not sufficient to take care of the great increase in population which has come since 1867, even when those resources are more fully and economically utilized than they are even today, particularly if the island of Hokkaido is taken into account. Consequently, since 1905, when the industrial transformation really began on a large scale, the interest of Japan has been increasingly manifested in securing the industrial foundations of the state. These interests, from one point of view, lie in gaining control of adequate supplies of coal, iron, and petroleum, among the sub-soil products; in creating a source of supply of her own of raw cotton; and in enlarging her controlled supply of food products to take care of the needs of her industrial and commercial population which obviously cannot supply its own wants. Japan's continental Asiatic policy after 1905, and especially after 1914, indicates this changing interest, as will be subsequently revealed.

*This has led to emphasis on expansion to secure a) raw materials*

From another point of view, the industrial state is actively interested in securing markets for its goods and, so far as possible, in establishing itself in those markets on a monopolistic or at least a preferential basis. While Japan holds a satisfactory position in the West for her silks and teas, her textile industry is primarily interested, of necessity, in the China market to which it sends its yarns as well as cotton piecegoods. Even before the war Japan had made remarkable gains in the China trade, and since then she has reached the point where her competition has seriously threatened British trade supremacy. Her favorable location and the early growth of her production make it possible for Japan to become the dominant factor in continental markets, except as China and India industrialize. The antagonism resulting from Japan's foreign policy also jeopardizes her trade position in China. But probably, as one writer put it as early as 1912: "The Western countries having given to Japan their industries will see the fruits of these industries passed on to China."<sup>8</sup>

*Without industrial development standards would have had to be lowered*

Industry, then, has enabled the Japanese to take care of their population expansion since 1905 without a lowering of the standard of living, but this expansion has been so rapid that industrialization has not elevated the standard materially. And it has also decidedly influenced the development of Japan's foreign policy.

Another method of taking care of an expansive population is by means of colonization. While Korea and Formosa and a foothold in

<sup>8</sup> LAWTON, *Empires of the Far East*, vol. 2, p. 926.

Manchuria were not acquired with a view to utilizing them as areas for colonization, an interest in Manchuria for such purposes might well be alleged, as it has repeatedly been in the past decade. But the Japanese have not been successful as colonizers. In Korea they have been successful organizers and exploiters, but they have not settled there in any large numbers in spite of organized efforts in the direction of colonization; and, as a matter of fact, the comparatively large Korean population, in any case, had first claims on the land. Formosa might have taken care of Japanese settlers, but the pioneer nature of the work to be done there has not proven attractive to Japanese. There, as in Korea, they have come as officials, as exploiters and as shopkeepers, but not as colonizers. The same thing has been true of Manchuria, where the Chinese, rather than the Japanese, have taken possession of, and maintained themselves successfully on, the soil.

*Colonization to take care of population surplus*

*a) On Asian continent and in Formosa*

More Japanese agricultural laborers have been attracted to Hawaii and continental America than to eastern regions, perhaps partly because the pioneer work has already been done. According to Japanese figures, by 1920 there were about 350,000 Japanese in China, including Manchuria and Hongkong; only about 18,000 in Singapore, the Malay Peninsula, Java, Sumatra, the Philippines, and other South Sea territories; 100,000 in Hawaii, constituting approximately half of the total population; about 90,000 in the United States, an underestimate according to some American figures; 14,000 in Canada; 43,000 in Latin-America; and about 12,000 in Australasia. These emigrants have contributed materially to the development of the regions to which they have gone in large numbers, but in North America and Australasia, as the number has increased, the hostility which the Chinese settler had encountered earlier manifested itself and led to the enactment of exclusion measures, notably by the United States and Australia. These measures, together with others discriminating against Japanese already in this country, have served to embitter the Japanese, as well as to close an outlet for Japan's surplus population. Since, however, this has entered into her foreign policy rather than her internal arrangements, its more detailed consideration must be postponed to a later chapter.

*b) Overseas emigration*

## 9. AGRICULTURAL LIFE

Thus far our discussion of the economic life of Japan has been concerned with industry. But that must not lead us to the conclusion that agriculture is of relatively little importance. The reverse is true, and because of its importance we can best conclude this chapter with a consideration of Japanese agriculture from the economic standpoint.

Agriculture in Japan has always been, and still is largely, synonymous with the cultivation of rice. Barley, wheat, and some legumes are grown, but rice is the staple both of cultivation and of diet. In 1919 there were 3,104,611 *chō* of land devoted to rice, and only 1,729,148 to barley and wheat. The production of rice, 60,818,000

*koku*, was much greater than the combined total production of wheat and barley. The rice grown is virtually all consumed at home, and is considered by the people to be much superior to that grown elsewhere and imported into the country.<sup>9</sup>

Land owning  
and tenantry

The holdings of land have always been small, and farming has been very intensive. The average holding is only about two and one-half acres per family. Prior to the Restoration, the farmer held his land as a tenant of the *samurai* or *Daimyo*. Subsequently, with the abolition of feudalism, he was confirmed in the ownership of the land which he worked. From this basis of a land-owning peasantry the general movement, particularly in the last twenty-five years, has been toward an increase in tenantry. This has been partly due to the attempts of the more prosperous and far-sighted farmers to increase the size of their holdings.

Some 34 per cent of the farmers are land-owners; about 40 per cent are owners and tenants; and about 28 per cent are tenants only. . . . But an unwholesome feature of recent years is that the number of landlords is decreasing, while the number of tenants is fast increasing. In 1919, for example, there were 30,500 fewer landlords and 25,163 more tenants than in 1914. . . . So that while many have lost their land, others have added field to field and become independent landlords, a class prone to be more parasitic in Japan than in Western countries. If the process continues it will very adversely affect the situation, for extension of tenancy always deprives the Japanese farmer of independence and incentive.<sup>10</sup>

In addition to this, the increase in tenantry maximizes the consequences of friction between landlords and tenants. With a rise in the cost of living such as came after 1914, the tenant's problem of livelihood becomes more acute, and antagonism to the landlord develops. In the future this will present an increasingly important series of problems. On the other hand, the landless man is more readily attracted into the factory town. This may be an advantage to industry, but it is not necessarily a good thing for the nation, and the competition with industry makes it much more difficult for the landlord to secure and hold his tenants. While the tendency toward increased tenancy must be deplored, the increase in the size of the holdings, together with consolidation and redistribution of individual properties, is of advantage in that it helps to increase productivity with the same application of energy. It also makes possible, to a limited extent, the introduction of new methods and tools. The problem, then, is to eliminate the evils of the situation while making the most of its possibilities for good.

Every year additional land is brought under cultivation. From 1905 to 1919, the total cultivated land was increased from 5,382,378 to 6,071,888 *cho*. The percentage of cultivated to uncultivated land

<sup>9</sup> The largest export, that of 1917, was only 769,129 *koku*. Imports in the last fifteen years have varied from the 309,158 *koku* of 1916 to the 4,647,168 *koku* of 1918. J. W. ROBERTSON SCOTT, *Foundations of Japan*, p. 388.

<sup>10</sup> BRYAN, *Japan from Within*, pp. 118-119.

in 1909 was 14.6 per cent, while in 1918 it was 15.6 per cent. This must not be taken to mean that there are large areas which in the future can be brought under cultivation. It must be remembered that the islands are of volcanic origin, and are extensively broken up by mountain ranges and formations. The nature of the country, from the agricultural standpoint, is further indicated in the fact that there are fifty intermittently active volcanoes and about a thousand hot springs. Consequently the inhabitable and cultivable area will remain small in relation to the total area. As it is, the mountain-sides are being farmed to an almost incredible extent. It is thus partly the character of the country which makes certain the maintenance of comparatively small holdings of land.

While there has been a slight increase in the area cultivated, there has been a much greater increase in the yield, particularly of rice. The rice production in 1882 of 10,692,000 *koku* may be compared with that of 1913, 50,222,000, and of 1928, 60,303,000 *koku*. This represents a seventy-five per cent increase of yield. During this same period the population increased only fifty-five per cent. The additional rice production, together with normal rice importations, indicates an increased per capita consumption and, consequently, a somewhat higher standard of living, notably among the upper classes. If, however, the population continues to increase as rapidly as in the past, it will not be many years before the increase in agricultural production will be outstripped by the growth of population. This will make Japan dependent on the outside world for her food supply, as she now is for part of the raw materials for her industry.

*Increase in  
crop yield*

This increased yield is partly due, as has been noted, to an increase in the area under cultivation. More largely, however, it is the result of paddy adjustment, which makes possible better irrigation; of more scientific manuring; of the use of improved implements; and of animal and mechanical power, where that has been possible; of more careful seed selection, and a wider use of better seeds; of afforestation to prevent floods; and of the development of better rural loan facilities.

*Explanation  
of increase*

As has been the case in other fields of development, the government has played an important part in promoting agricultural progress. It has established schools for the training of agriculturalists, and has introduced agricultural studies in the curricula of the lower schools. It has maintained experiment stations, which have studied some of the technical problems of the farmer and made the results available to him, encouraging him, in turn, to experiment. It has aided and fostered secondary rural production, such as sericulture and horticulture, though it has done this, apparently, not so much because of an interest in rural development as because of a desire to promote industry and to create an export surplus. It has sent lecturers on agricultural questions throughout the country. And it has been instrumental in improving communications.

*The rôle of the  
government*

That more has not been done is due to the lack of funds for these

*Lack of money  
retards  
developmental  
work*

purposes. "I have been assured again and again by prefectural governors and agricultural experts—and in talking to a foreigner they would hardly be likely to exaggerate—that considered plans for the prevention of disastrous floods, for the breaking-up of new lands, for the provision of loans and for the development of public intelligence and well-being were hindered in their case by lack of money alone."<sup>11</sup> This lack of funds for development purposes, it may be noted, is due primarily to the excessive proportions of the national income which are devoted to the army and navy, and to the payments on the debt incurred as a result of successive wars. This, however, is true of other countries as well as Japan.

*Secondary rural  
occupations*

The principal secondary types of rural production are tea cultivation, sericulture, horticulture, tree and plant dwarfing and shaping, and animal husbandry. In some prefectures, tea cultivation and sericulture should perhaps be classed as primary rather than secondary pursuits, but for the country as a whole the former classification is sounder. Tea is grown throughout all but the northernmost prefectures, but the individual areas are small, and in most places the cultivation is carried on as a side line. Furthermore, the preparation of the tea for market in many instances is accomplished by hand rather than by machinery.

*Tea cultivation*

The importance of tea cultivation is indicated by the fact that 48,843 *chō* are devoted to it, and that there are 1,122,164 tea factories, including those attached to households. The total production in 1919 was valued at about thirty-four million *yen*, and tea to the value of about eighteen and one half million *yen* is exported every year. Most of the exported tea goes to the United States and some to Canada. The exportation to the former country is decreasing—from 50,000 tons in 1918 to 23,000 in 1920. This may be partly due to increased consumption at home, but it is to be more fully explained by an increased use of black teas by Americans.

*Rural silk  
industry*

The silkworm and cocoon production of Japan has an annual value of over one hundred seventy million *yen*. "One acre in every dozen in Japan produces mulberry leaves for feeding the silk-worms which two million farming families—more than a third of the farming families of the country—painstakingly rear."<sup>12</sup> These statements indicate the importance to the farmer of the production of raw silk. It lends itself admirably to service as a supplementary activity to crop farming, since the worm may be attended by girls and women, and since the rearing season is a restricted time in the spring and autumn.

*Expansion of  
silk trade*

Japanese silk exportation is now twice that of China, her closest competitor, whom she passed in 1910. The production is three times that of Italy, and much greater than that of France. This has been made possible by the abundance of mulberry leaves in Japan, which serves to compensate for the atmospheric and climatic handicaps

<sup>11</sup> ROBERTSON SCOTT, *Foundations of Japan*, p. 370.

from which, in comparison with her competitors, she suffers. For a long time the bulk of the raw silk—seventy-five per cent—was exported, but as the number of factories increases Japan is steadily increasing the proportion of the raw product transformed at home. This particular rural activity serves as the foundation of a most important national industry.

As the domestic demand for raw silk has increased, greater attention has been paid to its production, with the consequence that in some regions the tendency is to make it a primary rather than a secondary activity. As supplementary to cultivation it has been most important in adding to the income of the farmer, and thus in making him more prosperous. If he devotes himself to it exclusively, it may have directly contrary consequences, especially as he will become dependent on the condition of a world market, and on an industry in the control of which he will only indirectly share.

*Silk production becoming primary rather than secondary as rural occupation*

The income of many rural communities is further augmented from the fisheries. About a million and a half persons are engaged in the fishing industry, and the per capita catch, in terms of the total population, averages in annual value about seventy *yen*. This activity has been among those encouraged by the government, which has made scientific investigations, and has stimulated the manufacture of marine products. It has also interested itself in securing, or attempting to secure, fishing rights for Japanese along the coast and in the inland waters of Siberia.

*Value of fisheries*

The attempts to interest the farmer in stock-raising have been comparatively unsuccessful outside of Hokkaido. There the government maintains a stock farm, which is used to produce animals mainly for military uses. There is also some private stock-raising. But with an increase in the demand for dairy products and for meat, due to changes in the diet of the people, increased activity would seem to be imminent. Lack of adequate and suitable pasturage, however, will probably check the growth of animal husbandry before it assumes a great importance to the rural communities.

*Stock-raising*

The contrary has been the case with horticulture, and the growing of vegetables. The two combined now yield an annual production valued at two hundred million *yen*. Not only have the number and variety of fruit-bearing trees increased, but the fruit itself in some cases has been much improved by experimentation.

*Growth of horticulture*

By these and other activities supplementary to his fundamental rice and grain cultivation, the Japanese farmer adds to his income and finds it possible to live on his small allotment of land. Only to the extent to which these supplemental types of production are developed, does he have more than a bare subsistence. The number of days of labor on the land averages between one hundred-fifty and two hundred, the latter a maximum estimate, for the year. Thus it is apparent that the farmer and the members of his household have surplus time which can be devoted to productive subsidiary pursuits

*Surplus time of farmer*

without neglect of the main occupation or undue prolongation of the working day. What is necessary is to find the most profitable between-seasons occupations, and to encourage him to develop them even beyond the point reached up to the present time.

*Development  
of Hokkaido*

Before leaving the subject of agriculture a few words should be added concerning the development of Hokkaido. The rigorous climate of that island has retarded its natural settlement and development by the Japanese, both because of natural antipathy to the cold climate, and by reason of the fact that the manner of living in Japan has not taught the people how to meet the cold. The poor people who constituted the group naturally drawn out of the main islands, even though they had by knowledge, or adaptive ability, been equipped to deal with the changed conditions of life, did not have the capital to build houses with well-fitted and glassed windows and to equip them with suitable stoves. The nature of the country also required a break with traditional methods of cultivation. This militated against its rapid settlement. Again, "an undoubted hindrance to the colonization of Hokkaido has been scandals and land grabbing." Some of the scandals have resulted in the overturning of governments. "Many of what the late Lord Salisbury called the 'best bits' are in the hands of big proprietors or proprietaries. Some large landowners no doubt show public spirit, but their class has contrived to keep farmers from getting access to a good deal of land which, because of its quality and nearness to practicable roads and the railway, might have been worked to the best advantage."<sup>13</sup> The result is that tenants, rather than freeholders, have been sought and that many emigrants have returned to their homes dissatisfied with their venture.

*Emigration  
to Hokkaido*

Much more might have been done to stimulate emigration to Hokkaido than has actually been undertaken. The beginnings made during the last quarter of the nineteenth century have not been progressively built upon, largely because of the increasingly heavy expenditure for other purposes since Japan became a World Power. More highways and railroads are needed. Money should be made available on easy terms to prospective settlers, and the land policy should be so revised as to discourage landlordism.

*Extent of  
development*

It should not, however, be inferred that no progress has taken place in Hokkaido. A railway has been built. Flour mills, breweries, beet-sugar factories, canning plants, and other enterprises have sprung up. A university, begun as an agricultural college, plays an important part in the life of the country. All of these represent developments begun at a comparatively early time. One might also mention stock-raising for milk purposes and the establishment of enterprises for milk condensation.

*Hokkaido and  
Japan's surplus  
population*

There is room for much further development, as has been pointed out. In Hokkaido there is an area capable of absorbing a part of

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 359.



Japan's surplus population. So long, however, as the Japanese refuse to emigrate to Hokkaido on any large scale, the non-Japanese world is certain to question the existence of an acute population problem. That the problem exists may be granted readily enough, but it may be a matter for question as to whether the right methods are being used for its solution.

For five years in succession Tokyo had cut down the Hokkaido budget. Necessary public work and schemes for development have been repeatedly stopped. At a time when the interests of Hokkaido demand more farmers and there is a general complaint of lack of labor, at a time when there are persistent pleas for oversea expansion, there are in Japan twice or thrice as many people applying for land in the island as are granted entry.<sup>14</sup>

Thus consideration of the agricultural aspects of the population problem, as well as its industrial aspects, brings us back to the question of foreign policy, which must be considered as a primary interest of modern Japan.

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<sup>14</sup>Ibid., pp. 359-60.

## CHAPTER XVIII

### THE ASSERTION OF JAPANESE HEGEMONY IN THE FAR EAST

A new level of Japanese power in eastern Asia had been reached in 1917-1918. The World War had enabled Japan to change from a borrowing to a lending nation, from a state with a constantly adverse trade balance to one with a favorable balance; from a nation with inadequate gold reserves to one with a large gold surplus. It had also enabled her to give free play to any continental aspirations which she had, without fear of foreign interference. But it was because the necessary preliminary steps had been taken that Japan was able to utilize the opportunity presented to her by the war. It was because she had already introduced modern methods of production that she was able to enlarge her markets, and it was as a result of the earlier efforts to build up a merchant marine that Japanese shipping was able to monopolize the Pacific carrying trade. It was also because the spade-work had already been done that Japan was enabled to attain at least a temporary hegemony in the Far East.



#### I. JAPANESE DEPENDENCIES: FORMOSA AND KOREA

In order to complete the picture of twentieth-century Japan, consequently, it is necessary to broaden the view from the Japanese State to the Japanese Empire. This involves, first, a consideration of the dependencies, Formosa and Korea; second, an estimation of Japanese activities and interests in Manchuria from 1905 to 1914; and third, an analysis of the China policy of the Japanese government from 1914 to 1918.

Space precludes an extensive consideration of Formosa, the southern outpost of the Empire. It has the advantage of commanding access to the waters and the coast of China north of Fukien province, and its possession has enabled Japan to assert a special interest in that province. It is of interest to Japanese because it was acquired as a result of the country's first successful war in modern times, and also because it has been a financial burden, for large sums have had to be devoted to the subjugation of the aborigines in the uplands, a task which has not even yet been completed. The numerous public works undertaken, such as highway and railroad building, harbor improvement, etc., together with the establishment of schools, have added to the burden until recently, when the administration has become more nearly self-supporting. From the economic standpoint the island furnishes opium, salt, camphor and a little tobacco, all

## Chap. XVIII] JAPANESE HEGEMONY IN FAR EAST

controlled by government monopoly; tea, with sugar, the largest item of export; fish and other marine products to the value of six and a half million *yen*; some coal and gold, and a little petroleum. The commerce of the island is mostly with Japan, China and the United States ranking a bad second and third in the trade. As has already been pointed out, Formosa has not attracted Japanese settlers in large numbers, in spite of some efforts at colonization, for as late as 1925 there were only slightly over 187,000 Japanese in the island.

Korea, renamed Chosen after its annexation, deserves, as the major dependency of Japan, more extensive consideration. The changes in its status up to 1905 have previously been indicated. The Chinese connection was finally broken off in 1895, from which time Russia and Japan struggled for supremacy. As one of the preliminaries to the final contest the first Anglo-Japanese agreement was negotiated in 1902. This was founded, among other things, on a recognition of the independence of Korea, with, however, a recognition as well of Japan's peculiar political as well as her commercial and industrial interests in the peninsula. The revised agreement of 1905 provided that "Japan, possessing paramount political, military, and economic interests in Korea, Great Britain recognizes the right of Japan to take such measures of guidance, control, and protection in Korea as she may deem proper and necessary to safeguard and advance these interests, provided always that such measures are not contrary to the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations."<sup>1</sup> Following the war a protectorate was established, Prince Ito becoming the first Resident-General. This status was maintained until 1910, when a treaty of annexation was concluded between the Korean ruler and the Japanese Emperor represented by General Viscount Terauchi, the Japanese Resident. Thus one of the objectives of Hideyoshi, the sixteenth century leader, was finally reached in the twentieth century; thus the work begun, in its modern phase, in 1876 was completed. This consummation, by ending the international life of Korea, had as one of its consequences the termination of foreign governmental intrigue in the country, although, from time to time, accusations were brought against American missionaries that they were preaching seditious doctrines in their schools, and as late as 1920 a British subject, resident at Antung, was arrested when in Korea "because he had long been a suspect as abettor and friend of the Korean independence agitators."<sup>2</sup> Internal turmoil, moreover, except for the independence movement, has ceased.

In a brief estimation of the condition of Korea under Japanese rule, such as alone is possible here, it is difficult to do justice to the question. Certain things seem to be clear, however, and they may be stated in a summary way, leaving out of consideration more controverted matters. It is clear that the material condition of the

*Changes in  
status of Korea*

*Internal  
improvements  
made by Japan*

<sup>1</sup> Art. 3 from text as given in *Japan Year Book*, 1915, p. 570.

<sup>2</sup> *Japan Year Book*, 1921-22, pp. 590-1.

## HISTORY OF FAR EAST IN MODERN TIMES [*Chap. XXIII*]

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## INDEX

- Abbé Chapdelaine, murder of, 47  
 Adams, John Quincy, 40  
 Administrative Boards (China), 19  
 Aglen, Sir Francis, 445  
 Agriculture (China), 3, 8, 279  
 Aigun, 183; treaty of, 407  
 Ainu peoples, 73  
 Alaska, 3, 433  
 Aleutian Islands, 433  
 Alexander III, 138  
 Alexandrovsk, 407  
 Alexievsk, 414  
 Allied Powers, 389, 393, 409, 416, 438; Siberian operations of, 394  
 American government, 55, 183, 187, 435; policies of, 84; proposals of, 85  
 American interests, 47, 181, 183  
 American investments (China), 481  
 American-Japanese friction, 417, 431  
 American leadership (China), 390, 395  
 American missionaries, 367  
 American representative at Peking, 52, 130  
 American sailors, 116  
 American ships, 3, 83, 89  
 American trade and traders (China), 32, 35, 45, 142, 144, 481, 482; (Japan), 86, 373, 482  
 American treaty (China), 43-45, 48, 121  
 American Wheat Loan, 517 (note), 532  
 Amoy, 41, 42, 45  
 Amur railway, 509; River, 507, 513  
 Amurski, 48  
 Analects (of Confucius), 6  
 Ancestor-worship (China), 9, 29, 307  
 Anfu ascendancy, 385  
 Anfu cabinet members, 303, 396  
 Anfu Club, 240, 249, 250, 251, 252, 395  
 Anglo-American relations, 432, 434  
 Anglo-American syndicate, 181-184  
 Anglo-Chinese war, 40  
 Anglo-French expedition, 47, 48, 161  
 Anglo-French fleet, 407  
 Anglo-German agreement, 141, 160, 431  
 Anglo-German loan, 179  
 Anglo-Japanese agreement, 162, 164, 170, 367, 371, 386, 387, 427, 479; provisions of, 378; revision of, 431, 432  
 Anglo-Japanese alliance, 438  
 Anhui (province), 20, 23, 200, 268, 524; faction, 236  
 Annam, 3, 59; government of, 70; railroad in, 139  
 Anping River, 132  
 Anti-British sentiment (China), 304, 305  
 Anti-Christian riots (China), 56  
 Anti-Li party (China), 129  
 Antung, 367, 372  
 Antung-Mukden railway, 383  
 Araki, 464, 494, 497  
 Arctic Ocean, 405  
 Argun, 48  
 Army leadership (Japan), 493, 494, 495, 496, 497, 498; policies, 495, 496, 497, 498, 505, 519, 520  
 Asan, 125  
 Asia, 49, 114, 126, 133, 137, 317, 378, 416, 426, 427, 434, 441  
 Asiatic peoples, 377, 400  
 Asiatic ports, 79  
 Asiatic Power, 142, 162, 432  
 Asiatic Russia, 368  
 Asiatic state, 70  
 Assassination, political (Japan), 496, 497  
 Associated Powers, 394  
 "Associations for Worshipping .God" (China), 62 龔  
 Australasia, 359  
 Australasian policy (Japan), 376  
 Australia, 430, 434, 482, 483, 501, 502  
 Austrian Empire, 412  
 Austrian prisoners, 410, 414  
 Austrians, 393, 394  
 Autonomous régime (North China), 518, 519, 521  
 Baikal, Lake, 406, 408, 415, 416, 509  
 Balance of Power theory (China), 146  
 Balfour, Lord, 411, 437  
 Bank of China, 285, 525, 526  
 Bank of Communications (China), 225, 285, 525  
 Bank of Japan, 111, 356, 493  
 Bank of the Salt Industry (China), 285  
 Banner troops, 193  
 Belgian capital, 163, 181  
 Belgian concession, 446  
 Belgian interests, 182  
 Belgian treaty, 446, 449  
 Belgium, 432, 438  
 Bezobrazov, 168, 169  
 Bismarck, 54  
 "Black Current," 73, 78

- Blagovensk, 414, 509  
 Blaine policy, 428  
 Blood Brotherhood League, 496  
 Blücher, General, 260  
 Blue Shirts, 523  
 Board of Communications (China), 204  
 Board of Foreign Affairs (China), 19  
 Board of Reference (China), 439  
 Board of Revenue (China), 24  
 Board of War (China), 236  
 Board of Works (China), 21, 193  
 Bogue, treaty of the, 43, 44, 45  
 Bolshevism, 396, 404, 414  
 Bolshevik propaganda, 304  
 Bolshevik revolution, division following the, 411  
 Bonin Islands, 107  
 Book of Changes, 6  
 Book of History, 6  
 Borah resolution, 430  
 Borneo, 445, 466  
 Borodin, 254, 255, 261, 263  
 Boxer indemnity, 173, 193, 201, 391, 393  
 Boxerism (China), 20, 150, 191, 305; collapse of, 151  
 Boxer protocol, 191, 391, 393, 401  
 Boxer uprising, 158-163, 401  
 Boycott, of British, 260, 447; of Japanese, 460  
 Brest-Litovsk treaty, 412, 414  
 British and Chinese Corporation, 204  
 British arms, 45  
 British capital, 372, 477  
 British capitalists, 183  
 British Commission, 43  
 British consuls, 42  
 British force (China), 38  
 British Foreign Office, 162  
 British government, 41, 55, 56, 184  
 British House of Commons, 411  
 British investments, 477, 481  
 British legation, 183  
 British memorandum, 447, 448  
 British merchant vessels, 305  
 British merchants, 42  
 British pressure on China, 37  
 British settlement, 45  
 British squadron, 89  
 British traders, 41, 56  
 British trade supremacy (China), 32, 139  
 British vessels, 40  
 Brown, Colonel, 58  
 Bryan Peace Commission, 432  
 Buddha, 335  
 Buddhism, 16, 77, 125, 308, 310, 311, 313, 335, 337; (Korean), 120; (Japanese), 338  
 Buddhist priesthood, 79  
 Buddhist Young Men's Associations (Japan), 338  
 Bureaucracy, Japanese, 491  
 Bureaucrats (Japan), civil and military, 99; civil, 129; military, 129  
 Buriats, 409  
 Burlingame, Anson, coöperative policy of, 52, 54, 143, 151, 428  
 Burma, 70, 466  
 Cabinet (Japan), 103, 104  
 California, anti-Chinese agitation in, 54; Japanese settlers in, 375; land laws in, 376, 377, 428  
 Cambodia, 59  
 Canada, 359, 405, 417, 430, 434, 483, 501  
 Canton, 25, 28, 30, 31, 34, 37, 38, 39, 40, 42, 44, 45, 46, 49, 51, 62, 67, 147, 258, 260, 261, 266, 396, 429, 529, 530; Sun Yat-sen at, 246, 250, 251, 252  
 Canton government, 522, 523  
 Canton trade, 32, 33, 142  
 Canton viceroys, 52  
 Cantonese, 14, 16, 23, 33, 46; leaders, 484  
 Capitalists, Japanese, 489, 490  
 Catholic Missions (China), 29, 44  
 Catholic orphanage, 56  
 Celestial Empire, 39, 51, 61, 114, 130, 143, 152, 173, 429  
 Censors (China), 19  
 Central America, Japanese trade with, 501  
 Central Bank of China, 525  
 Central Executive Committee, 261, 262, 265, 267, 268, 528, 529  
 Central Powers, 388, 390, 393, 396  
 Ceylon, 175  
 Chahar, 452, 513, 519  
 Chang, 8  
 Chang Ch'ien, 290  
 Chang Chih-tung, 20, 62, 68, 69, 147, 192, 193, 204  
 Changchun, 185, 372, 418; conference of, 417  
 Chang Fa-kwei, 267  
 Chang Hsueh-liang, 264, 266, 267, 424, 452, 453, 456, 461  
 Chang Hsun, 208, 230, 235, 238, 239  
 Changpei, 513  
 Chang Tso-lin, Inspector General, 242, 243, 244, 246, 249, 252, 258, 259, 263, 264, 397, 423, 424, 444, 452, 453, 456  
 Chang Tsung-chang, 251  
 Charter Oath of 1868 (Japan), 100  
 Chefoo, 58  
 Chefoo-Weihsien railway, 383  
 Chekiang province, 200, 204, 245; Industrial Bank of, 283  
 Cheliabinsk, 408, 412  
 Chemulpo, 120, 126, 165  
 Chengchiatün, 385  
 Ch'en Ch'üing-ming, General, 251, 252, 258, 259

- Ch'en Kung-po, 267  
 Chiangchun, 235  
 Chiang Kai-shek, General, 259, 260, 261, 263, 264, 266, 267, 268, 271, 455, 472, 473, 517, 518, 521, 522, 523, 524, 528, 529, 530, 531, 538  
 Chiao-tung-pu Nanyang, 297  
 Chief Eunuch (China), 149  
 Chief Superintendent (China), 39  
 Chihli group, 236  
 Chihli province, 20, 23, 58, 148, 150, 155, 200, 242, 245; Viceroy of, 193  
 China, accepts intervention of West, 475; and internationalism, 474; and recognition of Manchukuo, 506; constitutional development contrasted with Japan, 470-471; currency, 525, 526, examination system abolished, 193, 195; foreign investments in, 179-181, 299, 477, foreign post offices in, withdrawn, 442; industrialization, 483; military reform in, 193; military tradition in, 470, 472; "principles of the constitution" of, 195; railway guards in, 442  
 China Merchants Steam Navigation Company, 205  
 Chinchow, 183, 459  
 Chinchow-Aigun concession, 183, 184, 185, 373  
 Chinese attitude, 46, 49, 50, 57  
 Chinese Christians, 312, 313  
 Chinese civilization, 53  
 Chinese classics, 81, 297  
 Chinese counter-proposals to Japanese demands (1936), 539  
 Chinese Eastern Railway, 137, 139, 158, 184, 254, 409, 412, 419, 420, 421, 422, 424, 425, 453, 463, 506, 507; sold to Japan, 507  
 Chinese Empire, administrative system in, 74; agricultural economy in, 279; agriculture in, 3, 8; ancestor-worship in, 9, 29, 307; anti-foreign sentiment in, 149; artisans in, 11; autocracy in, 18; brigandage in, 64; Censorate in, 19; ceremonial rites in, 19; civil appointments in, 19; commercial law in, 26; Commercial Revolution in, 37; communications in, 14, 15, 300; concession in, 45, 67, 442; concubinage in, 9; cottage system in, 286; cultural unity in, 16; customs (collection of) in, 25; "divine right" in, 18; economic development of, 69, 450; economic life in, 14; education (agricultural) in, 281; (vocational and technical), 299; educational system in, 5, 6, 302; Emperor (power of) in, 18, 19; family system in, 9, 26, 307; famine in, 18; farmer in, 10-11; foreign trade in, 174, 274, 276, 278, 525; handicrafts in, 11; imperial authority in, 18; import trade in, 33; industrial development in, 11; Industrial Revolution in, 37; inter-family relations in, 10; labor conditions in, 290; localism in, 17; marriage system in, 306; military rule in, 22, 23, mineral wealth of, 3; missionary work in, 44; mission schools in, 203; monopoly in, 31; mountain ranges in, 4; Open Door principle in, 42; opium trade in, 34-35, 42, 48, 275; overseas emigration from, 200; palace government in, 19, partnerships in, 12; paternal authority in, 10; petty thievery in, 11; political life in, 24; political relationships in, 18; political system in, 17-18, 26; population of, 4; press in, 299; provincial system in, 20, 22; punishments in, 19; racial stocks in, 5; railway construction in, 188, 431; railway loans in, 180; reform movement in, 146, 148, 192, 194, 196; religious rivalry in, 29; revenue in, 19, 177; revolutions in, 18; roads in, 15; rural entertainment in, 11; scientific knowledge in, 7; social divisions in, 5; "squeeze" in, 25; taxation and finance in, 24; territorial extent of, 3; trade conditions in, 30; waterways in, 14  
 Chinese immigrants, 55, 155  
 Chinese Imperial Maritime Customs, 53, 60, 65, 70, 121, 152, 170, 380, 440; Inspector General of, 139  
 Chinese-Japanese enterprises, 383  
 Chinese jurisdiction, 30  
 Chinese "Latin," 301  
 "Chinese melon, cutting of the," 143  
 Chinese merchants, 30, 41, 42, 46  
 Chinese monopoly, 45  
 Chinese nationalism, 473, 474  
 Chinese Nationalists, 473, 474  
 Chinese navy, 131  
*Chinese Political and Social Science Review*, 300  
 Chinese Post Office, 442  
 Chinese railways, Manchurian, 455  
 Chinese reaction to Japan's "Monroe Doctrine," 516, 517  
 Chinese Repository, 299  
 Chinese Republic, 22, 220, 389, 391, 392, 394, 395, 405, 432, 467, 470; President of the, 148  
 Chinese Resident (Korea), 122, 124, 148; at Seoul, 193  
 Chinese-Russian Convention (1924), 422  
 Chinese sovereignty, 44, 67, 183  
 Chinese tariff, 45, 526  
 Chinese Viceroy, 118, 159  
 Chinese War Zone, 380  
 Ch'ing Emperor, 210  
 Chinghai, 214  
 Chinhai, 41  
 Chinkiang, 14  
 Chin Shih, 7  
 Chita, 414, 416, 417, 418  
 Chosen, 367  
 Choshu, 89, 90, 93, 94, 98, 342, 343, 493  
 Chou An-hui, 225

- Christianity (China), 29, 30, 68, 149, 308, 311;  
     (Japan), 19, 80, 84, 337  
 Chronicles of Japan (Nihonji), 331  
 Chuang, 8  
 Ch'ü-jên, 7  
 Chu Tzu, 308  
 Ch'un, Prince, 197  
 Chungking, 132  
 Chnsan, 41  
 Civil Administrator (China), 235  
 Civil Appointments (China), 19  
 Cleveland, President, 428  
 Cochín-China, 59, 60, 116  
 Co-hong, 31, 34, 41  
*Commercial Press* of Shanghai, 290  
 Commercial Revolution, 37  
 Commission of Inquiry, League (Lytton), 459,  
     460, 461, 462, 478, 506, 522  
 Communications (China), 270, 526  
 Communism, 265, 268, 271, 472, 522, 524, 530  
 Communist Party, Chinese, 254, 425, Russian, 254  
 Communist program, 258, 269  
 Communists, 266, 268, 521, 522, 523  
 Compradore, 31  
 Concubinage (China), 9  
 Conference on the Constitution (China), 231  
 Confucian Analects, 6  
 Confucian China, 462  
 Confucian Classics, 18, 22  
 Confucianism, 16, 120, 125, 308, 309, 338  
 Confucian philosophers, 77  
 Consortium, withdrawal of United States from,  
     187, 395, 402; revival of, 188  
 Constantinople, 466  
 Constitution of 1868 (Japan), 100  
 Constitutional Compact, 222, 223, 229, 231  
 Constitutional Conference (China), 231  
 Constitutional Council, 222  
 Constitutional Party (Japan), 344  
 "Constitutional Principles," 207  
 Consumption taxes (China), 182  
 "Convention of Citizens' Representatives"  
     (China), 227  
 Coolies, 55  
 Coöperative policy (China), 447  
 Coöperatives (Japan), 493; (China), 526, 527  
 Cossacks, 406, 407, 408  
 "Cotton King" (Y. H. Moh), 290  
 Council of Elders (China), 10, 26  
 Council of Governors (Japan), 101  
 Council of Ministers (Japan), 104  
 Council of State (China), 61, 198, 222, 226;  
     (Japan), 82, 93, 103  
 "Council of Three," 401  
 Councilors of the First Class (Japan), 93; of  
     the Second Class, 93  
 Councils, Upper and Lower (Japan), 76, 93  
 "Country ships," 34  
 Court of Archives (China), 19  
 Court of Justice (Japan), 100  
 Court of St. James (Japanese Minister at the), 162  
 Crimean War, 407  
 Crisp loan, 178  
 Crisp, Mr., 216  
 Cuba, 55, 136, 537  
 Curtiss-Wright Company, 517  
 Cushing, Caleb, 43  
 Customs, collection of (China), 25, 393  
 Czar, coronation of, 136, 167, 168  
 Czecho-Slovaks, 412, 414  
 Daijokwan, 93  
 Daimyates, 77  
 Daimyo, 75, 76, 77, 81, 93, 94, 95, 111, 332,  
     360  
 Dairen, 182, 372, 373; Conference of, 417  
 Dalny (Talienwan), 155, 156, 383  
 Dan, Baron, 496  
 Davis, L. V., 39  
 De Castries Bay, 407  
 Decembrists, 408  
 Defense Commissioners (China), 235  
 Democracy, principle of, 257  
 Demonism (Korea), 120  
 Denny, Mr., 124  
 Department of Education (Japan), 321  
 Department of Justice (China), 19  
 Deshima, 80, 81  
 Dewey, John, 302  
 Diet (Japan), 104, 129, 345, 348  
 Diplomacy, definition of (China), 175  
 District Magistrate (China), 21, 24, 26, 31  
 "Divine Right" (China), 18  
 Divorce (China), 9  
 "Doctrine of the Mean," 6  
 Dole, Sanford B., 428  
 Dolonor, 513  
 Dominicans, 29, 79  
 Doshi-kai (Japan), 347, 348  
 Dragon Throne (China), 228  
 Dutch, 28, 30, 34, 79, 80, 85, 433; vessels, 89;  
     school of learning, 468  
 Eastern Asia, 430, 466; Japanese supremacy in,  
     378, 387, 396  
 Eastern Inner Mongolia, 383, 402, 461, 462  
 East India Company (China), 32, 34, 36, 37, 38  
 East Indies, 80, 445  
 East Hopei Autonomous Council, 519, 520, 521,  
     527, 528  
 Economic development of China and Japan con-  
     trasted, 472  
 Educational mission (Chinese), 68  
 Educational systems, 107, 296, 297



- Edwardes, A. H. F., 445  
 Egyptian affairs, 145  
 Elder Statesmen (Japan), 104, 345, 347, 349, 350  
 Elgin, Lord, 47, 49  
 Eliot, Captain, 39, 41  
 Elliott, Admiral George, 41  
 Emigration (Chinese), 56  
 Emperor (Chinese), position of, 17-18, 20, 23, 29, 30, 35, 39, 42-44, 51, 117, 138, 147, 152; minority of, 53; Tao Kuang, 61; death of (Kuang Hsu), 197  
 Emperor (Japanese), 73, 74, 81, 321, 347, 367, 495, 498; position of, 87, 90; Meiji, 90, 92; signature of, 95; constitutional position of, 128; conspiracy against, 328  
 Emperor's Grand Tutor (China), 147  
 "Emperor's Merchant" (China), 31  
 Empress Dowager (China), 20, 22, 147, 148, 149, 192, 194, 197  
 Empress Mother, 61, 62  
 England, 30, 39, 40, 43, 47, 48, 49, 51, 54, 58, 59, 86, 107, 110, 118, 124, 129, 143, 144, 161, 169, 174, 175, 181, 186, 375, 378, 387, 388, 392, 394, 395, 397, 406, 417, 426, 429, 431, 432, 438, 467, 483, 532, 533; Imperial, 430  
 English policy (China), 47; (Asia), 431  
 English traders, 40  
 English Treaty (China), 42, 43, 44, 48; (Japan), 85  
 Entente Powers, 391, 392, 393  
*Eta* class (Japan), 325, 326  
 "Ever-Victorious Army," 64, 68  
 Examinations (China), 6-7  
 Extra-territorial Conferences, 403, 444  
 Extra-territoriality, treaty revision, 449, 471  
  
 "Factories" (China), 31  
 Factory Act of 1916 (Japan), 355  
 Fakumen, 183  
 Family system (China), 9, 26, 306; (Japan), 325-326  
 Far East, revival of interest in, 142, 401; Franco-Russian alliance extended to, 164; German activities in, 394; renewal of American interest in, 428-429; Western dominance of, 466; original interest in trade of, 466; English policy in, 483; future development of, 487  
 Far Eastern Committee, 435  
 Far Eastern Olympics, 315  
 Far Eastern politics, 473, 533  
 Far Eastern questions, 390, 417, 430; reasons for consideration of, 426  
 Far Eastern Republic of Siberia, 405, 416, 417, 432; Japanese attitude toward, 415; Japanese relations with, 417; Russian interest in, 417  
*Far Eastern Review*, 239  
 Far Eastern territory, Russian, 509  
 Fashoda, 145  
 Federated Malay States, 201  
 Fenghwang-cheng, 132  
 Fêng Kuo-chang, 230, 236, 250, 393  
 Fêng Shui, 8, 309, 310  
 Fengtai, 538  
 Fengtien province (Manchuria), 155, 159; Military Governor of, 242  
 Fêng Yü-hsiang, 245, 247, 249, 259, 263, 266, 267, 423  
 Feudalism, establishment of, 75  
 Finance, Minister of (Japan), 96, 101, 111; (China), 270  
 First National Bank (Japan), 111  
 Fisheries Convention, Russian-Japanese, 510, 511  
 Fiume, 400  
 Five Power government, 257, 529  
 Five Powers Group, 217, 235  
 Foochow, 42, 45  
 Foreign Board (China), 24  
 Foreign economic influence, 472  
 Foreign investments (China), 477, 481, 484  
 Foreign Office (China), 152, 253  
 Foreign trade (China), 271, 274, 276, 278  
 Formosa, 28, 34, 59, 61, 69, 72, 73, 82, 97, 132, 338, 348, 349, 384, 404, 433, 536; Bank of, 112; punitive expeditions to, 116; development of, 366-368  
 "Four Books" (China), 6  
 Four Powers Banking Group, 187, 204, 216  
 Four Powers Pact, 434, 438  
 Four Provinces Agricultural Bank, Hankow, 527  
 France, 47, 48, 49, 57, 58, 59, 86, 117, 123, 124, 133, 136, 141, 144, 158, 169, 181, 362, 388, 392, 394, 395, 396, 412, 415, 432, 433, 438, 467, 483; treaty revision (China), 446  
 Franciscans, 29, 79  
 Franco-British adjustments, 141  
 Franco-Japanese agreement, 371  
 Franco-Prussian War, 58, 109  
 French Catholics, 115, 338  
 French concession, 252  
 French Convention of Peking, 48  
 French Indo-China, 117, 466  
 French interests, 116, 477  
 French investments (China), 481  
 French priests, 116  
 French resident, 60  
 French treaty (China), 44, 45, 48, 446  
 French university organization, 107  
 French vessels, 89  
 Fu (prefectures), 17  
 Fujima, Lieutenant, 496  
 Fukien, 13, 139, 268, 366, 384, 426, 427, 522  
 Fusan, 115  
 Fushun mines, 372

- Geisha, 325  
*General Sherman*, the, 116  
 Geneva, 463, 517  
 Genghis Khan, 114  
*Genro*, 104  
*Genro-in*, 100  
 "Gentlemen's Agreement," 375, 376  
 George, Henry, 258  
 German declaration, 404  
 German-Japanese alliance, 387  
 German Leased Territory, 377  
 German prisoners, 410, 411, 413, 414  
 German Reparations Commission, 440  
 German vessels, 394  
 German vocational education (Japan), 108  
 Germany, 118, 133, 140, 143, 144, 160, 169, 176, 181, 186, 377, 383, 384, 386, 389, 391-393, 477; Japanese ultimatum to, 379; severance of diplomatic relations with, 390, 397, 398, 399, 402, 403, 404, 411, 427, 431, 438, 440, 467  
*Gijo*, 93  
 Ginseng, 33  
 Gold Franc Controversy, 420, 444  
 Goodnow, F. J., 222, 225  
 "Good Words to Exhort the Age," 62  
 Gordon, Captain, 64  
 Goto, Baron, 412  
 Graft (China), 24, 25  
 Grain Intendant (China), 21  
 Grand Canal, 14, 132  
 Grand Council (China), 19, 207  
 Grand Secretariat (China), 19  
 Great Britain, 38, 42, 47, 48, 58, 59, 70, 133, 136, 141, 145, 160, 164, 176, 185, 366, 378, 412, 430, 432, 433, 434, 438; and the Philippines, 537  
 "Great Learning," 6  
 Great Shrine (Ise), 337  
 Great Teacher, 16, 308  
 Great Wall, 28, 29, 142, 155, 161, 183, 427, 459  
 Green Flag Troops (China), 193  
 Gros, Baron, 47  
 Guam, 428, 434  
 Gubbins, Professor, 76, 82  
 Guild organization (China), 12-13, 283-285  
 Guilds (Japan), 78  
 Gulf Stream, 73  
 Habarov, 406  
 Habarovsk, 414  
 Haicheng, 132  
 Hainan, 61, 139  
 Hamaguchi, Premier, 495  
 Hanahira, Mr., 376  
 Han dynasty (China), 59  
 Hankow, 48, 163, 186, 206, 262, 263, 266, 267, 524; British concession at, 447; Cantonese capture of, 261; German concession in, 401  
 Hankow-Canton trunk line, 204  
 Hankow-Szechuan railway, 204  
 Hanlin, 7  
 Hanyang, 206  
 Hanyang Iron Works, 69  
 Hang Yeh-p'ing Corporation, 209, 290, 384  
 Hara, Premier, 349, 491  
 Harbin, 158, 410, 458  
 Harriman, Mr., 182, 183  
 Harris, Townsend, 85, 86, 118  
 Hart, Sir Robert, 53, 54, 60, 65, 68, 121  
 Hawaii, 3, 201, 359, 376, 428, 433, 434  
 Hay, Secretary, 144, 145, 146, 151, 161, 370, 429, 431  
 Hayashi, Count, 162; General, 494  
 "Heavenly King," 62, 63  
 Hei-lung-kiang province (Manchuria), 155  
 "Hermit Kingdom," 115  
 Hidetada, 76  
 Hideyoshi, 75, 114, 128, 367  
 Himalaya Mountains, 4  
 Hingan Mountains, 4  
 Hirota, Koki, Foreign Minister, Premier, 498, 516, 531; Three Point Program, 528, 531; demands, 530  
 Hizen, 90, 93, 94  
 Hokkaido, 73, 83, 101, 358, 363, 364, 365, 426, 491  
 Hokkaido Colonization Bank, 112  
 Holland, 30, 86, 426; treaty with Japan, 85  
 Honan, 20  
 Hongkew, 538  
 Hongkong, 40, 42, 46, 51, 59, 139, 147, 260, 359, 430, 477  
 Hong merchants, 31, 32, 38, 41, 42  
 Hongs, 442  
 Hopei, 519  
 Hopei-Chahar Military Council, 519, 520, 528  
 Hopei, East, Autonomous Council, 519, 520, 521  
 Hoppo, 31  
 Household Department (Japan), 103  
 House of Commons, British, 411  
 House of Peers (Japan), 345  
 House of Representatives (China), 231, (Japan), 104, 105, 106, 342, 344, 345, 346  
 Hsianfu, 160, 192  
 Hsien, 17, 21  
 Hsien Feng, 61  
 Hsingan Province, Manchukuo, 513  
 Hsinking, 503, 505  
 Hsinmintun, 183  
 Hsinmintun-Fakumen project, 373  
 Hsiung Hsi-ling, 215  
 Hsüchow Conference, 236  
 Hsüeh T'sai, 7  
 Hsü Shih-chang, 240, 241  
 Hsu Shu-tseng (Little Hsu), 421  
 Hu, Dr., 301, 529

- Hu Han-min, 250, 267  
 Huailai, 513  
 Huang Hsing, 208, 215  
 Hughes, Secretary, 424, 433, 434, 436  
 Hukuang railways project, 186  
 Hukuang, Viceroy of, 193, 208, 236  
 Hulutao, 455  
 Hunan province, 205, 524; Inspector General of, 243, 268  
 Hungtutze, 242  
 Hung Siu-Chuen, 62  
 Hupeh province (China), 200, 204, 268, 524  
 Hu Suh, Dr. (Shih), 300  
 Hypothec Bank (Japan), 112  
  
 Ili, district of, 65  
 Immigration Act of 1924 (Japan), 376  
 Imperial Academy (China), 7  
 Imperial Cabinet (China), 53  
 Imperial Clansmen and Nobles (China), 193  
 Imperial Conference (London), 432  
 Imperial Court (China), 147; (Japan), 76  
 Imperial Diet (Japan), 104, 105, 106  
 Imperial Family (China), 207  
 Imperial House (Japan), 337, 347, 469  
 Imperial House Laws (China), 18, 22, 196  
 Imperial Oath (Japan), 94  
 Imperial Peace Commission (China), 215  
 Imperial prohibition (China), 34  
 Imperial Rescript, 106, 129, 408  
 Imperial Resident, 121  
 Imperial Treasury (China), 24, 25  
 Imperial University (Tokyo), 322  
 Import trade (China), 33  
 Inagai, Mr., 347  
 India, 16, 28, 34, 36, 70, 80, 378, 431, 466, 467, 483, 485, 500, 501  
 India Office, 58  
 Indian government, 34  
 Indian system, 77  
 Indo-China, 5, 466, 537  
 Industrial Revolution (China), 37, 466  
 Industrialization (China), 483, 484; (Japan), 483, 484, 490  
 Inner Mongolia, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 530; Japanese policy toward, 512, 513, 514; autonomy, 512  
 Inner Mongolian Council, 513  
 Inouye, Finance Minister, 496; Nissho, 496  
 Internal trade (China), 378  
 International Banking Group, 389, 395; American participants in, 402  
 International Labor Conference, 355  
 International Law, 390, 398  
 International Loan Group, 216  
 International Settlement, 252, 260, 262  
 International Syndicate, 187  
 Internationalism, accepted by China, 474  
 Inukai, 463, 496  
 Itagaki, 99, 100, 101, 342, 344; death of, 328  
 Italian Air Mission, 517  
 Italians, 67, 400  
 Italy, 118, 139, 144, 362, 388, 395, 398, 415, 433  
 Ito, Count, 102, 103, 106, 111, 123, 128, 129, 344, 345, 367  
 Ito-Harriman agreement, 182  
 Ivanov, 424  
 Iwakura Mission, 100, 106  
 Iwakura, Prince, 97  
 Iyemitsu, 76  
 Iyeyasu, 75, 76, 87  
  
 Japan, agriculture in, 359-362, 493, 499, 500; American interest in, 82; and China, 531, 532; and China's currency, 526; and Europe, 467; and internationalism, 474, 475; and the League, 475; and Manchukuo, 502; and Mongolia, 513, 514, 530, 531; and the Philippines, 536, 537; anti-foreign sentiment in, 88; architecture in, 336; army, navy, policies of, 495, 496, 498, 505, 519, 520; artists and artisans in, 78; artistic crafts in, 336; Asiatic policy of, 431, 515, 516, banking system in, 111; capitalist class in, 488, 490, censorship in, 334; ceremonial life in, 78; Chinese influence in, 331; Christianity in, 338-340; colonization in, 359; communications in, 109, 319, constitutional system in, 342, 491; coöperatives in, 493; currency reform in, 111; development of, 72; dress in, 318; economic reorganizations in, 110, 351; education in, 107, 109, 319-322; effect of Manchurian adventure on, 464; electrical enterprise in, 354; emigration from, 359; factory system in, 354; factory workers in, 323; family system in, 325-326; feudalism in, 75, 94, 326; finance in, 105, 346; fishing in, 78, 363, 510, 511; foreign trade in, 352, foreign trade of, 485; furniture in, 319; heating methods in, 319; horticulture in, 363; idealism in, 332; imports and exports of, 352, 485; industrial capital of, 490; industrial depressions in, 356, 492; industrialization of, 483, 489; internal turmoil in, 89, 97, investments, China, 481, 485; joint stock enterprises in, 353; judicial reform in, 106; labor conditions in, 327-329, 357, 492, 493, 501; landowning and tenantry in, 360; learned class in, 77; material changes in, 318; metalwork and carving in, 335; military class in, 74; military reorganization in, 109; military tradition in, 470; missionary activities in, 79; modern tendencies in, 335; mountainous character of, 73; nationalism in, 473, 474; nobility in, 103; opening of, 96; periodicals in, 334; poetry in, 330; political conditions in, 127, 130, 133, 135, 143, 144, 154, 157, 161;

- population problem in, 364, 488, 489; press (the) in, 109, 333, 334; prostitution in, 324, 325, realism in, 332; relative increase in power of, 479, 480; religion in, 337-340; romanticism in, 332; rural coöperative societies in, 327; school attendance in, 319; secondary education in, 320; silk industry in, 362-363; stock-raising in, 363; strikes in, 357; tea cultivation in, 362; tenantry in, 326; territorial adjustments in, 107; territorial nobility in, 74; water communications in, 73; Western influence in, 331; women's activities in, 322-323  
 Japan-Manchukuo Protocol, 503  
 Japanese-American friction, 375, 429; demands (1936), 538  
 Japanese expansion, 478  
 Japanese Far Eastern policy, 515  
 Japanese fishermen, grant to, 409  
 Japanese Foreign Office, declaration, 516  
 Japanese hegemony, 480  
 Japanese imperialism, 478  
 Japanese in Manchuria, 267  
 Japanese interest in Siberian fisheries, 510-511  
 Japanese "Monroe Doctrine," 515, 528, 531, 532  
 Japanese parties, and the capitalists, 492; and the government, 491  
 Japanese policy in North China, 519-521, 527, 531  
 Japanese policy toward Mongolia, 514  
 Japanese railways in Manchukuo, 510  
 Japanese Resident (Korea), 367  
 Japanese smuggling in China, 520-521, 527  
 Japanese trade expansion, 500, 501, 502  
 Japanese Women's University, 322  
 Java, 359  
 Jehol, 40, 61, 462, 510, 525  
 Jesuits, 29, 79  
*Jiji Shimpō*, 333  
*Jiyuto*, 101, 102, 342, 344, 345  
 Joffe, 254, 421, 439  
 Judicial Commissioner of the Metropolitan Province (China), 193  
 Jung Lu, Viceroy, 148  
  
 Kabuki, 333  
 Kagoshima, 88, 89  
 Kaiping mines, 69  
*Kaishin-to*, 342  
 Kalgan, 513  
 Kamakura, 335  
 Kamchatka, 72, 78, 414  
 Kanegafuchi Spinning Company, 329  
 K'ang Yu-wei, 147, 148, 192, 201, 391  
 Kansu, 20  
 Kaoliang, 155, 371  
 Kaomi, 379  
 Kaomi-Yih sien road, 188  
 Kappel, General, 417  
 Karakhan, 421  
 Kato, Admiral, 350  
 Katsura, Count, 346, 347, 385  
 Kearny, Commodore, 42, 43  
 Kellogg Pact, 424, 460, 474  
 Kemmerer Commission, 271  
*Kensei-bonto*, 345  
*Kensei-kas*, 348, 349  
*Kensei-to*, 344  
 Kerensky government, 411  
 Khabarovsk, 509  
 Kiangsi province, 20, 200, 219, 268, 522; Inspec General of, 243; Soviet, 522  
 Kiangsu (China), 20, 200, 235, 247  
 Kianghwa, 116  
 Kiaochow Bay, 138, 377, 383, 398, 400, 404, 439, 443  
 Kiaochow-Tsinan railway, 398  
 Kido, 94, 97, 98, 100, 102  
 Kim Ok-kuin, 123, 126  
 Kyoto, 82, see Kyoto  
 Kirin-Changchun railway, 383  
 Kirin province (Manchuria), 155  
 Kiukiang, British concession at, 447  
 Kiyung, 46  
 Kiyouri, Viscount, 350  
 Knight, Rear-Admiral, 411  
 Knox, Secretary, 183, 184, 185, 373  
*Kojiki*, 331  
*Kokumin-dome*, 497  
*Kokumin-to*, 347, 348, 349  
 Kolchak, Admiral, 415  
 Komura, Viscount, 170, 182; treaty, 183, 372  
 Korea, 3, 49, 73, 75, 97, 98, 375, 384, 407, 409, 418, 426, 427, 466, 467, causes of war in, 129; China supports attack on Japanese by, 124; Chinese and Japanese intrigue in, 124; Chinese position in, 117, Chinese responsibility for war, 129; early Chinese contacts, 114, economic life, 120; factional divisions, 119; family basis of society, 120; fear of Russia, 127; fleet, 115; French attempt to enter, 115; Governor-General of, 349, 358, 359, 366; intervention of Three Powers, 132; Japan supports party of progress, 122; Japanese ascendancy, 165; Japanese economic interest, 127; Japanese occupation, 131; Japanese supremacy, 166; Japanese trade predominance, 368; King of, 117, 165, 168; Kingdom of, 114, 117; maritime customs, 121; political system, 368; privileged classes, 119; Progressives win control, 127 "Provisional Government," 369, Queen of, 165; rebellion, 125; revolt of (1919), 369; Russian interest in, 124, 156; Straits of, 167; subjugation of, 114; territorial losses, 132; Tong-haks, 125; treaties concerning, 117, 118  
 Korean expedition, 97

- Nanking incident (1927), 448  
 Nankow Pass, 250  
 Napier, Lord, 36-39  
 Nara, 79, 335  
 National Assembly (China), 196, 198, 208  
 National Bankers' Association (China), 285  
 National Congress, *Kuo Min Tang*, 528, 529  
 National Deliberative Assembly (Japan), 100  
 National government, 265, 266, 271, 522, 524, 525  
 National Parliament (China), 195  
     National People's Convention, 265, 449  
     National People's Party, 253  
     National Popular Education Association (China), 302  
 National Salvation Fund (China), 385  
 Nationalism, as principle of the *Kuo Min Tang*, 256; in China and Japan, 473, 474, 486  
 Nationalist government, 456  
 Nationalist Party (China), 264; Finance Ministry, 270  
 Naval limitation agreements, 494, 495, 499, 532, 533  
 Naval ratio, 433, 434, 479, 533  
 Neo-Buddhism, 310  
 Nerchansk treaty, 28  
 Netherlands India, 501  
 Netherlands, The, 483, 537  
 Netsuké, 335  
 New Life Movement, 523  
*New Tide*, 300  
 New Youth, 300  
 New Zealand, 434  
 Nichirin sect, 338  
 Nicolaievsk, 407, 414, 416, 417, 418  
*Nihonji*, 331  
 Nikko, 79  
 Nine Powers Customs Treaty, 304, 434, 436, 437, 438, 439, 445  
 Nine Powers Treaty, 450-451, 474, 516  
 Nine Prostrations (Kowtow), 30  
 Ningo Commercial Bank, 285  
 Ningpo, 41, 42, 45  
 Nishihara loans, 454  
 Nishi-Rosen convention, 166  
*No* performances, 333  
 Non-recognition applied to Manchukuo, 461, 463, 507  
 Northern coalition, 263, 473  
 "Northern expedition," 260-261  
 Northern militarists, 266  
 Northern Party (China), 147  
  
 Oi, General, 417  
 Oil Monopoly Bureau, 505, 506  
 Oil Monopoly (Manchukuo), 505, 506, 507  
 Okada, Premier, Admiral, 498  
 Okhotsk, Sea of, 405, 406, 426, 509  
 Okubo, 97, 102  
 Okuma, Count, 96, 101, 107, 342, 344, 345, 348, 349, 379, 385, 491  
 Old Buddha (Tzu Hsi), 62, 147, 148, 192  
 Omsk, All-Siberian government at, 414  
 Open Door, principle of, 42, 43, 144, 160, 183, 185, 370, 373, 386, 388, 429, 431, 436, 437, 439, 480, 504, 505, 506, 520  
 Opium, 34-36, 42, 48  
 Organic Law of National Government (China), 265; (Manchukuo), 461, 502  
 Oriental despotism, 165  
 "Oriental general election," 123  
 Oriental state, 162  
 Osaka *Asahi Shimbun*, 333, 351  
 Osaka compromise, 100  
 Osaka *Mainichi Shimbun*, 333  
 "Outer barbarians," 70  
 Outer Mongolia, 254, 420, 422, 423, 511, 513, 514, 515, 530  
 Outer Mongolia, government of, 224, 387, 427, 511, 512  
 Overlach, 174  
  
 Pacific Coast, Japanese on, 375  
 Pacific Ocean, 28, 47, 49, 54, 82, 378, 395, 400, 407, 418, 426, 428, 430, 433, 466  
 Pakhoi, 538  
 Palace eunuchs (China), 62  
 Palace government (China), 19  
 Palmerston, Lord, 36, 41  
 Panama Canal Zone, 433  
 Panchiang, 513  
 Pariah class (Japan), 326  
 Paris Conference, 302, 356, 368; Chinese delegation to, 399, 400, 402; Japanese claims at, 432, 440  
 Parker, specimen proclamation from, 24  
 Parkes, Sir Harry, 89  
 Peace Preservation Society (China), 225  
 "Peace Regulations," 357  
 "Peace Talkers," 8, 10  
 Peers (Japan), 104  
 Pei-ho, 14, 41  
 Peip'ing, 264, 538  
 Peip'ing-Tientsin region, 518, 530  
 Peiyang University, 297  
 Peking, 6, 13, 17, 20, 22, 23, 25, 26, 28, 29, 30, 34, 35, 40-54, 62, 264; American minister at, 390, 396, 402; American representative at, 52, 130; decline of English influence at, 136, 160, 163, 176, 230, 245, 376, 380, 385, 389; Russian ascendancy at, 135; Russian envoy to, 407, 427, 433, 439, 466  
 Peking-Hankow railway, 181  
 Peking-Kalgan road, 188

- Peking-Mukden railway, 169, 181, 200, 207, 245, 506, 529  
 Peking University, 295, 298, 302, 304  
 People's Convention, 252, 529  
 People's Volunteer Corps, 251  
 "Perfect Peace" dynasty (China), 62  
 Permanent Constitution (China), 220, 231  
 Permanent Court, 446  
 Perm-Ekaterinburg-Tiumen Railroad, 408  
 Perry, Commodore, 72, 77, 82, 83; treaty with Japan, 85, 87  
 Persia, 34, 466  
 Peru, 55, 56  
 Pescadores, 28, 124, 132, 426  
 Peter the Great, 407  
 Philippines, 28, 30, 142, 293, 315, 359, 428, 429, 433, 434, 466, 467, 482, 483, 485, 501, 502, 534; and Far Eastern politics, 535; Commonwealth of the, 534; economic conditions in, 535, 536; independence of, 534; Japanese interest in, 536-537; trade of, 534, 535  
 "Picture brides," 376  
 Pogranichnaya, 509  
 "Police Box" system, 375  
 Polish dissenters, 408  
 Political Council (China), 222  
 Pope, 80  
 Port Arthur, 139, 145, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 170, 383  
 Port Hamilton, 124  
 Port Lazareff, 124, 127  
 Porto Rico, 3  
 Portsmouth, 170, 182, 440; treaty of, 171, 409, 480, 510  
 Ports, treaty (China), 274  
 Portugal, 30, 55, 56, 432  
 Portuguese, 28, 30, 79, 80  
 Possiet Bay, 407  
 Posting hongts, Chinese, 442  
 Post Office (China), 443  
 Pottinger, Sir H., 42  
 Prefect, 21, 23, 24  
 Prefectural Governors, Assembly of (Japan), 100  
 Prefectures (China), 17  
 Pre-Restoration program (Japan), 127, 469  
 Primorsk, 161  
 "Principles of the Constitution" (China), 195  
 Privy Council (Japan), 103, 104, 344; (China), 196  
 Progressive Party (Japan), 101, 102, 342, 345  
 Progressives (Korea), 122, 123  
 Protestant missionaries (China), 44, 63, 150, 312  
 Provincial Councils, 265  
 Provincial officials (China), 20, 21  
 Provincial system (China), 20-23, 234  
 Provisional Chief Executive (China), 247  
 Prussia, 57, 102  
 Prussian constitution, 102, 103  
 Pukow, 186  
 Punishments, Board of (China), 19  
 Putiatin, Count, 48, 407  
 Pu-yi, Henry, Regent, 461; Emperor, 502  
 Radical group (Japan), 99, 102  
 Railway construction (China), 270, 455  
 Railways, Sino-Japanese, 455  
 Rajchman, 517  
 Rebellion (Satsuma) (Japan), 109, 111; (T'ai P'ing), 62; significance of, 63; effects of, 64, 65, 66, 199; (Tokugawa), 92  
 "Record of Ancient Matters," 331  
 Red Army, 248, 415, 524  
 Red Government, 415  
 Red River, 60  
 Reed, Minister, 47  
 Regent (Korea), 120, 121  
 Reinsch, Dr. Paul S., 378  
 Religion of the Lord of Heaven (China), 30  
 Remer, Professor, 481  
 Renaissance, the (New Tide), 300  
 Reorganization Committee (China), 248  
 Reorganization Loan Agreement, 218, 235  
 Reorganizationist group, 267  
 "Republican Army," 210  
 Republican Educational Program, 306  
 Republican Government (China), 210  
 Resident-General (Korea), 367  
 Restoration (Japan), 90, 96, 98, 101, 102, 103, 107, 317, 326, 331, 335, 338, 360  
 Revolutionists (Russia), 408  
 Ricci, 29  
 Richardson incident, 88  
 "Rights Recovery Movement" (China), 204, 305, 475  
*Rikken Kaishin-to*, 101  
*Rikken Seiyu-kai*, 345  
 Roberts, Issachar, 62  
 Robinson, Sir George B., 39  
 Rohan, 332  
 Roman Catholic Church, 312, 338, 340; missions, 29, 30, 47; missionaries, 60; priests, 150; seminaries, 296  
 Roosevelt, Franklin D., administration, naval policies of, 533  
 Roosevelt, Nicholas, 483  
 Roosevelt, President Theodore, 160, 170, 378, 427, 429, 480  
 Root Resolution, 435, 436  
 Root-Takahira notes, 371  
 Roy, M. N., 263  
 Rural Finance Relief Bureau (China), 527  
 Russell, Bertrand, 302

- Russia, 28, 47, 52, 58, 59, 65, 72, 118, 127, 133, 135, 144, 146, 154, 155, 167, 169, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 367, 373, 375, 380, 388, 392, 395, 398, 402, 404, 408, 409, 410, 412, 413, 417, 424, 427, 429, 431, 432, 433, 477, 480; accord with China, 422; advance opposed by England, 163; and recognition of Manchukuo, 506; British differences with, 163; convention, 371; court conflict, 168; customs union, 156; defeat, 170; early advance, 406; eliminated from Manchuria, 507; Empire, 138, 156, 158, 405, 406, 409; expansion, 114, 132, 133; Far East, 416; fleet, 85; gains (China), 49, 51; in Europe, 406; interest, 83, 184; influence, 250; Japan and, 418; Japanese give way to, 165; law, 137; leadership, 250; leased territory, 159; Liaotung, 409; military power of, 508, 509; minister, 47, 48; Orthodox Church, 340; peasant, 409; policy (1896-99), 156; Port Arthur acquired, 139; proposes non-aggression pact, 508; revolution, 330, 410, 418, Siberian relationship, 417; Soviet representatives, 304; Treaty of 1916, 387
- Russian advisers, 254, 260, 261
- Russian Five Year Plans, in Siberia, 508, 509
- Russian investments (China), 481
- Russian-Japanese frontier questions, 508, 514
- Russian-Mongolian Pact of Mutual Assistance, 515
- Russian orientation of *Kuo Min Tang*, 260
- Russian railways in Far East, 509
- Russian rights in China, 419, 477
- Russian treaty (Japan), 85
- Russo-Asiatic Bank, 419
- Russo-Chinese alliance, 136
- Russo-Chinese Bank, 137, 139, 158
- Russo-Chinese boundary, 407
- Russo-French diplomacy, 163
- Russo-French loans, 170
- Russo-Japanese Convention (1925), 418
- Russo-Japanese fisheries dispute, 510, 511
- Russo-Japanese friction, 506
- Russo-Japanese War, 182, 189, 242, 305, 332, 354, 409, 479
- Sacred Ancestors, 192
- Saghalin, 72, 73, 83, 107, 170, 407, 409, 416, 417, 418, 426, 427
- Saigo, 94, 98, 99, 100
- St. John's University (Shanghai), 296, 298
- St. Petersburg, 54, 136, 407, 409, 410
- Saionji, Prince, 345, 346, 347, 349, 350, 492, 496
- Saito, government, 464; Admiral, 497, 498
- Salisbury, Lord, 364
- Salt Comptroller, 21
- Salt Gabelle, 152, 179, 187, 216, 461
- Salvadore, El, recognizes Manchukuo, 506
- Salvation Army, 339
- Samisen, 333
- Samurai, 77, 78, 79, 81, 95, 98, 110, 327, 332, 360, 470
- San Francisco, 68; School Board, 375
- Sanmen Bay, 139
- Sanyo*, 93
- Satcho-Hito combination, 93
- Satsuma, 88; Prince of, 88, 90, 93, 94, 98; ware, 120; clan, 342-343, 493; rebellion, 109, 111
- Scott-Mouravieff agreement, 142, 163
- Sea of Japan, 124
- "Security Merchants" (China), 31, 32
- Seeckt, General von, 517
- Seiyu Club, 347, 348
- Seiyu-honto, 350
- Seiyu-kai, 345, 346, 347, 348, 349, 350, 463, 491, 496, 497
- Semenov, Ataman, 415
- Seoul, 117, 121, 123, 124, 127, 154, 165; Chinese resident at, 193, 368, 372
- Seward, Secretary of State, 428
- Seymour, Admiral, 151
- Shakce-Shameen massacre, 260
- Shanghai, 13, 42, 45, 49, 63, 65, 67, 69, 245, 262, 369, 477, 478, 538
- Shanghai affair (1932), 460
- Shanghai Child Labor Commission, 292
- Shanghai-Hangchow-Ningpo railway, 204
- Shanghai incident (1925), 260, 262
- Shanghai-Nanking railway, 181, 186
- Shang Ti Hui, 62
- Shanhaikuan-Mukden railway, 245
- Shanhaikwan, 161
- Shansi, 20, 142, 251, 519, 524
- Shantung, 13, 20, 138, 139, 142, 150, 180, 186, 200, 206, 378, 398, 400, 402, 403, 417, 519; German action in, 182; German contracts in, 188; Governor of, 193; German rights in, 387, 388; German position in, 397, 398; Japanese interests in, 379-380, Japanese intervention in, 264; treaty of, 383; railway rights in, 427, 440, 441
- Shasi, 132
- Sheng Hsuan-huai, 205, 207
- Shensi, 524
- Shidehara, Baron, 436, 452, 463
- Shimoda, 85
- Shimonoseki, 89, 115, 131, 132; treaty, 133, 136, 154, 160, 479
- Shin sect (Japan), 338
- Shinto, 81, 337, 468
- Shintoism, 77, 337, 338
- Shogun, 75, 76, 80, 87, 88, 90, 92, 99, 111, 468
- Shogunate, 76, 81, 87-89; end of, 90, 128, 468
- Showa-kai*, 497
- Shoyo, 332
- Shufeldt, Commodore, 118 (note)
- Siam, 5, 27, 141, 466, 467, 485, 533

- Siberia, 154, 167, 170, 363, 369, 394, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 414, 415, 416, 424, 426, 430, 433, 434, 515; American troops withdrawn, 418, 419; fisheries, 510  
 Siberian frontier, 504, 514  
 Siems-Carey Company, 188  
 Singapore, 201, 359, 434  
 Sinkiang, 3  
 Sino-Japanese relations, 518; War, 72, 129, 135, 146, 343, 438  
 Sino-Russian convention, 224  
 Six Power Group, 186, 216  
 "Sleeping Dragon," 70  
 "Society of Harmonious Fists" (Boxers), 150  
 Soong, T. V., 270, 529  
*Sosai*, 93  
 Soseki Natsume, 332  
 South America, Japanese trade with, 501  
 South Manchuria, 184, 369, 383, 384, 429  
 South Manchurian railway, 182, 184, 277, 372, 374, 383, 454, 455, 503, 504, 505  
 Soviet area (China), 522  
 Soviet Declaration (1919), 254, 420  
 Soviet government, 418, 420, 509, 510  
 Soviet government (China), 522, 523, 524  
 Soviet Union, 417, 530, 531  
 Spain, 55, 56, 59, 142, 428, 454  
 Spanish activities, 80; treaty, 446, 449  
 Special Parliament, 251  
 "Spheres of Interest," 140, 141, 144, 204  
 "Spring and Autumn Annals," 6  
 "Squeeze," 24, 25, 31, 34, 35, 69, 178, 191  
 Stalin, 515  
 State Council, 250, 265  
 Stimson Doctrine, 460, 461, 463, 476, 506  
 Straight, Willard, 193  
 Suiyuan, 519  
 Sumatra, 359  
 Sumitomo Company, 490, 492  
 Summer Palace, 147, 148  
 "Summer Revolution" (China), 221  
 Sung Chia-jen, 219  
 Sung-kiang, district of, 245  
 Sun Yat-sen, 146, 147, 202, 209, 210, 241, 244, 245, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 269, 270, 396, 397, 471  
 Sunyatsenism, 471  
 Super-Tuchuns, 244  
 Supreme War Council, Japan, 494  
*Surprise*, the, 116  
 Suzuki, Mr. Bunji, 357  
 Swatow, 538  
 Szechuan province, 4, 20, 141, 190, 524; Inspector-General of, 242  
 Taft, President, 187, 480  
 Taikwa reform, 74  
 T'ai P'ing, 62-66, 148, 199  
 Taiwunkun (Korea), 120  
 Takahashi, Viscount, 350, 497, 498  
 Tanaka, 452, 456  
 T'ang Chi-yao, 249, 252  
 Tangu armistice agreement, 462, 518, 520, 529  
 T'ang Shao-yi, 208, 215, 217, 230  
 Tao (Way), 16  
 Tao (Circuit), 17  
 Taoism, 16, 125, 308, 309, 313  
 Taoist temple, 16  
 Tao Kuang, 61  
*Tao-tai*, 21, 24  
 Tariff autonomy, 448-449  
 Tariff conference (China), 444  
 Tariff revision (China), 448, 450, 471; (Japan), 471  
 Tariff schedules, revision of (China), 48  
 Taxation and Finance (China), 24  
 "Tea and Rhubarb," 33  
 Temple of Heaven, 220, 231  
 Ten Points (China), 436  
 Terauchi, Viscount, 367  
 "Thousand Character Classic," 6  
 Three Eastern (Manchurian) provinces, 424, 455, 456, 461  
 Three-Point Program, Hirota, 528, 531  
 Three Powers, 133, 135, 157  
 Three Principles of the People (San Min Chu I), 256-259  
 Tibet, 3, 224, 392  
 Tien Shan Mountains, 4  
 Tientsin, 13, 14, 22, 41; treaty, 48, 54, 56; massacre, 57, 62, 63, 69, 118; Viceroy, 121; convention, 123, 148, 161, 169, 186, 392, 393; German concession at, 401  
 Tientsin-Pukow railway project, 186, 235  
 Tanghai, 41  
 Tobolsk, 406  
 Tokugawa, 75, 76, 77, 80, 86, 88, 94, 331, 468; supremacy of, 78; decline in power of, 81; rebellion, 92  
 Tokyo, 98, 101, 107, 368, 372, 397, 426, 532; University, 321; papers in, 334; Russian ambassador to, 388  
 Tomsk, 405  
 Tong-haks, 125  
 Tongking, 59, 60, 70, 123, 130, 139, 141  
 Tongshan railway, 69  
 Tosa, 90, 93, 94  
 Toson, 331  
 Trans-Baikalia, 416  
 Trans-Siberian railway, 137, 138, 156, 158, 408, 417, 509  
 Trans-Ural railway, 408  
 Treaty revision (China), 441  
 Tributary Princes, 53  
 "Trimeter Classic," 6



- Trotsky, 411  
 Tsai Ao, 236  
 Ts'ao Kun, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 361  
 Tsêng-Alexieff Convention, 159, 160  
 Tsêng Kuo-fan, 62, 63, 64  
 Tsinanfu affair, 455  
 Tsinghua College, 298  
 Tsingtao, 138, 377, 379, 380, 389, 392, 398, 440  
 Tsingtao-Tsinan railway, 440  
 Tsingtao-Tsinanfu railway, 180, 379  
 Tso Tsung-tang, 62  
*Tsungli Yamen*, 19, 53, 56, 58, 61, 136, 138, 150, 152  
 Tsushima, 73, 200  
 Tuan Chi-jui, 215, 230, 233, 236, 238, 239, 242, 250, 252, 258, 259, 390, 391, 393, 396  
 Tuchuns, 237, 238, 392, 393  
 Tumen River, 166  
 T'ung Chih, 61  
*Tung Meng Hui* (Alliance Society), 202, 218, 253  
 Tungwen College, 68, 297  
 Turkey, 445, 466  
 Turkish Empire, 25  
 Tushikhow, 513  
 Tutuhs, 212, 235  
 Twenty-one Demands, 224  
 Tydings-McDuffie (Philippine Commonwealth) Act, 534, 537  
 Tyler, President, 43, 55, 85  
 Tzu An, 61  
 Tzu Hsi, 61, 62, 195, 197  
 Ufa, 415  
 Ungern, Baron, 421  
 Union for Improvement of Chinese Labor, 288  
 Unionist Party (Japan), 347, 348  
 United States, 3, 40, 42, 43, 47, 55, 59, 66, 73, 97, 107, 117, 129, 131, 136, 142, 144, 146, 151, 160, 161, 168, 173, 175, 176, 183, 184, 193, 200, 313, 355, 359, 362, 367, 368, 371, 372, 373, 377, 379, 384, 387, 388, 391, 392, 394, 395, 396, 400, 406, 409, 410, 412, 414, 415, 417, 418, 426, 428, 430, 431, 432, 433, 434, 437, 463, 467, 477, 532; Burlingame Mission, 54; Hawaii acquired, 428; House, 430; investments (China), 477, 481; Japanese immigration to, 376; occupation of Philippines, 428, 482, 483; policy of, 478-481; reaction to post-1914 Japan, 430; Senate, 430; silver policy, 525, 526; trade (China), 481, 482; trade, Philippines, 534  
 "Union of the Provinces" (China), 237  
 Upper Burma, 58, 59, 117, 430  
 Urga, 224  
 Ural Mountains, 405, 406, 415  
 Urga, 224  
 Ussuri, 48, 49, 59, 407  
 Vancouver, 3  
 Versailles Peace Conference, 241, 390, 393, 395, 397  
 Versailles treaty, 242, 402, 440; Shantung provisions of, 402  
 Viceroys, provincial (China), 19, 20, 23, 24, 31, 36, 38, 39, 46  
 Village headmen (China), 26  
 Village temple (China), 8  
 Vladivostok, 137, 158, 407-411, 413, 510  
 Von Mollendorf, 124  
 Wade, Sir Thomas, 48  
 Wang Ching-wei, 250, 261, 262, 267, 268  
 Wang Chuang-jên, 15  
 Wang family, 15  
 Wang (village), 8  
 Wanh sien incident, 304, 447  
 Wanpaoshan case, 457  
 War Participation Board (China), 396  
 Ward, Frederick, 7, 63, 64  
 Washington, 47, 66, 394, 395, 396, 418, 419  
 Washington Conference, 304, 349, 350, 356, 402, 403, 404, 405, 417, 420, 432, 433, 434, 442, 447, 450, 476, 479, 480, 492, 494, 495, 533  
 Watanabe, General Jotaro, 498  
 Waterways (Siberia-Manchukuo), regulations for use of, 508  
 Webster, Secretary, 300  
*Weekly Review*, 300  
 Wei Hai Wei, 125, 131, 132, 139, 141, 425, 438, 443  
 Weng Tung-ho, 147  
 Wen Li, 300  
 Wen Siang, 61  
 West, and industrialization of Far East, 484; non-intervention by, 478  
 West River, 4, 14  
 Western Hills faction, 259, 262  
 Western intervention, unsuccessful, 476  
 Western power, diminished, 477  
 White Russians, 419  
 Willoughby, W. W., 439  
 Wilson, President, 187, 217, 400, 401, 402, 412  
 Witte, Count, 136, 138, 156, 170, 171, 196  
 Wood-Forbes report, 481  
 World War, Japanese participation in, 224; Chinese participation in, 232, 241, 277, 329, 332, 349, 352, 353, 364, 375, 377, 379, 385, 405, 410, 430, 438  
 Wuchang, 206, 250  
 Wuhan, 263  
 Wu P'ei-fu, General, 243, 244, 245, 249, 252, 258, 259, 261, 263, 396  
 Wusung, 69  
 Wu T'ing-fang, Dr., 206, 208, 238  
 Yakutsk, 406  
 Yalu River, 114, 131, 132, 166, 167, 170

- Yalu timber concession, 169  
 Yamagata, 106, 343, 344, 345, 347, 349; Prince, 128  
 Yamagata-Lobanoff protocol, 165, 166  
 Yamamoto, Admiral, 347, 350, 385, 491  
 Yamen, 7, 13  
 Yangtse lines, 142  
 Yangtse province, 146, 151, 163, 181, 199  
 Yangtse River, 4, 14, 16, 40, 41, 48, 63, 65, 131, 139, 142, 186, 200, 206, 212, 249, 252, 268, 304, 519, 520, 532  
 Yangtse viceroys, 147  
 Yang Tu, 225  
 Yap controversy, 417  
 Yedo, 76, 77, 82, 83, 87, 88  
 Yeh, 46  
 Yellow River, 4, 5, 14, 15, 142, 519, 531, 532  
 Yellow Sea, 426  
 Yen, Dr. W. W., 403  
 Yen Hsi-shan, Governor, 263, 266, 267, 275  
 Yen, Y. C. James, 302  
 Yenching, 513  
 Yentai mines, 372  
 Yermak, 406  
 Yezo, 72  
 Yi family (Korea), 120  
 Yi, house of, 118  
 Yingkow, 132, 455  
 Y. M. C. A., 312, 314, 339  
 Yokohama Bay, 72, 83, 85  
 Yokohama Specie Bank, 111, 389  
 Yoshida-shoin, 128, 343  
 Young China, 203, 302  
 Young Men's Buddhist Societies (China), 311  
 Yourin, Ignatius, 421  
 Yüan Shih-k'ai, 20, 121, 124, 148, 192, 193, 197, 207, 208, 210, 211, 214, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 226, 227, 228-236, 308, 380, 381, 382, 385, 386, 387  
 Yuan, governmental, 265  
 Yung Wing, 68  
 Yunnan province, 58, 60, 65, 139, 141, 180, 524, militarists, 251, 258, 259  
 Zemstvo system, 410  
 Zen sect (Japan), 338